By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

A Last Chance at Middle East Peace

The Middle East is teetering on the edge of a broad regional war. On June 12, Israel began a sustained bombing campaign against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, regime leadership, and oil and depots to - in the words of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu -  “degrade, destroy and remove [the] threat” of potential Iranian nuclear weaponization. Iran has responded with a barrage of ballistic missiles and by pulling out of nuclear negotiations with Washington. The Arab states have been worried about being dragged into a war between Iran and Israel ever since the two countries began sparring indirectly a year and a half ago. But as the fighting expands, and with missiles routinely traveling over the entire Gulf region, neighboring states are now asking not if, but when, the conflict will come to them.

There is still a narrow window to avoid an all-out war. But with Washington having seemingly cooled to diplomacy, it is up to countries in the region to stop the conflict. Only the Arab states and Turkey, after all, have good working relations with Israel, Iran, and the United States. Now, these countries must come up with de-escalation proposals. They need to set up a regionally run mediation initiative that allows them to speak with and act as a broker between the warring parties. They will still have to involve Washington. But they cannot depend on it.

Should the Arab countries and Turkey fail, the war will regionalize. They could well face attacks on their infrastructure from Iran. And fear and uncertainty will spread among their peoples.

 

Caught in the Crossfire

For years, Arab governments have regarded both Iran and Israel as troublesome countries. Iran’s ideological expansionism, advancing nuclear program, and support for proxy militias in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, as well as the former Assad regime in Syria, have long made it a threat to its neighbors. In 2019, the Arab world watched with alarm as Iran, according to the UN, U.S., and Saudi investigators, attacked Saudi oil facilities. (Iran denied involvement but cheered the strikes.) They were distressed when Tehran turned the Houthis, once a localized Yemeni insurgency, into a long-range threat that in 2022 struck a construction site and an oil facility in Abu Dhabi.

The Gulf states have had better relations with Israel, at least in recent years. But Israel’s prolonged and brutal war in Gaza, its treatment of Palestinians in the West Bank, its expansion of settlements, and its unwillingness to engage in postwar peace or security discussions have stoked concerns that it, too, is a destabilizing force. Its military achievements, which include degrading Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s leadership and infrastructure, targeting Iranian forces in Syria, and carrying out military strikes against Iran itself, have been quietly admired in Gulf security circles. But Arab governments must increasingly contend with mass public anger over Israel’s campaign in Gaza, that have further stalled the normalization process. They also oppose Israel’s continued military strikes in post-Assad Syria, which has invited further instability at a time when most of the Arab world wants Syria to be at peace.

Above all, Arab countries fear Israel’s war with Iran. Israeli officials have not said they want the conflict to expand, but the country’s strikes on Iran’s energy facilities, including the Shahr Rey refinery in Tehran and part of the South Pars refinery in the Gulf, may be designed to goad Iran into making good on threats to attack Gulf energy stations or to close the Strait of Hormuz. Such moves would draw Arab states into the conflict and force them to side openly with Israel, which is exactly what Israel is seeking. The United States, meanwhile, may soon enter the war on Israel’s behalf. If so, Iran will be even more tempted to target Arab states, which are home to multiple U.S. military bases.

For the Gulf countries, Iranian attacks on U.S. bases, Gulf energy infrastructure, or ships in the Strait of Hormuz would be a disaster. They would jeopardize oil exports and destroy investor confidence, derailing their carbon-dependent economies and undermining other economic endeavors, such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 initiative. They could also worsen the conflict in Yemen, where the rebel Houthis would likely resume attacks on ships in the Red Sea and direct strikes against Gulf states. Civilian Arab populations would suffer from any attacks that threatened food supplies, contaminated water, or led to cyber-disruptions. Acutely aware of the risks they face, these countries are becoming increasingly desperate to prevent the conflict from spreading.

 

Middlemen

To avoid being attacked, Arab states have tried hard to distance themselves from Israel’s actions. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) condemned Israel’s military campaign. Jordan has called for de-escalation. Oman and Qatar issued particularly strong statements against Israeli strikes, reflecting their fear that Israel is intentionally sabotaging U.S.-Iranian efforts to strike a nuclear deal. Turkey has been equally critical, with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan offering “to do everything” his country can “to prevent uncontrolled escalation.”

