By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
Russian Drone Terror Tests Europe
Mysterious drones have been spotted at
night at airports across Europe. How worried should we be?
Sometimes these turn
up in the dead of night, around Europe's airports, including one in Belgium's
main airport near Brussels earlier this month. There have also been similar
sightings in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Germany and Lithuania.
Unlike the clearly
identifiable Russian attack drones in Ukraine, these "civilian
drones" in Western Europe have not – so far – been armed with any
explosives. But because they're launched anonymously, it's hard to prove
where they come from, who activated them, or whether they're launched from
passing ships.
Suspicions fall on
Russia, with Western intelligence officials believing Moscow is using proxies
to launch these short-range drones locally to cause havoc and disruption. The
Kremlin denies any responsibility.
Belgium is one
significant target, as it is the home to NATO headquarters, the European Union,
and Euroclear (the financial clearing house that handles trillions of dollars
of international transactions).

From a European
perspective, there is only one country… willing to threaten us and that is
Russia,' argued Denmark's Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen in October.
There is an ongoing
debate around whether Europe should release around €200bn worth of frozen
Russian assets, held in Belgium, to help Ukraine. So is it a coincidence that
mystery drones have appeared around Brussels and Liege airports, as well as a
military base?
The UK has sent a
team of counter drone specialists from the RAF Regiment, deployed from RAF
Leeming in North Yorkshire, to help bolster Belgium's defenses against the
drones.
Still, the mystery
drones are worrying: both because of the danger posed to aircraft as they take
off and land but also because of the risk of surveillance, especially around
military bases and critical infrastructure such as power plants.
Drone wall: why it's not a silver bullet
The plan for a drone
wall is Europe's response to the threat of cross-border incursions by drones
launched specifically from Russia.
The wall has been
described as an integrated, coordinated, multi-layered defense system
stretching initially from the Baltic states to the
Black Sea.
It's likely to
comprise a combination of radars, sensors, jamming and weapons systems to
detect incoming drones - and then to track and destroy them.
EU foreign policy
chief Kaja Kallas has said a new anti-drone system
should be fully operational by the end of 2027.

Russia originally imported a type of drone known as
Shahed 136 drones from Iran
Not surprisingly,
those countries keenest to see it deployed quickly - including Poland and
Finland- are those geographically closest to Russia.
Katja Bego believes
it is necessary, and long overdue.
But she adds:
"This is not just about drones. There is really not enough in place in
terms of more traditional missile defense, air defense, along the Eastern flank
borders."
Nonetheless, a drone
wall is not a silver bullet for air defense. And others aren't convinced it's
entirely realistic.
Robert Tollast, a
research fellow at Whitehall think tank The Royal United Services Institute
(RUSI), argues that the idea of some "sort of impervious wall", is,
in his words, out of the question.
Yet he can still see
why there are calls for it and wants to try.

People in Kyiv and other cities across Ukraine are
facing the consequences of attack drones
"For countries
that are close to the Russian border, the Baltics, Poland, Germany as well
because of course they're within range of those long-range drones, it is
absolutely essential to try and build something like this," he says.
"The idea here
would be not so much to actually build a full-on wall, or something that's
fully impenetrable", agrees Bego.
"It's not really
possible, both in terms of the length and also just the available technologies
are not 100% foolproof... But rather you're looking at a combination of things
that hopefully can capture different types of drones and stop them."
Stopping drones: Hard kills vs jamming
Fabian Hinz, a
research fellow at The International Institute for Strategic Studies in London,
describes a whole menu of options to detect drones.
"You can have
acoustic detection; airborne radars that can detect low-flying targets really
well; ground-based radars that have very short ranges against low-flying
targets, but that still work really well against high-flying targets.
"You can have
optical systems, infrared systems - and once the detection is done, you have
either soft kill or hard kill."
Hard kill means
destroying the drone, either with gunfire or missiles. Soft kill means making
an incoming drone ineffective, usually through electronic means.

