By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
End the War in Gaza
Following the Israeli
and U.S. attacks on Iranian nuclear sites and the subsequent Iranian-Israeli cease-fire,
another agreement seemed to be close at hand, this time in Gaza. Late last
week, however, both the United States and Israel halted their participation in
the negotiations, accusing Hamas of a lack of coordination and good faith.
Hamas, the Islamist organization and de facto authority in the Gaza Strip,
wants the United States to guarantee that the cease-fire will become permanent,
Israel to withdraw its military, and the UN and other aid providers to surge
humanitarian assistance to Palestinians who are facing mass starvation.
U.S. President Donald
Trump’s continued deference to Israel and his withdrawal from the
talks are a huge mistake. Unless a deal can be made, Trump’s desire to preside
over a broader regional peace that includes the normalization of diplomatic ties
between Israel and Saudi Arabia will be dead in the water. Such a
comprehensive regional agreement is desperately needed after 21 months of death
and destruction in Gaza and persistent conflict between Israel and much of the
Middle East.
Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his ultranationalist governing
coalition, however, have not shown any signs that they are ready to prioritize
a durable peace. Even if the remaining Israeli hostages held by Hamas since
October 2023 are released, Netanyahu has emphasized that an end to the war in
Gaza is impossible until Hamas is completely disarmed and its leaders exiled.
And even then, he wants Israel to maintain security control over Gaza and the
West Bank indefinitely. Meanwhile, as Egyptian, Qatari, and U.S. mediators were
shuttling back and forth between the Palestinian and Israeli negotiators,
Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz advanced a
plan for relocating Gaza’s population into a so-called humanitarian city—what
former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert refers to as a “concentration
camp”—built on the ruins of Rafah near the enclave’s southern edge. Under
Katz’s proposal, over two million Palestinians would be held in an area a third
the size of Washington, D.C., until they can be resettled abroad.
“We are destroying
more and more homes, and they have nowhere to return to,” Netanyahu said of
Gaza’s population in May. “The only inevitable outcome will be the desire of
Gazans to emigrate outside of the Gaza Strip.” So even if he were to agree to a
short-term cease-fire, addressing Palestinians’ right to self-determination
cannot be part of any deal because he considers the notion of an independent
Palestinian state to be a threat to Israel, as the Israeli prime minister
stated during a visit to the White House on July 7.

US President Donald
Trump, right, meets with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Oval
Office of the White House in Washington, DC, on April 7, 2025.
But Netanyahu’s
formula to end the conflict in the Middle East is not fit for purpose. No Arab
government will entertain the forced displacement of Palestinians. Moreover,
Arab states have made it increasingly clear that they are no longer willing to
deepen their ties or normalize relations with Israel until Israel accepts a
sovereign Palestinian state. France, meanwhile, has announced that it will
recognize the state of Palestine. The British government is under growing
domestic pressure to go beyond the sanctions it has imposed on specific Israeli
cabinet ministers and approve a full embargo on arms exports to Israel and
support the International Criminal Court’s prosecutions of Netanyahu and the
former Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant for war crimes, including for the
deliberate starvation of Gaza’s population.
If left unchecked,
Netanyahu may soon succeed in forcing a mass displacement of Palestinians,
preventing Trump from properly recalibrating the United States’
Middle East policy and from reducing the U.S. military footprint in the region.
The blunt truth is that Netanyahu is one of a small handful of regional actors
whose interests do not broadly align with Trump’s. And Trump has more room to
maneuver than any other recent American president. He must deploy the full
weight of U.S. power to force Netanyahu to end his territorial ambitions and
accept a peace that enables recognition of an independent state of Palestine.
That is the only way Trump can be a genuine peacemaker in the Middle East.

