By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
Africa and the war in Ukraine
As Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine enters its seventh month, many African
countries have yet to show strong support for Kyiv, to the chagrin of Western
leaders. In the early days of the conflict, after 17
African countries declined to back a UN resolution condemning Russia,
several European diplomats assigned to African capitals made a great show of
browbeating African leaders for not taking a stand against the invasion. South
African President Cyril Ramaphosa, in particular, was
the target of some strikingly undiplomatic tweets, with Riina Kionka, at the time the EU’s ambassador to Pretoria, writing
that “we were puzzled because [South Africa] sees itself and is seen by the
world as a country championing human rights.”
Stephen Chan, a
professor of world politics at the University of London’s School of Oriental
and African Studies (SOAS), said the visits by Macron and Lavrov demonstrated
the increased need to woo Africa at a time of growing global tension and a
potential “new
Cold War.”
Despite continued
Western pressure, the
situation has not changed much in the months since. In July, for example,
French President Emmanuel Macron traveled to central Africa and West Africa to
rally support for Ukraine. Yet, he managed only to rankle many African leaders
when he accused them of “hypocrisy” for refusing to condemn the war. By
contrast, during a visit to multiple African countries that same month, Russian
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized Russia’s ties with the continent and
portrayed Russia as a “victim” in Ukraine. Only a handful of
African countries—Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria among them—have taken a strong stance
on the war, and even these have focused primarily on denouncing aggression more
broadly and on general calls for diplomacy and peace rather than on specific
criticism of Moscow.
Although leaders
in the West are puzzled by these developments, there are clear reasons for
African countries’ reluctance to embrace the Western narrative about Ukraine.
For one thing, Africa is a vast, complicated, and highly diverse continent. Its
54 countries and territories each have unique circumstances and histories and
different relations with Russia and the West. It would be unreasonable—and
condescending—to assume that the continent’s leaders could unify around a
single position instantaneously. When African countries have come together
around a common position in the past, it has often been after years of
deliberation, as with the transition from the Organization of African Unity to
the African Union, which took place in 2002 but had been in the works since the
late 1990s. On other occasions, a common front has been driven by a specific
and urgent threat, such as the Mano River Ebola outbreak or the COVID-19
pandemic. African countries knew they could not weather without a united front.
For Africa, Russia’s war in Ukraine has neither of these qualities.
Moreover, the skepticism
in African capitals about taking the Western side in a faraway war in Europe is
also rooted in a power imbalance between the West and African countries that
routinely plays out as structural violence. Beyond many historical injustices
that are not acknowledged—let alone accounted for—contemporary forms of
injustice persist. Leaders of Western nations are quick to sweep violent
colonial and neocolonial histories under the rug while African countries
continue to deal with their consequences. Consider the COVID-19 pandemic, in
which African countries were left begging for medicines and vaccines that
Western nations were throwing away by the millions, compounding the sense of
conditional friendship. Once Russia’s efforts to sway African countries are added
to the mix, history makes it difficult for the United States and its European
allies to build an African coalition against Moscow.
Putin and the freedom fighters
Of course, Russia’s
activities in Africa explain African reluctance to fall into line with the West
on Ukraine. As Western governments and analysts have noted, Moscow has been
engaged in a large-scale disinformation campaign to shape African opinion about
the conflict, particularly online. This effort builds on previous Russian
disinformation campaigns that have affected political processes elsewhere,
including in the United States. In May, The Economist published
a study of Twitter accounts used to spread Russian disinformation about the
war; many of these were based in Africa and seemed to be deliberately targeting
African communities.
One doctored image
shared widely by African Twitter accounts since the war began purportedly
showed a young Putin with former President of Mozambique Samora
Machel in a Tanzanian training camp for freedom fighters in the 1970s. In
reality, no such meetings could have occurred: Putin is not old enough to have
been in Tanzania when these photographs were taken. But the images went viral,
partly because they reinforced African grievances about the West’s colonial
legacy on the continent. Indeed, Machel later died in a mysterious plane crash
that South Africa’s Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission linked to the
apartheid government in South Africa, at the time a Western ally.
The wars of
decolonization in Africa are not ancient history. As recently as 2018, a group
of living victims of the British colonial government in Kenya successfully sued
the British government for the torture they endured in internment camps during
Kenya’s independence war in the 1950s. Other Cold War injustices are only
beginning to be addressed. In June of this year, the Belgian government
returned to the victim’s descendants a gold-crowned tooth that belonged to
Patrice Lumumba, the first prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), who was assassinated by a Belgian execution squad in 1961 in a
U.S.-backed plot.
For many countries,
communism provided an alternative to Western colonialism and a basis for
twentieth-century African independence movements. This legacy has allowed
contemporary Russia, a successor state to the Soviet Union, to portray itself
as on the right side of African history. Of course, Soviet support for
decolonization movements did not come only from Russia: much of it came from
other parts of the communist bloc, including Ukraine. But Russia has acquired
this reputation and exploited Africa’s complicated relationship with the West.
