Introduction
Serbia and Kosovo
seem to have avoided violence on the scale of that seen in the late 1990s,
mainly because the Radicals did not come to power during Serbian elections and
because Kosovar independence was continually put on the back burner this year.
This does not mean, however, that such violence can be avoided altogether,
especially as each side gets more fed up with the situation. Small-scale
violence has been seen and is not unexpected. Tensions are high between
Kosovars and Serbs and within each ethnic faction as well.
The Serbs within
Kosovo do not make up enough of the population to attempt any meaningful
military operations, but there are other threats. The most obvious -- but not
the most likely -- is that Serbia could do what it did in 1999 when it wanted
to reassert full control over Kosovo: send in the army. But the military is not
in the shape it was in then. Moreover, the Serbs within Serbia proper are too
fractured; some are willing to forgo Kosovo to gain EU membership, while others
are willing to fight to the end for the small province. That is enough to cause
trouble, since only a few radicals are needed to form paramilitary groups like
those seen during the war.
There are also small
Serbian terrorist groups that have been operating periodically in Serbia and
Kosovo. The best known is Tsar Lazar's Guard, which was a joke when it first
formed but has been gaining support -- and reportedly weapons -- as Dec. 10 approaches.
Serbs are not the only group reported to have militants working for their
cause; the Albanian National Army militant group reportedly has been recruiting
new members and equipment recently.
Kosovar Albanians
also have been stirring unrest inside the recently independent Montenegro. The
small Albanian population in Montenegro on the Kosovar border has already been
stirred up, however; a handful of Albanians were arrested in Ulcinj, Montenegro,
and Kosovar Albanians began flooding over the border and stormed the police
station in protest.
Montenegro
understands what it is like to push for independence from Serbia, but unlike
Kosovo the country is still very divided over whether it is content with its
new independence. Approximately 40 percent still consider themselves ethnically
Serbian, especially since they share the same church and same language, and are
thus loyal to Belgrade. Some Montenegrin Serbians have already pledged to help
fight if Kosovo gets its independence.
Macedonia
The militants in
Kosovo have also been linked to Albanians crossing the border from Macedonia.
Albanians are the ethnic minority within Macedonia but hold the majority of the
northwestern part of the country. The Macedonian-Kosovar border is mountainous and
incredibly porous, leading to large border crossings that the already weak
Macedonian military cannot prevent. These Albanians and Kosovar Albanians have
been seen actively engaging in violence on both sides of the border, proving
that the wounds from the 2001 Macedonia conflict, in which the Albanians within
the country began attacking Macedonian forces, are still fresh.
Internally, Macedonia
has been politically unstable because of the main Albanian party actively
pushing against the government as it keeps its eyes on Kosovo. Macedonia is
trying to keep a lid on any large-scale violence because of its aspirations to
join the EU, but hostilities have broken out within Macedonia’s borders. On
Nov. 7, Macedonian police killed four Albanians in an operation called Mountain
Storm on Mount Sar Planina. Macedonian police said the Albanians were planning
a major terrorist act that would destabilize both Kosovo and Macedonia.
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina
could be a flashpoint in the struggle over Kosovo. Bosnia-Herzegovina is split
between two autonomous regions, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska (the Serb Republic), and three ethnic
groups: Muslim Bosniaks, Catholic Croats and Orthodox
Serbs. In short, the country does not have a comfortable ethnic, social,
historic or political mixture. The U.N. administrative presence is the only
thing keeping relative peace and general unity in the country.
However, control is
being transferred from the United Nations to the European Union, something many
radical Serbs within the country are not happy with because it means the loss
of Russia's voice in Bosnia's future (Russia is on the U.N. Security Council
and supports the Orthodox Serbs). The Muslims within the country do not want EU
supervision, claiming the Union is not friendly to Muslims. Republika
Srpska has criticized the transfer, since they pledge their loyalty to their
brother Serbs next door and to their more numerous Orthodox brothers in Russia.
The Muslim Bosniaks and Serbs, with the Croats in flux -- are keeping
the country from moving toward any political unity or a real constitution. But
with Kosovo in play, the Serbs from Republika Srpska
are threatening to declare their own independence. It is no secret that the
majority of Serbs within Republika Srpska want Serbia
proper to annex their region, though many Serbs in Serbia proper look upon them
as radicals or country bumpkins. Serbs in Republika
Srpska could become very problematic if they either split from
Bosnia-Herzegovina or decide to flood across the border to fight with their
fellow Serbs. NATO, which commands the European forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
is rumored to have a contingency plan to sweep into Republika
Srpska if either of these events happens, taking the government buildings and
media outlets and blocking the main roads into Serbia.
