By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
Tokyo’s Leadership Vacuum:
Over the past decade,
as much of the world has become more chaotic and succumbed to nationalism, protectionism,
and illiberalism, Japan has been a force for maintaining the stability of the
international order. Tokyo has shored up its rules-based economic partnerships;
intensified security cooperation with like-minded countries, such as Australia,
India, and the Philippines; and “de-risked” itself from China while maintaining
its commitment to global trade. Japan has been able to play this stabilizing
role because it has enjoyed internal social and political cohesion and
benefited from strong leadership, most notably during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s second term, which lasted from 2012
to 2020.
Japan’s political
center, however, seems to be weakening. The Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP), which has governed Japan for nearly seven
uninterrupted decades, suffered bruising losses in the most recent elections
for both chambers of the national legislature—the Lower House last fall and the
Upper House this summer—as did its coalition
partner, Komeito. For the first time, Japan’s
ruling coalition is clinging to minority positions in both chambers. And a
populist far-right party, Sanseito, won 14 seats in
the Upper House elections—up from one in 2022—on an anti-foreigner platform.
The retreat of the
political establishment and surging support for an anti-globalist party are
symptoms of an even more pressing domestic problem in Japan: the failure of
mainstream parties to generate strong leaders. Power is fragmented because the
LDP is internally divided, its coalition partner is losing ground, and the
opposition is too disjointed to mount an effective challenge. This lack of
leadership is making it harder for Japan to respond to the tectonic
geopolitical realignments it faces, none more pressing than the United States’
extractive approach to the global economy and its alliances.

Sanseito party leader Sohei Kamiya
in Tokyo, July 2025
Trouble Adjusting
Japan’s ruling
parties are in a crisis because they’ve failed to adapt to long-term structural
changes in the country. The LDP has struggled with declining populations in its
key constituencies and the proliferation of independent voters. The party has also
had a hard time eliminating corruption. The LDP, for example, suffered a major
setback in 2023, when it was revealed that some of its factions—informal groups
of parliamentarians under the wing of a senior party figure—failed to report
revenue from fundraisers, instead kicking back the money to largely unmonitored
slush funds. The LDP adopted some internal
transparency and accountability measures to address public outrage, but
these did not restore faith in the party. Crucially, the slush fund scandal led
the LDP to dismantle its factional system, long considered the root of undue
influence of money on politics, but which for decades had structured intraparty
competition over funds and appointments. Ultimately, the party failed to
cleanse its image and gave up its primary means of sorting internal conflicts
and maintaining party cohesion. Thus, the party lost public trust and found
itself more divided.
Komeito, the LDP’s coalition partner and the political arm of
Soka Gakkai, a Buddhist religious organization, has also declined. Komeito hasn’t been able to win as many votes as it used to
because Soka Gakkai’s membership has stagnated, its charismatic leader died,
and, as the scholar Levi McLaughlin points out, its younger cohorts have become
less interested in political campaigning. In this summer’s Upper House
election, Komeito won 5.2 million votes, almost one
million fewer than it did in 2022. In 1986, The Church Universal and
Triumphant [CUT], sold its Headquarters, Camelot,
to Soka Gakkai for nearly $16 million. There was also a relationship
between Nichiren Buddhism
and Pan-Asianism.
The confluence of new
political pressures in post-pandemic Japan, namely inflation, a surge in
immigration, and the rise of new forms of media, has shaken politics. After
decades of deflation, the cost of living has steeply increased, becoming the
number one issue for most voters, whose real wages are being eaten away by a
depreciating yen and a 3.7 percent inflation rate. Inflation has also brought
out zero-sum thinking. Consumers and producers now view their interests as more
directly in conflict. The government’s initiative to lower rice prices to court
support from urban voters on the eve of the 2025 Upper House election, for
example, caused farmers to feel betrayed. As a result, the LDP lost heavily in
rice-producing regions.
The party especially
suffered because of its stance on the consumption tax. Whereas opposition
parties favored cutting or abolishing it, the ruling coalition of the LDP and Komeito—concerned that such a move would spook financial
markets—instead offered one-time cash payments of roughly $140 per person to
defray the cost of living. To many Japanese people, such a meager handout in
the face of higher prices for most everyday goods suggested that the LDP was
out of touch.
Add Me on Socials
Moreover, established
parties are struggling to compete with upstart ones that can take advantage of
social media. According to an exit poll by Jiji Press, a news agency, 47
percent of respondents used social media to guide their vote in the 2025
election. Internet-savvy parties, such as the Democratic Party for the People
and Sanseito, outperformed the rest online.
Sanseito was born on YouTube in 2020 with a message
trafficking in vaccine conspiracies. The party has gone on to develop an
alternative information ecosystem that can yield committed volunteers and a
crop of potential candidates, according to the political scientists Robert
Fahey and Romeo Marcantuoni. Sanseito’s leader, Sohei Kamiya, sees U.S. President Donald Trump as a role
model and advocates putting “Japanese first.” Sanseito,
and the smaller Conservative Party, blame foreigners for what ails the nation:
wage suppression (from an influx of foreign workers), rampant tourism, rising
land prices (as rich foreigners snatch properties), crime, and loss of a
national identity.
Sanseito has capitalized on the growing pains stemming from a
surge in Japan’s foreign population. Of the 3.7 million foreign residents in
Japan today, roughly one million moved to the country in the past three years.
In 2021, when the country imposed strict border controls during the COVID-19
pandemic, Japan received just 250,000 visitors, compared with nearly 37 million
in 2024. Sanseito has also taken advantage of the
political vacuum left by the tragic assassination of Abe in 2022 to attract
young conservative voters. And its message has resonated with the so-called
ice-age generation, a cohort of people in their 40s and 50s who joined the
workforce after the burst of the bubble economy in the early 1990s and feel
left behind economically.
But as the party has
risen to national prominence, it has also made costly mistakes. On the eve of
the Upper House election, a Sanseito candidate gave
an interview to Russian state media, putting the spotlight on Kamiya’s sympathy
for Moscow. Kamiya doubled down by saying the United States drove Russia to
invade Ukraine, causing a media firestorm that prompted some Japanese
politicians to urge an investigation into potential election interference by
Russia.
The trends epitomized
by this summer’s Upper House election—disaffected voters rallying around
anti-globalism, far-right parties clawing their way up the political system,
and social media changing campaign dynamics and raising the specter of
misinformation—could become normal in Japan, as they have in many Western
countries. But it is just as likely that the current moment represents the peak
of Sanseito’s influence. After all, over the decades,
many upstart parties have challenged LDP rule only to peter out soon after. And
the sudden surge in Sanseito’s popularity suggests
that its support came more from protest votes than permanent realignment among
voters. Moreover, much of what the party advocates for, including rejecting
gender equality, paring down individual freedoms in the constitution, reverting
to the prewar educational system, and adhering to outright historical
revisionism, has not gone mainstream.

