By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Part Two of Two

As we have seen in part one, the hierarchy inside the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere intentionally or inadvertently encouraged discriminative actions, including maintaining a superior attitude over other nations or peoples. It also fostered misconception, contempt, disregard, complacent indifference, and insensitive treatment (Peattie 1988: 217). For example, to justify recruiting soldiers from Joseon and to justify the draft itself, the Japanese Empire argued that the Joseon people were granted a crucial and important role in participating in the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and that the Joseon people were explicitly different from Indonesian archipelago According to them, the Joseon people who answered to the draft call were considered as “Soldiers of God,” led by the Tenno himself, and continuously reiterated the supposed fact of Joseon’s position of leading and guiding the Southeast Asian people, invoking a sentimentality of superiority in dealings with other peoples.

Similarly, during the Japanese occupation the Indigenous residents of Southeast Asia, including Saipan, had a tagline following them, which called them a third-class people (santo- kokumin), or to-nin, (“Islanders,” to-min). The title of “third class people” was not simply an insult but was referring to the general situation of the Chamorro of the Marianas or the kanaka (a completely pejorative term applied to all Carolinians and Marshallese) people. For example, they were generally banned from entering public bathhouses or restaurants owned and managed by the Japanese. In coffeehouses, the Japanese and the Micronesians were often seated at different tables. Despite the Hakko-ichiu principle (the endless incantations about imperial benevolence usually apportioned throughout the Empire), the Micronesians were accorded the lowest place of all its subjugated peoples. The racial hierarchy designed by the Japanese colonial administrators showed the Japanese at the top level. Next came, those Koreans and Okinawans who emigrated to the South Seas as farmers, fishermen, and laborers. Micronesians were regarded as being different from other imperial subjects in terms of status by the Japanese government and were always viewed as lesser peoples in the Empire.8 In fact the bonds that held Micronesians to Japan were made of straw, not steel, and were quickly sundered apart in the first gusts of adversity. The relationship was too inequitable, too unjust to have been made of stronger sinew.

Under this system that chose to foster mistrust and hostility among neighboring nations and peoples, the factor that determined the ranks within the hierarchy was the order of being subsumed into the Japanese realm of power, and such a characteristic very much resembled the typical chain of command inside the military. In the Manchurian area, the Joseon people were treated with respect as second to the Japanese, thus the Chinese were treated with lesser respect than the Joseon people. Among regions that were assimilated into the Japanese realm at virtually the same time, the level of influence they had determined their rank within the Japanese hierarchy structure. Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia were ample examples of that.9 The Japanese were trying to utilize all the resources of the peoples of Asia and mobilize them in their effort to create the so-called Greater East Asia. And in cases of necessity, the Japanese also considered temporary or permanent relocations of particular peoples.

Considering the relationship between Japan and other countries in East Asia to have been a relationship completely tainted with only hostility and misunderstanding would be oversimplifying the case. The relationships between Japan and other countries were usually pretty complicated in terms of region and rank and featured a quality that would make generalization a bit difficult. At the level of the general population, there were indeed unique responses to the Japanese people. For example, the general population did not resent the Japanese in Indonesia. In Indonesia, where small-scale merchants such as people engaged in apothecaries or grocery businesses occupied a huge portion of the population, and the Japanese people, unlike the Japanese in Manchuria or China, did not enjoy any kind of privileges or special interests and only cooperated with the Indonesian aboriginal people. In the early days of the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia when Japanese troops first entered the region, the general response from the population of the would-be colonized areas was friendly and welcoming. Especially, the people in Burma, Indonesia, and The Philippines passionately and also willingly welcomed Japanese troops. It was also true that after the initial occupation and also after it became clear that Japan was going to rule Indonesia, people who were betting their future and fates upon the welfare of the Japanese increased, just like there had been increases of such people in Joseon as well. People started to learn Japanese, and especially among high-class society members, the desire to form marital relationships with the people of the Netherlands was replaced by the desire to have such relationships with the Japanese, who were the new rulers of Indonesia.

