The Military Imbalance
Pakistan’s hope is
that, given its fragile state, Washington will restrain India from engaging in military
action against Pakistan that would destabilize the Indo-Pakistani border and
further complicate U.S./NATO operations on Pakistan’s western frontier. But
Islamabad cannot afford to become overconfident. India has a need to react to
the Mumbai attacks, for political as well as national security reasons. If
Pakistan is incapable or unwilling to give in to Indian demands, New Delhi will
act according to its own interests, despite a U.S. appeal for restraint.
The natural
geographic area for Pakistan and India to come to blows in a full-scale war is
in the saddle of land across the northern Indian plain, between the Indus and
Ganges river basins, where Pakistan would be able to concentrate its forces.
But military action against Pakistan after the Mumbai attacks is far more
likely to be limited to Pakistani-occupied Kashmir, involving some combination
of airstrikes, limited artillery exchanges and tactical ground operations.
To some extent,
Indian military action against Pakistan serves Islamabad’s interest in rallying
a deeply wounded and divided Pakistani population around the government.
Nevertheless, an Indian attack also would expose Pakistan’s profound military
disadvantages vis-à-vis its South Asian rival.
Geographically
speaking, India’s vast territory offers considerable strategic depth from which
to conduct a war, and its large population allows it to field an army that far
outnumbers that of Pakistan. Though the lack of terrain barriers along the
Indian-Pakistani border is an issue for both sides, Pakistan’s core in the
Punjab-Sindh heartland of the Indus River Valley deprives Islamabad of the
strategic depth that India enjoys. This is why Pakistan concentrates six of its
nine corps formations in Punjab, including both of its offensive “strike” corps.
Compounding its
underlying geographic weaknesses are the qualitative challenges Pakistan faces
in its military competition with India. Pakistan’s game of catch-up in the
nuclear arms race is ongoing, and the gap is enormous. Its warhead design is still
limited by rudimentary test data, while India is thought to have attempted
tests of more advanced designs in 1998. And with a recent U.S. civilian nuclear
deal, India can now secure a foreign supply of nuclear fuel for civilian use,
thereby expanding the portion of domestic uranium resources and enrichment
capability available for military purposes.
Indian delivery
systems are also more advanced. Pakistan has cooperated closely with China and
North Korea in nuclear weapon design and delivery system development, but
India’s missile program is far more advanced than Pakistan’s. With two domestic
satellite launch vehicles already in service, India’s knowledge of rocketry is
far ahead of Pakistan’s, which relies largely on expanding Scud technology. And
though both countries are also working on cruise missiles, India has already
fielded the supersonic BrahMos cruise missile,
developed in cooperation with Russia (though it is not clear whether India’s
nuclear warheads are compact enough to fit into one).
With mobile
land-based ballistic missiles and limited quantities of delivery systems on
either side, India and Pakistan are each thought to have the capacity for a
second, or retaliatory, strike. This, along with fairly dense populations on
both sides of the border, makes nuclear conflict especially unattractive (in
addition to the obvious detractions). Still, nuclear weapons capability is yet
another area where Pakistan’s disadvantage is real and significant, further
absorbing Islamabad’s resources and military capability.
India’s recent
military cooperation with Russia has stretched the qualitative lead even
further. Specifically:
India has fielded the
most modern Russian main battle tank, the T-90, and has even begun to build the
tanks under license. While Pakistan fields a significant number of older but
still reasonably modern and capable Russian T-80s, it is qualitatively
outmatched in terms of tanks.
India’s armored
formations also include more heavily armed armored fighting vehicles than those
of Pakistan. (However, Pakistan fields a large number of U.S. BGM-71 TOW
anti-tank missiles, including TOW systems aboard AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters,
which give it an anti-armor capability that cannot be ignored.) The Indian
formations are provided additional support by heavier and newer rocket
artillery, including the Russian heavy 300 mm BM-30 “Smerch”
system.
