By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
Searching for
the West
In searching for a
theory to explain the nature of the West, we discovered in P.1 that it is itself
a theory. As a political and social concept, or as an ideal-type construct, the
West offers an explanation for difference in the
present through narratives, explicit or implied, of world history.
Geoffrey Barraclough
complains, in articles written in the 1940s and published in 1955 as History in
a Changing World, that the West is not a proper object of historicaI
inquiry because it describes Europe in too limited a manner. It has caused the
history of Europe to be focused only on the history of a few nations in its
western part, and this has resulted in the general neglect of Eastern Europe,
including Russia (10).
Barraclough
especially objects to the rhetorical use of "Western civilization":
During the years since 1945 the clarification of the principles upon which
civilization rests has become one of the major preoccupations of thoughtful
people. Scarcely a day goes by without our reading or hearing of "our
inherited cultural tradition," the "typical values of western
civilization," "the idea of European coherence" - or, more
simply, "our western tradition," "our western values,"
"our western culture." No set of ideas has become more commonplace,
none been more assiduously drummed into our ears,
since the end of the war. (31)
That there exists a
Western "inherited intellectual tradition" is a theory that
originated in nineteenth century historiography; it is based upon an
interpretation of history which "has been shattered by historical
criticism and discarded by historical scholarship" (32). Used as a tool of
contemporary political ideologies, the narrative of the Western tradition is
appealing yet, any historian with a global perspective sees the standard
narrative of the West as a mere reflection of a self-glorying parochialism, one
that ignores facts and the discontinuities of history. The very labels of
"the West" and of "tradition" lead people to "confuse
words with things" (42), whether they are applied to the
ancient civilizations or modern Europe (45). History does not show the
development of "a specifically western European civilization,
differentiating or even separating western Europe as a historic unity from the
Slavonic east" (44); it shows cultural heterogeneity. The "cult"
of a common Western civilization is an ideologically-charged
impediment to present European unity (45). In Barraclough's judgment: "It
is easy to speak of 'western civilization,' but it is extremely difficult to
draw its boundaries, to maintain that this belongs to the west and that this
does not. Or rather, one should perhaps say that it is extremely difficult to
do 50, except on the basis of prejudice" (49).
Writing half a
century later, Norman Davies is likewise an historian of Europe who feels a
particular animus against the idea of the West, especially when it is used as
an organizing principle by historians writing about Europe. He argues in his
magisterial 1996 Europe: A History that "Western civilization" is a
way of constructing an arbitrary and partial definition of Europe which ignores
not only the nations in its east, but parts of its west (such as Ireland) and
north as well, often from ideological motivations:
In modem times, [the
idea of "The West"] has been adopted by a long succession of
political interests who wished to reinforce their identity and to dissociate
themselves from their neighbors. As a result, "Western civilization"
has been given layer upon layer of meanings and connotations that have accrued
over the centuries. (22)
Davies demonstrates
the meaninglessness of the category of the West by listing its contradictory
variants: those countries descended from the Western Roman Empire; Christendom
as opposed to Islam; the intellectual tradition arising in Latin (as opposed to
Orthodox) Christianity; Protestant Europe (as more "modem" than
Catholic); the heritage of the French Enlightenment and Revolution; the
industrial imperialism of the late nineteenth-century Great Powers; the
Germanic ethos of Mitteleuropa; the Anglo -American empire; the Germanic ethos
of the Nazis; the American-led alliance against Communism; and the distinctive
European, as opposed to Anglo-Saxon, attainment of culture (23-5).
"Western civilization" "is essentially an amalgam of intellectual
constructs which were designed to further the interests of their authors. It is
the product of complex exercise in ideology, of countless identity trips, of
sophisticated essays in cultural propaganda. It can be defined by its advocates
in almost any way that they think fit" (25). The only thing all the
variants have in common is that they are expression of a desire by so-called
Westerners to feel superior to others, especially those of "the East"
(25) through a process of identification with an idealized past: "One gets
the distinct impression that everyone in the "West" was a genius, a
philosopher, a pioneer, a democrat or a saint" (28-29).