In the meantime, the general media of the Japanese homeland, which broadcast War news and aired war-theme motion pictures, was only showing the Japanese population selected scenes of Southeast Asian populations welcoming Japanese troops and did not relay other kinds of responses. It was only after the War that the general population of Japan was made aware of the fact that the people of the Philippines extremely hated the Japanese. Media control overseen by the Japanese government and military pre vented the the East Asian peoples from interacting with each other. But even if such interaction had been enabled at the time, anti-war movements launched by non-governmental organizations and other civilian activities as seen nowadays would probably not have been possible. Just as the desire to learn and master the Japanese language that prevailed in Indonesia was another attempt to improve oneself for one’s own personal interests, the war had to mean something for the Japanese population as well. In the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, it was the event of sugar distribution that attracted the Japanese population, and the students who spent their youths in colonized Joseon still remember rubber balls being distributed to them when Singapore was being occupied.10 Including the population newly assimilated into the imperial realm, and of course including the Joseon people, the general population in the Japanese homeland was hardly never interested in the public living status of occupied regions, or their emotions, sentimentalities, or political awareness.11 All in all, people were truly indifferent, and cold beings. The reason that the Japanese general population actively cooperated with the Japanese government and the military’s mobilization process for the task of creating the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and liberating the East Asian region was because they were “thrilled” with the unusual elements of wartime emergencies,12 and also because they were hoping that something would be gained by victory in the War and the expansion of the empire.

If we turn to the (semi)colonial regions, the situation was much more compli cated. In China, conflicting elements featured themselves against each other at the same time such as passionate Nationalism and also sentiment resenting such ideology, the sentimentality resenting Anglo-Saxon qualities, cultural pluralism, and the concept of universality transcending Nationalism (Gerow 2002: 141). In the “Greater East Asian movie,” which was a war-propaganda motion picture made by the Japanese, the Japanese colonizers were to fear and wonder whether the faces of the Manchurian people who did not reveal their thoughts represented an acceptance of what the Japanese were trying to insert into their minds, or represented resistance against them. Especially, the sardonic smiles of the spectators could have been the result of their realization of the low-rated nature of Japanese movies but also Japan’s contradictory nature of fighting Americans while also transferring the American motion pictures into a viewable format for the Japanese people. In Joseon, there was also critical opinion regarding the situation of being mobilized to the frontlines, as such a situation was considered to be ensuring meaningless death and also cooperating with an unjust war of invasion. On the other hand, there had been passionate support for victory in the War and the East Asian liberation campaign as well. Underneath the layer, there had been indifferent, passive attitudes of ordinary people as well.

As we can see, although all the regions, peoples, and ranks inside the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere were being controlled by the Japanese style of divide and rule, there was one thing that was binding them together. Their common enemy was established as the Western powers, and especially resentment against the Western enemies was amplified by the anti-U.S. campaign generated and supported by the Japanese government and the military. For example, in the Philippines’ case, the military general of the Imperial Guard issued a total of six orders regarding the issue of education on February 17th, 1942 instructing the authorities and the public to eliminate old ways of thinking and become independent from the U.S. and the U.K., to nurture a new culture for the Philippines, and to join in the task of expanding the usage of the Japanese language and banning the usage of English. Also, an approval committee for official textbooks to serve as a censorship mechanism for published textbooks was organized with Filipino specialists and the Japanese as enlisted members. The Japanese who took control of the committee arbitrarily dropped portions that were deemed inappropriate from textbooks, most of which were themes related to the U.S. 4 The situation in Malaysia was not so different. All the U.S.-related schools were re-designated as official primary schools and the Japanese language replaced English.

