By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Indira Gandhi And Politics In India

Nehru believed that the murder of Gandhi was part of a “fairly widespread conspiracy” on the part of the Hindu right to seize power; he saw the situation as analogous to that in Europe on the eve of the fascist takeovers. And he believed that the RSS was the power behind this conspiracy. In December 1947, he had already written to the provincial governors:

We have a great deal of evidence to show that the RSS is an organization which is like a private army and that is definitely proceeding on the strictest Nazi lines, even following the technique of organization…I have some knowledge of the way the Nazi movement developed in Germany. It attracted considerable numbers of lower-middle-class young men and women, who are normally not too intelligent and for whom life appears to offer little to attract them, by its superficial trappings and strict discipline.

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, translated as 'National Volunteer Union' or 'National Volunteer Corps' is an Indian right-wing Hindutva volunteer paramilitary organization. It is the progenitor and leader of a large body of Hindutva organizations called the Sangh Parivar (Hindi for "Sangh family"), which has developed a presence in all facets of Indian society and includes the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the ruling political party under Narendra Modi, the prime minister of India. Mohan Bhagwat currently serves as the Sarsanghchalak (lit. 'Chief') of the RSS, with Dattatreya Hosabale serving as the Sarkaryavah, meaning General Secretary.

(We can see here Nehru’s unfortunate tendency to condescend to the average citizen, which gave a great advantage to the RSS organizes, who never made this error.) After Gandhi’s murder, therefore, the RSS was banned, and some 20,000 of its leaders, including Golwalkar, were arrested. (The Hindu Mahasabha, which we now know to have been much more closely linked to the plot against Gandhi, was not treated this way and remained legal.) On his release from prison, Golwalkar tried to convince Nehru to lift the ban, arguing that the RSS was a valuable ally against communism. Eventually, after prolonged negotiation, and the adoption of a written constitution describing its purposes, RSS did win the lifting of the ban in 1949.

During the 1950’s, Nehru’s staunch insistence on state secularism and his watchfulness about the danger from the Hindu right, together with the lack of any issue favoring their rise, gave the organizations of the Hindu right a weak political presence. The Hindu Mahasabha adopted radical positions, including the disenfranchisement of Muslims, which leaders wanted to introduce as a change to the Constitution itself, and the annulment of Partition, by force if necessary. It combined these positions, however, with conservative pro-landowner positions, thus suggesting to many that it was an elitist group out of touch with popular sentiment. The party appeared to have no coherent agenda and exercised little influence. Meanwhile, the RSS worked away, at some remove from politics, organizing as a mass social movement.

In the 1960’s a new political party, the Jana Sangh, came to be closely identified with RSS. It adopted goals, such as a ban on cow slaughter, that had considerable traditional resonance and that began to garner some popularity. The RSS understood its role as that of an ongoing source of energy behind these political developments, in Golwalkar’s words, “the radiating center of all the age-old cherished ideals of our society, just as the indescribable power which radiates through the sun.” The India-China war of 1962 gave Hindu nationalism an agenda against the dominant Congress Party,  it had been to “soft” toward China, and the 1965 war between India and Pakistan helped the RSS to whip up fear and suspicion against Indian Muslims.

lndira Gandhi was thrust into the Premiership, in 1966, through the auspices of the Syndicate, who felt that Nehru' s daughter would be a significant asset in the upcoming elections. During the same period, communal forces in India sought to reassert themselves in the public realm, and were actively working with sympathetic Congress members toward this end. Thus the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council- VHP) was established in 1964 by members of the RSS and other Hindu religious figures in order to promote the Hinduization of public life. Like their allies in the RSS, the VHP leadership believed that the political weakness of Hindus was rooted in their religious and cultural divisions, and that the strength of the community, therefore, could only be found through greater uniformity. This strategy of the VHP represented an effort to remodel Hinduism along the lines of the "Semitic" religions whose strength derived from their greater unity and centralization of authority. One mechanism for promoting greater conformity was the targeting of minorities.