The similarities
between Barraclough's and Davies' criticisms are instructive, for Barraclough's
forceful and convincing objections to the West, offered in his well-known
History in a Changing World, had evidently no discernable effect upon its
popularity.
There is something
about the West, perhaps that it is a "cult" according to Barraclough,
or the locus of "countless identity trips" according to Davies, that
has made it almost impervious to critique.
The West and Philosophy
As a category used
extensively in philosophical discourse, it would be natural to expect that the
West has been the object of the history of philosophy. Yet this
is has not generally been the case, and Michael
Allen Gillespie's 1999 "Liberal Education and the Idea of the
West" is a rare example of a consideration of the West as a philosophical
category within an historical perspective. According to Gillespie, the West was
first formulated in the late-nineteenth century, when Europeans started to
compare their culture with those in the East within the intellectual contexts
of historicism and the critique of modernity. The West came to replace
Christendom during a time when Europeans were discerning meaning through
historical rather than religious narratives, and it served to dissolve the
older contrast between the ancients and modems into the unity of a total
historical development (8). The advent of the West was essentially connected to
the death of God: "the rise of the idea of the West is concomitant with
the rise of nihilism" (11). Identifying the distinctive contributions of
Nietzsche, Spengler, and Heidegger to idea's development, Gillespie claims that
the West is inseparable from the anticipation of its ending.
Yet contemporary
Americans should not, Gillespie argues, try to "save" the West, for
as a concept it condemns us to viewing everything through the limiting prism of
history.
The culture wars over
West should be abandoned, because "the real problem may not be the
question of our connection to Western civilization, which the great debate
between postmodernism and traditionalism addresses, but the fact that both
sides so readily accept that there is such a thing as the West or Western
civilization" (24). Surprisingly, however, Gillespie treats the postmodern
critics of the West in the same simplistic and reductive manner as did Gress.
Lumping together deconstruction with race, feminist, postcolonial, and
multicultural theories, all under the rubric of "deconstructionist
postmodernism" (15), Gillespie equates them all to relativism,
subjectivism, resentment, and ethical indifference. Although he thinks that the
existence of something called the West is in doubt, Gillespie also seems to
believe that those who criticize Western civilization want to replace it with,
"at best," "an anarchic egalitarianism" (17), and, at
worst, a tyranny camouflaging "a new form of the will to power" (18).
Even given the limits
of Gillespie's hostile characterization of practitioners of contemporary
theory, it is evident that criticizing the West plays a central function in
their work, as Robert JC Young demonstrates in his 1990 White Mythologies:
Writing History and the West. Young describes the goal of deconstruction as
deconstructing '"the concept, the authority, and assumed primacy of, the
category of 'The West'," and the stance of postmodernism as involving
'"the loss of the sense of an absoluteness of any Western account of
History" (19). Marxism, on the other hand, is merely an extension of the
Western, and specifically Hegelian, project of universal domination whereby the
Other is to be subsumed by the Same. Even postcolonialism reproduces this Western
logic through its attraction to the simple opposition of colonizer and
colonized (5).
French theory, Young
suggests, might be understood as an attempt to get out of the Hegelian binary
of the master/slave dialectic, which it identifies with the West as such (8).
Young
however falls into the same habit of
essentializing through binary oppositions that he critiques. As some
commentators have noticed, he does not really challenge the concept of the West
itself, but only the positive way it has been characterized within certain literatures.
Alastair Bonnett, for example, argues that Young fails to deconstruct or even
question the category of the West, but that he rather takes "its form and
nature as pre given and beyond dispute" (6). Martin Lewis and Karen
Wigen, in their The Myth of Continents, conclude that
Young, and the postmodernist theory he speaks for, misrepresent the diversity
of the history of thought and portray the West as uniquely being the agent of
world history, despite their claims to the contrary. While Young repudiates the
totalizing drive of the West, his writing nevertheless employs a totalizing
definition of it, and Lewis and Young argue that,
"far from serving to deconstruct the West, rhetoric of this sort only
reinscribes it as a foundational sociogeographical
category" (103).
