The US mission to
China in 1843 was more than an isolated policy of opening relations with a
foreign country-it was about access to an entire market that would reposition
the spatial order of the earth. This development in plan and in action went
beyond the negotiations of a single treaty with a single country; it
encompassed the entire region.
Cushing had
articulated as much in his private correspondence with President Tyler when he
warned of British intentions in the Pacific. In the same breath in which
Cushing suggested immediate steps be made to send a mission to China, he also
said that upon successful negotiations with China the envoy ought to sail to
Japan and preempt British designs by being the first to secure a diplomatic
treaty with that country.142
Prior to the Opium
War, Americans had sought the opening of Japan in the spirit of accessing
markets after being expelled from the British mercantile system. Here the US
government did come to assume a positive role as early as 1815. The difference
in the case of Japan compared with China was that the Japanese offered no
avenues of trade with the outside world. Whereas the Chinese allowed trade
through Cantont the Japanese had shut themselves off
from foreign commerce and interaction since the early seventeenth century and
rebuked all attempts by merchants to visit their portst
allowing only the Dutch to carry on a meager and strictly regulated trade at
Nagasaki. Not until after the Opium Wart howevert
with the now articulated need of action by the US government to establish an
American presence in the regiont did consideration in
earnest begin to open Japan. While speculation on the Japan market did
entertain Americanst it was really the desire to
integrate Japan into the forming American spatial ordert
and the rivalry with Britain for the Pacific trade that gave urgency to such a
mission. In the mid to-late 1840s and early 1850s the US began to establish
steam lines to carry communications and passengers to important destinations
around the globe. Through steam routes from East Asia to North America and then
onto Europe the US saw the ability to control intelligencet
transportation and commerce. Such technology would put the US at the center of
the earth andt in the words of one US senatort "make New York to what London now is to the
great settling house of the world.“143 In order to create the steam route from
the American west coast to China a coaling station was needed. Japan possessed
of the necessary resource, and directly on route to Shanghai, stood positioned
to fulfill this role.
Unlike the China
mission however, no single event or factor can explain the motivation for the
Japan mission and why it occurred when it did. In the late 1840s and early
1850s a general consensus had formed in America on Japan and the action needed
to be taken by the US government. From all sides of the debate-merchants,
whalers, transportation investors, politicians, the Navy-voices pointed to the
necessity for one reason or another to open Japan to American commerce and
interaction by entering into direct diplomatic relations with that country.
What this myriad of voices did have in common however, and the theme that
knitted them together in the fabric of an expedition to Japan, was the idea of
American spatial order of the earth, and the systems and institutions that
would build this order. Under this general sentiment, the spark for positive
government action came when the British press, reflective of public opinion,
began a systematic campaign in the late 1840s to open Japan, and British
diplomats began to draw up plans to realize this opening; Americans once again
felt the threat and rushed to move before the British did and be the first to
open Japan; to set the terms of interaction of that country with the West,
giving America primacy and thus order. So it was that at this time, in the
summer of 1851 that Daniel Webster, again Secretary of State, now under
President Millard Fillmore, drew up instructions to send a mission to Japan and
negotiate a treaty on behalf of the United States.
Like the treaty of Wangxia, the opening of Japan by Commodore Matthew C. Perry in 1854 stands as a focal point of early US foreign
policy. The Perry's mission aimed at and succeeded in throwing open an isolated
Japan to the commerce of the world, convinced Japan to welcome shipwrecked
sailors and laid the grounds for a merchant base to access the China market. As
the US worked to reinvent interaction with Asia in terms of the Pacific trade
running through the American continent the incorporation of the Japan islands
into the global commercial system by Americans own design strengthened the US
hand. Unlike the case of China however~ the US initiated the first treaty with
Japan and thus set the terms by which this Asian country would interact with
the world. This not only gave American merchants an advantage of primacy but
also allowed the US to shape the relationship to its liking and gain greater
control over the Pacific and the Pacific markets.
Research on the Perry
mission to date (november 2007) has focused on
creating a narrative of the Japan mission. Not surprisingly Perry's own account
of his expedition Narrative of the Expedition to the China Seas and Japan,
which was compiled by Francis Hawks with Perry's notes and under the Commodore's
instruction, together with a number of transcripts and reports from the
contemporary Congress, has formed the basis of not least of all, the
academic analysis on the mission.144 Overwhelmingly historians have drawn on a
few passages from these sources to explain the origins of the mission.145 A
paraphrasing of the narrative goes something like this: 'American whalers who
had been frequenting Japanese waters since the early nineteenth century were in
need of ports of refuge and supplies. Compounding this requirement was the
acquisition of the Oregon Territory and California in the late 1840s, which
gave the US a new expansive coastline and at least four good Pacific harbors.
With the discovery of gold in California, thousands of Americans began to
populate the West coast. A new Whig president in office sought to expand US
trade, and his Secretary of State and Secretary of the Navy were towering
individuals with purpose of mind to penetrate the Pacific markets with steam
powered ships. Japan, standing on the edge of the Pacific and rich in coal, was
desired as a refueling depot for steam powered ships, and needed to be
persuaded to open its harbors to American trade.' This reasoning, in some type
of rhetorical or polemic variation can be found in Hawks, a few reports and
speeches by Congressmen, and some newspapers and journals of the day.146 These
sources and the explanation provided have remained the lynchpin for historians
moving their narrative from recognizing Japan, to interest in the island, to
positive action.
To be sure,
historians have done a fine job of telling this story of Perry and the Japan
mission-of recreating the narrative of the mission's inception to its success,
complete with details about the Commodore's habits of command. But lacking in
the often told story is a deeper understanding of what the opening of Japan
meant to Americans of the day. Discussion of a Pacific steam route, for
example, cannot be read simply as an explanation for opening Japan, but must be
seen in the context of the day of establishing a network of trade, penetration
into Asia, and international rivalry. Read in this manner, Japan appears in the
historical record as but a piece of a larger regional-and even global-strategy.
This is the greater story that the sources tell but is rarely recognized in the
historical literature. The acquisition of the West coast, the movement of
people, the patrolling of the Pacific, the individuals who formed East Asia
policy, are all but parts to the larger picture of US activity. Viewed this way
the horse returns to its position in front of the cart, or in our case,
pretensions of global dominance precedes the land based empire.
The historical
literature on the opening of Japan generally takes the event as a microcosm in
and of itself, settling on a narrow frame of reference, which allows the
construction of a linear causal link in the narrative, and which, by default,
hinders any broader analysis of the true desires of the US government in its
decision to play a positive role in forcing the Japanese government to open the
island to trade and interaction. The literature further fails to explain why
the US did so at this particular moment in history.