In May 1943, as U.S. troops started to set foot upon the regions previously colonized by Japan the situation turned to the worse for the Japanese, and a dete rioration on Japanese morale began to show in Japanese propaganda, which started to lack certain expressions like “The Light of Asia, Japan,” a catchphrase that was usually used to emphasize Japan’s capability and dignity.14 Instead, racist conflicts and hostility were promoted even more.15 From radio broadcasts being heard in the cities or villages of Indonesia, the slogan designed by Sukarno was being shouted, “Amerika Kita Setrika Ingelis Kita Linggis” (Tramp the Americans, Destroy the British) or “Let’s work! Work! Work! Let’s unite our spirit and our strength to destroy the allied forces!” The sentimentality of a so-called “Mobilization society,” the Japanese society as it was, which blamed the British and Americans, boosted the war and prevailed in Java society.

 

The Case of Korea, and the Contradiction of Colonial Ideology

The self-contradictory nature of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in terms of the national question was sharply revealed through the relationship that Japan had established with colonized countries, such as Joseon or Taiwan. Japan had forced itself into an ironic situation in which it had to own colonies while denying the concept of them at the same time. Neither from postwar studies looking at the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, nor from the discussions that were going on at the time, can we find any kind of discussion of the Joseon situation.

From the decision-making process of the Japanese government at the time, we can see that the Joseon matter was a very sensitive issue that was found hard for many people to discuss in an appropriate fashion. On February 10th, 1942, according to the agendas established for the Discussion Committee of Establishing the Greater East Asia realm by the Cabinet, the Governor Generals of Joseon and Taiwan were initially granted the authority to attend the conference and express their opinions. However according to the regulations established and announced on February 21st, 1942 that grant was denied. The Discussion committee on establishing the Greater East Asia realm was soon organized, and in the 3rd session “the Population and the National Policies entailed by the establishment of the Greater East Asia” was selected as the primary agenda. In this session, regarding the options that should be explored to expand the Yamoto race (the Japanese), the issue of the Joseon people was cited as a very important one. Most of the committee members argued that “the matter should be dealt with, with caution, and as a separate case,” so the issue was dropped from the agenda.

Then, what was the status of Joseon or Taiwan in the concept of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere? There have been multiple opinions suggested upon this issue. One way of addressing the issue should have been acknowledg ing the existence of colonial rule while also trying to solve the problem gradual ly. In this context, it was declared that the diplomatic matters of the protectorates (or other entities for that matter) inside the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, should be dealt with by the Japanese, but the desire for the independence of each nation should be realized considering an appropriate type of polity according to the political and economic requests, or the historical, political and cultural facts of each region, which were needed in binding and uniting the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Shigemitsu Mamoru (重光葵), then-foreign minister in April 1943, is said to have considered once granting political independence and autonomous control to Joseon and Taiwan while also preparing to grant Indonesia independence as the war situation was rapidly deteriorating for the Japanese in the Southeast Asian region (Okazaki Hisahiko 2000: 254). But right up until the end of the war, the Japanese continued to use the Malaysian peninsula and Indonesia as part of their imperial realm, and they did not let go Joseon and Taiwan.

On the other hand, another option should have been, rather than gradually attempting to bridge the gap between doctrine and reality, defining the doctrine more strictly. Accordingly, it was declared that a region or its people that was not a nation-state could not be considered as an independent member of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and should only be considered as a member of the nation-state to which it belonged. This position led to the fact that the official units composing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere were not ethnic groups but independent states, so the protectorates should participate in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in subordinated forms to the host country.

This matter was also discussed in the third session of the Discussion Committee for the Establishment of the Greater East Asia, which held the national issue as the primary agenda. The chairman, the Health Minister, solicit ed opinion on whether Koreans were fully assimilated-Japanese or should be regarded as somewhat distinguished from the Japanese. One committee member expressed a general opinion saying that the Joseon people, who were living inside the imperial realm, should be regarded as imperial subjects. Nonetheless, he added that the Joseon people should also be distinguished from the Japanese in the homeland. He also tried to distinguish the Joseon people living in Manchuria or the U.S.S.R. from those living in the Joseon peninsula (Kikakuin and Daitoa Kensetsu Shingikai ed. 1995: 109-110). In other words, he was say ing that the Joseon people living inside the Joseon peninsula should be consid ered as imperial subjects just like the Japanese proper, but should be distin guished at some level from other Joseon people living in other regions such as Manchuria or Russia.

