By Eric Vandenbroeck
and co-workers
The Coming Surveillance And FISA Reform
Americans live in an era
of unprecedented government surveillance, made possible by seismic changes in
technology and the law. People have never generated such volumes of personal
information, and the U.S. government has possessed such powerful means to
capture, store, and analyze it. At the same time, the 9/11 attacks prompted
Congress to relax many of the legal constraints on surveillance.
For the better part
of two decades, Americans acquiesced in these developments. In 2013, a National
Security Agency contractor, Edward Snowden, disclosed that the NSA was secretly
collecting Americans’ phone records in bulk—a revelation that briefly rattled
the public’s trust and led to some legislative reforms in 2015. But Americans
were soon occupied with matters that seemed more pressing than the abstract
risk of surveillance abuse.
As with so many other
things, the presidency of Donald Trump dramatically upended the blithe status
quo. Many Republicans became convinced that the FBI had abused the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to spy on Trump’s campaign. Democrats, for
their part, gained a new appreciation for the dangers of insufficiently
constrained executive power. Their concerns were reinforced when it emerged
that intelligence and law enforcement agencies had been spying on activists
taking part in a newly reinvigorated racial justice movement.
The country is now
headed for a reckoning over government surveillance, and the first testing
ground will likely be a part of FISA, known as Section 702. This authority,
which permits the government to conduct warrantless surveillance of foreigners
abroad, is scheduled to expire in December unless reauthorized by Congress.
Despite growing evidence that it was being used to spy on Americans, the
government had little difficulty persuading lawmakers to renew the law in 2012
and 2018. But that evidence is now overwhelming, and the politics of
surveillance have radically shifted. Section 702 is unlikely to be reauthorized
this time without reforms.
What remains unclear
is just how far Congress will go. The Biden administration and intelligence
hawks in Congress will likely support minor tweaks at most, whereas other
lawmakers will embrace far-reaching changes to the law. But Section 702 is just
one part of a vast ecosystem of overlapping surveillance authorities, and
addressing it in isolation would have limited effect. The government could
evade any new restrictions by using other, more permissive sources—or, in some
cases, by simply purchasing the information from data brokers. If Congress
intends to rein in warrantless spying on Americans, it must rethink
surveillance more broadly.
A Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy
The framers of the
U.S. Constitution understood that unjustified government intrusions into
citizens’ private lives threaten both individual liberty and the workings
of democracy. The Fourth Amendment accordingly protects Americans from
“unreasonable searches and seizures.” Subject to limited exceptions, the
Supreme Court has held that any government encroachment on a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” is inherently unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
unless the government has obtained a warrant from a court.
During the early
decades of the Cold War, however, intelligence agencies frequently spied
on social and racial justice activists, antiwar protesters, and political
opponents in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights—abuses that came
to light due to congressional inquiries in the 1970s. Moreover, the government
believed, and some courts agreed, that warrants were not always required when
the government eavesdropped on Americans’ communications to collect “foreign
intelligence”: information about the intentions and activities of foreign
entities.
Responding to these
developments, Congress passed several laws to protect Americans’ constitutional
rights and privacy. One such law was FISA, which generally governs domestic
foreign intelligence collection. (Overseas foreign intelligence
collection usually relies on claims of inherent executive authority and is
subject to fewer constraints.) As enacted in 1978, FISA required the government
to get a warrant known as FISA Title I to engage in domestic wiretapping of
Americans’ communications, including their communications with foreigners. To
obtain such an order, the government had to show probable cause to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (or FISA Court), a special court created to
oversee FISA surveillance, that the target of surveillance was a foreign power
or agent of a foreign power.
After 9/11, Congress
raced to loosen government surveillance restrictions placed two decades
earlier. The 9/11 Commission later determined that U.S. agencies had ample
intelligence about the planned attacks; they failed to share and act on that
intelligence. But in the attacks’ immediate aftermath, Congress assumed
otherwise. It passed the U.S.A. Patriot Act, a 341-page bill that amended more
than a dozen principal federal laws, one day after introduction—before most
members even had time to read it.
However, the law’s
sweeping new surveillance powers did not satisfy the government. President
George W. Bush authorized secret programs, code-named Stellar Wind, to collect
communications and other personal data without congressional authorization. One
of these programs involved the domestic warrantless collection of the content
of communications between suspected foreign terrorists and Americans in the
United States. This was a clear violation of FISA: although the Patriot Act
expanded the purposes for which the government could seek a Title I order, it
did not eliminate the requirement to obtain one.
Opening The Floodgates
After The New
York Times exposed the spying program in 2005, the government
attempted to obtain legal cover for it by securing the FISA Court’s approval.
When the court balked, the government turned to Congress. Bush administration
officials argued that changes in communications technology had resulted in
foreigners’ communications being handled by U.S. service providers, triggering
legal protections in FISA that were designed for Americans and impeding
counterterrorism efforts. They asked Congress to “modernize” FISA by loosening
its restrictions.