In the words of one
historian after outlining the plight of whalers and the acquisition of the West
coast: "Whatever the case, at some point in 1850, Commodore Perry began to
outline a plan for a major diplomatic undertaking.“147 Through the use of such
mechanisms, the historical narratives focus on the story telling, the causality
of events, and the individuals involved. The narratives do not attempt to
explain how the events or people are quilted together, or the greater meaning
or strategies behind the seemingly straightforward foreign policy decision.
What these narratives do do is recount the failed
attempts to open Japan prior to Perry, and then tell of the arrival of majestic
individuals who strut onto the scene in 1850, and who, through their
prescience, willpower, and genius, succeed where others had failed.
Much like the Cushing
mission, Tyler pennett's Americans in Eastern Asia
has served as the basis of modern scholarship on the Perry mission. Published
in 1922, Americans in Eastern Asia is very much a product of its time. Relying
on the outcome of the policies of individual diplomats and officials, the work
is thick with official documents and thin on analysis, giving absolute agency
to the men who spoke for history, and little primacy to the trends of the times
which informed these men's decisions and desires. Dennett reads the historical
record as a collection of interests and failed attempts to open Japan, and then
the successful acts of one man, Perry, which led to the accomplishment of the
mission. Dennett dutifully notes the rise of the whale industry and the
increasing need to repatriate shipwrecked sailors and to find ports of refuge
for American ships. He embodies the push for markets in an American merchant's
ceaseless proposals for a Japan mission. Dennett does justice in one paragraph
to the need for coal and a coaling station in the East, and hinges the
cumulative effort by Americans in the early 1850s on the settlement of the West
coast and the discovery of gold in California.148 This "an created an
atmospheric condition favorable to still further adventures," Dennett
wrote, continuing with a truism that ..the times were quite different" in
1850 than they were of decades past. And therefore the Perry mission. 149
Subsequent
scholarship has kept Dennett's basic interpretations and moved to fill in more
story in greater detail. Peter Booth Wiley' s Yankees in the Land of the Gods
follows Dennett's theme and only adds more story to the narrative. In
exhaustive detail and with liberal historical imagination Wiley tells the tales
of shipwrecked whalers and the intimacies of the personal lives of commodores
and the glory of steamships. He remarks on Perry's close ties with New York
merchants and his role in supervising the construction of new steamships. The
significance of such a connection, however, Wiley does not tell, and when it
comes time to explain the impetus for the mission, Wiley resorts to the
practice of his predecessors and lists the events. Similarly, John Schroeder,
in his biography of Perry, writes of the US expansion westward in the late
1840s and the logical move across the Pacific. For Schroeder, President
Fillmore, Secretary of State Daniel Webster, and Naval Secretary William Graham
came into office in 1850 with desires to expand trade. Perry thus
"responded to the nation's growing interest in Japan," and the
mission was born.150 Likewise, the editors of the Papers of Daniel Webster draw
the reasoning for the mission to having obtained the West coast and the natural
desire to build a steam line across the Pacific, at which time Webster and
Fillmore, ''resolved to send a mission to that secluded country.“151 The
editors conclude that coal was the reason for opening Japan.
In all of these
accounts the said authors give absolute agency to one man, Commodore Matthew C.
Perry, or, at best, include Secretary of State Daniel Webster and Secretary of
the Navy William Graham as fellow conspirators. Such analysis stems from a traditional
school of scholarship on diplomatic history in which a president or secretary's
policies are analyzed and judged as the movers of history. More immediate to
the historiography of US East Asia policy, Dennett's influence is again
unmistakable. His chapter on the opening of Japan is aptly titled
"Commodore Perry's Policy" and focuses-to no surprise-exclusively on
Perry. Dennett summed up his philosophy of diplomatic history with the
statement: "American policies in Japan, as in China, were largely
personal.“152 Scholarship on the mission has predominately followed this lead.
The challenge then,
is to deduce the true desires of these men who made policy and played an active
role in shaping history. Instead of interpreting the might of their character
and the resolve of their spirit as some innate driving force that separates them
from other men of their day or that propels them to do great things where
others demure, we must ask what led these actors to make the decisions they
made and to act in the ways that they did. This is not to deny the role these
men played, but rather to understand from a position of greater clarity what
drove them to do what they did. That is, we must abandon the subject as the
ultimate historical cause and look to a broader framework and trends that mayor may not have informed the agent, but certainly framed
the world within which the agent operated. 153
The historiography we
have, therefore, fails to take us beyond the story of the Japan mission and
into a deeper analysis of why it happened and what it meant. The scholarship is
limited to the mission itself within the single context of the Japan mission in
the early 1850s. (To be fair, the literature has tried to do nothing more.) Yet
in order to understand what drove contemporary Americans' interest in Japan and
why it was enough for the US government to intervene positively, we must look
at the role Americans wanted their United States to play in the world and the
spatial order they had set about to reconstruct. We must understand the
importance of Japan in context of the American nomos and what the island meant
to the new spatial order of the earth. Primary sources relating to those
involved and the sentiment at the time of the Japan mission cannot be separated
from the larger goals of the US in Asia and the world. It thus becomes
necessary to reintegrate the events of the Japan expedition back into US foreign
policy of the day and the narrative of US spatial order. Once we see Japan and
the mission sent to open it not as an event in and of itself but as an integral
piece to larger desires of Americans, then the world order that the US built
over the course of its history become clear.
But owing to their
own history, Americans believed that all nations have the right to
self-determination and decide its own course. This led Americans to regard
Japan like the American Indians, as peoples living outside of the law of
nations and undeserving of civilized treatment. Under this logic, the US gave
itself the right to use military threats, or to use force in order to bring
Japan and the Japanese into the "natural" order of things.
Claude Phillips did a
similar outline of holistic factors contributing to the origins of the mission
in his 1956 article ''Some Forces Behind the Opening of Japan." Whereas
Neumann focused on the ideological reasoning, Phillips took up the material forces,
arguing that various commercial trends in contemporary America led to extensive
Congressional debates on extending commercial relations with other countries.
In the case of Japan, Congressmen and their constituents believed that Japan
possessed a worthwhile market that could be a profitable outlet for American
agriculture products. Phillips outlined the business interests pressing for
government action since 1837, and the culmination of these demands bringing the
issue to greater and greater prominence through continued lobby. Congressmen
ultimately took up the call and voiced their own concern about opening the
Japan market.
