By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Egypt And Its Recent History

By using Islam as a basis of nationalist legitimacy, both Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak abandoned the earlier commitments to secular modernity that marked the Nasser era. It also created an opportunity for conservative activists to promote their vision of Islam in public life.

In June 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama delivered an address to the Muslim world proposing a new start in Arab-U.S. relations. He chose to deliver his potentially trailblazing speech at Cairo University in Egypt as a recognition of the country’s historic role in the Muslim world. (Subsequent developments, including the Arab uprisings and the rise of the Islamic State, dashed hopes for a shift on both sides.)

Others have argued that Egypt should be a core member of the regional alliance, which he said would streamline regional dialogue and cooperation regarding the Palestinian issue.

However, Egypt’s prominence as a regional leader has been declining for years. Beginning in the early 1970s during Anwar Sadat’s presidency, the country became increasingly inward-focused. It prioritized combating political opposition and Islamist militancy at home rather than projecting power abroad. Since Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi’s 2013 coup, which overthrew Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated President Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s foreign policy has been a reflection of its internal affairs. Countries that support the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Turkey and Qatar, are considered ideological adversaries, while those that oppose political Islam, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are seen as tactical allies.

 

From Pan-Arabism To Egypt First

Britain’s occupation of Egypt in 1882 cut off Egypt from its traditional foreign policy theaters, especially in West Asia. Under British occupation, Egyptian nationalism developed differently from the nationalist movements in West Asia and North Africa. Most Egyptian heads of state did not try to project power beyond Egypt’s borders, though there were two notable exceptions: King Farouk and President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Farouk was a descendant of Muhammad Ali, who seized power in Egypt in 1805 and aspired to create an Arab kingdom. Farouk decided to lead Egypt into the 1948 Arab-Israeli war against the wishes of his own government and army command. In 1950, he closed the Tiran Passes to Israeli shipping, and the following year, he played an instrumental role in drafting the Joint Arab Defense Treaty to confront Israel.

Nasser, meanwhile, had distinct Arab roots, unlike most Egyptians, and hailed from the Asyut governorate in Upper Egypt. He militarily and economically supported the Algerian war of independence in 1954-62. In 1957, he sent troops to Syria to defend the country against a possible Turkish invasion. In 1960, he dispatched army units to Kuwait after Iraqi President Abdul Karim Qasim threatened to occupy it. Two years later, he sent one-third of the Egyptian army to Yemen to defend the fledgling republican regime after a coup overthrew its king. Even after Egypt’s staggering defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War, Nasser remained a powerful figure in the Arab world. Though many Arab leaders viewed him as an enemy, the vast majority of the Arab public saw him as the uncontested champion of Arab nationalism.

Since Nasser’s death in 1970, however, Egypt’s regional ambitions have been limited. Egyptian presidents have recognized that the poor state of the country’s economy disqualified it from playing a leading role in regional politics. Anwar Sadat, who succeeded Nasser, opposed sending a single Egyptian soldier to fight on behalf of Arabs. During his presidency, he was boycotted by most Arab leaders because he made unilateral peace with Israel. Hosni Mubarak, who became president in 1981 after Sadat’s assassination, sent Egyptian troops to Saudi Arabia in 1990 as part of the U.S. coalition to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. But his move was not motivated by a desire for Egypt to become a regional power but by a desire to stop Iraq from becoming one.

 

El-Sissi’s Politics Of Regime Survival

Current President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi has mostly followed suit. Since becoming president, he has been preoccupied with internal security matters. As the only Egyptian president to stage a coup to seize power since 1952, his top concern has been staying in control, not reestablishing Egypt’s leadership of the Arab world. His focus has been on safeguarding Egypt’s borders from incoming militants and arms, which could be used to support Egypt’s homegrown militant movements.

El-Sissi has no regional power ambitions. However, he doesn’t want the aggressive foreign policies of the Saudi and Emirati crown princes to overshadow Egypt’s historical role in the region. He has deep concerns about the Gulf countries’ peace deals with Israel, which threaten to limit the need for Egypt’s regional mediation. Cairo gained its reputation as a regional peace broker after the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. But since then, the Palestinians have turned to Turkey to facilitate a reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, while Hamas has sought Qatar’s help to ease Israel’s blockade on Gaza. Egypt is also increasingly economically alienated. Last October, Israel Pipeline Company signed a deal with the UAE to transport oil from Abu Dhabi to Europe via the Eilat-Ashkelon Pipeline. The agreement effectively reduces oil shipments via the Suez Canal by 17 percent and compromises Egypt’s Sumed oil pipeline from the Gulf of Suez to Alexandria.

Egypt adopted a relatively proactive and pro-Palestinian approach to Israel’s recent operation in Gaza. (By comparison, it was relatively passive during similar bouts of violence in 2009 and 2014.) In 2014, Egypt pressured Hamas to accept Israel’s terms for a cease-fire, but this time around, it brokered a deal that took effect without any preconditions. It painted Israel as the aggressor in the conflict, and a prominent Egyptian Islamic scholar called on Muslims to seize Jerusalem and halt Israel’s West Bank settlements.