Although such activities were portrayed as cultural, they had political ramifications as well. This could be seen in the basic strategy of strengthening Hindu unity by stigmatizing various 'threats' to the nation, such as Christian proselytizing and Muslim separatism. A division of labor subsequently emerged, with the RSS and VHP taking the lead on religious mobilization, and leaving the more overt political activity to the Jana Sangh. Religious agitations by the former, though, were clearly intended to benefit the latter.

One such effort was the cow protection mobilization of 1966-7. While ostensibly aimed at eliminating the slaughter of a symbol of Hindu identity, this issue had historically been used as a means of stigmatizing Muslims. Due in part, to the fact that Muslims have long been involved in the leather industry, and that some cows are slaughtered by Muslims for religious purposes. Moreover, the limited consumption of beef makes it extremely affordable for poor Muslims.

This particular agitation however was intended to mobilize Hindu sentiments behind the Jana Sangh. The government's response, however, was forceful. After a large demonstration marched on Parliament in November 1966-and sparked a confrontation that left eight people dead-Prime Minister Gandhi dismissed the Home Minister, arrested several activists, and threatened the RSS with administrative action. In doing so, Gandhi demonstrated her steadfastness in the face of communalist assertion, and reinforced her governments commitment to secularism. It also ended the VHP agitation.

The controversy over cow protection, however, highlighted the deep divisions that continued to exist within the Congress party between the left-of center secularists and the more conservative traditionalists. This polarization was exacerbated, moreover, by the economic policies of the 1950's. Nehru's efforts to reform the agricultural sector-particularly his proposed caps on land ownership, and the failed cooperativization program-had alienated large segments of the economic elite. Despite the limited nature of these reforms, they were nonetheless perceived as a revolution from above, and an attack on private enterprise.

These policies helped to coalesce right-wing opposition to the broader program of state-led development. ironically, though, the entrenchment of the one-party system had at the same time undermined the impetus for reform. The emphasis on socio-economic justice, which ad characterized the early reformist period, had given way to the temptations of office, and the Party was increasingly seen among the population as dedicated to the pursuit o! patronage and the spoils of office. By 1967, the Congress party was no longer perceived as an agent of social change, but had, instead, become the 'underwriter of a inequitable status quo.

The national elections held in 1967 were subsequently a disaster for the Congress leadership. Although retaining power at the center, the Congress party lost a large number of seats in the national parliament, the Lok Sabha, and also lost control of several state governments. This reversal reflected the Congress party' s loss of popular support, and a growing disdain for the corruption of its leaders. The elections were also characterized by the defection of rich farmers and the landed elite to various right-wing and regional parties.

The electoral loss of 1967 also affected the internal balance of power within the party. The polarization along a left-right axis bad been in the making for some time, particularly on such issues as economic policy and reform of the agricultural sector. However, it became more pronounced as the progressives moved to support Indira in opposition to the conservative elements of the party.

The right wing had been advocating a greater reliance on private enterprise, and a corresponding de-emphasis on state planning. Consequently, it had supported efforts to reach out to the rich farmers and landowners. The left, on the other band, had sought to re-affirm the emphasis on socio­-economic reform and socialism, which were an essential part of the Nehruvian consensus.

The struggle between these two factions was evident at an All-India Congress meeting in July of that year, when Indira put forward a set of policies that fully associated herself with the left wing of the party.

 Although opposed by conservatives, many of the party bosses-weakened as they were by the 1967 elections-went along with Gandhi' s initiative.

The struggle over the direction of the party continued over the next two years, and came to a head after the death of President Zakir Hussein in May of 1969.The struggle to nominate his successor was significant since it would tip the balance of power to one faction or the other. The President of India, although a largely ceremonial position. has the power to invite one individual or another to form a government. This, it was believed, would shift the balance of power toward one wing of the Congress at the expense of the other.