Although Japan never
held the allure of the markets of China, the fact that Japan lay closed to the
outside world led to a good deal of mystique and speculation about the riches
of the island. Americans first explored Japanese waters in 1788 when whalers
sailed the north Pacific. Within thirty years the fertile waters of the Pacific
had produced five grounds for American fishing men, and in 1843 over one
hundred whaling ships sought out the small circle between the fifty-first and
fifty-sixth degrees of north latitude.154 In 1847, American whaling vessels in
the Pacific exceeded six hundred, giving employment to over twenty thousand
men. This far outweighed the number of merchant vessels calling on ports in the
Pacific and East Indies, which amounted to only 181.155 In the summer of 1848
American whaler Captain Roys sailed north of Japan to
fish and brought home tales of success, which inspired 154 whale ships the next
year to sail forth and bring home 206,850 barrels of whale oil and 2,481,600
pounds of bone. In 1850, 144 American ships of larger stock brought home
243,680 barrels of whale oil and 3,654,000 pounds of bone. "In these two
years," Navy Secretary William Graham remarked, "more American seamen
were engaged in that small district of ocean than are employed in our whole
navy at anyone time.',IS6 By the 1850s, estimated
annual worth of whaling in the North Pacific waters was estimated at $7
million, employing some 18,000 men on 700 ships, outnwnbering
the rest of the world's whaling fleets put together. Such a presence led to
Hennan Melville's novel Moby Dick, in which he wrote of Japan: "If that
double-bolted land, Japan, is ever to become hospitable, it is the whale-ship
alone to whom the credit will be due; for already she is on the threshold.“157
Whalers had
unsuccessfully attempted numerous times to obtain supplies from Japan, and
shipwrecked sailors found themselves at the unwelcome mercy of Japanese
captors, but none of these whaling expeditions attempted to trade directly with
Japan. In 1791 the first American ship sailed into Japanese ports and requested
permission to trade. On his way to China peddling furs from the Oregon
territory, John Kendrich hoped to test the Japanese market. Refused entry and
driven off he did not try again nor press the matter. Americans took part in
the Dutch monopoly during the Napoleonic war, however. Due to the English
prowess of the European continental commerce, the Dutch hired Americans as
neutrals to carry trade in and out of Japan. When the wars ended in 1807,
however, the Dutch took back the trade and cut out the Americans. Some three
decades later the American traders Olyphant and Company based in Guangdong
(Canton) sent their ship the Morrison to Japan to request trading privileges.
As missionary Wells Williams, who sailed with the Morrison, wrote, "Free
trade begets a free interchange of thought; with the goods, the civilization
and Christianity of foreign nations will extend.,,158 Although the Morrison
carried Japanese shipwrecked sailors to repatriate, the Japanese refused the
ship entry and fired warning shots driving the American merchants away. 59
American reports in
the first half of the nineteenth century exhibited wide speculation on the
worth that prospective trade with Japan could bring. US Consular at Batavia Jolm Shellaber wrote in the 1830s
of the benefits of opening trade with Japan, including an annual tonnage of
5,000 amounting to $300,000.160 Twenty years later the New Orleans Journal De
Bow's Review reported the Japan market was worth $200 million
annually-surprising growth considering the country was still closed to the
world. 161 Other American press quoted the more realistic British United
Service Magazine as saying that "What [Japan] trade would really be, it is
impossible, a priori. To determine, because we neither know with certainty the
population of the empire, nor the extent of its resources.“162
Following the opening
of more ports of trade with China in 1844, a type of market fever gripped
Americans. The Secretary of the Navy, John Kennedy, reported to the Senate in
1853 that US trade with China "must necessarily increase," and that
the "same causes which produce this increase must augment our trade with
the continent of Asia and the islands of the Pacific." Kennedy continued
to say that, "These consequences are so apparent and inevitable that it is
not deemed necessary to repeat what has been so often said in relation to the
trade here referred to.“163 In addition to the China market, which would rescue
the south from its cotton glut, the other markets of East Asia also held
promising allure, and led to vast discursive speculation. Japan stood in
prominent view of Americans in these debates. As Commodore Biddle wrote to Navy
Secretary George Bancroft in 1846, "the supply of American cotton in Japan
may, perhaps, become equal to the demand."I64 Com too was viewed as a
commodity which the Japan market would consume.165 Congressman Pratt took the
debate to the House floor pontificating on the Japanese population
"exceeding fifty millions, (about thrice as numerous as the whole
population of the United States)" and the great strength of Japanese
industry "comparable with that of the Chinese." Although Pratt noted
that foreign trade remained forbidden, he pointed out that "the internal
commerce of Japan is very extensive," which, if the US could tap, would
yield forth great wealth.166
Americans viewed the
Japan market as a natural right to access. Ideologically, trade was not a
choice but something open to and deserved by all, and which would serve the
greater benefit of humanity. These views were prominently expressed for the
American public in the spring and summer of 1852 by both the Whig and
Democratic parties in extensive articles in their respective journals. The
article "Japan," published in the Democratic Review of April 1852,
opened with a long discursive on free commerce and the ills of a despotic
system that kept its subjects trapped in tyranny and locked out from the wider
world. Such a system, the editors continued while still employing an ambiguous
and abstract tone lacking a subject, defies "a natural right which every
being possesses...that of traffic with any other being who will trade with
him." Should a legal bind governing the rules and stipulation of trade not
yet exist between two countries then "all our citizens retain their
natural right to trade with the citizens of such nation."
Indeed, "if no
treaty exists, then my natural right claims full force." This means, by
ideological definition of the understanding of the term, and inherit in being,
that "every citizen of our country has a natural right to convey his goods
to the ports of another country, and trade, if he can." However, for a
state that closes itself off to the world and denies "the right" of
trade and intercourse with others, "denies them every good which lies
beyond their borders, and chains them to a routine of unnatural and soulless
customs and traditions." The journal then directly referred to such a
state as Japan by name, the article continued to provide for its readers a
detailed description of a Japanese government enacting "a system of
espionage, distrust, and hatred in society, sanguinary Draconism
in law, and arbitrary distinctions in rank." This government kept its
people in "a most unnatural and repugnant system of political and social
coercion; that, naturally a trading nation, they are debarred from extended trade."
For such reasons the Democratic Review argued, the opening of Japan ''is
demanded by reason, civilization, progress, and religion." 167
Echoing similar
sentiments, the American Whig Review published a similar article two months
later with the title "Japan-the Expedition" arguing that the
"Japanese can be brought into commercial and friendly relations with other
nations." Like their partisan counterparts, the editors here decried the
Japanese as "a rude, intractable nation; selfish, unsocial, and
uninteresting." Important for the Whigs was the freedom of commerce and
allowing enterprising American merchants to have free reign of the sea and to
trade with whomever they may desire. To this end the Review quotes Secretary of
State Daniel Webster's instructions for the opening of the country: "steps
should be taken at once to enable our enterprising merchants to supply the last
link in that great chain which unites all nations of the world.,,168 Although
lacking the theoretical discursive of the Democratic Review, the American Whig
Review article maintained a similar moralizing tone and proselytizing discourse
about the natural rights of free trade and the demonism of the Japanese system
of government.