Congress responded by
enacting Section 702 of FISA in 2008. The law authorizes the government to
target almost any foreigner abroad and collect the content of all their
communications, including those with Americans, without obtaining an
individualized court order. The only substantive restriction is that the
collection's significant purpose must be acquiring foreign intelligence. The
FISA Court annually approves general procedures for how the government collects
and handles information, but it does not support individual targets.
In 2011, the
government informed the FISA Court that it had collected 250 million Internet
communications under Section 702 the previous year. Given the growth in the
program, the number today is likely closer to one billion. This inevitably
includes large volumes of American communications for the simple reason that
Americans communicate with foreigners. The government refers to collecting
Americans’ communication as “incidental” to signify that Americans are not the
intended surveillance targets.
Critically, the
program would be unlawful if the government intended to eavesdrop on those Americans.
Purposefully spying on Americans would require a regular warrant (in criminal
investigations) or a FISA Title I order (in foreign intelligence
investigations). Congress included two key provisions in the law to prevent the
government from using Section 702 as an end-run around these constitutional and
statutory requirements. First, the government must “minimize” the collection,
sharing, and retention of Americans’ information. Second, the government must
certify that it is not engaged in “reverse targeting,” namely, using
surveillance to obtain the communications of particular, known Americans.
Domestic Spying
Fifteen years into
the program, it is clear that these protections are not working. With the FISA
Court’s backing, the government has adopted a remarkably maximal interpretation
of minimization. After collecting the data, the NSA routinely shares portions
of it—including Americans’ communications—with the CIA, FBI, and National
Counterterrorism Center. All agencies retain the data for at least five years,
and in some cases, such as when the data is encrypted, much longer.
The most
controversial aspect of the program, however, is the use of “backdoor searches”
(or, as the government refers to them, “U.S. person queries”): the practice of
electronically searching the Section 702–acquired data to find and retrieve
Americans’ phone calls, text messages, and emails. In other words, having
obtained the data without a warrant by certifying that it is not seeking access
to the communications of particular, known Americans, the government then
intentionally searches that very data for the communications of particular,
known Americans.
Information obtained
through backdoor searches can be used against Americans in cases having nothing
to do with the original surveillance. The FBI routinely performs these queries
at the beginning, or what is known as the “assessment” stage, of its
investigations—before it has sufficient facts to support a reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity, let alone probable cause and a warrant.
This practice is a
bait-and-switch that violates the spirit of the reverse-targeting prohibition,
if not the letter. It might also violate the U.S. Constitution. The FISA Court
has blessed backdoor searches, but the court, which operates in secret and
often hears only from government lawyers, is notoriously deferential to the
government. Several judges have expressed constitutional concerns among the
handful of regular federal courts that have had the chance to address these
searches. As federal appellate judge, Carlos Lucero stated: “U.S. persons do
not lose their protected privacy interests when they communicate with
foreigners abroad.”
After years of
resisting calls to disclose the information, the government recently began
reporting the number of backdoor searches conducted by the FBI. In 2022 alone,
the FBI conducted around 200,000 of these queries—upward of 500 warrantless
daily searches for Americans’ communications. The NSA and CIA also conduct thousands
of backdoor searches each year, according to government reports. These
staggering numbers leave little doubt that a surveillance authority meant to
target only foreigners has become something else entirely: a powerful domestic
spying tool.
Breaking The Rules
Backdoor searches
aside, Section 702 has been marked since its inception by repeated violations
of the rules Congress and the FISA Court put in place to protect Americans’
privacy. These violations are often revealed in FISA Court opinions
declassified and made public by statutory requirements and in government
reports required by Congress.
One grave violation
dates back to the very beginning of the program. For several years, one of the
NSA’s collection methods resulted in the acquisition of tens of thousands of
purely domestic communications. The NSA kept this information from the FISA
Court until 2011. When the agency finally came clean, the court ruled that
the agency’s actions violated both Section 702 and the Fourth Amendment. It
imposed remedial measures to limit NSA’s access to Americans’ communications.
Five years later, the NSA reported that its agents had not complied with these
measures. It was not until 2017, after nine years of operating the program unconstitutionally,
that the NSA stopped using this particular collection method.
Around the same time,
Justice Department auditors began noticing and reporting violations of the
FBI’s requirements for U.S. person queries. The FISA Court had approved that
U.S. person queries must be reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence or
evidence of a crime. That is a fairly low bar compared with the probable cause
showing required for a warrant. Nonetheless, beginning in 2018, the FISA Court
issued a series of opinions finding that FBI agents had engaged in “widespread
violations” of this standard.