What appears to be a
recent exception to this tendency in poststructuralist theory instead only
confirms it. John McCumber, in his 2005 Social Identities article
"Dialogue as Resistance to Western Metaphysics," observes that the
West "can of course mean many things," being "an immense
collection of diverse historical phenomena, ideas, and approaches to life, many
of which contradict one another"; the category "has nothing to do
with geography," and is therefore merely a sign of "semantic
desperation" (197-98).
Despite these
reservations, however, McCumber still believes that "something separated
itself from the rest of the world and turned against it." That something was ''the enterprise of global domination," the
"metaphysical project," we call the West. The West
therefore, as it turns out, is a ''project'' and an
"enterprise," not just a word. The author's initial skepticism about
the West as a category is merely a skepticism about the validity of its
geographical reference. The West does have an essence, according to McCumber,
but it is a philosophical one, which is to think that things have a single
essence. This "hylomorphic concept of
'Being' ," first developed Aristotle, "has exercised unusual power
over the West, power so great that it virtually constitutes the West"
(199).
According to
McCumber, as well as the West's having an essence, one imparted to it by
philosophical activity, it has intentionality, and unethical intentionality at
that: "So I believe that it is possible, after all to define 'The West':
it is metaphysical civilization, the culture which once wrote domination and
oppression into the nature of Being itself, and which has never abandoned that
model of Being for the human realm" (199). Based on this confident
understanding of the nature of the West, McCumber feels empowered to make
sweeping historical claims, the truth of which he obviously regards as
self-evident: "When the West, which I would now like to call 'ousiodic civilization,' began serious encounter [with]
non-western cultures in the fifteenth century, it encountered them as cultures
without form - and so without reason - and so without truth. The Europeans had
nothing to learn from the barbarians, any more than the capitalist needs to
learn from his workers" (206).
The West and Ideology
Thus even postmodernist and poststructuralist theorists in
their critiques of the West assume that what Latour calls the Great Divide
indeed exists, with the West alone on one side and all the Rest on the other.
Although accused by Robert Young of being Eurocentric, Marxism, and its
offshoots such as world-systems analysis, inform the approaches that have
problematized the West more consistently. Lynn Hunt observed in 1985 that ''the only major genre of historical writing today that
poses the question of the West's distinctiveness" is the
"neo-Marxist" world-systems analysis (158-9). The dynamic of
historical change, which others attribute to a unique element in Western
culture, is attributed by Marxists to capitalism. Cultural explanations are the
expressions of mere false consciousness or ideology, because capitalism is a
modern global and globalizing phenomenon, not the unique product of a
distinctively Western civilization.
Antonio Gramsci, in
his Prison Notebooks written between 1929 and 1935, and especially influential
in European Marxism during the 1960s and 1970s, argues that: "every point
on the earth is East and West at the same time," but "because of the
historical content that has become attached to the geographical tenns the expressions East and West have finished up
indicating specific relations between different cultural complexes." The
two terms have become "crystallized" within contemporary thought
"from the point of view of the European cultured classes who, as a result
of their world wide hegemony, have caused them to be accepted everywhere"
(447). Erk Wolf, in his 1982 Europe and the People without History, likewise
contests the meaningfulness of treating the West and other such "reified
categories" as distinct entities (7):
If there are
connections everywhere, why do we persist in turning dynamic, interconnected
phenomena into static, disconnected things? Some of this is owing, perhaps, to
the way we have learned our own history. We have been taught, inside the
classroom and outside of it, that there are exists an
entity called the West, and that one can think of this West as a society and
civilization independent of and in opposition to other societies and
civilizations. Many of us even grew up believing that this West has a genealogy,
according to which ancient Greece begat Rome,Rome
begat Christian Europe, Christian Europe begat the Renaissance, the Renaissance
the Enlightenment, the Enlightenment political democracy and the industrial
revolution. Industry, crossed with democracy, in turn yielded the United
States, embodying the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
(5)
Thomas Patterson's
1997 Inventing Western Civilization is another developed expose of the
ideological underpinnings of "Westem
civilization." Patterson argues that the very concept of civilization is
inherently hierarchical, being dependent upon a
contrast with other uncivilized and inferior cultures, and this regard
particularly critiques Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and
the Remaking of the World Order. For Patterson, the idea of Western
civilization is really an ideology constructed by intellectuals to serve power,
principally the interests of capitalism.
