In our prediction for the next three months on 1 Oct we wrote: While members of the political elite manage the financial
crisis in the near term and debate long-term structural reforms, popular
discontent throughout Europe will grow.
Less than a weeks
later this already started
in Spain and Belgium
might start to be next.
The Start of
Europe’s fragmentation
Rifts between
northern and southern eurozone countries formed as soon as the crisis began.
Traditionally austere and fiscally disciplined countries, such as Germany,
Finland and the Netherlands, pressured southern countries, such as Greece and Portugal,
to meet their deficit
targets. Financial assistance to southern Europe is a constant source of
political tension in the parliaments of northern Europe.
In the south, Italy and Spain supported bailouts to other peripheral
countries, like Greece, even though Athens clearly is not meeting the targets
to which it agreed with the European Union and the International Monetary Fund.
Rome and Madrid believed the bailouts for Greece, Portugal and Ireland were
essential to prevent the crisis from reaching Italy and Spain.
However both economic and political division also exists within the
European Union between the eurozone states and the 10 EU members outside the
monetary bloc: the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Among these 10 countries,
there are vastly different views of the banking union and the overall
trajectory of the European Union and eurozone.
As the European Union continues trying to resolve the financial crisis,
efforts at deeper integration among the eurozone states will be high on the EU
agenda in the coming months. Projects such as the proposed European banking
union and more comprehensive fiscal integration efforts aiming to overcome the
crisis within the currency union -- but affecting countries outside the
currency union -- will be especially high priorities.
The eurozone states' national strategic interests have spawned differing
views of these projects, and the debate likely will push the banking union's
debut well past its proposed start date of January 2013. However, an even
deeper division exists between the eurozone states and the EU members not in
the monetary bloc. Some of these countries are apprehensive about signing on to
projects like the banking union -- which, according to current proposals, will
have greater control over banking regulations but will not give the
non-eurozone countries what they consider a sufficient voice in decision-making
efforts. The EU countries outside the eurozone are attempting to adapt to this
new situation. While some of these countries need to keep a distance from eurozone
developments for strategic reasons, they face the possibility of increasing
irrelevance in European policy discussions if they choose to avoid further
European integration.
And now Europe's economic crisis as we recently
saw with Catalonia is also heightened the sense of regionalism within
certain eurozone countries, highlighted here for example by Spain, Italy,
Belgium.
During its first stage, the European crisis caused political tensions
primarily at the supranational and international levels. At the supranational
level, EU member states debated intensely with Brussels over which policies to
apply and the timeframe in which to apply them. Meanwhile, at the international
level, countries' leaders held summits to discuss future measures among
themselves.
In both cases, the main issues were the scope of economic reforms and
the implementation timeframe. The European Commission required Southern
European countries to cut expenditures and increase the efficiency of their
fiscal and administrative systems. Northern European countries, such as
Germany, the Netherlands and Finland, often backed these proposals. The
countries in Southern and Eastern Europe asked for flexible timetable goals and
targets, along with permanent financial assistance. In this sense, there was a
division between the eurozone core states and periphery states that was
expressed primarily at the intergovernmental level.
At its present stage, the crisis is expanding at the intranational
level, as central governments are having difficulty enforcing austerity
measures at regional and domestic levels.
Spain
Spanish regions historically have developed independently and relatively
isolated from each other, and Madrid’s attempts to solidify control over the
regions – such as prohibiting regional languages during Francisco Franco’s
dictatorship – have been greeted with resistance. But when democracy was
restored in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Spain established a delicate
constitutional balance, in which Spanish regions received varying degrees of
autonomy.