The conservative elements, backed by the Syndicate, blocked Gandhi' s candidate for the post, and subsequently nominated one of their own. In the following election, the conservative candidate was defeated by a coalition of Indira's supporters, leftist parties, the DMK (a caste based party), and the Muslim league. A candidate who was supportive of Indira (running as an independent) subsequently won the vote. Within this same time period, Indira stripped Morarji Desai, a conservative Congress party minister, of the finance ministry portfolio, and took control of it herself. She then nationalized the banks, eliminated preferential policies for the former princes, and watched as her popularity soared. These actions led to a formal split in the party in November of 1969 and the formation of rival organizations, the Congress (Requisitionists) led by Indira, and the Congress (Organization) which represented the conservative opposition.

Thus Indira's politics and rhetoric during the 1971 elections were defined by an increasingly leftist populism. Since the split with the conservative faction, Indira had come to rule India with a coalition of minority and leftist parties. Her main opposition was a coalition alliance composed of the Congress, the Jana Sangh, and other right wing parties. The latter groups mobilized around the motto: "Indira Hatao!" (Remove Indira!), to which Indira's supporters responded with the campaign theme: "Garibi Hatao" (abolish poverty). By emphasizing the issue of poverty, Indira was able to refocus the 1971 campaign upon the core themes of Congress legitimacy, social­ economic reform, seeularism and socialism. A key issue in the campaign was the abolition of the payments to the former Princes (so-called 'privy purses'), which Indira had tried to eliminate before. Similarly, Indira spoke throughout the campaign of the need to defeat those who opposed her efforts to bring about social change. She also targeted the Jana Sangh for its support of communalism-which was depicted as divisive-and promised the middle classes a strong, stable government.

The Congress (R)'s victory in the 1971 elections was massive. The party had won a clear majority, capturing 352 of 518 seats in the Lok Sabha, and Indira emerged as a dominant force with both a mandate and a political base. Moreover, the forces of conservatism were decisively defeated, and the Nehruvian consensus re-validated.

Indira's standing was further bolstered by the war with Pakistan in 1971-2. Perhaps the most significant conflict between the two countries, the crisis led to the military defeat of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. Gandhi' s determined leadership and ultimate success played welI  for her personally, and helped created the image of Indira as a Durga (Female Deity). More importantly, it translated into tangible electoral benefits, as her party won control of all the regional governments in state assembly elections held the following year. The opposition was unable to portray themselves as either more populist or more patriotic than Gandhi, and, as a result, had no campaign platform. There were several defining features of Indira's tenure during the early 1970's that are worth noting. The first, and most indicative, was a deep sense of discontent among the population.

Despite the electoral gains of 1971, and the war with Pakistan, Indira's leadership rapidly fell into crisis. Much of this derived from the poor economic performance of the state. Despite early economic gains in the 1950's and 60's-and the passage of various anti-poverty programs-industrial development remained stagnant, unemployment was high, and poverty remained pervasive. The economic situation was the product of a variety of factors, including the war with Pakistan, the influx of refugees from Bangladesh, two years of drought and other factors.1

In rural areas, land was still concentrated in the hands of a few, and the inability (or unwillingness) of the Congress party to implement genuine reform left the social structure of rural India largely unchanged.

 Guerilla movements had already emerged in Bengal to take the social revolution into their own hands. In the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, an armed peasant movement in Bengal emerged. Organized by a militant faction I Communist party (the Naxalites), the peasants took land reform into their own hands and seized property, burned records of ownership, and kiIled the landlords.

The expectations among urban laborers (and middle classes) similarly went unfulfilled. These trends were exacerbated by the 1973 economic crisis-sparked by the oil shock of the 1973 Middle East war-which led to higher food prices, inflation and recession. The resulting discontent was manifest in a series of strikes across the country that culminated in a bitter railway strike in 1974.