The Indian air force
has begun to field the Russian Su-30MKI “Flanker,” one of the most modern jet
fighters in the world, and has more on the way. In international exercises with
the United States in Nevada known as “Red Flag,” India’s Su-30s and their
pilots have been regarded as increasingly professional and capable over the
years. Pakistan, meanwhile, has struggled to secure more modern F-16s from the
United States in return for its counterterrorism cooperation, but even the
latest F-16 is outmatched by a competently operated Su-30.
Already overwhelmed
by a jihadist insurgency within its own borders, Pakistan is in no way fit to
fight a full-scale war with India. The Pakistani military simply lacks the resources
for internal security missions and border protection in rough, mountainous
terrain in both Kashmir to the east, and along the Afghan border to the west.
With more attention now being placed on the Indian threat, the jihadist
strongholds in Pakistan’s northwest have more freedom to maneuver in their own
operations, with Pakistani Taliban leaders even volunteering their services to
the Pakistani military to fight the Indians.
Exacerbating matters
is the fact that the Pakistani military, the primary instrument of the state,
is in internal disarray. With military threats from India, pressure from the
United States, rogue ISI operatives, civil-military infighting and a battle
against jihadists whose main objective is to break the morale of Pakistan’s armed
forces, command and control within the Pakistani military-intelligence
establishment are breaking down.
Ethnically,
religiously and territorially divided, Pakistan began as a nation in crisis. It
was not until the military intervened in the early days of parliamentary
democracy and established itself as the guarantor of the state’s stability that
Pakistan was able to stand on its own feet. Given the current state of the
military and the mounting stresses on the institution, Pakistan is showing
serious signs of becoming a failed state.
Pakistan historically
has been an economically weak, mismanaged and corrupt state. The Pakistani
military elite, deeply entrenched in the economy, holds much of the country’s
wealth as well as a number of key assets in the corporate and real estate
sectors. The agricultural industry remains the country’s economic backbone,
employing some 44 percent of the population, yet accounting for only 21 percent
of Pakistan’s gross domestic product (GDP). The remainder of the GDP comes from
services (53 percent) and industry (27 percent).
Pakistan’s most
fundamental economic problem is that it has very few natural resources to tap
in the first place. And it is not necessarily a matter of lacking the
resources; security issues in the country’s northwest have long constrained
even basic exploration in much of the country, going back to times that predate
the British colonial experience. In order to industrialize, therefore, Pakistan
has been forced to import whatever materials it needs without first being able
to establish a source of income. The unavoidable results are high debt and a
sustained, massive trade deficit. As of 2008, the country’s national debt was
more than 60 percent of GDP, and the trade deficit about 9.3 percent of GDP.
Even agriculture, the
cash cow of many developed states, is a bit of a no-go for the Pakistanis. The
Indus River Valley might be productive, indeed, Pakistan has leveraged it to
become the 11th-largest producer of wheat, but the country remains a net importer
of foodstuffs largely due to the a burgeoning population of 168 million. Though
Pakistan is the fifth-largest exporter of rice and 14th-largest exporter of
cotton, floods and pest pressure over the past year have hit rice and cotton
production hard, with the growth rate last reported by the agricultural sector
(for fiscal year 2008) at a dismal 1.5 percent.
The bulk of
Pakistan’s exports come from low-value-added products such as textiles and
chemicals, but the relative income from such sources has been declining for
three decades and is somewhat in danger of disappearing altogether. Pakistan
used to enjoy access to the broad Commonwealth market, but starting in 1973,
when the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community (EEC, a predecessor
to the European Union), that market evaporated, forcing Pakistan to compete
internationally on its own merits. And now that textiles are subject to the
full/normal trading rules of the World Trade Organization,
Pakistan lacks much
of a competitive advantage. China, Bangladesh and India can regularly produce
textiles at lower cost. In fact, the only true growth industry in Pakistan is
its near-monopoly on fuel supply to NATO forces in Afghanistan. Aside from
refining, nearly all of Pakistan’s economic sectors face massive challenges at
best, and are flirting with collapse at worst.