In a similar vein, Silvia
Federici's 1995 Enduring Western Civilization is a collection of articles
examining the politics behind the idea of the West. Many contributors describe
how the West was invented out of the history of European expansion and the
development of global capitalism. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
Europeans became conscious that they played a unique role in bringing about economic,technological and
political revolutions. Revolutionary change fostered a consciousness of
history, and a search for the meaning of social transfonnation.
The history of the changing world became the history of the rise of the West,
and thus the West emerged as a term that both describes and explains the dynamic of history. Yet, while most of the contributors in
Enduring Western Civilization agree that the idea of the West originated in the
nineteenth century, none give exactly the same account
of how and why it did so.
Federici's
introduction begins by referring to Barraclough's critique of the West, and argues that "no more clarity presently exists
concerning the meaning of this concept" than there was when he wrote in
1955 (x). Postmodemism emphasizes the constructed
nature of all meaning, yet it has failed to analyze
the West itself as a construction.
Educational critics
show the exclusionary nature of curricula based on the Western tradition, but
they have also neglected to consider that the tradition itself might be only a
"fiction," mystifying the true nature of global and class conflicts
(xi). The very opposition of contemporary theory to Western culture has only
served to naturalize the idea of Western civilization, ",so
that the concept is now increasingly used as a self
explanatory term, a term of absolute reference, and above all a neutral term."
But as a concept of cultural particularity, the West will always perform as a
cover for the operations of global capitalism, Federici argues. Due to the
spread of the capitalist system during the last five hundred years, it is
impossible to distinguish between Western and other cultures (xii).
"Western civilization" is therefore only a mask, "a recent
ideological invention, dissimulating under a cultural mantle the worldwide
expansion of capitalist relations" (xii). Despite its falsity, the West
has continued to be used because it has always been ''retooled''
by elites, who have given it "exceptional backing" (xiv).
In her own
contribution to the volume, Federici makes an important critique of the
tendency to characterize Western civilization as an inheritance or a legacy.
Such imagery "imparts the transmission of property as the model for
historical development, and, through an act of temporal conquest, enables
'Western Civilization' to appropriate as its own all that is valuable in the
past" (76). An emphasis on the culture, heritage, or tradition of the
West tends to result in the neglect of the cultural contributions of others to
the modern world.
While the Federici
collection of essays is extremely valuable, the political analysis of its
contributors is often reductionist, finding the interests of power sufficient
for explanation.
There is nothing to
know about the tradition of the West except its function as a mask for a system
of domination. Except for Christopher GoGwilt's
contribution, which we will look at later, Federici's volume treats the West as
ifit had a single mythical
content determined by the interests of elites.
Neil Lazarus, in his
2002 "The Fetish of the 'West' in Postcolonial Theory," argues
against theorists such as Stuart Hall who write of the idea of the West as if
it were an actual agent of oppression. This "fetishizes" the West,
because in reality the term is merely an
"ideological category," standing for nothing. It does not correspond
to any real agency, such as a state, and yet it is used by postcolonial
theorists as if it has causal efficacy (44). Although postcolonial writers
intend to critique the West, Lazarus holds that the
result of their approach is that they end up treating one particular
civilization, the Western, and one small group of actors, the Europeans,
as the central agents of history (47). Intended to undermine the operations of
European power, such an understanding of the West only reinforces it, because
it has Western Europeans uniquely "producing"modernity.
The emphasis on the colonizers' will to power results in the "bracketing,
displacement or euphemization of the specific agency
of capitalist social relations in imperialist development" (54). And,
since the West is "the super-agent of domination in the modem world,"
anything that is identified as Western, such as science and reason, also is
considered an instrument of domination to be resisted. The anti- Westernism of
postmodern theory both masks the operation of capital and serves to elevate the
importance of Westerners, even if in the role of oppressors exerting hegemonic
power.