Still, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu thanked el-Sissi for facilitating the cease-fire. As for Hamas, it was skeptical of Egypt’s offer of $500 million for Gaza’s reconstruction, knowing that Egyptian companies run by the armed forces would lead the reconstruction efforts and that these efforts would increase Egypt’s influence over Gaza.

Egypt’s government-controlled media referred to Cairo’s efforts to negotiate a cease-fire deal as the dawning of a golden era in Egyptian foreign policy. The media lauded Egyptian officials’ negotiation skills, ignoring the fact that Biden played the decisive role in stopping the fighting. The claim that Egypt was restoring its relevance as an international peace broker rings hollow because in Egypt, Gaza is often considered more of a domestic matter rather than a regional one. (Cairo occupied the Gaza Strip from 1948 until 1967.) In any event, successful mediation does not make a country a regional power.

Egyptian media have exaggerated el-Sissi’s achievements. They claimed that his forceful diplomacy protected the Palestinians against Israeli aggression. It also spread propaganda about his military coup, claiming it was a popular revolution that saved Egypt from the Muslim Brotherhood. The media also glorified Egypt’s massive troop mobilization in the northwest – which it claimed resolved the Libyan crisis to Egypt’s advantage.

Egypt has myriad other problems with which to contend. It has a weak economy, heavy debt, poor educational system and high unemployment. According to the World Bank, Egypt’s per capita income in 2019 was $3,000 compared to $8,000 for the Middle East and North Africa region. Although real incomes saw modest growth over the past few years, they are not sustainable in the long term because Egypt’s economic reforms are superficial. The Egyptian economy relies heavily on the public sector, led by the armed forces. The International Monetary Fund strongly recommended that the government promote the private sector, but instead, it increased the military’s involvement in the economy.

The 1952 military coup ended a century of capitalistic development. Nasser’s nationalization of the economy had devastating consequences for Egypt’s economic growth. When Sadat made peace with Israel, he slashed the military budget but allowed the armed forces to play an active role in the economy to generate revenue. Under Mubarak, the military effectively dominated the economy, a trend that only grew under el-Sissi, who’s dependent on the loyalty of senior army officers who oppose any attempts at privatization.

Egypt is also facing a low-intensity insurgency in northern Sinai and an intensifying water dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. (The project, which is still under construction, has already decreased Egypt’s production of staple crops – wheat, rice, and sugar – by more than 25 percent.) El-Sissi believes Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is seeking to transform his country into an economic hub and marginalize Egypt’s role in the region.

A country with an economy controlled by its military and facing an existential threat to its water supply can hardly expect to become a regional power. El-Sissi has shifted Egypt’s focus from the Middle East to Africa, in part because of the dispute over the dam, but he remains too preoccupied with the existential threat from the south to worry about restoring Egypt’s regional power status.

Egypt enjoys geostrategic advantages that qualify it to play a leading regional role. It straddles Africa, Asia and Europe and controls one of the world’s most important maritime routes. It is the Arab world’s most populous country and has its most homogeneous population. However, Egypt remains inwardly focused, and its people have little interest in non-Egyptian affairs. Considering the state of the country’s economy, it’s unlikely these conditions will change any time soon.

Yet Egypt had a weak response to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), a massive project that threatens to decrease the flow of water downstream through the Nile River. Yet the expenditure of billions of dollars on arms despite the government’s refusal to resort to military action to settle its dam dispute.

But this level of criticism directed at the president is extremely rare in Egypt. 

Many Egyptians share opinions on the water issue. And that el-Sissi should not have signed the 2015 Nile Agreement, which absolved Ethiopia from respecting Egypt’s water claims. 

Egyptian leaders are unaccustomed to being criticized. For example, the Egyptian media never criticized former President Gamal Abdel Nasser during his lifetime. After the 1967 Six-Day War, he accepted full responsibility for its disastrous outcome and admitted the failures of the armed forces. Still, the Egyptian public showered him with praise and believed he would lead them to victory. But Nasser knew how to communicate with the people, unlike el-Sissi, who in 2016 announced that he would deploy troops throughout the country in six hours after activists called for mass protests against the deal to give Riyadh control over the Red Sea islands.

 

Legacy Of Apathy

There are many explanations for the Egyptian people’s hesitation to rebel against repressive leaders. One argument attributes political inaction to the country’s rule by foreigners – Persians, Romans and Arabian Muslim conquerors – for more than two millennia. Even prior to that time, Egypt was ruled for three millennia by the pharaohs, to whom Egyptians attached divine attributes that justified their absolute power.

Another explanation is that hydraulic societies promote political apathy because imperial dynasties monopolize water supplies and regulate their distribution. Egypt’s population lives on just 5 percent of its 1 million square kilometers of land, making it easy for its rulers to control them in the flat and narrow plains.

