Political Buddhism in Sri Lanka and Burma
In Sri Lanka, a
situation that bears a certain resemblance to Ireland, the demand for
recognition of its separate status by an island minority linked by religion and
ethnicity to its larger neighbor (in this case Hindu Tamils of southern India)
is perceived by members of the majority community-Sinhalese Buddhists-as a
threat to the nation's integrity. Like Irish Catholicism the Theravada Buddhism
of Sri Lanka has developed into a nationalist ideology in which religion has
become a marker of communal identity. The reasons are largely historical. Sri
Lankan Buddhists regard themselves as the survivors of the great Buddhist
empire founded in India by King Asoka in the third century BCE. While in
mainland India Buddhism eventually disappeared as society relapsed into the
multiform patterns of worship which came to be known as Hinduism, the Sinhalese
held to the Buddhist faith which eventually became politicized. In Sri Lanka
(as in Burma), Buddhism provided the stirrings of anti-colonial sentiment by
offering 'the only universally acceptable king who rescued Buddhism and our
nationalism from oblivion.'
In 1956, the year of
Britain's Suez debacle, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, leader of the opposition Sri
Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP), was able to win power on a proBuddhist,
pro-Sinhalese ticket, replacing the upper-class, English-educated liberals of
the United National Party who had governed the country since independence. The
SLFP benefited hugely from celebration of the 25ooth anniversary of the
Buddha's birth (Buddha Jayanti) the following year and from the previous
publication of a report detailing the suppression of Buddhism under the
British. The Jayanti enlarged upon and celebrated the national myth bonding the
Buddhist faith to the land and the Sinhalese nation which 'had come into being
with the blessing of the Buddha as a "chosen race" with a divine
mission to fulfil, and now stands on the threshold of a new era leading to its
"great destiny"'. The SLFP was aggressively supported by the United
Monks' Front, which rejected the concept of secular nationhood in terms very
similar to those that would be used by Ayatollah Khomeini in his famous Najaf
lectures.
The 'Buddhisization' of Sri Lankan politics had the inevitable
consequence of making non-Buddhists (Tamils and Muslims) feel excluded from the
nation, provoking demands by Tamil separatists for a state of their own. The
Tamil Tigers-as the activists called themselves-were concerned not only with
securing political rights, but more importantly with maintaining a cultural,
ethnic, and religious identity which had been suppressed or alienated as
Sinhalese nationalism became increasingly reliant on Buddhist symbols. More
than 60,000 people from both communities lost their lives in the ensuing civil
war that lasted nearly two decades. In the late ig8os the Tigers resorted
increasingly to the novel tactic-pioneered by the Shii
Hezbollah in Lebanon-of suicide bombing. More often than not the victims were
civilians. A steady campaign of assassinations (including that of the Indian
Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, in iggi, by a female
bomber) and indiscriminate murder was kept up through the 1990’s. In 1996, 91
people died, and 1,400 were wounded, in the suicide bombing of Colombo's
Central Bank; 18 were killed in the destruction of the twin-towered World Trade
Centre in Colombo in 1997; 16 died in the suicidal attack on a Buddhist shrine
in Kandy in 1998. Some, though not all, the Tigers were practising
Hindus, who dedicated themselves to Shiva before sacrificing themselves-and
others.
The example of
Buddhism in Sri Lanka clearly demonstrates that none of the major religious
traditions is immune from 'fundamentalism', to which violence is closely
linked-though it might be better in this, as in most other contexts, to
describe the process as the 'nationalization' or secularization of religion.
Donald Swearer argues that by 'homogenizing' the Buddhist tradition and
reducing it to a simplified core teaching along with a moralistic programme of right living linked to Sinhalese Buddhist
identity, Bandaranaike (and his later successor President Jayawardine)
'ignored the polar dynamic between the transmundane and the mundane, a
distinction basic not only to traditional Theravada Buddhism but to the other
great historical religions as well. The absolutism of fundamentalism stems from
this basic transformation of the religious worldview.' The narrowly ideological
nature of 'fundamentalism', Swearer concludes, means that it is 'not religious
in the classical sense of that term but rather a variant of a secular faith
couched in religious language'. In this process traditional religious symbols
are 'stripped of their symbolic power to evoke a multiplicity of meanings'.