Historicizing the West
Christopher GoGwilt is equally skeptical of the West, calling it a
"rhetorical claim," but nevertheless offering an illuminating and
detailed history of the idea in his 1995 book The Invention of the West: Joseph
Conrad and the Double-mapping of Europe and Empire, and in his chapter in the
Federici collection, "True West: The Changing Idea of the West from the
1880s to the 1920s," an expanded version of that history and published in
the same year. GoGwilt characterizes the West as
"an abbreviated rhetorical claim of coherence for a whole set of
incommensurable ideas" ("True West" 1), a distortion that attempts ''to reconstitute historical discontinuity as the
continuity of 'Western history'" (Invention 3), and '.an imagined identity
that cannot be mapped" invented by Westerners in reaction to anti-colonial
movements (9). GoGwilt wants both the conservatives
and poststructuralists who invoke the West to realize how Western civilization
and Western culture are not only suspect but also recent ideas ("True
West" 37). He argues that they originated during the period of the
well-known sense of crisis at the end of the nineteenth century, often called
the fin-de-siecle, which was not a crisis of the West but a crisis that
produced the West. The West came to constitute the framework for a new cultural
identity for Europeans, formed through the "double-mapping"
of their differences from the East of empire and the East of Europe in Russia
(Invention 1). Positing a double mapping of Europe and empire is essential for
understanding the complexity and depth of the "rhetorical invention"
of the West, which incorporates cultural tradition, history, and the assertion
of political power (16, 26). The assumption that the West is something that is
"coherent, intelligible," closes us off from understanding history
(38). GoGwilt thus states his objective in this way:
"It is to enable a richer, a more diverse, and a more historically
accurate conceptualization of human history, that I argue for dislodging the
paradigm of ' West em Civilization'" (59).
For the purposes of
this study, one of GoGwilt's most interesting
arguments is that the European idea of the West originated in part through the
process of "back formation," by which negative generalizations about
the West by certain thinkers in Russia came to be adopted in the West, but in positive
form. Europeans came to see themselves as constituting a coherent whole called
the West whose rationality and progress were in contrast to
Russian mysticism and backwardness. This is a suggestive but overly simplified
version of the complex inter-relations between Russian and European thought
which led to the emergence of the West, and we will explore these seperatly. GoGwilt's accounts are
limited by his tendency to treat ideas as merely the effects of ideologies, or
as the inventions of ruling elites meant to mask reality.
One field in which
the meaning of the West has received more precise attention has been geography,
both cultural and historical. At least on the face of it, the West seems to
refer to a locatable place, yet, as has been observed already, it is in practice
unmappable. The relation between its idea and geography is analyzed in Martin
W. Lewis and Kiren E. Wigen's 1997 The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Meta
geography, which poses a comprehensive challenge to the prevailing "metageographical concepts" through which the
globe is mapped. As well as the East/W est axis,
these concepts include continents, Eurocentrism, Afrocentrism, nations,
civilizations, and regions. One critique the authors make of all of them is
that they confuse geographical categories with political or cultural ones -
both Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism, for example, assume that the landmasses
called continents correspond to cultural commonalities. Another critique is that that our designations of certain landmasses as
continents are Eurocentric, for they have been developed historically out of
Europeans' perceptions of their relation to others. There is no reason, for
example, that Europe should be considered a continent separate from Asia, or
that Asian culture should name such a diversity of peoples, or that the East
should be used to designate practically anything not Western, including Eastern
Europe.
Lewis and Wigen do
not focus their critique on the constructed nature of all names, and in this
they set themselves against postmodernists, whom they fmd
too willing call any labels whatsoever "essentialist." Instead, the
authors believe that present metageographical
concepts are confused in that they wrongly divide the world into discrete
blocks, wrongly assume that these blocks can be organized into "neat
hierarchies," and wrongly treat geographical space that a uniform
substance that can be simply divided and ordered (11-12). In the place of
current incorrect models, there need to be developed ones that are truer to the
specificities being described, and Lewis and Wigen propose that
''world regions," defined by webs of human interconnection rather
than geological features, are truer to human experience.