The net result is not
only a low level of development (with the notable exception of Karachi, the
center for Pakistan’s international trade, and Lahore, the country’s agricultural
capital), but also a chronic lack of capital to invest in the sorts of
projects, such as infrastructure, education and finance, that could enable
Pakistan to make true economic progress. Pakistan’s only substantial source of
capital comes from abroad, and access to that capital is dependent upon factors
such as currency rates, the global economic situation and the price of oil,
factors that remain firmly beyond Islamabad’s influence.
And the need for new
sources of capital is now greater than ever. In recent years, Pakistan has
witnessed a collapse of its infrastructure, with power outages of up to six
hours a day across the country. The 2008 spikes in energy and food prices
almost bankrupted the state. In the year to date, Pakistan’s food bill has jumped
by 46 percent over 2007 figures, and its oil bill by 56 percent.
Simultaneously, the deteriorating security environment has manifested itself in
major cities in the form of suicide bombings, Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi
have not proved immune, and has done an excellent job of chasing away foreign
and even domestic investors. Foreign direct investment (FDI) per capita in
Pakistan has plunged to a barely noticeable US$32 per year. (By comparison,
sub-Saharan Africa’s per capita FDI is US$50 per year.)
Pakistan is holding
the line only by spending money that it does not have to spare. What social
stability that remains can largely be credited to food and energy subsidies,
which have contributed to an annual inflation rate of more than 25 percent. The
costs of those subsidies, along with ongoing military deployments, have landed
the budget in deficit to the tune of 7.4 percent of GDP, among the world’s
highest. Recent spending has reduced Pakistan’s foreign currency reserves by 75
percent in the course of one year to US$3.45 billion. This is only enough to
cover one month of imports, bringing the country dangerously close to
defaulting on its debts. Though it has seen some respite in the form of sharply
declining oil prices, Pakistan’s ability to finance the debt through bond
issues has effectively ended; during a credit crisis, few investors want to
lend to well-managed countries, much less a badly run country like Pakistan.
The Economic Limits of Geography
What truly sets
Pakistan apart from other countries in terms of economic performance is a
geography that greatly curtails its economic opportunities. Of Pakistan’s
cities, only Karachi remains globally competitive by most measures. Karachi is
the country’s only real port and has easy access to major trade lanes. Moving
north along the Indus Valley, one becomes tightly hemmed in by marshes and
deserts to the east and arid highlands to the west. The result is that Karachi
functions as a city-state unto itself, with the bulk of Pakistan’s population
found much farther upstream, where the Indus Valley widens.
The upper Indus is
where the country’s best infrastructure is located and where any deep,
integrated development might take place. But such development is impossible for
three reasons. First, the region’s high population has required extensive
irrigation, which has drawn down the Indus’ water level, making it unnavigable
by any but the smallest of ships. The upper Indus region is, in effect, cut off
from Karachi except by far more expensive rail or road transport. Second, the
upper Indus’ natural market and trading partner is none other than India.
Indian-Pakistani hostility denies the region the chance for progress. Finally,
what water the Indus does have is not under Pakistan’s control; the headwaters
of not just the Indus but nearly all of its major tributaries lie not in
Pakistan, but in Indian-controlled territory. India is damming up those rivers,
both to generate electricity and to further tilt the balance of power away from
Pakistan.
The remainder of
Pakistan’s population is split off (or perhaps more accurately, sequestered)
into the mountainous region of the North-West Frontier Province and Federally
Administered Tribal Areas, a region that is simply too remote to justify
developing under normal circumstances. With the notable exception of Karachi,
economic development in Pakistan is virtually impossible without the country
somehow getting past its conflict with India.