Given their righteous
understanding of this natural right, it followed for Americans that free trade
begat liberalism and civilization.169 "It is the mission of commerce to
civilize the world," said Senator Miller of New Jersey in 1852. "It
is commerce, aided by steam, that is to carry those principles of liberty and
enterprise which have given this country its prominence and its glory
throughout the world to the other races and nations of mankind.“170 Should
Japan open its harbors and cease its practice of ''unnatural seclusion",
then, Americans of the day argued, all the evil practices and institutions that
have oppressed the Japanese people, the "cruel feudal regulations
oppressing the peasantry, degrading servitude fettering the nobles, utter
contempt visited upon the merchants, arbitrary laws impeding agriculture,
joined with a sanguinary code of laws, a vagabond priesthood, a corrupt police,
and a thousand debasing superstitions," as expressed in the
Democratic Reivew, all these uncivilized ways of a nation
"out of the pale" would be transformed. 171
For Westerns of the
day, such developments were certainly in the best interests of the world, and
justified the use of force if necessary. In the words of Commodore James Glynn
in early 1851, if ''They won't willingly comes to
terms-make them; we could convert their selfish government into a liberal
republic in a short time; such an unnatural system would at the present day
fall to pieces upon the slightest concussion."172 Glynn drove this point
home in a letter to the president later that year arguing that ''the progress
of civilization demands" that Japan enter into relations with the US and
the rest of the world, by force if necessary. 173 Or, as the New York Daily
Times admonished in early 1852: "Japan has no right to bury her treasures
behind her walls, and to imprison her people under the cover of loathing and
ignorant superstition...it is the duty of those who know her, even better than
she knows herself, to force upon her the dawning of a better day.“174
The spread of these
"natural rights" and social and political values were integral to the
US project. In view of itself as distinct from Britain, Europe and the rest of
the old world, the US world order likewise needed to distinguish itself from
that of monarchy, class, commercial regulation, political and social
restriction, and most of all the colonial British empire. By propagating itself
as the pinnacle of freedom and civilization the US could at once justify its
maneuvers to secure markets under contest by force if necessary, and at the
same time begin to build a world order based on open trade in lands that it
held a superior geographical advantage, and not on subjugation, colonization
and exclusion. A new spatial order began to form in the physical act of drawing
geographical access based on new legal justifications, and it swirled like the
eddies of the black ditch current in the South Japan seas around the China
markets and access to those markets.
Yet the Japan market
was not the only cause for active engagement with the closed state; in fact,
the drive for the Japan market only occupied a peripheral concern in the lager
strategic goals of the US for total access and control of the region. In consideration
of Japan, the American agenda focused on building an institutional order that
would at once secure all the markets of the Pacific and the trade ushering on
that great ocean. It would do this through treaties and footholds and funnel
trade through the US, and in doing this counter European influence and order.
Fast, reliable transportation and communication was necessary. Poised on the
Pacific Rim, Japan would complete what Daniel Webster, the Secretary of State
in the early 1850s, called "the great chain of being." The US had
consolidated the western American coast fulfilling the goal of obtaining the
prime ports for access to the China market. With this complete, Americans
continued the cause by building more invasive structures that would give them
control of the region. The Democratic Review noted in 1852: "It is
beginning to be pretty well understood that these coasts are a sort of key to
Eastern Asia, and that a commanding influence established upon them by a
civilized nation, will give it the sway of the Pacific, and of all benefits
which may hereafter flow from a great maritime outlet of Asiatic trade."
But more than that,
by opening Japan to American ships under their own terms, the US saw, as
expressed in the Democratic Review "a new highway for all the most
valuable exchanges of east and west." For the US, then, access to Japan
meant putting American "mercantile power in the position of warders to the
whole Asiatic continent.“175 This was not a partisan issue, but something that
all Americans agreed on as their destiny as they built an empire. The American
Whig Review echoed the view when it discussed "The establishment of a
steam marine on the California coast, by which the celerity of our commerce
with China will be vastly increased, and the influence of the United States
extended over the entire East, is vividly suggested by this step towards opening
an intercourse with that long-secluded and inhospitable nation of which we have
been speaking [i.e. Japan]."Only then, the journal continued, "When
this step of progress is consummated, the destiny of the Republic of the United
States will but have commenced.“176
In pursuit of these
goals, Japan and its geographical position beckoned. Americans saw the need to
bring Japan into that "great chain of being" to solidify the emerging
US spatial order. Standing at the edge of the Pacific, American ships
encountered Japan first on their route to Asia. For Americans, therefore, a
port of entry was needed in accessing Asia, as was a reliable supply station
for ships coming and going. As Webster's instructions for the opening of Japan
read: "The moment is near when the last link in the chain of oceanic steam
navigation is to be formed. From China and the East Indies to Egypt, thence
through the Mediterranean and Atlantic ocean to England, thence again to our
happy shores, and other parts of this great continent; from our own ports to
the southernmost part of the isthmus that connects the two western continents;
and from its Pacific coast, north and southwards, as far as civilization has
spread, the steamers of other nations and of our own carry intelligence, the
wealth of the world, and thousands of ttavelers.“177
This opening
paragraph in the brief two pages of instructions to the Commodore assigned to
open Japan emphasize the US construction of a new spatial order in which Japan,
positioned at the edge of an important market, serves as a key link. Although
Americans recognized Japan as an important link, it was the introduction of
steamship navigation that accelerated the necessity to incorporate this link
into Webster's chain. American naval, merchant, but especially mail steamers
from San Francisco to Shanghai needed a refueling station in Asia, and Japan
was widely believed to be possessed of an abundance of suitable coal. As
Webster wrote in the instructions for the Japan expedition: "The interests
of commerce, and even those of humanity, demand, however, that we should make
another appeal to the sovereign of that country, in asking him to sell to our
steamers, not the manufacturers of his artisans, or the results of the toil of
his husbandmen, but a gift of Providence, deposited, by the Creator of all things,
in the depths of the Japanese islands for the benefit of the human
family."178
When Americans went
forth to do and Japan open its shores, they did so asking them not to buy
American goods, or allow American merchants access to the Japan markets. Rather
they went asking only to purchase coal to fuel their hegemonic desires. The
rise of the technology of steam driven ships in the early to mid-nineteenth
century was akin to the advances in astrological navigation in the fifteenth
century. Where the use of chronometers and star maps allowed ships to sail with
precise coordinates of longitude, steam allowed a system of regularity and
speed in transportation and communication never seen before. Whereas merchants
and mail ships once had to rely on weather patterns and fear storms, which
could delay transportation by weeks and months, steam powered ships could
arrive at their destination within a predictable number of days. Furthermore,
the speed of steam could outpace sail by twice as much or more. As David B.
Tyler, the historian of steam power, wrote in Steam Conquers the Atlantic, "Steam
shrunk the ocean to an eighth of its size in the day of the sailing ship..
.commerce attained a degree of regularity and reliability that rivals
transcontinental commerce.“179 More polemical, but ever as apt in catching the
mood of the time, Commodore Perry wrote in 1838, "The destines of nations
are henceforth to be in a great measure controlled by a power of which steam
will be the great governing element.“180
Despite such
proclaimed advantages, the US government was slow to accept the benefits of the
steamship advancement. In the late 1830s the British and French governments had
subsidized steamship ventures and were regularly commissioning steamship
construction to carry mail and passengers. 181 The US, however, had not
commissioned steam routes and did not support the construction of steam ships.