The issue of the Joseon people was also discussed with regard to the subject of industrial bases. One committee member questioned exactly what kind of industries were going to be established inside Joseon, which was being considered as part of the Empire. The Chairman, the Commerce Minister, answered that “Joseon and Taiwan are considered as part of the Empire, and related matters are being considered on such terms.” In other words, Japan was considering Joseon and Taiwan as entities included in the same group with Japan, and Manchuria with China in another group, and they intended to develop each region on the basis of its characteristics. Joseon was considered as part of the Empire itself along with Taiwan, and for that reason Joseon was excluded from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Greater East Asia Realm that was established in November 1942, along with the Japanese home land, Taiwan, and Sakhalin.

Ozaki Hotsumi, who advocated the theory of the East Asian Cooperation Community also thought that the issue of Joseon and Taiwan nationalism was part of the Japanese Empire, and he examined how much these peoples had been assimilated into it. He speculated that the issue of Joseon nationalism would not become a major one as long as the Japanese adhered to the ultimate cause of establishing the Empire, and it would not be necessary to employ an artificial policy of assimilation (Ozaki Hotsumi 1962: 65). In other words, he was expect ing that Joseon would be fully assimilated into the Japanese Empire to the extent of no longer requiring any kind of policy to ensure that. His opinion represents a stark contrast from the critical attitude toward the Japanese policies on national ism in Southeast Asian countries. Joseon and the Southeast Asian countries were all the same colonies, yet he chose to regard them in different terms. This kind of dual attitude was in itself a vivid demonstration of the ideological shortcomings of the Japanese critical intellectuals at the time and their perception of the colonies.

As we can see, in the concept of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan was considering the status of the colonized Joseon in several different ways, but in essence, Japan was maintaining that Joseon was part of the Empire and therefore not a colony. But considering the history of modern colonies and the fact that colonies in Asia and Africa were colonized as peoples or tribes instead of being ruled as nation-states, there was no line that could be drawn between the logic of Western countries colonization and that of the Japanese. The Japanese tried to establish a logical basis for their strict assimilation policy targeted at Joseon or Taiwan, countries which did not go through the coloniza tion process of Western countries but were directly integrated into the Japanese Empire. But unfortunately, the whole purpose was only for the extraction of resources and the mobilization of soldiers, and was not meant for the survival or prosperity of Joseon people.1

The Case of Korea, and the Contradiction of Colonial Ideology The self-contradictory nature of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in terms of the national question was sharply revealed through the relationship that Japan had established with colonized countries, such as Joseon or Taiwan. Japan had forced itself into an ironic situation in which it had to own colonies while denying the concept of them at the same time. Neither from postwar studies looking at the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, nor from the discussions that were going on at the time, can we find any kind of discussion of the Joseon situation.

The self-contradictory nature of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II

1. According to the mobilization plans for resources during wartime, the Manchurian area and Joseon were designated as “supplementary systems for the Japanese empire,” and thus, Joseon, the ambitious “five-year plan for the industrial development of Manchuria” was abandoned (Yamamoto Yuzo 1996: 570). Also, abiding by the principle of “utilizing other peoples and countries inside the East Asian sphere for defense reasons,” the Joseon and Taiwan peoples were to be mixed and integrated into the Japanese army, thus obligatory military service was officially required of them. The total number was projected to be 5% of the entire population, which amounted to 1.5 million Joseon soldiers, and 0.5 million Taiwan soldiers. Based upon this estimate, the Japanese government and the cabinet decided to initiate drafting soldiers in Joseon in May 1942 and announced it in March 1943 (the actual draft was initiated on August 1st).

Singapore was being occupied.10 =

10. During the occupation of Java, the Japanese government executed the special distribution of sugar and tried to leave the public with the impression that if Java were successfully acquired then sugar would be at everyone’s disposal. Oil stoves were hard to find as oil was a strategic tool for the War and so a product such as oil should not have much to do with ordinary life. What was favorable for the people in ordinary life was sugar.