Immovable Object
Netanyahu has been an
obstacle to Trump’s objectives in the Middle East since the U.S. president’s
first term in the White House. Back then, Trump hoped to make a grand Middle
East peace deal his signature achievement. But by allowing Netanyahu to have a
hand in drafting his 2020 plan for a comprehensive regional peace, Trump killed
any chance he had for success. That plan sought to resolve all outstanding
issues between Israel and the Palestinians in Israel’s favor: there would be no
Israeli military withdrawal from the West Bank, no evacuation of any Israeli
settlements, and no right of return for Palestinian refugees, either to Israel
or to the Palestinian territories. Predictably, Palestinians refused to accept
their permanent subjugation under a regime that the International Court of
Justice judged in 2024 to be equivalent to apartheid rule. Netanyahu’s strategy
allowed him to appear a peacemaker while denying Trump a true peace deal that
addressed Palestinian rights head on and cleared the way for Israel’s
integration into the region.
Trump may not have
fully appreciated the extent to which Netanyahu’s political identity was
founded on denying Palestinians’ national identity. “Everyone knows that I am
the one who, for decades, has blocked the establishment of a Palestinian
state,” Netanyahu, Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, asserted last year.
He was not being braggadocious; he spoke the truth. For over two decades, he
has been instrumental in putting obstacles in front of any agreement that would
further Palestinian self-determination.
Netanyahu is now
better positioned than ever to not only prevent the creation of a Palestinian
state but also annex the occupied Palestinian territories for Israeli
settlement. Days after Hamas’s October 2023 attack on Israel, the Israeli
Ministry of Intelligence submitted a plan to Netanyahu—versions of which had
been in circulation since 2018—recommending the depopulation of Gaza under the guise of “humanitarian voluntary
evacuation.” The Israeli government went on to prosecute a military campaign that
destroyed most of the enclave and its agricultural land; what buildings still
stand are being methodically leveled in controlled bombings.
Netanyahu has
repeatedly claimed that killing Palestinians—the toll stands at more than
59,000 Palestinians—and rendering Gaza unlivable was necessary to destroy
Hamas. His critics often counter that he has prolonged the war in Gaza to keep
himself in office as he battles corruption charges in court. But his underlying
goals are bigger, and if not for the ongoing trial, Netanyahu would likely be
pursuing the same policies in Gaza. His government has established a bureau to
find willing third countries to take Palestinians from Gaza. And in the West
Bank—where there is no Hamas enemy to point to—the Israel Defense Forces
launched the so-called Operation Iron Wall mission in January to, as Katz, the
Israeli defense minister, explicitly put it, apply the lessons of what the
military accomplished in Gaza. More than 40,000 Palestinians were forced from
their homes, the greatest displacement in the area since the 1967 Arab-Israeli
war. Essential infrastructure and symbols of Palestinian national identity were
destroyed, and streets were widened to make way for future Israeli tanks.
Netanyahu also seized control of the Palestinian land registry in the West Bank
to expedite the transfer of Palestinian private land to Israeli settlers.
Netanyahu has no
intention of deviating from the platform of his Likud party, which states that
“between the Sea and the Jordan there will be only Israeli sovereignty.” As he
stated in December 2022, his government’s guiding principles are that “Jewish people
have an exclusive and indisputable right” to settle in the entirety of “Judea
and Samaria,” encompassing all the West Bank. Under Netanyahu’s leadership,
Zionist parties to the left of Likud have shifted toward his position. In July
2024, the Israeli parliament overwhelmingly approved a bill opposing the
establishment of any Palestinian state that included territory west of the
Jordan River; last week, an even larger parliamentary majority called for
annexing the West Bank.

An Israeli soldier near the Israel-Gaza border, May
2025
Moral Majority
If October 7, 2023, and
its aftermath established anything for key Arab states, however, it is that the
need for regional peace and security is urgent—and that peace between Israel
and the Palestinians is indivisible from this aim. The lack of a resolution has
become a national-security noose around the neck of every state in the Middle
East—whether because of the spillover of fighting since October 7, the threat
of refugee flows across borders, or the impact of persistent regional turmoil
on states’ ability to act on essential national development goals. Even if some
appetite still exists among Arab leaders to deepen relations with Israel, they
are now constrained by the fact that their populations’ opinions of Israel are
overwhelmingly negative, as Michael Robbins and Amaney Jamal wrote in Foreign
Affairs in January.
Saudi Arabia’s de facto
leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has been clear: after what he
referred to as Israel’s “collective genocide” in Gaza, his country can accept
only a normalization process that resembles the one proposed by the 2002 Arab
Peace Initiative, adopted at an Arab League summit: Israel must first accept a
Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and only then will Saudi
Arabia normalize relations. In early July, the crown prince’s foreign minister,
Faisal bin Farhan, reiterated that position, saying that a cease-fire in Gaza
must be “a prelude to the establishment of a Palestinian state.” And despite
statements in June by Trump administration officials that Lebanon and Syria
might be on the cusp of embracing Israel as a neighbor, the Israeli air attacks
that have pounded eastern Lebanon and the heart of Damascus this month make
that unlikely.
Significant elements
of Trump’s domestic base, meanwhile, want him to prioritize American interests,
which they believe diverge from Netanyahu’s vision for the Middle East. Figures
such as Tucker Carlson question the unconditional financial, military, and
diplomatic support the U.S. government gives to Israel. Others go further: in
June, for instance, the influential podcaster Theo Von called out Israel’s
“genocide” of Palestinians during an interview with Vice President JD Vance.
These MAGA influencers are not outliers; they are reflective of broader changes
in the Republican Party and the country. A March survey by the Pew Research
Center found that 37 percent of Republicans overall and half of Republicans
under 50 now hold an unfavorable view of Israel. And according to a poll
released in May by Ipsos and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, over 60
percent of Americans now agree that Israel is playing a negative role in
“resolving key challenges in the Middle East.”
People stamping on a U.S. flag in Tehran, June 2025

