By Eric Vandenbroeck
and co-workers
China's Global Security Initiative
In April 2022, Chinese
President Xi Jinping gave a speech on foreign policy at the Boao
Forum for Asia, an annual conference of business executives and world leaders
in Hainan Province. In it, he proposed what he called Quanqiu
Anquan Changyi, or the Global Security Initiative
(GSI), which he framed as “promoting the common security of the world.”
Xi offered few details of how the initiative might be implemented; however, the
speech did not receive much attention, with Western governments intensely
focused on Russia’s unfolding war in Ukraine.
But the speech was
hardly insignificant. Chinese diplomats and analysts close to the government
have made clear in the months since the GSI marks a significant shift in
Chinese foreign policy. It directly challenges the role of U.S. alliances and
partnerships in global security. It seeks to revise global security governance
to make it more compatible with the regime security
interests of the Chinese Communist Party.
During his first two
terms, Xi transformed China’s approach to internal security in ways that caught
the world off-guard—writing China’s first-ever national
security strategy and
a host of new security laws, restructuring the country’s domestic security
apparatus, purging and jailing many of the security forces’ top leaders,
building a massive surveillance state, and intensifying repression at a speed
that few outside observers predicted. The guiding framework for those efforts
was something that Xi called the “comprehensive national security concept,”
which was a regime security concept codified as a grand strategy. Xi is
applying that framework to foreign policy, attempting to remake regional and
global security orders to guard against threats to China’s domestic stability
and further consolidate the party’s grip on power.
Security Above All
Xi’s new approach to
security began to take shape in 2014 when he rolled out what he called
the zongti guojia anquanguan, or
comprehensive national security concept, often also referred to as the
“overall” or “holistic” state security concept. At the same time, he unveiled a
new party body, the Central
National Security Commission, tasked with putting the concept into practice. At
the time, many U.S. analysts thought the CNSC would resemble the U.S. National
Security Council, but the linguistic parallel was misleading. The Chinese
conception of national security places a much greater emphasis on internal
security than the American one (a better translation might be “state
security”). Much of the CNSC’s work is conducted in secret. Still, most of its
known meetings have focused on domestic matters, such as the potential
for COVID-19 to fuel instability in China or the
party-state’s counterterrorism policy in Xinjiang.
As its name suggests,
the comprehensive national security concept is comprehensive. The CCP Central
Committee covers “political, military, homeland security, economic, cultural,
social, technological, cyberspace, ecological, nuclear, overseas interests,
outer space, deep sea, polar, and biological security issues, among others.”
Defined widely, the concept can frame almost any topic or area of life as a
security threat and empower Chinese officials to respond accordingly.
The concept also
reveals the CCP’s underlying insecurity: it portrays threats to China as
growing and the country’s capabilities as inadequate. Even the phrase “major
changes in the world unseen in a century,” often used by Chinese officials and
commonly portrayed by Western analysts and officials as a triumphal assessment
of China’s rise, has a darker side. In the context of official discourse, it
often implies that rising opportunity is accompanied by rising peril. In
November 2021, the CCP Central Committee argued that China was faced with “unprecedented
external risks and challenges” and that “China’s ability to safeguard national
security falls short of what is required of us by the current circumstances.”
In an increasingly dangerous world, the party’s chief aim is political
security, which Chinese officials and state media have defined as “safeguarding party leadership, China’s
socialist system, and the authority of the Central Committee with Xi Jinping at
the core.” Xi and other CCP leaders believe political unrest and ideological contamination
could threaten this order. In their view, communism in the Soviet Union was
doomed by corruption from within, lack of ideological commitment, and
insufficient party control over the organs of coercion. One can draw a direct
line from these threats to Xi’s signature initiatives: his anticorruption
campaign, his efforts to strengthen patriotic education, ideological
indoctrination, the party’s penetration of society, and his push to assert
party control over the military and domestic security apparatus.
Comprehensive
national security is the strategic concept that ties these seemingly disparate
efforts together.