Like Juergensmeyer, Swearer sees nationalism as
triumphing over religion, rather than the reverse: 'Religions thus harnessed to
nationalism are often regarded as more pure and orthodox than the traditional
forms they seek to supplant; in turn nationalism readily takes on the character
of a fervid, absolutistic revival of religion. In the case of Sri Lanka, as
elsewhere, the search for national identity is prior and conditions the
fundamentalism of the religion(s) incorporated into nationalism.'
Sri Lanka's toxic
identity politics are not altogether unique, especially in other Theravada
Buddhist nations. As we shall see in the section underneath Buddhist
nationalism in Myanmar, for example, provided a similar rallying point against
British colonialism. But the conflation of "the land, the race, and the
faith" among the majority there, along with a view that this majority is
the steward of its own uniquely pure form of Buddhism, has been a great source
of political and cultural disharmony with the country's many non-Buddhist
minority groups, most recently the Rohingya Muslims. Although Buddhism might
eschew violence on a doctrinal level, it is not immune from nationalist myths
that see a place for it.
Militant Buddhism in Sri Lanka
Militant Buddhism in
Sri Lanka has its roots in an ancient narrative called the Mahavamsa (Great
Chronicle), which was composed by monks in the sixth century. According to the
Mahavamsa, the Buddha foresaw the demise of Buddhism in India but saw a bright
future for it in Sri Lanka. "In Lanka, O Lord of Gods, shall my religion
be established and flourish," he said. The Sinhalese take this as a sign
that they are the Buddha's chosen people, commanded to "preserve and
protect" Buddhism in its most pristine form. According to myth, a young
Sinhalese prince in the second century BC armed himself with a spear tipped
with a relic of the Buddha and led a column of 500 monks to vanquish Tamil
invaders. In addition to defending his kingdom from mortal peril, the prince's
victory legitimized religious violence as a means for national survival.
Militant Buddhism was
a driving force behind the 25-year war between the majority Sinhalese (74
percent of the population) and the minority Tamils (18 percent), who were
fighting for an independent state in the island's north and east. (Muslims, who
make up six percent of Sri Lanka's population, were often caught in the
middle.) During the war, monks repeatedly undercut efforts to work out a peace
agreement.
The sangha, as the
clergy is collectively referred to in Theravada Buddhism, has historically
exercised political power from behind the scenes, embodying a broad form of
religious nationalism.
While most canonical
texts in the Buddhist Theravada tradition offer evidence for a doctrinal
position against violence, at the same time, the Theravada canonical literature
recognizes that the
predicament of kingship for the performance of its duties necessarily entails conducting
wars or inflicting
violent punishment on culprits, i.e. acts that bring negative karma to the
king's future rebirths.
Pivotal in fostering
the social and material conditions for enlightenment, Buddhist communities
generally do not unite across national boundaries for a common goal or to
combat a religious "other." In contrast to other world religions,
Buddhism does not uphold a belief in religious redemption through warfare like
the Crusades. Nor does it have a doctrine or history to mobilize religious
communities to act violently against unbelievers. Buddhists in its
"authentic" form, also do not identify with a global, transnational,
or universal brotherhood in order to legitimate local practices. Instead, the
Buddha's sacred biography and the cult of his relics justify ritual veneration
at sacred centers throughout the Buddhist world that are seen as centers of
extraordinary power. That power is understood to embody simultaneously
political and religious dimensions that reflect on the status of local Buddhist
leaders and define a political and ritual hegemony within their communities.