A second, trend was the centralization of state power and party control. Indira’s defeat of the former party bosses, and the electoral gains of Congress I, significantly shifted the balance of power within the government. Under the new regime, the central leadership appointed the Chief Ministers of the various states who served only so long as they bad the center’s support. The Ibis group of institutions provided Gandhi a great deal of control over the regional governments, and reflected a degree of bureaucratic centralization that bad not existed during Nehru’s tenure. Similarly, within the party, Gandhi sought to undermine the state branches which bad previously been the institutional base of the party bosses. Internal party elections were eliminated, and positions within the party structure at all levels-state, local and national-were filled by appointment from above rather than by election from below.2

The result was a clear weakening of the party as an institution; since the regional organizations were no longer run by local elites, its traditional capacity for dealing with community issues-and mediating inter-group conflict-was significantly diminished. These two trends, moreover, were very much intertwined; diminishing the influence of local networks was crucial in centralizing power within the state.

A third, and related, point was the emergence of a new style of populist politics. The traditional party structure bad long relied upon the local party machinery to interact with regional elites and deliver the popular vote. This reflected both the ability of local party bosses to direct voter preferences-and mobilize their populations-as weIl as to mediate between national demands and community interests. This electoral strategy worked weIl in maintaining Congress hegemony throughout the Nehru period, even if it served as a stumbling block to the social reforms promoted by the center. Indira’s new populist politics, however, was premised upon bypassing the traditional party structure, and reaching out to the population directly. Through mass communication, modem advertising and national campaigns, the Congress I actively nurtured a cult of lndira.

Associated with this style of politics was the Congress Party’s corresponding loss of ideological commitment. Although the debate in 1971 was a serious one-and reflected a major challenge to the Nehruvian consensus-the policies that bad won the election remained unimplemented, and, perhaps, were never intended to be. What this illustrated was an instrumentalist approach to ideology that demonstrated the lack of seriousness with which party platforms were now taken. As elections came to be fought through the mass media, serious programmatic debates were largely replaced with campaign themes, and elections were transformed into populist referendums that hinged on misleadingly rhetorical questions, like whether (people] wished to see poverty removed.

Moreover, this type of mass politics was intimately associated with the decline of the traditional party structure, and neither trend-the diminution of the party, nor the lack of substance of ideology could have occurred had the very nature of politics in India not change during this period.

This new, populist politics [of Indira’s era] turned political ideology-a serious disputation about the social design during the Nehru era-into a mere electoral discourse, use of vacuous slogans not meant to be translated into government policies. [The] shift of the Congress to populist politics quickly set up a new structure of political communication in which Indira Gandhi could appeal directly to the electorate over the heads of the party organizations. The relation between the party and its leader was turned around: instead of the organization carrying her to power, she carried them.

The volatility inherent in this type of mass politics became evident in 1974 with the emergence of the JP movement. This popular revolt was sparked by discontent over an increase in the price of food in both Gujarat and Bihar. This led to widespread civil unrest, rioting and anarchy, which, in turn, sparked a violent backlash by the government. Although initially led by students, opposition parties quickly joined these young activists and sought to broaden the revolt. In the Spring of 1974, Jayaprakash (JP) Narayan, a former socialist leader, came out of retirement to lead the agitation in Bihar, and sought to transform it into a nation-wide movement against government corruption. Touring Northern India, Narayan called for the removal of Congress, and particularly Indira, who was identified as the “fountainhead” of corruption. Many opposition parties on both the right and the left ra1lied behind the so-called JP Movement, and spread it to other areas of the country. Despite the amorphous ideology of the movement, the opposition was united in removing Gandhi, and found that socio-economic concerns were an effective means for mobilizing popular sentiments behind their anti-Congress I attack.

The involvement within the JP movement of the Jana Sangh, the RSS, and the Congress was extremely significant. On the one hand, the participation of these communalist groups was important because their activist networks were national in scope, and they were able to provide an organizational structure to the movement. The RSS and Jana Sangh, in particular, were essential in organizing street protests and popular agitations. RSS activists subsequently became a major force in the movement.