Better armed than allied
A second reason
African countries have been slow to support Ukraine stems from differences in
how African countries and their Western counterparts view contemporary
geopolitics. Many governments currently pivoting to Russia—including Mali,
Ethiopia, and Uganda —owe their political survival to Russian support. For
instance, Russia is a key weapons supplier and has provided military support
through mercenary forces like the Wagner Group to many African countries that
abstained from the UN vote condemning Russian aggression. Today, according to
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia is Africa's most
powerful weapons exporter, accounting for 44 percent of weapons purchases
between 2017 and 2021. (Ukraine is also a weapons supplier to some African
countries, particularly South Sudan.)
Several African
leaders with longtime Western backing have not hesitated to cultivate Russian
military support. With Western support, for example, Yoweri Museveni has ruled
Uganda for 38 years; Paul Biya has ruled Cameroon for
40. Both have remained in office despite copious evidence of crimes against
their people. (Macron was in Cameroon when he made his remark about hypocrisy.)
Yet, although the United States trains Ugandan soldiers to fight on its behalf
in countries like Somalia, Uganda primarily buys its arms from Russia and has
the sharpest increase in military expenditure in Africa in 2020. Similarly,
Cameroon, a significant beneficiary of French largesse, signed a weapons deal
with Moscow in April 2022, shortly after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. For
authoritarian regimes, efforts to play off both sides’ ties have reinforced the
continent’s ambivalence toward Ukraine.
Cameroon's President
Paul Biya (right) with his French counterpart
Emmanuel Macron at the presidencial palace in Yaounde, Cameroon:
But for other
countries, what Macron calls hypocrisy is more plausibly understood as conflict
fatigue. After all, Africa has experienced and continues to experience
many intractable wars. During the Cold War, many African wars were proxy
battles between the Soviet Union and the United States. Although Western powers
have been slow to recognize it, the legacy of those conflicts—including in
Angola, the DRC, Mozambique, and elsewhere—continues to cast a long shadow on
many parts of the continent. The last time Africans were asked to take sides in
a war between the West and East, countries were devastated, and millions of
people died.
In his classic essay
on decolonization, “Concerning Violence,” published in his 1961 book The
Wretched of the Earth, the psychiatrist and political philosopher Frantz
Fanon wrote that “neutralism produces in the citizen of the third world … a
fearlessness and an ancestral pride resembling defiance.” He argued that for
African countries, staying neutral was necessary for survival. But he
criticized African leaders for allowing neutralism to fuel foreign efforts to
militarize the continent. Today, the same pattern is emerging, and the warning
stands. Russia has promised to expand weapons supplies to African countries to
buy their allegiances. Now, many activists and leaders in pro-democracy circles
fear that the continent is entering another period in which efforts by foreign
powers to buy friends in African governments will herald a new era of poor
leadership.
The missing peace
African countries
have a unique vantage
point toward Russia’s war in Ukraine. Rather than inviting more of them to
join in the war, Western countries could use this opportunity to allow Africans
to practice the lessons they have learned from generations of war on their
soil. The African Union has declared that one of its aims is “silencing the
guns by 2030,” African countries have some of the most complex mechanisms for
peace and security in the world, partly because they are so frequently called
into use. For example, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union is a
standing decision-making body within the union. At the same time, subregional
organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
have gone as far as building their peacekeeping and early warning capacities.
For those who have worked with such bodies, the overarching question about the
war in Ukraine is, “Where are the peacemakers?” Aside from the UN
Secretary-General, they do not see much evidence of world leaders urging
de-escalation. Isn’t a conflict between Russia and the West the precise
scenario that international diplomacy exists to address?
Thousands of people have been killed in the conflict
in Tigray:
Indeed, African
countries know how difficult ending wars can be. In East Africa, multiple
conflicts are underway, including in eastern DRC, Ethiopia, Somalia, South
Sudan, and Sudan. Several of these have been devastating: there is mounting
evidence of genocide
in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, and Sudanese people continue to struggle for
an end to military rule as other countries—including Russia—offer the military
regime military and financial support. These conflicts have triggered interventions
by the African Union, the Inter-Governmental Agency for Development, and the
East African Community, not to mention a few bilateral efforts at mediation.
Some of these wars have been raging for a generation. African countries’
collective hesitation to be drawn into Ukraine must be interpreted, in part, in
light of this visceral awareness of the long-term harm that wars on the
continent have produced.
History reminds
African countries to approach Ukraine’s conflict cautiously and treat
claims of friendship with suspicion. For many Africans, the current
overtures from Russia and the West are not about friendship. They are about
using Africa as a means to an end. Authoritarian leaders like Biya can and have reaped benefits from the war. But the dominant
African position, given the significant uncertainties about the war and its
outcome, has been to demand peace and urge diplomacy—and, whenever possible, to
avoid having to take sides in a conflict that seems unlikely to offer much to
Africa, mainly if it turns the continent into a new theater of proxy war.
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