It is unclear what, exactly, Erdogan is proposing. But regional actors do have the unique position, credibility, and leverage to stop the spiral between Iran, Israel, and the United States. Gulf states maintain direct lines to both Tehran and Washington. They host American forces, broker back-channel talks, and understand the security calculations on both sides. They now also have ways to speak with Israel, publicly or privately. In this moment of crisis, they must use all those assets not just to manage fallout but also to forge a cease-fire and a path back to nuclear and broader regional diplomacy.

To do so, regional governments should launch a diplomatic initiative, perhaps under the auspices of the Arab League or a smaller, Gulf-led contact group, that uses trusted intelligence and diplomatic back channels to establish indirect talks between Israeli and Iranian representatives. They can use this network to push for a cooling-off period between Iran and Israel in which the two countries would agree to limit strikes, especially on highly populated civilian areas. At the same time, the Arab states and Turkey must open a separate diplomatic channel that is focused on protecting energy and maritime infrastructure, as well as preventing the environmental and health crises that can result from attacks on nuclear facilities. Such public initiatives would have the added benefit of showing U.S. President Donald Trump that de-escalation and negotiations are the best path forward—and the one the region wants. It would also pave the way for talks about a full cease-fire and a durable peace deal.

At first, it might seem hard to imagine that Trump would agree to a truce brokered by a foreign government. However, Arab Gulf countries were the first to receive a visit from the U.S. president after his return to the White House, and his trip gave Gulf leaders a renewed sense that Washington was not only listening but also aligning with their core security concerns. Trump repudiated past U.S. military entanglements and democracy promotion efforts, calling for a new era of “peace and partnership” instead. He praised the Gulf states’ investments in “commerce, not chaos” and “technology, not terrorism.” He endorsed their calls for sanctions relief in Syria and provided support to that country’s new government. More importantly, in private meetings, Trump signaled a willingness to back Gulf priorities. The visit suggested that he was not only willing to listen to the Gulf states’ input but also to act on it.

Israel may be more reluctant than the United States to entertain a Gulf-brokered peace agreement. But two Gulf states, Bahrain and the UAE, have become key economic and strategic partners of Israel. Israel also wants to normalize ties with Saudi Arabia, and Israeli officials know that doing so will be much easier if they back away from its war with Iran. And although Netanyahu may want escalation, other Israeli leaders understand that a wider war could threaten energy markets in ways that would make life harder for their constituents.

Iran, for its part, has every incentive to accept a Gulf-brokered deal. Under constant and unyielding Israeli bombardment, the Islamic Republic’s leaders are looking for a face-saving off-ramp. Iranian officials are so worried about internal unrest and losing their hold on power that they have stated publicly that Tehran will return to the negotiating table if a cease-fire is possible. The Arab states, for their part, have proved adroit at handling tricky negotiations with Iran. Iran’s attacks in the Gulf in 2019 and the Houthi attacks in 2022 frightened the region but also precipitated a de-escalation and normalization: the UAE resumed diplomatic ties with Iran in 2022, and Saudi Arabia followed suit in Chinese-brokered mediation in 2023.

Smoke rising from an Israeli strike in Tehran, June 2025

 

Last Chance

In 2003, Arab states and Turkey strongly opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq, warning that it would destabilize the region and empower extremist forces. Today, these same governments are again united in urging de-escalation, recognizing that another unchecked war could unleash even greater chaos. The stakes are extraordinarily high for them: they know that if the conflict does not stop, there is very little they can do to shield themselves from spillover and instability. With limited time and rising risks, coordinated regional action is essential to preventing a wider catastrophe.

Hopefully, these countries can talk Iran and Israel out of continuing to fight, and the United States out of joining. They can tell Israel that its current actions could turn the path toward normalization into one toward isolation and turn the status quo of effective deterrence into one of perpetual conflict. They can make Iran understand that its nuclear program, missile strikes, and proxy activities will not be tolerated—and that its continued integration into the region requires a behavior change.

Achieving a peace agreement will be extremely difficult. Iran and Israel are entrenched in their respective positions. The conflict appears to be intensifying, not easing. Yet the world desperately needs a serious, sustained diplomatic effort at de-escalation. That effort must involve Iran and Israel and must be supported by the United States. But it can only be led, or at least catalyzed, by states in the region.

 

 

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