In May 1943, as U.S. troops started to set foot upon the regions previously colonized by Japan the situation turned to the worse for the Japanese, and a deterioration in Japanese morale began to show in Japanese propaganda, which started to lack certain expressions like “The Light of Asia, Japan,” a catchphrase that was usually used to emphasize Japan’s capability and dignity.14 Instead, racist conflicts and hostility were promoted even more.15 From radio broadcasts being heard in the cities or villages of Indonesia, the slogan designed by Sukarno was being shouted, “Amerika Kita Setrika Ingelis Kita Linggis” (Tramp the Americans, Destroy the British) or “Let’s work! Work! Work! Let’s unite our spirit and our strength to destroy the allied forces!” The sentimentality of a so-called “Mobilization society,” the Japanese society as it was, which blamed the British and Americans, boosted the war and prevailed in Java society.

The status of Joseon or Taiwan in the concept of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere? There have been multiple opinions suggested on this issue. One way of addressing the issue should have been acknowledging the existence of colonial rule while also trying to solve the problem gradually. In this context, it was declared that the diplomatic matters of the protectorates (or other entities for that matter) inside the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, should be dealt with by the Japanese, but the desire for the independence of each nation should be realized considering an appropriate type of polity according to the political and economic requests, or the historical, political and cultural facts of each region, which were needed in binding and uniting the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Shigemitsu Mamoru (重光葵), then-foreign minister in April 1943, is said to have considered once granting political independence and autonomous control to Joseon and Taiwan while also preparing to grant Indonesia independence as the war situation was rapidly deteriorating for the Japanese in the Southeast Asian region. But right up until the end of the war, the Japanese continued to use the Malaysian peninsula and Indonesia as part of their imperial realm, and they did not let go Joseon and Taiwan.

On the other hand, another option should have been, rather than gradually attempting to bridge the gap between doctrine and reality, defining the doctrine more strictly. Accordingly, it was declared that a region or its people that was not a nation-state could not be considered as an independent member of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and should only be considered as a member of the nation-state to which it belonged. This position led to the fact that the official units composing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere were not ethnic groups but independent states, so the protectorates should participate in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in subordinated forms to the host country.

This matter was also discussed in the third session of the Discussion Committee for the Establishment of Greater East Asia, which held the national issue as the primary agenda. The chairman, the Health Minister, solicited opinion on whether Koreans were fully assimilated-Japanese or should be regarded as somewhat distinguished from the Japanese. One committee member expressed a general opinion saying that the Joseon people, who were living inside the imperial realm, should be regarded as imperial subjects. Nonetheless, he added that the Joseon people should also be distinguished from the Japanese in the homeland. He also tried to distinguish the Joseon people living in Manchuria or the U.S.S.R. from those living in the Joseon peninsula. In other words, he was saying that the Joseon people living inside the Joseon peninsula should be considered imperial subjects just like the Japanese proper, but should be distinguished at some level from other Joseon people living in other regions such as Manchuria or Russia.

The issue of the Joseon people was also discussed on the subject of industrial bases. One committee member questioned exactly what kind of industries were going to be established inside Joseon, which was being considered as part of the Empire. The Chairman, the Commerce Minister, answered that “Joseon and Taiwan are considered as part of the Empire, and related matters are being considered on such terms.” In other words, Japan was considering Joseon and Taiwan as entities included in the same group with Japan, and Manchuria with China in another group, and they intended to develop each region based on its characteristics. Joseon was considered part of the Empire itself along with Taiwan, and for that reason, Joseon was excluded from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Greater East Asia Realm that was established in November 1942, along with the Japanese homeland, Taiwan, and Sakhalin.