Some of the reported
breaches carry echoes of the politically and racially motivated surveillance
abuses that occurred under J. Edgar Hoover’s reign as the head of the FBI. In
2021, for instance, the FBI conducted 113 searches of Section 702–collected
data for the communications of people who were arrested in connection with
protests after the police killing of George Floyd. FBI agents reportedly wanted
to find out whether the protesters had any foreign ties, but as the FISA Court
found, they had no basis to suspect such connections. FBI agents also ran
thousands of U.S. person queries in a baseless hunt for evidence of foreign
involvement in January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol. That same year, the
FBI searched for the communications of more than 19,000 donors to a
congressional campaign. And between 2017 and 2020, the FBI searched for
information about a member of the U.S. Congress, a local political party; multiple
U.S. government officials, journalists, and political commentators; and two
“Middle Eastern” men who witness reported because they were loading boxes
labeled “Drano” into a vehicle.
The FBI has also
entirely ignored a separate limitation on U.S. person queries imposed by
Congress. In 2018, Congress enacted a provision requiring FBI agents to obtain
a warrant for a tiny subset of questions in advanced-stage criminal
investigations.
According to a
statistical report produced by the government, this requirement
was triggered at least 100 times between 2018 and 2022. According to that
same report, the FBI never once complied with it.
The FBI implemented
new training and oversight requirements in response to these violations.
Officials promise that these changes will ensure compliance with the rules
going forward. But the government has made similar claims numerous times, and
there has been little effect on the overall pattern of violations. As
surveillance expert Julian Sanchez put it, the government has been engaged in a 15-year game of
“compliance whack-a-mole.”
Given this history of
violations, one might wonder why the FISA Court continues approving Section 702
surveillance. At the bottom, the FISA Court operates fundamentally differently
from ordinary courts. It usually hears arguments only from one party: the U.S.
government. It must accept the government's facts, as there is no discovery
process to unearth additional or conflicting information. And the government
attorneys who appear before the court are repeat players who engage in an
ongoing dialogue with court staff, creating a kind of partnership dynamic.
Reading the court’s opinions, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the
court, even when expressing profound frustration over the government’s conduct,
sees its role as “getting to yes.”
Collecting It All
When Section 702 was
enacted, government officials and lawmakers described its purpose as preventing
terrorist attacks. As the threat of terrorism has become less salient, the
government’s description of Section 702’s value has shifted. Officials now tout
the law’s usefulness in combating cybersecurity attacks, fentanyl trafficking,
and espionage attempts by China and other major powers.
But no threat is
required to conduct surveillance under Section 702. The law permits the
management of any foreigner abroad as long as a significant purpose of the
administration is to acquire “foreign intelligence information.” FISA defines
this term exceptionally broadly to include any “information related to . . .
the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs.” A conversation between friends about
whether the United States should do more to support Ukraine would justify
surveillance under this definition.
Spying on foreigners
without a sufficient security-based justification would violate their privacy
rights under international agreements, such as the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, to which the United States is a party. And the mere
license to engage in such surveillance is already creating headaches for U.S.
businesses. In 2015 and 2020, the Court of Justice for the European Union
struck down U.S.-EU agreements governing the transfer of EU citizens’ data from
EU companies to U.S. companies—agreements that allowed more than 5,000 U.S.
companies to do business overseas. The European court ruled that U.S. companies
could not provide adequate protections for EU citizens’ data, partly because
Section 702 provides the U.S. government with such easy access.
The sprawling scope of
Section 702 surveillance also has privacy implications for Americans. The
larger the pool of permissible targets, the greater the amount of “incidental”
collection may occur. Moreover, if the government can target ordinary private
citizens of other nations, it dramatically increases the chances of obtaining
innocent conversations between Americans and their friends, colleagues, and
relatives overseas.
Politics Upended
Since Section 702’s
enactment, progressives and libertarians in Congress have expressed concerns
over the law and have worked together to try to reform it. But until recently,
centrist Democrats and Republicans supported the law. Moreover, the
congressional intelligence committees, like the FISA Court, have tended to act
as intelligence agencies’ partners rather than their overseers. These
committees have exercised their clout to sideline reform efforts.
Throughout the Trump
administration, however, the politics of FISA radically shifted. The Department
of Justice’s inspector general issued a report in 2019 with sobering
findings: the government’s applications to the FISA Court under Title I to
surveil a Trump campaign aide, Carter Page, were riddled with errors and
omissions. A follow-up report showed that similar flaws pervaded Title I
surveillance applications, suggesting that slipshod submissions to the FISA
Court are the norm. Nonetheless, Trump and his supporters in Congress concluded
that the Obama administration (which initiated the Page surveillance) abused
FISA for political purposes.