The highest degree of autonomy was granted to the Basques. The Spanish
Constitution of 1978 recognized the Basque people as a “nationality,” created
the autonomous communities of Basque Country and Navarre (with Spanish and
Basque made co-official languages in both regions) and allowed them to collect
their own taxes. This helped reduce Basque nationalism and deter militant
groups such as ETA that formed when Franco held power. In Basque Country,
regional political parties have willingly worked with Spain’s two dominant
national parties – the People’s Party and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party
– and the first non-regionalist government in the Basque Country was formed in
2009. The dynamic between regional and national parties suggests that the
region is politically stable.
By comparison, Catalan nationalism has been exacerbated by the European
crisis. As with Basque Country and Navarre, the 1978 constitution recognized
Catalan as a nationality and created the autonomous region of Catalonia.
However, the region was not granted the same authority as other autonomous
communities to collect its own taxes and spend them at its discretion.
Catalonia is the wealthiest region in Spain – it accounts for more than 20
percent of Spanish gross domestic product – and it believes that what it
contributes to the Spanish state outweighs the benefits it receives. But
despite its wealth, Catalonia is also one of Spain’s most indebted regions.
After winning elections in November 2011, the conservative government of
Mariano Rajoy tightened the central government’s control over regional budgets,
generating considerable resistance in Catalonia and leading to a political
crisis. While separatist sentiment has grown in Catalonia, serious questions
remain about the economic consequences of secession and the inevitable exit
from the European Union. Moreover, Catalans themselves are divided on the
issue; a poll in late September found that 43 percent supported full statehood
while 41 percent opposed it. In this context, the most likely outcome is that
Catalonia will moderate its demands for independence and focus instead on
gaining greater autonomy over taxation.
Italy
The biggest challenge for the new Italian government will be to build a
stable coalition that can approve policy changes. Italy has a long tradition of
political instability, which explains much of its economic instability. Given
the number of challenges that the new government faces, that political
instability is unlikely to end with the elections and will very likely increase
during the transition from Mario Monti's technocratic government.
The consolidation of Italy as a nation-state is a relatively new
phenomenon. Before 1861, the Italian Peninsula was a collection of small
kingdoms, principalities and duchies, often controlled by foreign powers. Like
Spain, geography has contributed to historical Italian fragmentation; the
country is divided by mountains and includes the two largest islands in the
Mediterranean.
Thus, politically and economically, Italy can be explained in terms of
the developmental differences between its north and south. The northern regions
around the Po River Valley are some of the richest of Europe and represent
Italy's financial and industrial center. The south has traditionally been
agriculture-based and ignored by the north in terms of infrastructure and
investment. Due to these geographical and economic divides, numerous separatist
movements have emerged in Italy since the mid-1800s -- both in the north and
the south. However, none of these movements ever achieved sufficient political
support to pose a real threat to the Italian state.
Still, the economic crisis has exacerbated Italy's divisions. In July,
for example, Sicily received a loan of more than 400 million euros ($522 million)
from the central government to help pay salaries and pensions. The island
subsequently became the focus of sharp criticism throughout the country -- but
especially among northern media outlets and politicians -- due to the huge size
of Sicily's public sector and continual scandals involving mismanagement and
corruption. Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti has also expressed concern about
the situation in Sicily.
In the past two decades, the north-south divide has been exploited most
notably by the Northern League, a political party that is especially strong in
the northern regions of Veneto and Lombardy. The party has sometimes advocated
for northern secession, but it primarily advocates the consolidation of fiscal
federalism and greater autonomy for the regions. However, the Northern League
is currently in crisis due to several recent corruption scandals that have cost
it a considerable amount of public support. No political party has taken the
Northern League's place in demanding greater northern autonomy, and, despite
the prevalent anti-southern rhetoric, no major Italian party is advocating any
sort of real separatism.
Belgium
Modern Belgium was created in 1830 essentially as a buffer state between Europe's superpowers
-- France, Germany and the United Kingdom. As a result, the country is
inherently fractured and consists of three highly distinct communities:
Wallonia, in the south, is mainly French-speaking and has historical ties with
France. The Flemish-speaking communities in the northern region of Flanders
share historical ties with the Netherlands. A small German-speaking community
lives in the east near the German border.