On the other band, these communalist groups saw the IP Movement as an opportunity to portray themselves as within the mainstream of lndian politics. Narayan’s respectability, his ties to Gandhian idealism and his former association with the Socialist party provided an aura of legitimacy which extended to these organizations. Similarly, while the Jana Sangh had fared poorly in national elections-Iargely due to its continued reliance upon upper class and upper caste notables-the JP movement provided an opportunity for them to work with grass roots voters on matters of popular concern.

The influence of the Hindu right upon the JP movement can also be seen in its program of social reform. The socialist planning and industrialization of the Nehru era, and its corresponding program of modernization, was subject to attack and stigmatized as the source of both the corruption and the socio-economic ills of society. Moreover, the JP Movement depicted India as in a state of ‘total crisis,’ which was as much cultural as economic or political. The subsequent call for ‘total revolution’, i.e. a revolution in every sphere of social life and organization- -sat well with the RSS and VHP which had long argued the need for a cultural transformation of society. The dominance of the Hindu right, along with Narayan’s calls for the ‘purification of the democratic process,’ however, struck many, including Indira Gandhi, as fundamentally illiberal. The Movement’s extra-legal tactics also brought into question its commitment to democracy.

The violent response by the government to the strikes, demonstrations ad gheraos (protect’) continued to fuel the tension between the state and its opposition. When, in the Summer of 1975, a decision in the Allahabad High Court declared Indira Gandhi’s 1971 election to the Lok Sabba to be fraudulent, the opposition called for the Prime Minister’s resignation, and announced a nation-wide civil disobedience movement intent on removing her from power. Two weeks later, on June 26, 1975, Indira declared a state of emergency, arrested the opposition leadership, and effectively ended the JP Movement.

The 1975 emergency was declared, and justified, on the basis of preserving the nation. In the course of several speeches and radio broadcasts, Gandhi argued that the stability, security, unity, the fabric and the very survival of the nation were in danger due to national and international threats.

She argued that opposition parties were working to undermine democracy in India, and that the emergency-a contingency allowed for under the Indian constitution-was necessary to preserve the established order. Indira took particular aim at the RSS and the Jana Sangh for their willingness to use violence, and to work outside of the established political institutions, to overturn a democratically-elected government. She also alluded to “foreign influences” which sought to subvert the Indian government in a manner similar to President Allende of Chile, who bad been deposed just two years before. The assumption was that the United States was working to undermine  Gandhi’s position owing to her close ties with the Soviet Union. See Oriana Fallaci, “Indira’s Coup,” New York Review of Books, September 18,1975.

Finally, the Prime Minister justified the imposition of emergency as a necessary pre-requisite for following through on her economic reforms, which, she argued, bad been consistently blocked by the ‘forces of reaction.’ While the Emergency initially brought a degree of stability, it greatly diminished Gandhi’s popular support. Moreover, it was during this period that Congress I’s break with the traditional ideals of the Nehruvian consensus became particularly evident.

The arassent and corruption associated with this era, along with the anti-poor policies that characterized emergency rule damaged the Congress’s credibility as a force of progressive change. Particularly egregious were the so-called family planning and ‘urban beautification programs’ that were overseen by Indira’s son, Sanjay, during the emergency. These programs entailed coerced sterilization and forced relocation of the urban poor, and relied upon the police and state apparatus to carry out these programs.

Both the slum clearances and the compulsory sterilization, moreover, disproportionately affected Muslim and lower caste communities, groups who were traditional constituencies of the Congress party. Sanjay’s close ties with private enterprise, and his illiberal tendencies, also characterized a new trend in the governing elite. Sanjay himself was the beneficiary of a government license and numerous bank loans to set up a car manufacturing facility which never quite got off the ground.3

When elections were finally held in March of 1977, not only did Congress lose, but both Gandhi and Sanjay lost their respective bids for parliament. 104 There was a debate as to why the Prime Minister cal1ed elections at this time; the conventional wisdom is that. Being surrounded by sycophants and loyalists, she was misled about the popular perception of the Emergency, and thought she would actually win the election.