Ozaki Hotsumi, who advocated the theory of the East Asian Cooperation Community also thought that the issue of Joseon and Taiwan nationalism was part of the Japanese Empire, and he examined how much these peoples had been assimilated into it. He speculated that the issue of Joseon nationalism would not become a major one as long as the Japanese adhered to the ultimate cause of establishing the Empire, and it would not be necessary to employ an artificial policy of assimilation. In other words, he was expecting that Joseon would be fully assimilated into the Japanese Empire to the extent of no longer requiring any kind of policy to ensure that. His opinion represents a stark contrast from the critical attitude toward the Japanese policies on nationalism in Southeast Asian countries. Joseon and the Southeast Asian countries were all the same colonies, yet he chose to regard them in different terms. This kind of dual attitude was in itself a vivid demonstration of the ideological shortcomings of the Japanese critical intellectuals at the time and their perception of the colonies

As we can see, in the concept of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan was considering the status of the colonized Joseon in several different ways, but in essence, Japan was maintaining that Joseon was part of the Empire and therefore not a colony. But considering the history of modern colonies and the fact that colonies in Asia and Africa were colonized as peoples or tribes instead of being ruled as nation-states, no line could be drawn between the logic of Western countries' colonization and that of the Japanese. The Japanese tried to establish a logical basis for their strict assimilation policy targeted at Joseon or Taiwan, countries that did not go through the colonization process of Western countries but were directly integrated into the Japanese Empire. But unfortunately, the whole purpose was only for the extraction of resources and the mobilization of soldiers and was not meant for the survival or prosperity of Joseon people.1

1. According to the mobilization plans for resources during wartime, the Manchurian area and Joseon were designated as “supplementary systems for the Japanese empire,” and thus, Joseon, the ambitious “five-year plan for the industrial development of Manchuria” was abandoned (Yamamoto Yuzo 1996: 570). Also, abiding by the principle of “utilizing other peoples and countries inside the East Asian sphere for defense reasons,” the Joseon and Taiwan peoples were to be mixed and integrated into the Japanese army, thus obligatory military service was officially required of them. The total number was projected to be 5% of the entire population, which amounted to 1.5 million Joseon soldiers, and 0.5 million Taiwan soldiers (Soryokusen Kenkyujo 1942: 15, 196). Based upon this estimate, the Japanese government and the cabinet decided to initiate drafting soldiers in Joseon in May 1942, and announced it in March 1943 (the actual draft was initiated on August 1st).

Singapore was being occupied.2. During the occupation of Java, the Japanese government executed the special distribution of sugar and tried to leave the public with the impression that if Java were successfully acquired then sugar would be at everyone’s disposal. Oil stoves were hard to find as oil was a strategic tool for the War and so a product such as oil should not have much to do with ordinary life. What was favorable for the people in ordinary life was sugar.

2. In the cases of Burma, Indonesia, and India some ordinary Japanese citizens believed that they were helping local peoples in gaining their independence and that the Japanese were fighting for the liberation of Asia. In this vein, Utsumi Aiko and Tanabe Hisao mentioned the catchphrase “This is it, keep up the pace, Ghandi! I’m coming,” a slogan designed by an employee working at a car sales company who was dispatched to Burma during the war.

Utsumi Aiko and Tanabe Hisao recorded that it is easy to surmise that the general population could have been thrilled by war news coming from the radio broadcasts and newspapers, and the marches decorated with flags and lights.

As for a reference to “The Philippines’ flag and the American flag,” “The Philippines commonwealth government,” “The Birthday of George Washington,” and “The currency and gauge system of America” could be enumerated.

Within this category of “third class people,” Japanese colonial policy made further ethnic distinctions. The issue of overseas Chinese was one of the most important issues in the discussion committed to the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and was therefore hotly debated. Overseas Chinese could not be ignored considering the size of the population and their economic capabilities. They were a powerful rival of Japan in terms of commerce and merchandise and were an important client of Japan as well. They had maintained a strong network and also a powerful sense of unity and resisted the Japanese advance while maintaining a unique relationship with the Chungching administration of China.

As we have seen, Japan was not an easy opponent to deal with. The discussion committee for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere decided that considering the various situations the overseas Chinese population was representing, it would be wise not to employ a single policy for various situations, and it would be especially important to employ active control and utilization in dealing with the economically powerful individuals or groups within the overseas Chinese society, instead of just letting them do their businesses.

 

 

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