The Belgian political system was designed to establish a balance of
power between the communities. However, Flemish access to the North Sea and
traditional trade routes with the Low Countries -- the Netherlands, Luxembourg
and parts of northern France and western Germany -- have made it more
economically dynamic than the Walloon south. This has created social and
economic tensions between the two regions. In recent times, the differences
have also become political. While Wallonia tends to vote for center-left
parties, Flanders recently has leaned toward conservative parties. This makes
consensus at the national level difficult.
Flemish
nationalism is not a homogeneous movement. Broadly speaking, there are
moderate factions that seek to protect the Flemish language and culture and
calls for greater regional autonomy, including the possible replacement of the
current federal state with a confederation marked by regional fiscal and
judicial autonomy. Some of the Flemish mainstream parties, including the
Christian-Democratic and Flemish Party, subscribe to this view. Other factions,
however, are demanding full independence for the region. These factions also
vary. The euroskeptic and nationalist Vlaams Belang party, for example,
combines Flemish separatism with anti-immigration rhetoric, while the New
Flemish Alliance proposes an institutional reform that would lead to a gradual
separation between Flanders and Wallonia over the long run.
The economic crisis has intensified Belgium's divides, and the New Flemish Alliance has
gained support in recent elections. But the party's growth has also
exacerbated its own internal splits. Some members still call for full
independence, while others propose a gradual separation between Flanders and
Wallonia. Thus, Flemish governments are likely to press for more autonomy in
the coming years, especially if the European crisis is prolonged. While an
agreement on a confederal system is likely, full independence will likely not
occur in the medium term.
Separatist forces are weaker in Wallonia. While most political parties
defend the French language and Walloon culture, only the Rassemblement
Wallonie France (a small party that operates both in
Wallonia and Brussels) openly proposes the secession of the region and the
union with France.
In all three of the above cases these conflicts are not new, as most
European countries historically have regional frictions, but the current crisis
is aggravating these pre-existing tensions. Central governments are feeling
pressure at all levels, which is reducing these governments' abilities to
mitigate the effects of the crisis.
Romantic nationalism
can fulfill a people's dreams or nightmares and usually does both. Catalonia
gives us a sense of the dreams. But in most places, the distance between dreams
and nightmares is not as great as people might like to think. Economic pain coupled
with romantic nationalism, now bound together through a massive structure like
the European Union that is incapable of understanding the forces that are
lurking beneath the surface, have always had a way to generate nightmares in
Europe.
Also in Greece, two
anti-system parties (the left-leaning SYRIZA and the far-right Golden Dawn)
received a record number of votes in the general elections. It took two rounds
of voting for the traditional elites in Greece to withstand the onslaught of anti-system
parties. Since then, Athens has been governed by a fragile coalition of
traditional parties.
Thus it will be only
a matter of time before European leaders' options are dwindling. At the
international level, the institutional framework of the European Union and
market pressure limits their range of choices on economic and fiscal policy. At
home, domestic populations are pressing for a change of direction that directly
conflicts with the institutional and market constraints. And as we have seen
exemplified above, groups that question the current political system are
gaining popular support.
The European Commission however has made it clear that if any state
separates itself from any EU member, that new country will have to apply for
membership like any ordinary country, which means that Catalonia, or whoever
decides to separate itself would have to apply for EU membership. This is
already creating concerns in Catalonia because the Catalan businesses are
worried that they could lose access to the Spanish markets or to the European
markets. So what's important about this is that the European crisis is
threatening the territorial unity of some European countries, with Spain and
Belgium being the most advanced cases. But in other countries we are seeing
that the crisis is threatening the links of solidarity between regions within a
country. In countries such as Italy or Germany, we are seeing the wealthier
regions feeling that the poorer regions are a burden and asking the central
government for renegotiations of the schemes of distribution.
For updates click homepage
here