Clear Path
This offers Trump
some freedom to break from Washington’s decades-long approach mandating that
there be “no daylight” between Israeli and U.S. policy in the Middle East. The
president should listen to his public and shift the U.S. government’s
relationship with Israel so it better reflects Americans’ preferences, as well
as the desires of most U.S. partners in the Middle East. That means preventing
Netanyahu from thwarting a permanent cease-fire; accepting that it is
impossible, in the near term, to eliminate Hamas from Palestinian society;
helping strengthen Palestinian institutions; and putting Palestinian statehood
at the center of any regional agreement. Any peace deal that Trump proposes or
backs will have to look very different than the one he put forward in 2020,
when Netanyahu stood beside him at the White House without a Palestinian
counterpart.
Trump should aim for
a deal that draws support from a wide variety of stakeholders in the Middle
East, throughout the Muslim world, and in Europe. He will need many governments
in those regions on his side to help provide the many billions of dollars necessary
to fund Gaza’s reconstruction. The essential elements of a cease-fire deal that
could lay the foundation for a more comprehensive regional peace already exist
in two documents: the so-called 2024 Beijing Declaration (which the major
Palestinian political factions, including Fatah and Hamas, signed last year)
and the Arab League’s Plan for the Early Recovery, Reconstruction, and
Development of Gaza, backed by the 57-member Organization of Islamic
Cooperation and by France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. According to
Jeremy Scahill’s reporting at Drop Site News, Hamas negotiators have offered
Israel an “all for all” formula as long as the United States guarantees that
Israel will not resume its attacks after Israeli hostages are freed.
To take advantage of
this opportunity, Trump must be willing to hold Israel to a commitment not to
restart hostilities anywhere in the occupied Palestinian territories. Then he
would have to secure an agreement from Israel to allow international peacekeeping
forces into Gaza, and eventually the West Bank, as a broader political accord
is negotiated. Egyptian and EU forces were successfully deployed during the
short-lived cease-fire that began in January, and they should be called on
again. Their presence could allow signatories to implement the Beijing
Declaration, in which Hamas agreed to hand over governance and security control
in Gaza to the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority and Fatah agreed to hold
elections and begin a process to integrate Hamas into the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO).
Successful solutions
to other once intractable conflicts, such as the decades of sectarian and civil
strife in Northern Ireland, show that enduring peace is possible only when all
stakeholders are invited in. And Hamas is hardly the only entity that seeks the
outcome delineated in the Beijing Declaration. A March poll conducted by the
Institute for Social and Economic Progress, a think tank based in the West Bank
city of Ramallah, found that more than 60 percent of Palestinians in Gaza
supported a unity government for postwar rule and that over half said they
would also support rule by the Palestinian Authority.
Only when Gaza and
the West Bank come under one authority can the enormous task of healing and
rebuilding in Gaza begin. And only a unified and legitimate Palestinian
leadership can guarantee that the terms of any future political agreement with
Israel will be upheld. Ultimately, to broker a real peace between Israelis and
Palestinians, Trump will need the PLO, the internationally recognized
interlocutor possessing the legal capacity to sign an agreement on behalf of
all Palestinians. And by supporting the inclusion of Hamas under the
organization’s umbrella, he would mitigate the potential for spoilers.

Break the Mold
Achieving all this
would likely have been too tall an order for most U.S. presidents over the past
three decades. But the war in Gaza has cost the United States an extraordinary
amount. According to estimates from the Watson School of International and Public
Affairs at Brown University, the United States provided Israel with at least
$22.7 billion during the war’s first 12 months. That was far above the annual
cap of $3.8 billion mandated in a ten-year memorandum of understanding between
the United States and Israel that extends until 2028. On top of this monetary
assistance, the U.S. government has been roped into a game of international
whack-a-mole on Israel’s behalf to prevent countries such as France and the
United Kingdom from imposing sanctions on Israel or recognizing a Palestinian
state.
Food
More than half the
Egyptian aid trucks that entered the Gaza Strip on Sunday were looted by
unknown actors and their contents later sold in local markets, according to a
report in the UK-based, Qatari-owned newspaper Al-Araby Al-Jadeed.
Out of 130 trucks, 73
of them were looted near the Morag Axis, which separates Rafah from Khan Younis
and is controlled by the IDF, the report says.

Trucks carrying
humanitarian aid wait to be allowed to cross from the Egyptian side of the
Rafah border crossing with the Gaza Strip on July 28, 2025.
Trump To Break With Netanyahu Again?
Rather than expend
such resources and political energy to win Israel’s forever war in Gaza—one
that the United States’ Arab partners oppose—the Trump administration must
recalibrate U.S. policy toward winning the peace. Trump has been uniquely
willing to break with Israel on many issues—for instance, by making deals with
the Houthi militant group in Yemen and opening a diplomatic dialogue with
Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Shara, despite his past alignment with al-Qaeda.
Trump will have to break with Netanyahu again, regardless of the implications
for the Israeli leader’s political future. He should walk back his previous
statement supporting the resettlement of Palestinians from Gaza and make the
case directly to Israelis that their security is tied to the security of
Palestinians and the rest of the region. With a recent Pew poll indicating that
more than 80 percent of Jewish Israelis have confidence in Trump as a world
leader, he can credibly argue that opposing Palestinian self-determination will
undermine Israeli security and preclude normalization with Arab states and
Israel’s regional integration.
When it comes to
Israel and the Palestinians, Trump’s administration has already shown
flexibility by breaking with Washington orthodoxy to open channels of
communication with Hamas to secure the release of an American held in Gaza.
Now, putting American interests first requires brokering an immediate and
permanent cease-fire in Gaza. If Trump goes further, he might have a
peace-prize-worthy achievement, but not if Gaza starves.
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