By Eric Vandenbroeck
and co-workers
America Is Back
Many foreign policy
analysts breathed a sigh of relief when Joe Biden replaced Donald Trump in the White
House two years ago. With Biden’s hands on the wheel (and Trump’s erratic and,
at times, reckless tenure in the rearview), the United States could return to
being a stabilizing force in the world. The president himself embraced that
perception. “America is back,” he pledged to allies in February 2021. After the
tumult of the Trump years, an administration with a serious foreign policy
agenda once again called the shots in Washington.
Yet the first two
years of the Biden presidency have not vindicated this optimism or
promise. Instead, confusion abounds, with a troubling disconnect between the
administration’s stated priorities and conduct. Biden’s desire to protect U.S.
workers and boost U.S.-based industries has found itself at odds with the
imperative of building an alliance to contain the threat of China.
The central
deficiency of Biden’s national security strategy is the absence of an economic
vision that will allow the United States and other countries to reduce their
dependence on Chinese products and markets. With Washington unable to get
allies on the economic front, other elements of U.S. strategy carried more
weight, notably the armed forces. But there, too, the administration’s
recognition of the urgent military threat posed by China has not produced a
sufficient change in actual policy in terms of both the defense budget and how
policymakers deploy U.S. forces. The State Department is not strong enough to
compensate for these deficiencies and often finds itself sidelined. Unbalanced,
the administration’s strategy lacks credibility. Unless the administration puts
into practice the strategy it extolls—by disciplining the president’s loose
comments about Taiwan, giving friendly countries incentives to enact
difficult economic transitions, enforcing export controls, significantly
increasing defense spending, and boosting the capacity of the armed forces—its
foreign policy will continue to be ineffective.
Muddled Thinking
Unless the administration
puts into practice the strategy it extolls—by disciplining the president’s
loose comments about Taiwan, giving friendly countries incentives to enact
difficult economic transitions, enforcing export controls, significantly
increasing defense spending, and boosting the capacity of the armed forces—its
foreign policy will continue to be ineffective. The administration’s
thinking about how economic policy relates to foreign policy has been muddled
from the outset. On the one hand, the White House seeks to protect the United
States from the supposed ravages of globalization and Chinese
mercantilism. On the other, it preaches the virtues of alliances and the
international community's solidarity. These two goals have inevitably clashed.
The administration
has ignored the pleas of allies in East Asia to help them reduce their economic
reliance on China. China’s neighbors do not want paeans to have democracy
or military posturing that might increase the risk of war. Instead, they want a
path to prosperity that weakens China’s economic grip on them. For example,
Australia, Japan, and South Korea have asked the United States to commit more
seriously to free trade in the Indo-Pacific. More than simply trying to isolate
Beijing, Washington needs to craft a positive economic policy that persuades
its allies to develop markets and supply chains independent of China. But
the economic plank of Biden’s foreign policy seems interested only in the
vicissitudes of U.S. domestic politics, demanding that allies bring their
economies into line with U.S. standards and offering few concessions.
The administration
cannot return to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Asian trade pact negotiated
when Biden was vice president. It cannot develop a “friend-shoring” trade policy
that increases resilience by relying on allied countries in supply chains. The
Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors for America legislation
(CHIPS) does not preclude U.S. companies from using Chinese materials or
penalize China for illicitly acquiring technology, and it could end up helping
Chinese businesses since U.S. firms that receive subsidies could still rely on
supply chains that lead to China. Biden’s Treasury and Commerce Departments
also have a checkered record in enforcing export controls. Moreover, his
administration allowed trade promotion authority (legislation that allows
Congress to vote only yes or no on trade treaties) to lapse in 2021, ensuring
that no trade deals can now get ratified without amendment by Congress. It has
maintained most of the Trump administration tariffs, even those
leveled against allied countries, such as restrictions on European Union steel.
And it has embittered allies by delivering greater subsidies to U.S. firms
through the Inflation Reduction Act.