The opposition coalition that won the elections, however, was short-lived. It was composed of many of the same elements of the JP movement, and made the elections of 1977 a referendum on the Emergency. As such, they soundly defeated the Congress. However, the so-called Janata Front coalition quickly fragmented. They bad no unifying ideology-apart from a shared opposition to Indira Gandhi-and no agreement on state policy. This became problematic as tensions in the rural areas turned violent. Many of the rural elites, who bad long backed the right-wing parties, used this opportunity to roll back what few socio-economic reforms had been implemented in earlier years.

Moreover, caste violence in the rural areas became pronounced, as was the confiscation of land previously distributed through land reform. At the same time, communal violence and crime escalated. The Janata leadership was unable to deal with these issues since it was pre-occupied with keeping the coalition together. Moreover, the efforts to arrest and prosecute Gandhi were badly mishandled, and inadvertently helped regenerate her support. As the Janata coalition crumbled, a number of former defectors returned to Indira’s Congress [now Congress (I)]. When elections were called in January 1980, Congress swept into office, and Gandhi was back in power.4

The Emergency and its aftermath reflected the diminution of democracy of previous years.106 Indira’s rule prior to 1975 had been destined by the consolidation of authority within both the party and the state, which produced a highly centralized apparatus of governance controlled by a closed oligarchy.5

This trend undermined the federal nature of the state, and diminished the government’s responsiveness to local needs and concerns. It consequently strained relations between the center and the regional state governments. The centralization of state power-and the demise of the Congress party as an institution-also contributed to the government's instability to mediate conflicts between different sectors of society, and forced the expression of dissent outside normal political channels.6

The centralization of authority also coincided with an increased criminality in Indian politics. there “as a heightened degree of corruption in the form of kickbacks and bribes, as well as a large number of people entering politics with criminal records. Many of the younger cadres recruited into the Congress party by Sanjay Gandhi fit this description. More problematic was the emergence of a ‘gangster’ element which was employed by various political factions for the purpose of murder or intimidating opponents. This was seen in a variety of local and state contexts, and particularly in the police agencies which were becoming more and more corrupt, criminalized and lawless. These trends were also related to the alliance between India’s economic elites and its national leaders (particularly Sanjay Gandhi), who increasingly found that they bad a shared interest in constraining the poor. New laws were passed which banned the right to strike, and the state-working in conjunction with the landowning elite-increasingly targeted violence against the rural peasantry.

Associated with these authoritarian tendencies was Gandhi’s articulation of a new nationalist discourse rooted in religious ecomunalism and fear of minority separatism. The turbulence of the 1970’s-particularly in regard to the radicalization of the poor and their disaffection from the party-created a erisis of legitimacy to which the ruling party responded by emphasizing its historical role as the authentic representative of the nation.

 Dissenting voices were stigmatized as threats to national unity, and the ruling Congress elite was portrayed as the only group  capable of protecting the community.

Of particular significance was the majoritarian nature of this discourse, and its link to security, ethnic conceptions of nation, and the stigmatization of minority populations. By depicting the separatist tendeneies and minority grievanees that had emerged under her role as ‘anti-national,’ Indira was able to marshal the Hindu majority behind her.

There were several important features of this new discourse. First, it was intended to redirect populist mobilization along new lines. The democratization of the 1950’s and 60’s bad mobilized the population behind a leftist program of social reform and development. However, these forces became increasingly frustrated as the opportunities for advancement remained closed, and state-Ied development failed to raise living standards on a large scale. The emergency can be seen, then, in part as an effort to restrain the populist forces which bad been unleashed by the Congress party, but now threatened its rule. Although the JP Movement was infiltrated-and some would say hijacked-by the communalist organizations, it nonetheless fed off a populist impulse associated with the disgnmtlement I lower classes. Despite Congress’s traditional commitment to economic equality, little bad changed in the 30 years of Congress rule.