The pharaohs’ establishment of the world’s first centralized state, when Menes united the delta and upper Egypt 5,000 years ago, enabled them to keep the population at bay under the hegemony of a powerful political entity. The historical experiences of a people brought together by destiny feed into their collective consciousness, which can either trigger or inhibit collective action. While individual Egyptians do take issue with the regime, these personal acts of defiance do not grow into widespread demands for reform. Those who do call for change become pessimistic over time, realizing they cannot mobilize their fellow citizens who fear government reprisal. Eventually, they reach the point of believing that they do not stand a chance against the state’s overwhelming machinery of coercion.

 

Stability And Tolerance

Despite the tendency toward apathy, Egypt has witnessed several bouts of unrest throughout its history. In 1919, a pro-independence uprising swept through Egypt after the British arrested nationalist leader Saad Zaghloul, who was later exiled. In 1922, the British declared Egypt an independent state and introduced a system of participatory politics – though they remained in control of the Suez Canal area. In 1968, workers at the Helwan industrial complex south of Cairo protested against the light prison sentences given to air force commanders deemed responsible for Egypt’s defeat in the Six-Day War. In 1971-72, student demonstrations erupted against President Anwar Sadat’s reluctance to go to war against Israel and liberate Sinai. (He reneged on a promise to end Israeli occupation before the end of 1971.)

But these public displays of discontent were short-lived. Egypt’s agricultural society and predictable pattern of living engendered the development of a rich culture that puts a premium on stability and tolerance. Egyptians welcomed Alexander the Great as their liberator from the Persians and treated him as a deity. They accepted the Ptolemaic Kingdom that succeeded him, especially after its kings immersed themselves in the Egyptian way of life. Egyptians even accepted Cleopatra, who was of Macedonian heritage, as one of them. After succumbing to the Roman Empire and its Byzantine successor, they did not resist the Muslim conquest in the 7th century and appreciated the Arab military commander Amr ibn al-As for freeing them from Byzantine rule. They adopted the Arabic language, unlike, for example, the Persians and Turks, who adopted Islam but clung to their own language and cultural heritage.

When the Fatimids conquered Egypt in 969, Egyptians converted to Shiism. Then, in 1169, when Saladin gained control over Egypt, they reverted back to Sunnism. They did not resist the French, who occupied Egypt between 1798 and 1801 – in part because the French brought with them modernization and, unlike the Mamluks, treated the Egyptians with respect. The Ottomans sent Muhammad Ali, an Albanian army officer, to Egypt to rein in the Mamluks after the French departure, but he established a dynasty that lasted from 1805 until 1952. He founded modern Egypt, making it a cultural, educational and literary hub.

 

Disappointment With Self-Rule

In 1952, Egyptian army officers staged a military coup, which eventually led to Nasser taking the reins of power. He wanted to develop Egypt economically but got bogged down in military adventures throughout the region. He led Egypt from one disaster to another: the 1956 Suez War, the Yemen War and the disastrous Six-Day War. Yet, Egyptians did not hold him accountable for his erratic policies, and many still view him as a national hero. After Nasser’s untimely death in 1970, Anwar Sadat became president. He deconstructed Nasser’s socialist economy, introduced neoliberalism and created a class of nouveau riche business entrepreneurs. In 1977, hundreds of thousands of poor Egyptians protested against the government’s curtailing of food subsidies – though they made no political demands. Sadat found it more practical to reinstate the subsidies and ignore the recommendations of international financial donors. Hosni Mubarak, who succeeded Sadat after his assassination in 1981, allied with the neoliberal class and allowed the army to become a significant economic player, to the detriment of most Egyptians, who languished in poverty. In 2008, the rise of the April 6 reform movement – a coalition of young activists and organized labor – was a testament to the Mubarak regime’s decay and the armed forces’ resentment of his scheme to have his son Gamal succeed him.

The torture and brutal killing in June 2010 of an innocent young pharmacist triggered short-lived and inconsequential protests in Cairo and Alexandria. In contrast, the uprising in Tunisia in 2010 that followed the death of a street vendor named Mohamed Bouazizi – who set himself on fire after being harassed by police – triggered the Arab Spring protests and reminded Egyptians of the excesses of their country’s security forces. The ouster of Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali after 24 years in office gave Egyptians hope that they could do the same.

After Mubarak resigned following mass protests, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces allowed Mohammed Morsi to become president with the intention of deposing him and reclaiming complete political control. Politically inept, Morsi angered many Egyptians, and the military overthrew him in 2013. El-Sissi became president in 2014 and continues to maintain a tight grip on power.

Under his leadership, authoritarian rule in Egypt has reached a new peak. Egypt’s history and geographic isolation have led many Egyptians to accept the country’s despotic leadership, believing that better days are ahead. But Egyptian society can flourish under the management of a bold leader – which it hasn’t had in decades.

 

 

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