Seen from the vantage
point of history, however, violence has been and continues to be present in
Buddhist societies as Buddhists have been both targets and agents of communal
violence. In 1973, the Thai monk Kitthiwuttho stated
that killing communists did not cause negative karma and the Buddhist Precepts
were tantamount to national law. (Donald Swearer, The Buddhist World of
Southeast Asia , 1995, 95) And in the absence of a national constitution in
Burma since 1988 (that would otherwise empower the official acts of a secular
modem state), the regime has employed Buddhist authority and institutions to
legitimate its politics.
In Sri Lanka, violent
riots have been promulgated by Buddhist monks and lay people in defense of
their vision of a distinctly Buddhist nationalism. At the same time, Sri Lankan
Buddhists have been the target of violence unleashed against them by ethnic and
religious, the Tamil Tigers. (See Donald Lopez, 2001)
At the turn of the
twentieth century, Buddhism underwent revitalization and reforms in Sri Lanka
that were in large measure the result of efforts by Angitara
Dharmapala, the Sri Lankan protege of Henry Olcott and Helena Blavatsky,
prominent founders of the Theosophical Society. This revitalization, modeled
largely after Christian organizations and a Buddhist identity in Sri Lanka,
became a rallying point against British colonial power.
Upon independence,
monks claimed the right to vote in elections and hold political office. These
facts strengthened their role in the public life and politics of the new
nation. Thus in Sri Lanka, monks have been able to occupy significant political
positions in public life, gaining the right to vote in elections and run for
political office. In this regard, the Sinhalese sangha negotiated to a far
greater degree a modem re-definition of the normative role of a Buddhist
ascetic. Traditional monastic ideals remain normative in Burmese national
culture, however, where monks may not vote and are encouraged by the Ministry
of Religious Affairs, on grounds of rules governing monastic conduct (vinaya), to remain aloof from worldly and political
affairs. (See H.L. Seneviratne, The Work of Kings: The New Buddhism in Sri
Lanka, University of Chicago Press, 1999).
In Sri Lanka, about
75 percent of the population is Buddhist. Tamils constitute a minority that is
mostly Muslim, but also includes a significant (18 percent) number of Hindus.
But for Sri Lankan nationalists, Buddhism is commensurate with a Sri Lankan identity
whose history they believe reaches back to the mythic origins of the island
recounted in the sacred Mahavamsa (Great Chronicle). Sinhalese monks continued
to be activists in the ethnic and political struggles of the early 1980s. Their
actions, indeed, their self-proclaimed sacred duty, were to preserve thatreligio-nationallegacy for future generations. Monks
saw themselves as not merely advisors, but as moral guardians of the Sri Lankan
nation and defenders of the Dharma, both threatened by ethnic and religious
others. It was their responsibility to pave the way for politicians to
safeguard a Sri Lanka where Buddhism would prosper. During the bloody civil
wars in the 1980s between Tamil separatists and Sinhala Buddhists, monks were
instrumental in organizing and mobilizing people to defend the Sinhala
identity. Statements like "There is no Buddhist sangha where there is no
Sinhala race" were part of their battle cry. (See Anada Abeysekara, Colors of the Robe: Religion, Identity, and
Difference, 2002). Monastic militancy even led to the murder of Sri Lanka 's
Prime Minister, Ranasingha Premadasa, in 1993.
Contrary to popular
perceptions in the west however, the sangha is an institution structured by
multiple principles of hierarchy. A culture of hierarchy pervades interactions
with and among monks as junior monks are expected to obey and respect senior ones.
Most basic is the seniority that monks acquire through years spent living a
monastic life. In most branches of the tradition, full ordination requires that
the monk be at least 20 years of age and his seniority increases with each year
of service. The relative seniority of a monk since ordination also determines
whether he greets another monk by bowing to him or whether he will receive such
homage, although the relative position of two individuals to one another may be
less marked. Monastic rank within a monastery further differentiates status
among monks, with the abbot receiving unqualified respect from monks residing
in his compound. Ordination lineages in the Theravada tradition may also
differentiate themselves from other lineages by stressing stricter adherence to
the monastic code of conduct (vinaya). Respective
claims to strict purity in monastic practice also introduce an element of
contesting relative hierarchy among monastic communities. Modem reforms of the
sangha introduced by the state have sought to institute administrative
centralization that links local chapters to regional committees and national
leadership. While traditional practice espouses strict adherence to hierarchy
within the sangha, such interpretations necessarily also recognize, but may not
condone, ways to contest it. Hence, it would be misleading to view the sangha
as a monolithic institution since historically, it comprises diverse
communities that distinguish themselves through local teachings, practices,
language, and ethnic identity.