Thus, the state could not allow the continued mobilization along class lines, and sought, instead, to shift public discourse away from socio-economic issues to those of religion and nationalism. A second defining feature of this new discourse was its religious orientation, and its clear appeal to the Hindu majority. The turn toward religion could be seen, superficially, in Gandhi’s public demonstration of her religious devotion, visiting (and inaugurating) temples around the country, and cultivating an image of devoutness. Indira was greatly influenced by Dhirendra Brahmachari, a close associate of  Gandhi who established an influential ashram in Delhi, and had his own television show where he lectured on Yoga. Indira’s turn toward religion became more pronounced in the aftermath of Sanjay’s death in 1980.

She also began reaching out to activists within the Hindu nationalist community, relying upon her nephew Arun Nehru as a conduit, and increasingly surrounding herself with ‘godmen.’ The communal nature of Congress (I)’s orientation was more explicitly evident, though, in the Gandhi’s rhetoric of the early 1980’s. Initially, this was articulated in terms of the ‘nation in danger’ -threatened by both internal and external enemies-but it became increasingly religious in orientation as the challenges were defined as emanating from ‘anti-national minorities.’ In a 1983 speech, for example, Gandhi noted that in “certain places [Le. Kashmir and Punjab]” minority populations have been guaranteed rights and privileges, while the “majority community was being suppressed.” 7

Similarly, in another speech to the Arya Samaj in November of the same year (1983), she explicitly stated that “our religion and traditions are under attack.“ 8

This theme would be reiterated the following year, when, in the aftermath of the assault on the Golden Temple in Amritsar, she claimed that ‘’the Hindu Dharma was under attack,” and appealed to her audience for support in her efforts to save “Hindu [tradition] from the attack that was coming from the Sikhs, the Muslims and others.” And Gandhi was “engineering a Hindu religiopolitical revival, in the style of Zionism, a la Rabbi Meir Kahane.“ 9

Implicit within Gandhi’s depiction of the ‘nation in danger’ was a link between national unity and state security. At the heart of her message was the claim that the national security required a strong centralized state and continued Congress rule. By emphasizing the existence of amorphous security threats, the Gandhi regime played upon the fears of the population, and held the Congress out as the one force that could make them safe. Criticisms of Gandhi and Congress Party rule were subsequently depicted as outright attacks on the nation. Similarly, dissent and the articulation of grievances were perceived as either anti-national or treasonous, and were commonly dealt with as problems of law and order and not politics.

The result was that political conflicts which derived fundamentally from a crisis in relations between the state and the regions, increasingly became articulated in religious and nationalist terms, and were depicted by state elites as fundamental threats to national unity and security. This discourse of religious nationalism was evident in the elections of the early  1980’s. In the 1983 assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir, for example, the Congress party based its electoral strategy upon an explicit appeal to communal sentiments, and played upon Hindu fears of domination by the Muslim majority. The main opposition to Congress in this state was the National Conference, a predominantly Muslim political party, which Gandhi depicted as ‘anti-national” and “pro-Pakistani.” 10

Similarly, in the 1983 local elections in Delhi, threats from separatists in Punjab and Kashmir were again made central campaign themes. In this depiction, it was only Congress that could defend the interests of the majority from the ‘anti-national’ forces that sought to weaken it.