A House Divided
While Indian Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Tokyo was about
deepening a longstanding partnership, his first visit to China in seven years
for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
leaders’ meeting in the eastern Chinese port city of Tianjin effectively
drew a line under a tumultuous period between the two neighbours.
The biggest challenge
to governance in Japan is not far-right populism but power dispersion and the
gridlock that comes with it. The LDP, still the largest party in both the Upper
and Lower Houses of the legislature, is deeply divided. The chances are low
that the party can find a strong, unifying leader who can rescue the LDP brand.
Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru,
of the LDP, has defied calls to step down after his coalition received a
shellacking in three consecutive elections under his watch. The rift over
whether Ishiba should stay or go has prevented the
party from agreeing on a strategy to rebuild itself.
Because the ruling
coalition now lacks a majority in both chambers, it is vulnerable to a vote of
no confidence and has to rely on other parties to pass legislation. Meanwhile,
opposition parties remain too fragmented to form an alternative coalition and,
therefore, cannot name a new prime minister. Without a clear power center in
the Japanese legislature, it will be harder to reform taxes and social
security, overhaul political funding rules, and relieve the pain of inflation
and U.S. tariffs. In the near future, no party or coalition seems able to
produce a strong leader.
Without strong
leadership, Japan is ill-equipped to meet the singular domestic and
international challenges of the current moment. Key among these is Tokyo’s need
to redefine its relationship with the United States as Trump upends the global
trading system, urges allies to take on a greater role in their own defense,
and contemplates changes to the footprint of U.S.
troops in Asia.
In July, for example,
the United States and Japan signed a trade deal that placed 15 percent tariffs
on Japanese goods, which is lower than the rate Japan was already paying on car
exports and lower than the rate Trump had threatened to use. It also expanded
market access for U.S. rice and committed Japan to purchasing liquefied natural
gas and agricultural products from the United States.
The proposed trade
deal includes numerous areas where the two sides seem to differ in
interpretation, which will likely lead to more political friction and show that
Japan’s government must still scramble to tariff-proof its economy. As part of
the deal, Japan agreed to invest $550 billion into the United States for
projects related to economic security. According to the White House, Japan will
transfer the money into investment funds that will be allocated by Trump, with
the United States retaining 90 percent of the profits. Tokyo, however, has said
that the vast majority of the money would come from loans and loan guarantees,
and that the nine-to-one profit ratio holds for only a sliver of the total
amount. Neither does the promised relief on auto tariffs appear guaranteed: the
White House fact sheet on the deal makes no mention of a lower 15 percent
tariff for cars. With weak leadership, Japan will struggle to navigate the
uncertainty emanating from Washington.

Tokyo Adrift
Tokyo’s leadership
crisis is of great consequence not only to Japan but also to the world. Macroeconomic
management might become less sound as the LDP is forced to compromise with a
greater number of parties on taxes and budgets. An inward-looking Japan would
fail to attract global talent and fix labor shortages, dimming economic
prospects. And without a strong political center, Japan will be less able to
resist Chinese domination of Asia or sustain international cooperation on free
economic exchange.
Japan’s contributions
to a stable international order are more valuable than ever as the United
States becomes increasingly protectionist and mercurial. To fix Japan’s
leadership vacuum, mainstream parties must restore voters’ trust through
meaningful political reform, articulate a compelling strategy to address the
shift from a deflationary to an inflationary economy, bridge generational
divides in the electorate, and avoid pandering to the far-right as it peddles
the dubious benefits of a closed Japan. Only by getting its own house in order
can Japan sustain its essential role as a global force for stability.
For updates click hompage here