The Myth of
Continents presents a compelling case for suspicion of all received metageographical concepts, showing why they were first
developed and how they have been or could be contested by alternative ways
of mapping. The authors thus seek to denaturalize the sense of space which
reinforces mistaken notions of history and geography
and which promotes Eurocentrism. They show how difficult it is to upset the
East/West polarity through their telling critiques the
unquestioned acceptance of the West within apparently oppositional discourses
such as poststructuralism. But in their wide ranging survey
they are not always careful in their own. use of terminology, often using
"European" and "Western" interchangeably. And, while they
criticize the legitimacy of the East/West division, they also criticize the
tendency of "Western theorists," from the ancient Greeks onwards, to
define the East negatively (73). Their historical explanation for the rise of
the notion of a "supra-European West" to replace European Christendom
(49), is limited to the practical need for a term that would include areas of
the European diasporas such as the United States (51). And their characterizations
of the arguments in philosophical works are too-often overly-simplistic.
Lewis and Wigen are at their best when describing the changes that have
occurred within the study of geography as a field of scholarship.
It is another
geographer who has written the work the most extensive study of the history of
the West to date. Alaistair Bonnett, in his 2004 The
Idea of the West: Culture, Politics and History, argues that "from the
late nineteenth century, and particularly from the first two decades of the
twentieth, the West, became a central idea, a ubiquitous category in the
articulation of the modem world" (25). As an idea, it was developed
relatively independently in a number of different
national contexts. Bonnett considers a number of these. including Britain.in
the early twentieth century; the Soviet Union, Japan, Turkey, the spiritual
Asia in the early twentieth century; and capitalist Asia, American
neo-liberalism, and Islamicism recent times.
Presenting a wide-ranging survey of the meanings of the West on a global scale,
his approach is more episodic than comprehensive, as he acknowledges (11). Yet,
within the limits of his considerations, Bonnett provides an impressive bibliography
of the literature on the West.
One of Bonnett's
goals is to demonstrate the creative ways in which the idea of the West has
been employed by non-Western thinkers. He intends to combat the Eurocentric
habit of believing that innovative thought always has a Western origin through
his proposal that, to a large extent, the idea of the West
was invented in the non-West (2). For Bonnett, the West has been a tool
for the definition of national identity employable in many different circwnstances. Although as the result of his work claims of
Western uniqueness will be harder to justify, Bonnett does not believe that the
West is merely a myth or hypothetical construct. He thinks that there has been
a real difference in how Westerners and non- Westerners experience the world,
with the former enjoying a sense of agency in regards to
the future and the latter feeling subjected to outside forces (166).
On the other hand,
while Westerners have used the idea of the West to claim ownership over
modernity and progress, and thus have remained little
interested in the intellectual life of non-Westerners, intellectuals outside
the West have engaged it quite closely (163).
Yet, because he is
committed to establishing the creativity of non-Western intellectuals, Bonnett
is reluctant to use the image of "hybridity" when describing
non-Western discourses about the West. Hybridity to him seems to suggest that
non-Western cultures are derivative, or that the innovations of non-Western
thinkers can be subsumed by a common undertaking defined in the West (65). For
example, Bonnett denies that the writings on the West by the
nineteenth-century Japanese writer Fukuzawa would be an example of cultural
borrowing and hence hybridity: Rather than importing or translating a
ready-made idea of the West, Fukuzawa actively fashioned a certain
representation of the West to suit his own (and, in large measure, his social
class's) particular political ambitions. This process is best understood as a
creative and original intervention in the history of the idea of the West. (70)
But Fukuzawa, writing
in 1875, does not himself make this kind of claim for his work. Instead, he
situates himself within a generation of scholars beholden to two traditions,
one Japanese and the other Western: "We have lived two lives, as it were; we
unite in ourselves two completely different patterns of experience" (3).