Thus, the question
must be asked: How is Pakistan able to survive? Economic development has been
nearly impossible since partition from India, and certainly since the United
Kingdom joined the EEC. The answer, put simply, is that Islamabad has been very
creative. What Pakistan has succeeded in doing is leveraging the political and
security aspects of its geography in order to keep its system going. Just as
geography has been Pakistan’s curse, to a great degree it also has become its
lifeline. Pakistan sits at the intersection of many regions, countries and
cultures, including Iran, India, Afghanistan, Shiite Islam, Sunni Islam and
Hinduism. This mix makes ruling Pakistan a major headache on the best of days,
but it also means that powers beyond Pakistan’s immediate frontiers have a
vested interest in seeing Pakistan not fail.
British diplomatic
and economic support has maintained the Pakistani-Indian balance of power. All
manner of Chinese support, including the sharing of nuclear technology, has
strengthened Pakistan against a far superior India. Economic and energy support
from Arabs of the Persian Gulf has lent strength to Pakistan when it seemed
that India would overwhelm it. And support from the United States, which proved
critical in backing the Pakistanis against the Soviet-leaning Indians during
the Cold War, continues today in exchange for Pakistan’s support in the war
against militant Islamism.
Islamabad’s success
in leveraging its geography means that the country has not had to succeed
economically on its merits for decades. Put another way, Pakistan has leveraged
its geopolitical position not only to push for softer security policies from
the United States or India, but also to pay the bills.
This has certainly
been replicated in current times. None other than U.S. Central Command chief
Gen. David Petraeus was reported to have personally intervened with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ensure that Pakistan received a US$7.6
billion loan in November, a loan for which Pakistan certainly did not qualify.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates chipped in another US$2 billion in
credit, while China contributed US$500 million and the Asian Development Bank
provided another US$300 million, all in the past few weeks.
While these funds
certainly will delay Pakistan’s day of reckoning, they are unlikely to prevent
it. Pakistan’s economy is flirting with becoming nonfunctional, and it cannot
operate in the black any more. Doing that would at a minimum require slashing
military and subsidy expenditures, an impossible move for a socially seething
country operating on a war footing (and, incidentally, a move the IMF loan
supposedly will require).
But the real danger
is that the world is shifting away from Pakistan, and with that shift,
Pakistan’s ability to leverage its geography diminishes. The United States
views Pakistan to be as much part of the problem of the Afghan insurgency as it
is part of the solution. Oil prices have dropped by US$100 a barrel in less
than five months, drastically limiting the Gulf Arabs’ ability to dole out
cash. China has many concerns, and fighting Islamist extremism that has leaked
into its own western provinces is something Beijing is now weighing against its
commitment to Pakistan. The result might not prove to be a total cutoff of
funds, but a slackening of support certainly seems to be in the offing. And
without such outside support, Pakistan will have to make it or break it on its
own, something it has never proved capable of doing.
Conclusion: After a period of diplomatic, restraint India is
likely to proceed with unilateral military action against militant targets in
Pakistan. The United States is trying to press Pakistan into concessions to
prevent a flare-up on the Indo-Pakistani border; as we mentioned on 10 Dec.
such a flare-up at a minimum would complicate the Afghan war. Islamabad,
however, can only go so far, which means New Delhi will have to act. It seems
the Indians intend to limit such action to surgical strikes, but the chances
for miscalculations on all sides are high. We will therefore continue to
monitor the situation and post more information as soon it is available.
But while initially we thought Kashmir would be the main target, while many of the militants
hiding out in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir by now have already fled, the Indian armee most likely already is focussing
on other targets, for example they might choose an entrance point near the the Barmer district would involve
mechanized and armored forces that could threaten the core
Karachi-Hyderabad-Islamabad corridor, Pakistan’s only transit corridor that
links the Pakistani heartland of Punjab with the coast:
Case Study Indian Subcontinent Today P.1 of 3: From Geography to Crisis in Indian-Pakistani Relations.
Case Study Indian Subcontinent Today P.2 of 3: Kashmiri Groups Cut Loose.
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