Biden’s commitment to
a “foreign policy for the middle class”—a nebulous slogan that in practice
seems to mean trade protectionism and subsidies for U.S. companies—appears to
take precedence over building a united front with allies. The Biden administration’s
defense of its recent protectionist legislation, delivered in Davos by Joe
Manchin, a Democratic senator from West Virginia, was to tell Europeans that
they should welcome efforts to strengthen the U.S. economy, even if they come
at the expense of European businesses. The current government in Washington may
not believe in free trade, but the one in Beijing does. Last year, China
created the world’s largest free trade area by launching the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership with Southeast Asian countries. Still,
the United States responded with only a vague initiative called the
Indo-Pacific Economic Forum that no one seems to explain.
Barking, Not Biting
The lack of a
coherent economic policy that can support the National Security Strategy’s
objective of successfully competing with China to shape international order
places more stress on other areas of national power, particularly the military.
The United States has had to talk tough about regional security to reassure
allies since its economic policies have alienated them. And yet it has not
backed up that talk with actions. The administration has made significant
policy choices that necessitate increases in defense spending, notably the
president’s departure from decades of American ambiguity on Taiwan, by
repeatedly asserting that U.S. forces would defend the island in the event of a
Chinese attack. Beijing could interpret Washington’s new rhetoric as a provocation
and lunge against Taiwan.
But the
administration has not adjusted U.S. defense spending, force structure, or the
stationing and deployment of the military to account for that possibility. Nor
do the admirably aggressive Department of Commerce restrictions that prevent
Chinese entities from accessing U.S.-produced commodities and advanced
technologies appear to have been coordinated with the Department of Defense,
even though such commercial sanctions could make China more willing to go to
war. A more considered, integrated approach to deterring China’s bad behavior
would synchronize these sanctions with demonstrations of American military
readiness for a potential conflict (and the participation of U.S. allies in
such exercises) and with diplomatic efforts to stabilize relations and reduce
the potential for conflict. But the administration does not seem to have
prepared for the increased military risks that come with the visits of U.S.
congressional delegations to Taiwan. With the Chinese military now more active
in and around the Taiwan Strait, the Pentagon has described the elevated threat
to Taiwan as “the new normal.”
Many officials in the
government recognize this danger. In May 2021, the Indo-Pacific commander,
Admiral Philip Davidson, testified before Congress that China is most likely to
attack or attempt to blockade Taiwan between now and 2027. Avril Haines, the
director of national intelligence, called the likelihood of China attacking
Taiwan between now and 2030 “acute.” Bill Burns, the CIA director, concurred
with that judgment. Jake Sullivan, the national security adviser, delivered a
National Security Strategy that called the next ten years “a decisive decade
for shaping the terms of competition, especially with the PRC.”
Yet the activities
and budget of the Department of Defense reflect none of that urgency. The 2022
defense budget includes $109 billion in spending on issues such as
homelessness, climate change, and public health research that do not boost
military power, which should be the responsibility of other government
departments. The administration’s first budget in 2021 increased nondefense
spending by 16 percent but raised defense spending by only 1.6 percent, and
that in nominal terms rather than real terms that account for inflation. The
International Institute for Strategic Studies assessed in 2021 that this
increase was negligible and that it made “clear that the Biden administration
is not attempting to make significant changes to the spending trajectory, at
least in this budgetary round, at the U.S. Department of Defense.” In both 2021
and 2022, Congress found the Biden administration’s proposed defense budgets so
deficient that, on a bipartisan basis, it insisted on more funding for the
military, adding $28 billion in the first budget and $45 billion in the second.
The urgency of the Chinese threat to Taiwan must also be fully
registered in the Defense Department. It conducted a force posture review early
in the administration that resulted in no meaningful changes; what marginal
changes it has subsequently proposed, such as rotational stationing and
dispersed bases, are not occurring at a pace consistent with the threat. The
Defense Department plan proposes to reduce the army's size and take ships out
of the fleet and squadrons out of the air force soon to free up funding for a
future force to be fielded in 2035. In other words, the department plans to
limit its ability to carry out its current strategy to be able to field a
stronger force in the distant future, well after the timeframe in which U.S.
officials think a Chinese attempt to take over Taiwan would most likely occur.