Part of the reason was that Americans made sailing ships of superior quality
and was thus reluctant to promote steam. Furthermore, the US had not yet begun
to exploit its coal supply, providing an obstacle and a cost that a country
like Britain did not face.182 This all added up to the problem of cost; ocean
steamships were not profitable unless supported by government subsidy. American
capitalist R.B. Forbes found this out firsthand when he built steamships in the
mid-1840s to take advantage of the newly opened China ports. His first attempt
led to a breakdown and had to rely on sail to return home. The second attempt in
1845 sailed to Bombay and then Hong Kong but was refused opium supplies for
trade out of fear that the heat of the steamship would destroy the drug. He
later chartered his ship to the US government for use in the Mexican War.183
American
entrepreneurs however had a close relationship with steam. In 1815 steam power
for river transportation had begun to be realized, and within two years ten
steamboats ran between New York City and Albany, and eight to nine between New
York City and New Jersey. That year (1817) an American ship, the Savannah, was
the first steamship to cross the Atlantic. Making it from New York to London in
twenty-nine days and eleven hours. Numerous times over the decades the US
government attempted to build war steamers, authorizing construction in 1814,
1829, and 1839, but construction did not commence until 1842 due to lack of
funds.184
By this time the US
had begun to notice the rest of the world had outpaced it in steam development.
Engineering advances since the Savannah first crossed the Atlantic had halved
the time it took to sail from New York to London in the late 1830‘s, making steam
travel not only practical but a growing necessity. As President Tyler said in
his 1844 annual address: "I cannot too strongly urge the policy of
authorizing the establishment of a line of seam ships
regularly to ply between this country and foreign ports, and upon our own
waters.. . We cannot be blind to the fact, that other nations have already
added large numbers of steam ships to their naval armaments, and that this new
and powerful agent is destined to revolutionize the condition of the world. It becomes
the United States, therefore, looking to their security, to adopt a similar
policy.“185
On this initiative
the Congress passed a bill in the last days of the Tyler presidency to
subsidize steam lines. As the cost of building and maintaining steam still
appeared too great for the infant government, and the technology still
advancing, the US government opted for policy borrowed from Britain of
subsidizing the building of steamships and the routes they would run to carry
mail regularly. In the event of war the Navy would purchase the ships and
outfit them for battle. The first step taken to achieve this end was the
passage of a bill that authorized the postmaster general to contract the
carrying of mail to private and foreign companies. Foremost, the mail could be
carried by private companies running the steam lines, and in the event of war
and the government possession and use of these ships the mail could be
contracted out to foreign companies.
On October 4, 1844
the government opened bidding for four steam driven mail routes: transatlantic,
Cuba, the Gulf of Mexico, and Panama with an extension to Oregon. 186 By the
late 1840s the US had thus begun to build a network of steamers carrying communications
around the Western hemisphere. Legislation in early 1847 approved a line from
Panama to a port on the western coast of the US, establishing what the Chairman
of the House Committee on Naval Affairs, T. Butler King, said afforded
"frequent and regular means of intercourse with all places on the American
shores of the Pacific.“187 These lines carried regular correspondence to and
from ports, as well as encouraged the timely transportation of passengers.
With the
establishment of regular steam lines the US spatial order of the earth took on
a new dimension, shrinking both time and space. Americans were able to work
with this new technology to methodologically extend their influence when
possible and solidify it where needed. For the US at mid-century, this meant
the establishment of a steamer line across the Pacific. The treaty with China
in 1844 and the solidification of American territory on the Pacific coast led
Americans to take the next step and carve out footholds in the Pacific and
extenuate its control in that region. The recent developments, King said in a
report in 1848, "have placed in our power, ultimately, to communicate with
China almost as rapidly as we now do with Europe. To accomplish this, however,
we must extend telegraphic wires across the continent, and establish a line of
steamers from San Francisco or Monterey to Shanghai and Canton."188 This
proposed line from China to the western US coast and across the American
continent to connect to the steam lines crossing the Atlantic, would cut the
time required for communications from Canton or Shanghai to less than half the
time required by the overland route, from sixty days to twenty-seven days. Add
on the sixteen days necessary for British steamers to sail from Calcutta to
Canton, to make forty-three days from Calcutta to London, a few days less than
the British line. "We, therefore, have it in our power, ultimately,"
King wrote, "to establish and control the most rapid means of
communication with all India as well as China.“189 But why stop there? In a
letter to Senator King, Navy Lieutenant Maury informed him of the ability to
use such a line to convey communications "from China, through the United
States, to the people of St. Petersburg and Moscow, and, perhaps, at no distant
day, to Constantinople also, within 45 days."190
From an intelligence
point of view this had its obvious strengths: the US would be able to control
the flow of information and receive correspondence and intelligence before its
European rivals. From a commercial point of view, this would allow American merchants
to relay information and instructions back and forth at a faster rate than
before as well as ahead of their competitors. As M.P. Maury, a navy lieutenant
wrote to King in 1847, "In the progressive sprite of the age, time has
become to be reckoned as money.“191
This point was
emphasized by Senator Rusk in 1850 in a report to the Senate on the need to
build steamships for the necessity of rapid travel which would beget the
accumulation of wealth. ''Where ever facilities of rapid travel exist, trade
will be found with its attendant wealth... the commercial history of England
has shown that mail facilities have uniformly gone hand in hand with the
extension of trade." 192 Before his peers in Congress King here emphasized
this point of commercial advantage, which would "give the American
merchants and manufacturers greatly the advantage of those of Europe, in the
means of communicating with correspondents in China." He also continued to
outline the possibility of passenger transport from China to New York and
London, which could take place at the rate of twenty and thirty-two days
respectively, "Bringing them to New York in less than one third, and to
London in about one half the time now required to pass over the British, or
overland route." So great where the prospects of this system of
communication and transport that King prophesized that "in a few years,
cause the balance of trade with all nations to turn in our favor, and
make New York, what London now is, the great settling house of the world.“193
The strategic and
commercial goals here articulated by the United States Congressman were
embedded in the true desires of Americans and the US government as they sought
to impose their order in the Pacific. The nuts and bolts of the new nomos being
fonned were bound up in this steam line. As Glynn
wrote to New York merchants Holland and Aspinwall, the steamship line across
the Pacific is ''the most magnificent and perhaps profitable projects that has
ever entered the mind of a practical man-that of diverting the commerce of half
the human family from its foreign channels into the bosom of his own country.