Prevention And Control
Not all the ideas in Xi’s
comprehensive national security concept were new. Aspects of the concept drew
on long-standing themes in Chinese history and party discourse—for example, the
tendency to see internal and external threats as interconnected. But the
comprehensive national security concept made clear that the Chinese political
system needed to take internal, nontraditional security threats such as
terrorism and unrest much more seriously. The concept’s function was also
novel: it served as a systematic framework for officials to assess and address
threats and gave them new tools. Moreover, the concept called on officials to
become more proactive about heading off such threats, replacing the
language of “stability maintenance” that characterized previous eras of Chinese
leadership with a discourse centered on fangkong, or
“prevention and control.”
The concept
transformed how China handled internal security. In January 2015, eight months
after Xi announced the concept, the Politburo approved China’s first-ever
national security strategy; the Politburo approved a second five-year strategy in 2021. China’s
strategy is not publicly available, unlike the U.S. National Security Strategy.
Still, based on official media coverage, it closely parallels the content in
Xi’s speeches and other official commentaries. The inauguration of a formal
national security strategy was significant because of its content and indicated
a significant change in China’s national security policymaking process.
Other reforms
followed. Since the comprehensive national security concept was announced,
China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress, has passed a raft of
national security legislation on topics ranging from criminal procedure to
border security, regulation of nongovernmental organizations, data security,
counterterrorism, intelligence, cybersecurity, and other threats. .
Xi has also reorganized the military and domestic security forces,
including the command structure of the People’s Armed Police, to strengthen
party control over these organs. Meanwhile, his anticorruption campaign—which
has targeted officials in the military, police, state security, and judicial
system, in particular—aims to ensure that corruption does not erode the CCP’s
control over coercive agents from below or make them susceptible to bribery or
other forms of compromise by foreign intelligence agencies. The CCP has even
replicated the CNSC subnationally, embedding
subordinate national security commissions in the party structure down to the
county level Other reforms followed. Since the comprehensive national
security concept was announced, China’s legislature, the National People’s
Congress, has passed a raft of national security legislation on topics ranging
from criminal procedure to border security, regulation of nongovernmental
organizations, data security, counterterrorism, intelligence, cybersecurity,
and other threats. Xi has also reorganized the military and domestic
security forces, including the command structure of the People’s Armed Police,
to strengthen party control over these organs.
Meanwhile, his
anticorruption campaign—which has targeted officials in the military, police,
state security, and judicial system, in particular—aims to ensure that
corruption does not erode the CCP’s control over coercive agents from below or
make them susceptible to bribery or other forms of compromise by foreign
intelligence agencies. The CCP has even replicated the CNSC subnationally,
embedding subordinate national security commissions in the party structure down
to the county level. China has also ramped up spending on its surveillance
state. Under an official 2015
directive to construct
what the party-state calls a “multi-dimensional information-based prevention
and control system for public and social security,” local and provincial
governments have substantially increased spending on domestic security, collectively
exceeding what China spends on national defense. Much of the investment has
been in technology for surveilling the public and in back-end analytical
platforms that use the resulting data to improve governance and maintain social
order.
Applying the comprehensive
national security concept has yielded the harshest repression in Hong Kong and
Xinjiang. Beijing is especially fearful that foreign powers could foment
internal instability in these two places. In Hong Kong, a new national security
law has steadily eroded civil liberties and civil society, and many
pro-democracy activists have been jailed or forced to exile abroad. Repression
has been even more severe in Xinjiang, which the CCP identified in 2014 as a
test case for applying the comprehensive national security concept. (The region
presents precisely the combination of internal and external security concerns
that the party-state is worried about.) A visit by Xi to Xinjiang in April
2014, immediately after he launched the concept, only raised the bureaucratic
stakes. The result has been a sharp escalation in collective repression of the
region’s Uyghur Muslim population, not only through the rapid expansion of
surveillance and police power but also by confining citizens in a network of
internment and “re-education” camps that showcase the extremes to which China
now goes to prevent the emergence of threats.
Safe China, Safer World?