"To be Burmese
is to be Buddhist" is a slogan first coined by the early nationalist
movement, the Young Mens' Buddhist Association
founded in 1906 when the country was a British colony. Usually referred to as
the YMBA, it was modeled after the YMBA founded by Angitara Dharmapala, the Sri Lankan protege of Henry Olcott and Helena
Blavatsky, prominent founders of the Theosophical Society.
The Buddhist sangha
is the only cultural institution surviving the collapse of the traditional
kingdom after the third and final Anglo-Burmese war in 1885. Buddhism has been
a rallying point for resistance against the colonial state and its successors
since independence in 1948, even like is the case with Indonesia and India,
Burma, represents the continuation of a ‘British colonial’ state. But the type
of political and economic reforms critical to fostering civil society in
Indonesia were not implemented with sufficient cohesion to build a
post-colonial state to serve the Burmese nation. (1)
While most canonical
texts in the Buddhist Theravada tradition offer evidence for a doctrinal
position against violence, at the same time, the Theravada canonical literature
recognizes that the predicament of kingship for the performance of its duties
necessarily entails conducting
wars or inflicting
violent punishment on culprits, i.e. acts that bring negative karma to the
king's future rebirths.
Pivotal in fostering
the social and material conditions for enlightenment, Buddhist communities
generally do not unite across national boundaries for a common goal or to
combat a religious "other." In contrast to other world religions,
Buddhism does not uphold a belief in religious redemption through warfare like
the Crusades. Nor does it have a doctrine or history to mobilize religious
communities to act violently against unbelievers. Buddhists in its
"authentic" form, also do not identify with a global, transnational,
or universal brotherhood in order to legitimate local practices. Instead, the
Buddha's sacred biography and the cult of his relics justify ritual veneration
at sacred centers throughout the Buddhist world that are seen as centers of
extraordinary power. That power is understood to embody simultaneously
political and religious dimensions that reflect on the status of local Buddhist
leaders and define a political and ritual hegemony within their communities.
Seen from the vantage
point of history, however, violence has been and continues to be present in
Buddhist societies as Buddhists have been both targets and agents of communal
violence.
With the exception of
the British colonial administration, every Burmese government since
independence in 1948 has catered to the sangha for popular support, religious
blessing, and political legitimation. By the same token, these governments have
also had to contend with the power of the sangha to mobilize people.
Governments have used Buddhist ritual to legitimate political power in times of
constitutional crisis or in the absence of a national constitution altogether.
Governments have used Buddhist authority or "Buddhification"
to rally nationalist sentiments among the general population, to foster an
ideological Buddhist nationalism, to integrate Christian, animist hill tribes
and other ethnic minorities into the administration of the nation-state, and to
put pressure on non-Buddhists to convert to Buddhism. For instance,
"Indian Rights Group Accuses Myanmar of Forcible Conversion of
Christians," Agence France Presse, November 11,
2001, reported that according to the Naga People's Movement for Human Rights
(NPMHR), hundreds of Christian Nagas had been forced to convert to Buddhism by
the ruling military junta and religious bodies. Those resisting either
experienced displacement and persecution or were kept as bonded laborers by the
junta and Buddhist monks. Other forced conversions occurred in other tribal
areas.