The steam line between Asia and America is by common consent considered the
very foundation of this splendid structure.“194
This idea swirled in
the mind of many Americans. The US stood poised to capture the riches of East
Asia and the commerce of Europe as goods flowed across oceans and through the
American continent. The transpacific steam line shuttling goods to and from the
shores of America would allow the US to capture the commerce and trade of
transport and finance, enriching its people and thus the country. Here indeed,
as Francis L. Hawks wrote in the Narrative of the Expedition to the China Seas
and Japan in 1856, "our continent must, in some degree at least, become a
highway for the world.“195
In the Congress,
King's oratory and report led to a series of joint resolutions in May 1848 by
both Houses to establish lines to steam the Pacific from California to China,
and California to Hawaii. Citing "extensive and rapidly increasing
commerce" on the Pacific, the primary resolution noted the necessity to
provide the means of frequent and timely communication with whaling vessels in
Hawaii and the principal ports in China. The Congress thus directed the
Secretary of the Navy to employ one war steamer to transport mail and
passengers from a port in California to Hawaii and back once a month, and a
line of three or four war steamers to proceed once a month from a port on the
US west coast to Shanghai and then onto to Canton.196 In a corollary resolution,
the Congress authorized the Secretary of the Navy to establish coal depots to
supply the said steamers.197
As the matter of the
establishment of a Pacific line was discussed, the issue of coal supply
constantly haunted the debate. The US had not tapped its continental coal
supplies, nor did it have immediate access to any in the Pacific. For King this
did not provide an obstacle even if "the difficulties which may arise in
the establishment of depots of coal cannot be foreseen." He proposed that
the US tap China, Japan and Taiwan, which he believed would hold abundant coal
supplies.198 Others, however, were less sanguine on the prospect of obtaining
coal from China or Taiwan, neither of which were known to contain sources of
adequate supplies. Due to the New York capitalist Aaron Palmer's research on
Asian states not having relations with the US, Japan was widely believed to
have an abundance of coal. The convenient necessity of Japanese coal was made
all the more appealing because the southern part of Japan lay directly on the
shortest line from San Francisco to Shanghai. Palmer was quick to point this
out to the Secretary of State in a letter in September 1849, advising him to
request permission from the government of Japan to establish coaling stations
"at a port or ports in Japan proper."l99 Likewise, Naval Commander
James Glynn, in a letter to the owners of the shipping company Howland and
Aspinwall, who were, at the time, running the subsidized steam route from
Panama to California, wrote „there are, too, I have no doubt, abundance of
coals in Japan that could be delivered at a comparatively low cost, in consequence
of the very low rate of wages in that country.“200 Having spent two years
patrolling the Pacific and paying port call in Japan in order to argue for the
release of shipwrecked American whalers, Glynn saw the desirability of Japan as
a coaling station and refueling station for American ships sailing the Pacific.
"No country in the world is more conveniently separated into sections by
the sea," he wrote. Glynn knew the challenge of obtaining supplies and
refuge from Japan. "The diplomatic influence of our government will be
required to secure the privilege of establishing a depot as well as for the
supply of the coal, as I have stated, and it is time that something had been
done.“201
In the debate on the
American spatial order and linking that spatial order through steam
transportation and communication, Americans in the late 1840s and early 1850s
came to see the importance of Japan. The country stood at the edge of the
Pacific, projecting outwards across the ocean, and controlling maritime access
to China's eastern seaboard. Japan would help link the US from its west coast
to China and the markets of the Pacific. It was at this time that Americans
came to see the importance of steam and the role that it could play in
realizing the construction of their new order of the earth. A Pacific route
from California to Shanghai and Hong Kong would give the US control of
information and economically empower the US, helping solidify not only regional
hegemony but global dominance of trade and information. Japan was key to this
enterprise because of its position and its natural coal resources. By opening
Japan on American terms and using the islands as a coaling station, the US
could shore up its hold. Rivalry with Britain added a dimension of urgency to
the debates in the US Americans saw themselves in a struggle for power of the
earth with Britain. While Britain asserted itself where it so desired with
force and pomp, Americans had not the ability to extend themselves and create a
military presence in other parts of the world. The US thus attempted to build a
system of spatial linkages within which it could maintain influence through a
legal system of treaties, contracts and footholds, thereby denying other powers
monopoly of markets, and constructing a world order that funneled all commerce
and exchange through the space of the United States. East Asia stood as the
proving grounds, through which markets and dominance would be won or lost. Here
specifically the US kept a close watch on the ''blood-thirsty'' British whose
"foreign policy has lost that purity which belongs to ours, and which
seems inherent in its very nature; and they are uneasy at the contrast,"
as the American Whig Review wrote.202
Strategically the US
felt threatened and confined by British strength; as if they had been caught
napping while their rivals conquered the world and dissected it. Matthew Perry
had traveled to England in 1838 in order to asses the
extent of British steam development in their naval capacity. His letters back
to the US relate the superior advancement by the British in this important
regard.203 With more than a bit of alarm, over such developments Congressman
King discussed the British naval threat in a comprehensive report to his House
colleagues: "The amount of our tonnage on the Pacific and in the China
trade is much larger than that of Great Britain, yet she maintains a strong
military establishment at her newly acquired posts in China, and a naval force
almost equal to our whole navy, and also a large squadron on the west coast of
America, with mail steamers conveying passengers and intelligence in all
directions, for the protection and encouragement of that commerce, while our
government has not, until recently, taken the first step towards placing our
merchants on a footing, in these respects, with their British competitors.“204
This statement could
be said to sum up the entire debate on steamship navigation and American
penetration in Asia. If the US did not act, then someone else would. Or more to
the point, if the US failed to act, Britain's hold on its order would
strengthen and the ability to secure American interests would come increasingly
under threat from its rival. Here Americans found themselves in a double bind
of anxiety and threat. As Senator Miller put it before his colleagues in 1852:
"The English Government will have the control of the transportation of
every letter, and every pound of specie, of passengers, and of most of the
freights...then, indeed, we shall be subject to a complete monopoly.“205
Because Britain posed
a very real threat to the US, Americans watched British naval capacity and
steamship development closely and pushed to check aggressive moves. In a report
to the Senate in September 1850, Senator Rusk laid out charts and tables of British
steamer construction, and devoted nearly half of his report to intelligence of
British ships and the system by which Britain facilitated the building of its
ships. "We have beheld England increasing her steam-marine at an enormous
expense," Rusk said, and then detailed the pending threat of Britain's
steam ships to the US coast. "In carrying out this system, the
steam-marine of England has been extended to a limit that startles belief, and
suggests to every reflecting mind the propriety, on the part of other and rival
nations, of taking steps to guard themselves from the attacks of so
overwhelming a force, in the event of a collision with that great power."