Bonnett is so concerned to guard his subject's
autonomy and creativity that he fails to acknowledge Fukuzawa's conscious
participation in a wider intellectual field or his inner struggles with a sense
of doubleness - or even his sense of superiority, for Fukuzawa writes that his
two lives gives him an advantage over one-sided
Westerners. While hybridity is a more apt image for the cultural world of the
non-Western intellectual than Bonnett would allow, it need not imply a
secondary position for that intellectual; perhaps describes a condition of
heightened self-awareness, which Bonnett acknowledges in a different context.
Instead, the point to be made here is that the Western
intellectual should be thought of as culturally hybrid as well, with
debts to other cultures. Perhaps the difference between the two is that, in the
case of the Westerner, those debts have tended to be forgotten. But the way to
combat the claims that all important thought about the West is Western in
origin is not to assert that all origins are conceptually original and
equivalent. 6
A briefer but more
theoretically developed consideration of the meaning of the West is Jan
Ifversen's 2004 conference paper "Who Are the Westerners?". Ifversen
proposes that, while the West as a concept "has played a major role in
forming various configurations of world order" (2-3), it seems to be now
in decline in terms of frequency of use, suggesting that we are perhaps
entering new conceptual terrain. To test this, Ifversen examines uses of the
West in newspapers and journals at the present time. He identifies in them five
"macro-semantic configurations": one "Old West," meaning
the continuity of a particular cultural tradition; another "Old
West," meaning a certain narrative of the stages of history; "the new
West," as equivalent to modernity; "westernization," as the
process of globalization; and the "political West" as the post-war
alliance of We stem Europe and the US (5-7). With the decline of the political
West, noted also earlier by Harries, and with the growing divisions between
Europe and the United States, employment of the West in any of these ways seems
to be in decline, yet the term has been recently given new life by the debate
over Huntington's "clash of civilizations" and by rise of radical
Islam (30). Ifversen finds that, while the concept of the West might be
problematic, it is difficult to do without it, for it serves to demarcate
cultural and political differences in a way that many still find useful (29).
Ifversen's rather
neutral assessment of the West as a functional category is in
contrast to Naoki Sakai's 2005 "The West - A Dialogic Prescription
or Proscription?". Sakai understands the terminology of "the West and
the Rest" to be a ''telling trope of the global
reality," one which explains differences through ''the execution of a
subjective technology." While some might still assume that the West exists
as an autonomous entity with distinct outlines, either in space or as a
tradition, the West is nothing else than a mode of self-fashioning and
self-representation. It is a "mythic construct" that posits "a
putative unity" despite a multiple reality (180). Sakai asks whether or not the function this
myth plays in discourse is an ethical one. Can the two sides of the dichotomy ''the West and the Rest" engage in a kind of
dialogical relationship, through which what is different is no longer thought
to be alien? Sakai answers in the negative (179).
Although "its
sense of coherence is fast evaporating," the West and its distinction from
the Rest still regulate the divisions of academic knowledge. The
humanities, which concern what is Western, are centered on humans as active
knowers. The objects of the humanities are also subjects, engaged in continual
critique and innovation; their consciousness of this engagement is revealed
through narratives of historical development concerning modem "Western
Man." The world-historical project of self overcoming, even if only undertaken by a small group,
is inscribed into the Western subject as such: philosophy, and now theory, is
"a distinguishing mark or even mission of the West" (182).
Anthropology, on the other hand, is centered on humans as passive objects of
study. The objects of anthropology remain merely objects; they possess no
historical consciousness, and do not participate as knowing subjects in the
unfolding of modernity. This division leads to the West's blindness about those
engaged in critical reflection outside the West
and about the majority of people who are not engaged in projects of
transcendence. Rational thought is by definition Western,
and all those who are Western are by definition rational thinkers. The West and
the Rest distinction is indeed at the bottom a racist one, because it
naturalizes and essentializes differences in subject positions that, while
really experienced, stem from differences in their orientation rather than
biology (184).