Affairs Of State
The misalignment of
Biden’s foreign policy goals and the administration’s conduct can also be seen
at the State Department. The administration committed to “elevating diplomacy
as our tool of first resort”. It increased diplomatic spending by 14 percent in
its first two years, expanding the ranks of the Foreign Service by around 500
people. The State Department and the U.S. Agency for Independent Development
produced a solid joint strategic plan that established institutional
priorities: mobilizing coalitions to address global challenges, promoting
global prosperity, promoting good governance and human dignity, revitalizing
its workforce, and improving consular support for Americans abroad. This agenda
can potentially reshape the State Department's institutional culture for the
better.
But there is little
evidence the State Department has succeeded in its desire to “modernize
alliances and revitalize international institutions.” The department has been
marginal to the successes of the joint Australian, British, and U.S. security
partnership, AUKUS, and has played a minor role in
galvanizing NATO support for an embattled Ukraine. The White House
directly negotiated the AUKUS defense agreement. In contrast, the State
Department struggled to handle the predictable French fury that resulted from
the deal (owing to the cancellation of an Australian purchase of French
submarines). CIA Director Bill Burns, not Secretary of State Antony Blinken,
seems to be the White House’s emissary of choice in challenging diplomatic
encounters, whether with Russia, Turkey, or Ukraine. Sullivan appears to be
China’s main interlocutor, and the diplomatic heavy recently called upon to
deal with German truculence about providing tanks to Ukraine. Lloyd Austin, the
secretary of defense, holds monthly meetings abroad with 50 counterparts to
orchestrate weapons delivery to Ukraine. Blinken and his department have no
diplomatic equivalent in motion for galvanizing international support for Kyiv.
The 2021 Summit for
Democracy, organized by the State Department, was a bust, devolving into
debates about which governments were invited and failing to craft a
consequential agenda: the summit inaugurated a “year of action” to strengthen
democracies that produced little action. The department’s bid to promote global
prosperity appears to be mostly advancing the president’s domestic economic
agenda or extolling things that the State Department cannot affect, such as
U.S. technological leadership.
Salvage Job
At the midpoint of
Biden’s administration, the U.S. government has been unable to untangle the
contradictory elements in its ambitious strategy, nor has it compensated for
these misjudgments by boosting its military and diplomatic spending. The
administration’s inability to fashion an international economic policy impedes
its central objective of building an effective international coalition to
counter China. In this way, it tips the balance of importance away from
economic policy and diplomacy toward exercising military power, which the
administration explicitly sought not to do.
With two years
remaining in the president’s term, the administration should capitalize on U.S.
public support for trade—which, according to a 2021 Chicago Council on Global
Affairs study, is at an all-time high—and provide the leadership that allies
need to reduce their reliance on China. Instead of enrobing protectionist
policies in the ermine of a “foreign policy for the middle class,” the
president could make a case for advancing democracy by tightening economic
cooperation with allies and partners, instructing the Commerce Department and
Treasury Department to develop policies that shift manufacturing and the
sourcing of materials to allied countries, encourage countries to adopt U.S. standards
by giving them greater access to the U.S. market through the Indo-Pacific
Economic Forum, and offer extensive exemptions from restrictions in the
Inflation Reduction Act for businesses from allied countries. Washington should
take a couple of punitive measures that target China with incentives for
friendly nations to adjust their economies to increase their bargaining power
in dealings with China.
Instead of forcing
Congress to correct the administration’s inadequate defense budgets, the
administration should develop a more realistic baseline budget for carrying out
its strategy—one that accounts for the rate of inflation and the requirements
of the possible defense of Taiwan right now and in the future. And since a
president can solemnly defend another country only with congressional consent
to a diplomatic treaty, the secretary of state should commence such
negotiations to move toward a formal alliance. The sticker price for the
administration’s national security strategy is likely around $1 trillion, or a
real yearly increase of five percent above current defense spending. Trying to
cut costs by urging reforms in the Defense Department and armed forces will not
produce significant savings and only distract from the urgency of addressing
what matters: improving the military’s ability to fight and win wars,
increasing stockpiles of essential weapons, and aiding allies in upgrading
their armed forces. In its next two years, the Biden administration should find
what was lacking in its first two, a seriousness of purpose that matches the
ambitions of the White House’s strategy.
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