Since 1847, Britain
had stationed twenty steamers on the US coast, ''which could at a moment's
warning have been employed in burning down our cities and ravaging the
seacoast.“206 His colleague, Senator Miller, warned again of the British threat
two years later, detailing the five routes of the British mail steamers, and
emphasized twice in his speech that all sixty-three of these British steamers
could be converted into war steamers and used for nefarious purposes. He echoed
the sentiments of many of his Congressional colleagues, his merchant
constituents, and the Navy when he said, "England is plowing the oceans
from pole to pole with her mighty fleet of steamers, and sowing the seeds of a
commerce and of trade from which she will hereafter reap a harvest such as no
nation on this earth ever garnered before. That is her policy. It should be
ours. It is our mission.“207
With such inspiration
debates over steam competition with the British occupied the Congress in the
early 1850s, as representatives constantly took up the issue of funding for a
merchant marine. Rusk had made steam his issue and promoted its importance to
no end. In a separate report to the Senate in order to gamer more funds for the
construction of steamships Rusk outlined the historical necessity of steam:
"In this way the commercial interests of the United States were, on the
one hand, entirely at the mercy of British steamers which plied along our
southern coast, entering our ports at leisure and thereby acquiring an intimate
knowledge of the soundings and other peculiarities of our harbors-a knowledge
which might prove infinitely injurious to us in the event of a war with Great
Britain; and on the other, of a foreign line of ocean mail steamers, which,
under the liberal patronage of the British government, monopolized the steam
mail postage and freights between the two countries. Under such a state of things,
it became necessary to choose whether American commerce should continue to be
thus tributary to British maritime supremacy, or an American medium of
communication should be established through the intervention of the Federal
government, in the form of advances of pecuniary means in aid of individual
enterprise."
Rusk continued in
warning that it had become impossible for American merchants to compete against
their British counterparts so aided by their government. Indeed, for Rusk,
"American interests were becoming every day more and more tributary to
British ascendancy on the ocean." Such a phenomena affected not only
American merchants but was contextualized in the perspective of the entire
nation and the order of the earth. Rusk again spelled out the alarm:
"Great Britain was exerting herself, successfully, to make the United
States, in common with the rest of the world, tributary to her maritime
supremacy. She possessed the monopoly of steam connection between the United
States and Europe, the West Indies and South America. There was not a letter
sent by ocean steam conveyance, in these quarters, which did not pay its
tribute to the British crown, and not a passenger nor parcel of merchandize
transported, by the agency of steam, upon the ocean, which did not furnish
profit to the British capitalist. Great Britain asserted her right to be the
'queen of the ocean,' and, as such, she levied her imports upon the industry
and intelligence of all of the nations that frequented that highway of the
world." This necessitated the full backing of an expanded steam marine by
the US government: "The question is no longer whether certain individuals
shall be saved from loss or enabled to make fortunes, but whether the American
shall succumb to the British lines, and Great Britain be permitted to
monopolize ocean mail steam transportation, not only between Europe and
America, but, through the world.“208
In the context of
this rivalry with Britain, the subsidization of mail steamers also met the
contingency of warships in addition to establishing communication lines and
probing regions in US spheres of interest Lacking the funds to build a steam
navy the US would subsidize its building in the construction of dual-use
steamers. As the Secretary of the Navy said in the late 1840s, "steamers
shall be so constructed as to be easily convertible into war steamers,"
This meant that the Navy Department would "at all times exercise control
over them, and shall at any time have the right to take them for the exclusive
use and service of the United States.“209 In order to meet this requirement the
steamers subsidized by the government on mail lines were to be built of larger
capacity and with platforms to accommodate large guns. This would allow the US
to maintain a check on "the temper of the times," according to
Senator Rusk, which "requires that we shall keep pace with the rapid
improvements of other nations, commercially and militarely.”210
In East Asia, the
urgency was not diminished. The US feared British control of intelligence and
commerce in the Pacific due to the strength of its navy and mail steamers. As
Navy Secretary John Kennedy warned in 1853, "The numerous lines of English
mail-steamers place in the hands of Great Britain almost an entire monopoly of
the wealth of the East.,,211 All mail out of the Pacific ran through London,
either by overland route through India, or by sea around the African cape. Such
control enabled British merchants and officials to receive information before
their American counterparts. Furthermore, the threat of severed communication
lines due to hostilities between the powers constantly haunted the Americans.
In addition to this, British coaling stations around the region overwhelmed the
US. The English held what were seen to be the most important points in the East
India and China seas: Hong Kong, Singapore and Borneo.
With these
possessions Britain had "the power of shutting up at will, and controlling
the enormous trade of those seas," according to Commodore Perry. From
these bases Britain could patrol the seas and regulate or control what came in
and out, set the terms of engagement, or even choose to colonize the region and
refuse trade and commerce from any outside of the British mercantile system.
Even as it stood, Britain controlled the major coal depots in Singapore and
Hong Kong, and had set the terms of interaction with China, considered to be
the largest untapped market on earth. Indeed, as Perry wrote in his Narrative:
"When we look at the possessions in the east of our great maritime rival,
England, and of the constant and rapid increase of their fortified ports, we
should be admonished of the necessity of prompt measures on our part."
Fortunately the Japanese and many other islands of the Pacific are still left
untouched by that gigantic power, and as some of them lay in a route of a
commerce which is destined to become of great importance to the United States,
no time should be lost in adopting active measures to secure a sufficient
number of ports of refuge. "Commercial settlements in the China and
Pacific seas will be found to be vitally necessary to the continued success of
our commerce in those regions."212
For Perry, as for his
countrymen, steam navigation and the use of a steam merchant marine and navy in
East Asia was vital for the expansion and protection of US interests. Such a
system folded into the enactment of the new spatial order of the earth.
Anglo-American Ascendance P.1.
Anglo-American Ascendance P.2.
Anglo-American Ascendance P.3: Asia in the New Spatial Order.
Anglo-American Ascendance P.4: The China Blockade.
Anglo-American Ascendance P.6: Opium War
142 Cushing to Tyler,
Dee 27,1842, Caleb Cushing Papers, box 35.
143 T. Butler King,
Steam Communications with China, and the Sandwich Islands. House Report
596:30-1, serial set 526, p. 16.
144 Peny, Hawks, and
Wallach, Narrative, v. 1, p. 75. S. Ex. Doc 34:33-2 p.5 (1852); S. Ex. Doc.
50:32-1 serial set 619, p. 32; See also, ''Our Foreign Policy," The
Southern Literary Messenger, Ian 1850, v. 16, n. 1, p. 1.
145 See W. G.
Beasley, Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 1834-1858 (Sandgate, Kent: lapan Library, 1995), 87, Dennett, Americans in Eastern
Asia, 253, lohn H. Schroeder, Matthew Calbraith Perry
: Antebellum Sailor and Diplomat, Library of Naval Biography (Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2001), 165, Peter Booth Wiley and Ichiro Korogi, Yankees in the Land of the Gods : Commodore Perry
and the Opening of Japan (New York: N.Y. Viking, 1990).
146 Perry, Hawks, and
Wallach, Narrative, v. 1, p. 75. S. Ex. Doc 34:33-2 p.5 (1852); S. Ex. Doc.