Violence against Rohingas
The extent of violence
inflicted upon Muslim communities is difficult to ascertain. One measure,
however, is the large number of Muslim refugees the riots engendered,
especially among Rohingas who fled their native
Arakan in Lower Burma primarily to Bangladesh. The attacks caused an unknown
number of deaths, the burning of Muslim homes and shops, and the desecration of
sacred sites and objects, including the destruction of mosques, scattering of
Qurans in the street, and driving pigs through consecrated grounds. Accounts
about these raids do not add up to a coherent master narrative, but fall into
separate versions. They include an official version given by government media,
accounts by Buddhist monastic organizations, and additional versions based on
foreign press reports and first-hand descriptions by Burmese Muslims, Buddhists
monks, and other eyewitnesses. Each kind of narrative attributes to entirely
different contexts the underlying causes and immediate catalysts for these mob
attacks on Burmese Muslim.
According to official
state media and newspapers, Buddhist-Muslim rioting again broke out in Mandalay
on March 17, 1997 over an alleged rape of a Buddhist girl by a Muslim man.
Different observers
affirmed SLORC's (State Law and Order Restoration Council) role in instigating
the riots. Some observers stated that the monastic attackers, whose identity
was mostly hidden by robes draped over their heads, were, in actuality, mere imposters
and agitators sent by the regime's grassroots organization the Unity,
Solidarity, and Development Association (USDA). The Nation reports on March 28,
1997: "Lt. Gen. Myo Nyunt, Burma's religious minister went to meet local
Muslim leaders and reportedly said: 'Let them [monks] destroy it - don't resist
them, the army will compensate you for everything.' Thus warnings of impending
attacks would come from local government officials or army officers urging
Muslims not to retaliate or fight back, but to endure the Buddhists' rampage.
This allowed many Muslim families to flee to safety, abandoning their homes and
mosques to destructive fires set by rampaging crowds.
In response to the
rioting that spread within days throughout Burma, SLORC imposed martial law,
closed all universities, and instituted curfews on monasteries in Mandalay and
in other cities. Soldiers surrounded many of the larger monasteries, especially
in Mandalay and Rangoon. At the same time, state television aired lengthy and
frequent broadcasts depicting the regime's leading generals venerating senior
Buddhist monks and making extravagant donations to them.
Aung Zaw writes in
The Nation: "A young monk in Rangoon did not deny that they were involved.
In the same piece, Aung Zaw reports that " ... about 50 monks at Bargaya Road in Rangoon followed by soldiers and riot
police went to another mosque, chanting: 'We don't want Muslims' and throwing
stones at the mosque. The authorities did not intervene." (2)
In March 1997 and in
incidents since then as recently as November 2003, Burmese Muslims became
targets of violent rampages by Buddhist monks. Anti-Muslim rioting flared up
over a local conflict that is said to have occurred in Mandalay. From there,
anti-Muslim riots spread to all major cities in Burma within just a few days.
The extent of violence inflicted upon Muslim communities is difficult to
ascertain. One measure, however, is the large number of Muslim refugees the
riots engendered, especially among Rohingas who fled
their native Arakan in Lower Burma mostly to Bangladesh.(3)
Muslims throughout
the country often received warnings from local officials of impending mob
attacks, indicating that the riots were not spontaneous, but planned in
advance. The strategy also concentrated the loss of property and buildings and
likely reduced the loss of lives. In response to the rioting that spread within
days throughout Burma, SLORC imposed martial law, closed all universities, and
instituted curfews on monasteries in Mandalay and in other cities. Soldiers
surrounded many of the larger monasteries, especially in Mandalay and Rangoon.
At the same time, state television aired lengthy and frequent broadcasts
depicting the regime’s leading generals venerating senior Buddhist monks and
making extravagant donations to them. (Some of the above was previously
published by us on an earlier link).
1. Robert W. Hefner,
Civil Islam, Princeton University Press, 2000.
2. Aung Zaw, "
Rangoon Plays the Muslim Care!," The Nation, March 28, 1997.
3. A detailed and
multi-faceted Report on the Situation For Muslims in Burma was published by
Images Asia in two parts in March 1997:
http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/burma/MMR_1/SEC%20II/Report%20on%20sit%20muslims.pdf
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