As Xi concludes
his second term as party leader and approaches the start of a likely third,
there are signs that the CCP is thinking seriously about how to project the
comprehensive national security concept abroad. This effort appears to center
on the Global Security Initiative that Xi announced in Hainan in April. Like
the comprehensive national security concept (also announced in April, eight
years earlier), the GSI includes rhetoric used previously by party leaders and
Chinese diplomats—just repackaged more systematically and strategically. And
like the comprehensive national security concept when it was first proposed,
the GSI is currently vague, more of a slogan than a well-developed policy.
(Even the Chinese word for “initiative,” changyi, implies
a proposal or suggestion more than a concrete action plan.) Given the GSI’s
nebulous and somewhat repetitive framing, it is unsurprising that the
initiative received little attention when it was announced.
But observers should
not assume that it will be insignificant because the GSI is vague. On the
contrary, Chinese-language commentary suggests that the initiative will bridge
Beijing’s domestic security agenda and its foreign policy. Analysts at the
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, a think tank
associated with China’s Ministry of State Security, describe the
GSI as a “vivid practice for guiding
China’s diplomatic work based on the comprehensive national security concept.”
Other Chinese analysts refer to it as the “vertical continuation” of the
comprehensive national security concept and a mechanism by which to “coordinate between China’s domestic
security and the common security of “promoting the common security of the
world.”
That phrase also
appears in an essential resolution on party history adopted by the CCP Central
Committee in November 2021, which describes the protection of national security as a “fundamental
task” for the CCP and the party’s “top priority.” If these descriptions are
accurate, Chinese officials will be under substantial pressure to
operationalize the GSI over the next five years. Their goal will be to revise
the international system to protect not just China’s national interests as they
are traditionally understood but also the regime's security and the CCP’s hold
on power, as the comprehensive national security concept directs.
From the CCP’s point
of view, externalizing the comprehensive national security concept through the
GSI makes sense. Xi has always seen external security threats mainly through
the prism of how they could undermine party rule at home. For the past ten
years, official statements have urged Chinese bureaucrats to address potential
threats early and preventively, often using medical metaphors such as calls to
“immunize” the Chinese body politic against foreign pathogens that could infect
it. By the same preventive logic, ensuring the regime’s security at home requires
a more proactive and interventionist approach abroad to defend against
intruding threats of “encirclement, suppression, disruption, and subversion,”
as the Central Committee phrased it last fall. Indeed, one of the most puzzling
things about the comprehensive national security concept has always been that
it lacked a robust foreign policy dimension, despite attributing many of
China’s internal security issues to external meddling. In that sense, the GSI
is overdue.
What the GSI will
look like in practice is still an open question. It took several years for the
full import and impact of the comprehensive national security concept to become
apparent. The same will likely be true of the GSI. But China’s dissatisfaction
with the current international security order is not a secret, and in its calls
for reform are some clues about what themes the GSI may emphasize.
The first is the need
to reform the global and regional security architecture. Chinese
officials argue that the U.S. system of alliances and
partnerships is destabilizing because it pursues security for members of that
network at the expense of those outside it. Ukraine is a key example used to
bolster these arguments. Since the war began, Chinese officials have
consistently assigned primary blame for the conflict to NATO and the United
States rather than Russia. (The joint Russian and Chinese statement issued on
February 4, 2022, suggested that both powers share a fear that U.S.
influence on their peripheries will destabilize their regimes at home, one of
the core threats that the comprehensive national security concept seeks to
guard against.) Chinese officials present the GSI’s emphasis on
“indivisible security” as a superior alternative to the bloc system created by
U.S. alliances and, under the initiative, have called
directly for changes to Asia’s
security architecture.
A second theme is
that the world must consider new forms of security cooperation to address
nontraditional security threats. In practice, this has meant expanding Chinese
police activity worldwide and offering police training and law enforcement
assistance as a growing element of Chinese foreign policy. In a speech at the 2017 Interpol General Assembly in
Beijing, Xi argued that the international security environment had changed:
threats had diversified, traditional and nontraditional security threats were
more entwined than before, and transnational threats were increasing. These
“new problems,” all identified in the comprehensive national security concept,
meant that “global security governance had many inadequacies” and therefore
required reform—an assessment repeated in statements on
the GSI by Chinese
Foreign Minister Wang Yi this year. Similarly, at an internal work conference
in 2019, China’s senior domestic security officials called on police and internal security personnel to
strengthen and develop “a new system of international public security
cooperation” and “promote the establishment of an international law enforcement
cooperation and coordination system under the unified leadership of the
Ministry of Public Security Party Committee.”