50:32-1 serial set 619, p. 32; "Our Foreign Policy," The Southern
Literary Messenger, Jan 1850, v. 16, n. 1, p. 1.
147 Wiley and Korogi, Yankees in the Land of the Gods, 79.
148 Dennett,
Americans in Eastern Asia, 251-253.
149 Ibid., 254.
150 Schroeder,
Matthew Calbraith Perry, 165-167.
151 Daniel Webster,
The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers V. 2, ed. Kenneth Shewmaker
(Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1987),252.
152 Dennett,
Americans in Eastern Asia, 260. As might be expected from an analysis working
off of such a premise, Dennett calls the late 1840s and the 1850s outside of
the Perry mission the "Period of Confusion" because no single
individual came forth with a single articulated policy stamping direction on
the means of micro-interaction with East Asian states.
153 Two works
appearing around the hundred-year anniversary of the Perry mission did attempt
to remove
agency from the individual and investigate the ideological background of the
mission and the forces leading to its inception. William Neumann's 1954
article, "Religion Morality, and Freedom: The Ideological Background of
the Perry Expedition," argued that Americans of the day linked commerce
and civilization. Neumann thus put the mission to Japan in the light of
Americans going forth to "liberate and educate the less fortunate peoples
of the world" (p. 247). For Neumann, the Japan mission was as much about
civilization as it was about trade, coal, and ports of refuge. Americans saw
the isolated Japan existing in an unnatural state, refusing to bow to the
divine laws of trade, commerce and interaction, and natural rights that ought
to be guaranteed to all. The US, therefore, would free Japan and turn it into a
liberal republic.
157 Herman Melville,
Moby Dick (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 119, 121.1
158 Wells Williams,
"Narrative of the Morison." Chinese Repository VI (Sept-Dee) 1837).
159 See Dennett,
Americans in Eastern Asia, 246.
160 Ibid., 245.
161 Claude S.
Phillips, "Some Forces Behind the Opening of Japan, " Contemporary
Japan 24, no. 7-9 (1956): 434.
162 "Commercial
Mission to Japan," Littell's Living Age, v. 25, April, May, June, 1850, p.
551.
163 Report of the
Secretary of the Navy, S. Ex. Doc. 49:32-2, serial set 655, p. 2.
164 Biddle to
Bancroft. July 31, 1846, Senate Executive Document 59:32-1, p. 65.
165
"Japan," Democratic Review, April 1852, p. 321.
166 House Document
138:28-2.
167
"Japan," Democratic Review, April 1852, p. 322-324, 328, 332.
168 "Japan-the
Expedition," American Whig Review, June 1852, p. 515, 513, 514.
169 See also William
Neuman, "Religion, Morality, and Freedom: The Ideological Background of
the Perry Expedition," Pacific Historical Review 23 (1954).
170 Congressional
Globe, 32-1, p. 1166.
171
"Japan," Democratic Review, April 1852, p. 332; "Japan-the
Expedition," American Whig Review, June 1852, p. 512.
172 Glynn to Howland
and Aspinwall, Feb. 24, 1851, S. Ex. Doc. 59:32-1, p. 62.
173 Glynn to
Fillmore, June 10, 1851, S. Ex. Doc. 59:32-1, p. 74.
174 "An
Expedition to Japan," New York Daily Times, Feb. 2, 1852, p. 2:1.
175
"Japan," Democratic Review. Apri11852, p. 331.
176 "Japan-the
Expedition," American Whig Review. June 1852, p. 515.
177 Webster to
Aulick, June 10, 1851, Senate Executive Document 59:32-1, p. 80; Webster, The
Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers V. 2, 289-290.
178 Ibid.
179 David Budlong
Tyler, Steam Conquers the Atlantic (New York. London: D. Appleton-Century,
1939), viii. ISO Quoted in Schroeder, Matthew Ca/braith
Perry, 63.
181 Tyler, Steam
Conquers the Atlantic, 100.
182 Ibid., 122.
183 Ibid., 134, 128.
184 Ibid, 11-16, 137.
186 Tyler, Steam
Conquers the At/antic, 144.
187 T. Butler King,
Steam Communications with China, and the Sandwich Islands House Report
596:30-1, serial set 526, p. 1.
188 Ibid., 10.
189 Ibid., 15.
190 Maury to King,
Jan. 10,1847, House Report 596:30-1, serial set 526, p. 23.
191 Maury to King,
Jan. 10, 1847, House Report 596:30-1, serial set 526, p. 24
192 S. Ex. Doc.
50:32-1, serial set 619, p. 17.
193 T. Butler King,
Steam Communications with China, and the Sandwich Islands, House Report
596:30-1, serial set 526, p. 16.
194 Glynn to Howland
and Aspinwall, Feb. 24,1851, S. Ex. Doc. 59:32-1, p. 62.
195 Perry, Hawks, and
Wallach, Narrative, 75.
196 House Report
596:30-1, serial set 526, p. 17.
197 House Report
596:30-1, serial set 526, p. 18.
198 T. Butler King, Steam
Communications with China. and the Sandwich Islands, House Report 596:30-1,
serial set 526, p. 14.
199 Aaron Haight
Palmer, Documents and Facts Rlustrating the Origin of
the Mission to Japan, Authorized by Government of the United States, May 10th,
1851, and Which Finally Resulted in the Treaty Concluded by Commodore M. C.
Perry. U.S. Navy, with the Japanese Commissioners at Kanagawa, Bay of Yedo, on the 31st March 1854 (Wilmington: Scholarly
Resources, 1973), 12.
200 Glynn to Howland
and Aspinwall, Feb. 24, 1851, S. Ex. Doc. 59:32-1, p. 59.
201 Glynn to Howland
and Aspinwall, Feb. 24, 1851, S. Ex. Doc. 59:32-1, p. 62.
202 "Japan-the
Expedition," American Whig Review, June 1852, p. 513:1
203 Peny to
[illegible], Jul 8, 1838, Perry Papers, correspondence, Library of Congress
manuscript division.
204 T. Butler King,
"Steam Communications with China. and the Sandwich Islands." May 4,
1848, House Report 596:30-1, serial set 526, p. 13.
205 Congressional
Globe 32-1, Apri122, 1852, p. 1167.
206 S. Ex. Doc.
50:32-1, serial set 619, p. 17,20.
207 Congressional
Globe 32-1, Apri122, 1852, p. 1166.
208 Senate Report
267:32-1, serial 631, p. 2,4,6-7.
209 S. Ex. Doc.
50:32-1, serial set 619, p. 55.
210 S. Ex. Doc.
50:32-1, serial set 619, p. 26.
211 Report of the
Secretary of the Navy, Feb. 22, 1852, S. Ex. Doc. 49:32-2, serial set 655, p.2.
212 Perry, Hawks, and
Wallach, Narrative, v. 2, p. 179.
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