By
Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
Russia today slaps sanctions on Turkey in retaliation for
the November 24 downing of a Russian fighter jet over the Turkish-Syrian
border.
While I do not agree
with the actions Turkey took, it does deserve looking at why it did so.
The shooting down by
Turkish forces of a Russian Su-24 warplane follows
rising tension between the two countries over a continuing Russian bombing
campaign against ethnic Turkmen villages in north-western Syria, close to
Turkey’s border.
Plus Syria has become the arena for the long-simmering
regional contest between (Sunni) Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies on one side,
and (Shia) Iran on the other. Russia sees a vital national interest in
sustaining the regime in Damascus; Turkey in overthrowing it. Sunni states also
want to see Isis defeated, but not at the price of a victory for Tehran,
Russia, and Assad. And here are just a few of the dizzying complexities of the
conflict.
Perhaps the West was
so quick to privately criticize Turkey because it is partly to blame. If the
United States had responded more effectively to Russia’s intervention in Syria
a couple of months ago, Russia would have been deterred from further provocations.
Turkey’s downing of a
Russian plane on November 24 thus should not really have come as a surprise as
there was a clear build-up of tension.
Already when Russia
annexed Crimea in March 2014, it recalled the Russo-Turkish War and the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca. And after its capture in 2014, Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan underlined that Turkey would
never recognize the annexation of Crimea by Russia.
It isn’t just rhetoric that has heated up since Russian fighters marched into
Ukraine. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, which is supplied by the ports of
Novorossiysk, Odessa, and Sevastopol, has dominated the Black Sea, engaged in a number of radar-locking incidents with Turkish and NATO
ships. The most worrying came in March 2015, when Russian planes, during a
practice aerial bombardment run, mock
targeted the USS Vicksburg missile cruiser and the Turkish TCG Turgutreis frigate, which were in the area.
To avoid
confrontation in the Black Sea after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Turkey
redirected some of its Black Sea squadrons to South Africa and the Indian
Ocean, which caused a former Turkish navy admiral to publicly protest the weakening Turkish naval presence in the
Black Sea.
Over the following months,
Russian presence in the Aegean Sea intensified. It launched frequent eastern
Mediterranean patrols and stepped up its activities at the Russian naval base
in Tartus, Syria. By the summer of 2015, with NATO countries increasing
their aerial campaigns in Syria (and with Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad, an ally of Russia, losing ground), Moscow
believed that its access to Tartus was in jeopardy. Vice Admiral
Viktor Chirkov, commander in chief of the Russian navy, warned
that the “base is essential to us; it has been operating and will
continue to operate.”
And so, following
preparations throughout the summer, in late September, Russian forces arrived
in Syria with an official mission of supporting Assad’s forces, relieving the
Russian air base in Latakia and naval base in Tartus. Russia’s
entry into Syria was perhaps more serious for Turkey than Russia’s annexation
of Crimea. Turkey’s 1939 takeover of Hatay Province
from Syria was the only expansion of the Republic of Turkey after its borders
were consolidated. Further, Turkey backed some of the rebel groups that Russia
was now fighting, including those consisting of Turkmen
from northwestern Syria.
By fall, Russian warships were cruising
around Tartus and Latakia, around the Black Sea, out of the
existing Russian base in Armenia, and along the Aegean Sea. On October 3, then
a Russian fighter jet entered Turkish airspace during a bombardment mission in
Syria. Two Turkish planes quickly escorted the jet back into Syrian territory,
and Ankara summoned Russian Ambassador Andrey Karlov to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Russia claimed that the violation was a
navigation error.
However, one day later, on October 4, a Russian MiG-29 approached Turkish
airspace from Syria and then locked its radar on two Turkish
jets cruising the Turkish side of the border. On October 5, the show
repeated, with a Russian plane locking its radar on eight Turkish jets, again
cruising within Turkish territory.
Turkey called an
emergency NATO meeting, after which NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg
said; “this does not look like an accident, and we have seen two of them.”The White House soon
issued a statement in which it referred to repeated Russian violations as a
“provocation.” Secretary of the State John Kerry emphasized that the recent
incidents could lead to escalation. In response, the Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs proposed a joint Turkish-Russian
working group, consisting of high-level military attendance, to better
coordinate both countries’ aerial operations in Syria. Despite these, there was
no indication of whether the Russian side got the message or whether it was
even conducting these violations deliberately.
The Turkish narrative
of the Turkey’s downing on November 24 states that the Russian jet was
unidentified and was mistaken for a Syrian jet. On November
26, Erdogan argued that Turkey’s response would have been different if the jet had been identified as
Russian. Russia’s story is that the two Turkish planes that shot down the
Russia craft were in an ambush posture, indicating that the incident was
planned, something that could be possible, but then it also might simple be a
Russian invention. The Russian military also trotted out a man it claimed was
the surviving crew member; he denied receiving any warnings to leave
Turkish airspace. Never mind that the orchestrated-looking video showed him
only from behind and failed to conceal him from appearing to read his answers
from cue cards.In fact after
the downing of a Russian SU-24 bomber, a myriad of fake theories was spawned by
the Russian media.
In Russia, outrage
about the crash is enabling the Kremlin to expand on its Soviet-style narrative
about the West spreading global instability, sponsoring a fascist war in
Ukraine, and seeking to steal Russia’s natural resources. Moscow is
tapping into not only its perceived status as the “third Rome,” after the second
Rome, Constantinople, but a centuries-old
sense of Russian exceptionalism.
In turn, in the wake
of the recent downing of a Russian airliner over the Sinai and, even more
importantly, the recent Paris bombings, there had been talk of a common cause
being formed by the West and Russia against ISIS. This would-be alliance
might’ve been perceived by Turkey to threaten its interests insofar as it was
positioning itself to be geo-economically more important to Europe than Russia.
Taking a page out of Russia’s “Russkiy Mir” (Russian
World) playbook in Ukraine, Turkey had been making noises about defending the
“Turkic World” and its Turkmen “compatriots” (presumably Turkish-backed rebels)
against Russian airstrikes next door in Syria. These sentiments, combined with
Russian annexation of Crimea, serve to make the European security architecture
unstable.
But coming back to
why I do not agree with what appears to be Erdogan’s dreams of empire, and why
this can become perilous for Turkey.
Through its efforts
to oust Syria's non-Sunni president, Bashar al-Assad, and build a Muslim
Brotherhood-type of Sunni Islamist regime in Damascus, Turkey has become
everyone's foe over its eastern and southern borders -- in addition to having
to wait anxiously for the next Russian move to hit it -- not knowing where the
blow will come from.
The confrontation
with Russia has given Moscow an excuse to augment its military deployment in
Syria and the eastern Mediterranean, and weaken allied
air strikes against Islamic State (IS).
Russia has increased
its military assets in the region, including
deploying S-400 air and anti-missile defense systems,
probably ready to shoot down the first Turkish fighter jet flying over Syrian
skies.
Waiting for Turkish-Russian tensions to ease, and trying to avoid a
clash between NATO member Turkey and Russia, U.S. officials have quietly put on
hold a request for Turkey to more actively to join the allied air missions in
Syria against IS.
For the US and its
allies, the overarching interest is the re-establishment of regional stability
and the defeat of the Isis jihadis. But this is a conflict that defies partial
solutions. An eventual peace will demand the unraveling
of the confessional and the temporal, that religion surrenders to realpolitik.
The Gordian knot is
the struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia, but a settlement would have also to
acknowledge Russia’s interests and Turkey’s fears.
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