Part of the problem
with a subject's identification with the West is that there is nothing that actually given the West an identity or coherence. One
individual, for example, might be considered to be
Western in one context and non-Western in another.' Subject positions are
adopted out of the desire for recognition and the desire to position the self
in relation to an other
within specific contexts; those who do identify with the West are
"ahead" in historical time from those who do not (185). Given this function,
the trope of the West has been employed in similar ways in different places at
different times. Since, Sakai argues, "there is
no single quality which is adequate to define the identity of the West,"
there is no single sign of membership (189). And yet, although increasingly we
cannot believe in its unity, "curiously, nowhere in the world does the
term 'The West' seem to have lost its universal appeal and immediate
intelligibility"; and "nowhere in the world has it lost the force of
an objective reality." In many places it still functions as a "master
index" of cultural comparison. The question that needs to be asked is:
"how can people in many places in the world
continue to believe in the West despite the glaring evidence of its
instability, transience, and over-determination?" (189-90) - a question
Bonnett also poses. Sakai's answer is that the West speaks to people's desire
to ground difference in natural properties (190). Because the West is an index
of identity, the anxiety caused by the instability of its meaning results
in even-greater attempts to naturalize it.
Despite the problems
with the dichotomy of the West and the Rest, including the fact there are some
who fit on neither side, the end of the West as a
trope is not near. Although seemingly threatened by globalization, the presumed
unity of the West will not be challenged any more that the sense of racial
identity is challenged by facts of science and history (192). While Sakai
focuses narrowly on a certain set of meanings of the West, especially within
the academy, he successfully draws attention to the important role that the
West as a trope has played in modem subjectivity. He, more than any other
critical Occidentalist, analyzes the affective power
of the West, which he links to its function in identity formation.
Theorizing the West Conclusion
Lewis and Wigen
observe that, under the term "Asia," European thinkers have subsumed
a tremendous diversity of geographies and cultures, and
then have accused Asia itself of being incoherent (37). The same could be said
about the West. In a passage previously cited, Serge Latouche writes that the
West cannot be equated with any defined geography, religion, philosophy, race,
economy, or culture, but instead: there emerges a face unlike any known to us
and which must infallibly astonish or even frighten us: a very monster,
half-mechanic, half-organic, which fits none of our categories for the
definition of species. The West appears to us a living
machine whose components are human beings, who give it its life and
strength but from whom it is autonomous: it moves through time and space at the
dictates of its own fancy. (26)
But really it is not
an entity called "the West" that is monstrous and protean, but rather
the category. The West's mysterious reach and strength, noted by the authors
discussed above, are evidence of the fundamental role the category has played
in conceptualizing space and time all through the contemporary world, yet it
plays this role as something indefinable. To cite Barraclough again: "It
is easy to speak of 'western civilization,' but it is extremely difficult to
draw its boundaries, to maintain that this belongs to the west and that this
does not."
Researchers engaged
in what we could call critical Occidentalism have attempted to define the
notional West in order to explain its peculiar
properties. They have characterized the West as: a linguistic object (a
discourse, a narrative, a trope, or a name); an object of belief (an ideology,
or a political myth); a construction (an invention or a fiction); a type of
thought (an idea or a concept); or a type of image (a social imaginary, an
imagined community, or an imaginary geography). All of
these correctly describe ways in which the West has been used, but none
sufficiently explains what the West is in all its aspects, either in the range
of its meanings or in the complexity of its history. While some would conclude
that the uses of the West are so contradictory that the term needs to be jettisoned simply, we would argue that any category that
informs so much of political and historical discourse, and that functions so
clearly as a major keyword in the contemporary era, is worthy of investigation
despite being so "monstrous." Can such an unsystematic
entity as the West become available for systematic analysis? Is there a
way to turn something so problematical into a
problematic?
Bur what kind of category is the West, and when and why
did it become fundamental for intellectual discourse?
It seems most
comprehensive and productive to think of it is as a concept, but understood in a specific way. Because the West,
in all the forms identified in the literature review, is to be distinguished
from the ordinary uses of the west as a direction and relative location and the
poetic imagery that traditionally has been derived from these uses.
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