People look at debris of a Geran-2, among destroyed
Russian military equipment on display in Kyiv
Russia and Ukraine
have been able to get around soft kills on the battlefield by packing their
drones with tens of kilometers worth of fibre-optic
cable that spools out as it flies, but that's not an option for something
travelling hundreds of kilometers across borders.
As for hard kills,
Hinz describes many ways of achieving them: from surface-to-air missiles to
fighter jets and helicopters.
"You can have
lasers which could be useful as well," he adds, "but [these] are not
quite the one the wonder weapon people make them out to be."
André Rogaczewski
believes jamming can be effective as an alternative. Ultimately, however, for
any drone wall to be effective, it needs to be able to deal with a wide variety
of aerial threats, possibly all coming at once.
A financially controversial question
As tensions between
Europe and Russia have risen since Moscow's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, so
too have other incidents of so-called "hybrid" or "grey
zone" warfare attributed to Russia, which in most cases denies them.
These include cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns, incendiary devices
inserted into cargo depots, surveillance, and sometimes sabotage of undersea
cables.
And yet at a security
forum in Bahrain earlier this month, Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, the Italian
chairperson of NAO's Military Committee, told me that of all NATO's defense
needs right now, air defense is the top priority.

Adm Giuseppe Cavo Dragone said that of all NATO's
defense needs right now, air defense is the top priority
The first stages of
the drone wall are due to be activated within months, though not all details
have been finalized.
Meanwhile, NATO's
Allied Command Transformation (ACT) based in Norfolk, Virginia, is working on
longer-term solutions. This is not an easy challenge.
Tollast says the main challenge of the drone wall is the
sheer scale of the area that needs to be protected. "You need a huge range
of tactical radars for low flying drones and larger radars for higher altitude
targets, across thousands of kilometers.
"And you need
cost-effective interceptors and forces to be ready around the clock. It will
never be watertight, and even as costs of some radars and interceptors fall,
it's very unlikely to be cheap."
The question of
finance is a complex one. "It is a really difficult defense
question," says Tollast. "Even with rising
European defense expenditure, there's still going to be a lot of competition
from other sectors in defense [for that funding] - we need more ships,
submarines, nuclear weapons even, satellites as well.
"So this is why
a drone wall will remain this sort of slightly financially controversial issue
for some people."
It will potentially
be funded from a mixture of EU money, national budgets (especially in Eastern
Europe), and interest from frozen Russian assets.
Initially, says Bego,
the drone wall referred to defenses across the Eastern flank, but since the EU
has been spearheading this, they've been expanding it.

"Everyone
recognizes something needs to happen and there is a need to coordinate this and
to mobilize money for this, but the who and what is very much under
discussion...
"The more
foolproof you would want it to be, the more expensive it gets".
As for the target
date, Tollast believes 2027 is very ambitious, but
adds, "they can definitely achieve more protection by then".
Shoot the archer, not the arrow
While all of this is
going on, the task of building the wall is becoming ever harder. Because as
fast as new counter-drone measures are introduced, up pops a new form of drone
threat that can overcome them.
This all makes it
something of a new arms race.
"The development
cycles for technologies in this space are hyper-accelerated, above all in
conflict environments," says Josh Burch, co-founder of Gallos
Technologies, a UK-based company that invests in security technology.
"It means that
any defense against drones will rapidly be rendered outdated as aggressors
adjust.
"The
aggressor", he concludes, "will observe, adjust, repeat – until they
get through".

Many have died or been wounded in Ukraine from Russian
drone and missile strikes
So are we asking the
wrong question altogether? Rather than building a drone wall to stop the
drones, is it better to target the bases launching the drones themselves - as
the old saying goes, shoot the archer, not just the arrow.
"It's one thing
to become more resilient against it, but it would be much better if it did not
happen at all," argues Bego.
"And that's
really around making it much clearer to Russia, or whichever actor is behind
this, that this kind of behaviour crosses the line.
It has consequences and comes with costs for them. And that's important. It
should really be part of this."
But any suggestion of
NATO hitting Russian targets – kinetically, as opposed to digitally in
cyberspace – would be incredibly risky and escalatory.

Ever since Russia
carried out its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the
challenge for NATO, and especially its most powerful member, the US, has been
to help Ukraine to defend itself, but without getting drawn into a NATO-Russia
war.
Building a defensive
drone wall in Europe is one thing. Attacking the places where those drones are
launched from is quite another.
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