The GSI, therefore,
is likely to amplify an already growing trend: international outreach by
Chinese police and domestic security officials. China has already begun to expand
the deployment of police liaison officers abroad and has held high-level
discussions on
“foreign police training with Chinese characteristics,” with the aim of
“enhancing the international influence” of China’s police work and “telling the
story of a ‘Safe China.’” This has meant active engagement with existing global
agencies such as Interpol and building new forums such as the Lianyungang
Forum, where Chinese
officials share best practices and Chinese surveillance and policing companies
market their wares to foreign law enforcement agencies and officials. The
GSI is also increasingly a feature of China’s regional diplomacy. At the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit last month, Xi invited member-states
to participate in the initiative, offering to train thousands of law enforcement officers and help
them build security and counterterrorism capacity. A similar proposal to a
group of ten nations in the Pacific Islands also included offers of substantial police and law enforcement
assistance (although it was ultimately rejected), and police cooperation has
been a notable
feature of China’s
growing relationship with the Solomon Islands.
These offers of police
and domestic security assistance seem designed to make China the security
partner of choice for countries that might not want such assistance to come
with the human rights conditions or democratic accountability mechanisms that
Western nations often demand. And they follow on the heels of a global
expansion in Chinese exports of surveillance technology, such as Huawei’s Safe
City platforms, which appear in dozens of countries worldwide. Chinese
companies market these products as tools for ensuring public safety and
managing nontraditional security, keeping with Xi’s focus on nontraditional and
domestic threats to social stability. But given the primacy of political
security in China’s police and law enforcement.
These offers of police
and domestic security assistance seem designed to make China the security
partner of choice for countries that might not want such assistance to come
with the human rights conditions or democratic accountability mechanisms that
Western nations often demand. And they follow on the heels of a global
expansion in Chinese exports of surveillance technology, such as Huawei’s Safe
City platforms, which appear in dozens of countries worldwide. Chinese
companies market these products as tools for ensuring public safety and
managing nontraditional security, keeping with Xi’s focus on nontraditional and
domestic threats to social stability. But given the primacy of political
security in China’s own police and law enforcement
the system, the
expansion of these activities abroad is likely to result in a marked increase
in transnational repression—something the United States is already closely
monitoring.
Washington needs to
tread carefully here. Countries often seek out Chinese technology or assistance
to solve genuine governance challenges. U.S. officials have not always been
effective in pairing their critiques of China’s behavior with constructive
alternatives. But Chinese exports and activities already pose serious threats
to data security, citizen privacy, human rights, and liberal democracy, and
under the GSI, these concerns are likely to grow. Thus far, Washington’s
focus on military competition in the Indo-Pacific risks overlooking and missing the
nonmilitary—but equally serious—challenges that the GSI poses to global and
regional security order and American interests.
Whether or not China resorts to military might to achieve these
goals, the approach outlined under the GSI thus far should give the United
States pause. The fact that the initiative is founded on the comprehensive
national security concept and seeks to project that concept’s focus on regime security abroad should be a warning. The CCP
aims to revise global and regional security governance to align more closely
with its regime's security interests and use Chinese foreign policy to secure
its hold on power at home. The United States should not underestimate the risks
of this new Chinese approach to foreign policy. Titling it the China
Threat, the FBI argues that the counterintelligence and economic espionage
efforts emanating from the government of China are a grave threat.
In the end, the
Western Allies and China will likely never agree on the global order, and
they’re never likely to abide by the other’s rules. Ultimately, neither power
can fully enforce its version of the rules. To a certain extent, they both
prefer it that way. The battle over rules concerns power, which country
has it, and which country can project it.
For updates click hompage here