The Threat of Violence
Contagion effects of
Balkan violence are well known; they were seen both in the early 20th
century and in the 1990s, and the recent outbursts are following the same
pattern. Since EU and NATO forces are present, there have been no large wars
declared by the states themselves. But if the region does ignite, Western
forces could face many problems. First, those forces are a mere shadow of what
they were during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, during which it took four
years to get the region generally under control. European and U.S. forces are
deployed only in the non-Serbian section of Bosnia-Herzegovina and within
Kosovo, not throughout the region. Furthermore, NATO and the United States are
bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq and trying to juggle threats larger than
the Balkans, namely Iran and Russia.To put it
plainly, the West is not paying much attention to the Balkans other than as a
bargaining chip with other global players such as Russia. But with or without
the world watching, the actors in the Balkans are ready to move.
As For Belgium
Using his authority
as one of the few unifying symbols of the Belgian state, King Albert II held
talks with party leaders Monday as he sought to end a 155-day political crisis
that has called the country's future into question. Negotiations on forming a coalition
government fell apart last week when Flemish parties pushed through a
preliminary vote to break up a bilingual electoral district in and around
Brussels. That vote, which swept aside the principle of compromise at the heart
of Belgian politics, enraged Francophones. The reaction to the vote and the
continued failure of the parties to cobble together a government despite
interminable discussions has raised speculation about an eventual breakup of
Belgium. Conceived as a buffer state, Belgium was born in 1830 and is made up
of a predominantly French-speaking south - Wallonia - and the mainly
Dutch-speaking north - Flanders - with a small German-speaking community in the
southeast. Once the political and cultural masters of the country, French speakers
have had to accept inferior economic status as heavy industry has declined in
Wallonia and prosperity has risen in Flanders.
Language and money
issues have become the main battlegrounds between the two communities. One
recent study from the Facultés Universitaires
Notre-Dame de la Paix in Namur suggests that in 2005 €5.6 billion passed from
Flanders to Wallonia, representing a subsidy of €2.50 each day from each
Flemish speaker to each Francophone. Flemish politicians want to revise the
Constitution to keep more economic issues at the regional level. French
speakers fear this would be the beginning of the end of the cash subsidies.
At one crucial
flashpoint, passions have been aroused over the issue of splitting an electoral
district called Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde. Flemish
politicians argue that the issue is obeying the laws and learning the language
of the place they make their home, while preventing Francophone encroachment in
Flanders. French-speaking voters fear the split could deprive them of their
right to vote for Francophone political parties and to attend court in their
own language. "If you, as a francophone, get called into court and you
have to defend yourself in Dutch, that is very difficult," said Caroline Sagesser, researcher at the Centre de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Politique in Brussels. "The
Flemish should, perhaps, remember that one of their first claims - correctly -
was that all the judicial system used to be in French and Flemish people were
unable to understand what was happening in court. "The area around
Brussels is sensitive because the city is a special linguistic case.
Geographically in Flanders, of which it is the capital, Brussels is now
francophone but officially bilingual. Carl Devos, professor of political
science at the University of Ghent, says the so-called BHV dispute is a
"border conflict" limited to a small area. "The average French
and Flemish speakers do not have much contact with each other," he said -
"perhaps when the Flemish visit the Ardennes or the francophones visit the
Belgian coast. But we don't watch each other's TV or read each other's
newspapers because they are in a different language."
The crisis reflects
the extent to which the two communities have gone separate ways and the
problems created by a complex political system designed to satisfy both
communities.
The enlargement of
the EU to include a host of countries much smaller than Flanders, which has a
population of about six million, has made the prospect of separation more
realistic. That factor has been reflected in the growing assertiveness of
separatist parties from Catalonia to Scotland. In Belgium the willingness of
each community to learn the other's language has declined. "We prefer to
speak English than the other language," Sagesser
said. "We could have tried to make bilingualism mandatory," he said.
"Instead, what happens now is that, except in Brussels, you are free to
opt for English instead of French or Dutch as your second language in high
school. English has been progressing to such an extent that some people have
joked that a solution would be to adopt English as a common language."
Belgium is having to tackle the problems in the federal system it created to
stave off conflicts between its two main communities. Coalition building at the
federal level becomes more difficult if potential partners oppose each other in
regional parliaments.
Yves Leterme, the man
most likely to become the next prime minister, is part of a generation of politicians
unschooled in the ways of the traditional Belgian compromise, having made his
career so far in Flemish politics. "Switching to a federal state did help
to appease the conflict, but it added a different framework and so people are
now thinking in this framework," Sagesser said.
"People like Leterme are very popular in their part of the country but
virtually unknown in the other where they are viewed with suspicion."
"They only need
to talk to one half of the country to be elected," he said. And while the
crisis has generated passions among politicians, it has left most of the public
unmoved, thus giving leaders little incentive to compromise. With many basic
functions of the state devolved to the regions, most Belgians have gone 155
days without a government with few ill effects.
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