This strategy was largely opportunistic in nature, for it was a reflection of the demise of the Congress Party’s electoral base. Moreover, Indira now perceived the reliance upon minority votes and upon the poor as a liability. The proliferation of Muslim and low-caste parties also siphoned off support from the Congress, while majority complaints over reverse discrimination were increasingly vocal. Upper caste Hindus, in particular, perceived themselves as suffering discrimination from the types of off innative action programs that were designed to address historic inequities. The result was a ‘Hindu backlash’ against policics that were perceived as “pampering minorities,” a criticism that had become a staple of the Jana Sangh's successor, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). On the other band, the shift towards an explicit Hindu majoritarianism reflected a much broader ideologieal transformation that was rooted in the search for a new basis of authority. Since the Congress Party’s historical commitment to a progressive agenda was no longer credible, an alternative means of populist mobilization was needed. The party subsequently sought to develop a new strategy that was premised upon reaching out to the Hindu majority, particularly the middle classes of Uttar Pradesh and the other states in the “Hindi Heartland.”

RSS had always understood its role as that of the sun in a solar system, the center of a family of affiliated organizations. By encouraging the formation of distinct entities with similar ideologies, it could encourage the idea that this ideology was that of the nation as a whole, or of Hindu people as a whole. The most important such organization was the VHP, Vishva Hindu Parishad (All-Hindu Council), founded in 1964, with considerable help from trained RSS leaders. It is difficult to describe precisely the difference between RSS and VHP, in part because the two are typically so closely linked. VHP portrays itself as a cultural organization. It is less concerned with youth mobilization than RSS, although it later gave birth to a youth wing, the Bajrang Dal, a quite militant and often violent organization. In official ideology, there are few differences between the VHP and its parent organization. That is indeed deliberate, so that the ideology, stemming from a plurality of sources, should increasingly come to seem ubiquitous and natural. In style, VHP has evolved as a more openly confrontational organization, given to mass organizing and not averse to violence; it is less focused on asceticism and strict discipline. One of its tactics is to call on many diverse and even contradictory sources of inspiration, including (a highly selective use of) Gandhi, Tagore, and many others, so that it does seem to be a universal ideology. “No great Hindu figure has been left out,” write the authors of Khaki Shorts, Saffron Flags. “Rather than composing a distinct, defined lineage for itself, the attempt is to establish a complex, constantly proliferating and sprawling kinship network which stops only at the Muslim, the Christian and the ‘secular’.” From this point onward we may speak of the “Sangh Parivar,” the family of Hindu organizations (the name means “Family of Groups”) who work together, the RSS providing core values and direction for all.

 

1. See Bipan Chandra, In the Name 0f Democracy: JP Movement and the Emergency, New Delhi, 2003.

2. James Manor, “Parties and the party System,” in Atul Kohli, ed., India ‘s Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations, Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 70.

3. See K.N. Seth and N.N. Bhardwaj, “Sanjayvad: A Study of the Phenomenon that Defeated Congress,” Secular Democracy, April (1) 1977. Seth and Bhardwaj also argue that it was at this point that the forces of reaction worked their way back into the Congress by throwing their support behind Indira after her defeat of the Syndicate. lan lack, “Sanjay’s Untold Story,” The Sunday Times, London, March 6, 1977.

4. Harold Gould, “The Second Coming: The 1980 Elections in India’s Hindi Belt,” Asian Survey, Vol XX, No. 6, June 1980.

5. See also Rajni Kothari, “A Moment of Truth,” in State Against Democracy: In Search of Human Governance, New Delhi, 1988.

6. See also Pool Brass, “National Power and Local Politics in India: A Twenty-Year Perspective,” in Brass, ed., Caste, Faction and Party in Indian PolWes, Vol. I: Faction and Party, New Delhi, 1984.

7. Mrs. Gandhi quoted in “Congress (I) and Minorities,” Economic and Political Weekly, December 15, 1984, p. 2098.

8. Ibid., p. 2098.

9. Impact International, ”India Votes for Dynasty, But Rajiv Rides a Holy Tiger,” London, 11-24, January 1985.

10. See also Aaron Klieman, “Indira’s India: Democracy and Crisis Government,” in Political Science, Vol. 96, No. 2, Summer, 1981.

 

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