By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Russia and Ukraine have signed an agreement to permit the shipping of grain through the Black Sea to world markets. A few hours after the contract was signed in Turkey, Russia attacked the Black Sea port in Odesa. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has also fired his security chief to investigate allegations of treason and dismissed his chief prosecutor and other officials. At the same time, a U.S. congresswoman asks President Joe Biden to investigate Zelenskyy’s chief of staff for his alleged ties to Russia. The war is becoming complex.

The decision to permit wheat shipments makes sense for the rest of the world. Ukraine is the fifth-largest wheat exporter, accounting for a little under 10 percent of global supply, and the Russian blockade drove the price of grain up dramatically. Whatever sense the agreement makes, it is unheard of for two nations engaged in a war to reach formal agreements on the side. Stranger still is that though Russia benefits from the arrangement too, it is far more beneficial for Ukraine, which not only receives more revenue but also gains a sense of security for its Black Sea ports. The attack on Odesa was no doubt meant to remind Ukraine that such agreements can be abandoned quickly, but the fact that it was reached, to begin with, is odd nonetheless.

Also startling is the firing of senior officials. Zelenskyy claimed that they were guilty of treason. General corruption is one thing, especially in the former Soviet Union. The invocation of betrayal is quite another. In some quarters of Kyiv, support for Russia is nothing new; Ukraine has more than its fair share of pro-Russia sympathizers. But if, say, the Federal Security Service (previously the KGB) had penetrated Ukrainian security – which is likely – then the weeks of speculation about their job security makes little sense. If senior officials are found to be compromised, their removal would be instant. Instead, Zelenskyy destabilized his government and unnerved his allies. (Of course, it could have been a foreign intelligence service that detected the breach, and Zelenskyy may have been reluctant until forced to act. As in all such matters, those who know don’t talk, and those who talk don’t know. What is clear is that this sort of matter in the course of the war is not normal.)

Russians and Ukrainians sitting side by side can’t help but bring to mind the possibilities of a peace treaty. The firings in Kyiv seem to indicate a degree of instability and discord in Ukraine, creating the possibility, however remote, that new considerations are being made that could lead to some more significant deal.

If we count the noisy leadup, the war has been raging for five months – six months. It has not gone as Russia hoped. Moscow’s initial offensive, a three-pronged attack on Kyiv, Odesa, and Donetsk, failed for various reasons: the limits of Russian logistics, the difficulty of coordinating an armored system at a distance, and above all, Ukrainian tactics and American weapons. The Ukrainians fought an infantry battle with a decentralized command structure and tactical mobility, and they did so with weapons such as Javelin missiles that were ideally suited for combatting the Russian army.

The Russians were forced to retreat to the east as they fought for the Donetsk region, a relatively small area along the Russian border where Moscow already had a significant presence. Moscow has been engaged there for five months, with mercifully short supply lines to Russia proper, and is now almost in control of the area. Even this highly vulnerable region predisposed to Russian victory took months to subdue. The experience there signals a long war in which Russia will struggle to project force over increasingly large areas of a country it does not occupy.

Meanwhile, Ukraine may have had the luxury of resting and training its infantry to the west and north, but it cannot be sure how it’ll fare against new Russian tactics. Kyiv has the advantage of American weaponry and intelligence. In theory, it has the capability to at least resist a Russian offensive even if it cannot launch a larger one of its own. This is why instability at the top of the Ukrainian command is a problem. Zelenskyy may be cleaning house in preparation for a Russian offensive, but that doesn’t explain why he dragged his feet on the dismissals. Russia might strike sooner rather than later, but the unrest at the top will likely trickle down to lower levels. Officers linked to offenders may lose focus, or troops might lose confidence in the chain of command. It is one thing to fight a war based on the unity of purpose. It is another thing to fight a war with an uncertain chain of command.

Though it’s unclear what exactly is happening in Kyiv, the Americans and the Russians are likely well informed. Assuming they didn’t force the firings for unknown reasons, the Americans will be pressing to contain the purge until later. The Russians, who certainly have assets in the Ukrainian government and military, will seek to destabilize.

There’s a chance that the firings were a minor event. That doesn’t seem likely. The war has created tension and risk at the highest levels of authority. The challenge for Ukraine is to contain the issue before it affects the army.

Both sides, then, would seem interested in a negotiated settlement. The problem is that neither side can afford one. Russia’s objective was to secure Russia and Moscow, particularly against NATO (read: American) actions. So far, the distance to Moscow is where it was when the war started. Russia cannot accept a peace that does not move Russian control far to the west. Ukraine, and by extension, the United States, might be interested in a stand-still. Russia can’t accept that without risking confidence in the government.

And it’s not a given that Ukraine would settle for it either. There is dysfunction at the top. If Kyiv were to cede significant portions of territory to Russia, things would get only more dysfunctional. For the west, moving the Russian border closer to Eastern Europe would not end the war; it would only create the pretext for the next. The closer Russia is to the western Ukrainian border, the more it must be assumed that Russia would choose to move farther still. True or not, it must be considered.

As the risks mount, a settlement seems likely. The agreement on grain was signed with some notion of what it could mean. The concept of a peace agreement is sound, but the geography of such an agreement, and imperatives on both sides, seem impossible. What is needed here is fear.

 

 

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