Since then, a large
faction of Republicans has turned against FISA in all its forms. When a
different provision of FISA came up for reauthorization in 2020, Trump fired
off a storm of tweets opposing it, and the reauthorization failed. As for
Democratic lawmakers, four years under Trump opened their eyes to the
importance of meaningful checks on executive power. They also have been alarmed
by recent revelations about the frequency of backdoor searches and the FBI’s widespread
violations of querying rules, including incidents of spying on racial justice
protesters.
Democrats’ concerns
about Section 702 have been reinforced by recent abuses and misuse of other
forms of warrantless data gathering. In 2019, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection created a list of American reporters, lawyers, and activists who
were subject to questioning and enhanced scrutiny at the border because of
their role in assisting asylum seekers. During the summer of 2020, the
Department of Homeland Security created dossiers on racial justice protesters
and monitored their social media accounts. In late 2020, Vice News reported that the Department of Defense had purchased
geolocation information generated by popular Muslim prayer and dating apps. And
in 2022, DHS monitored social media for “reactions” and “reflections” related
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Organization.
These incidents serve
as stark reminders that warrant protect not only privacy but also the civil
rights of marginalized communities. When government officials are not required
to furnish evidence of wrongdoing, it is much easier for them to fall back on
conscious or subconscious prejudices, whether racial, religious, or political.
Get A Warrant
Given the newly
reshaped political landscape, lawmakers will unlikely reauthorize Section 702
this year without significant reforms. They should first require government
officials to obtain a warrant or a FISA Title I order before conducting U.S.
person queries of communications received under Section 702. An amendment
passed the House of Representatives in 2014 and 2015, and U.S. Vice President
Kamala Harris cosponsored a similar amendment in 2018 when she was still a
senator.
Government officials
have countered that a warrant requirement would be unworkable. The courts lack
the capacity, they argue, to absorb an additional 200,000 warrant applications
each year; in any event, the government lacks probable cause in many of these
cases. But of course, the massive number of queries and the absence of probable
cause for those queries is precisely why advocates and lawmakers are pushing
for a warrant requirement. The fact that warrants constrain government
surveillance is a feature, not a bug.
Officials also assert
that warrantless U.S. person queries are necessary to identify potential U.S.
victims of foreign cyberattacks, spy recruitment efforts, and foreign influence
campaigns. The argument has superficial appeal. But the need to protect victims
is hardly unique to foreign intelligence cases. Law enforcement agencies are
routinely faced with this task, and they manage to keep the public safe using
investigative techniques that comport with the Fourth Amendment—including
obtaining the consent and cooperation of potential victims. There is no
“victim” exception to the Fourth Amendment.
There is good reason
for that. Regardless of the purpose of a search, the result is to expose an
American’s private information to review by a government agent, with all the
potential for abuse such access entails. Indeed, the line between “victim” and
“suspect” can be pretty malleable—particularly when the activity being
investigated is alleged foreign influence. Under J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI
justified spying on antiwar protesters and civil rights activists by claiming
that foreign communist groups attempted to influence or infiltrate them.
In addition to
closing the backdoor search loophole, Congress should narrow the pool of
permissible targets to people or groups likely to have information about a
threat to the United States or its interests rather than allowing the
surveillance of almost any foreigner overseas. This would better protect the
privacy of innocent foreign nationals and the Americans with whom they
communicate, and it would ensure that U.S. companies can continue doing
business with their counterparts in the European Union.
A Borderless World
However, if Congress
stops at Section 702, its reforms will have a limited impact. Most of the
government’s foreign intelligence surveillance activities do not take place
under FISA.
Generally speaking,
and regardless of whether the target is a foreigner or an American, FISA
applies when the government collects information inside the United States or
from U.S.-based companies. When the government conducts surveillance abroad, it
typically relies on a claim of inherent presidential authority, as regulated by
Executive Order 12333, a 1981 directive issued by President Ronald Reagan. This
executive order has far fewer protections for Americans’ privacy than FISA, and
surveillance under it involves no judicial oversight.
In 1978, when FISA
was enacted, there was arguably some logic to the geographical distinction it
incorporated. Domestic surveillance usually meant surveillance of Americans;
overseas surveillance usually meant surveillance of foreigners. Today, however,
communications are routinely routed and stored worldwide, regardless of where
they originate or terminate. Indeed, the fact that purely foreign
communications were being routed and stored inside the United States, thus
triggering FISA’s requirement of a probable-cause order, is one reason the
government sought to “modernize” FISA in 2008 through the enactment of Section
702.
But Section 702
addressed only half of the problem. Just as foreigners’ communications can
travel through or reside in the United States, purely domestic communications
frequently travel through or reside in other countries. An email between a
mother in Akron, Ohio, and her daughter in Spokane, Washington, could transit
over fiberoptic cables in France or sit on a Google server in Ireland. This
digital wandering can sometimes remove domestic communications from FISA’s
protections and expose them to surveillance under the Reagan-era executive
order. Congress and the executive branch have imposed limits on the targeting
of Americans under this order. Still, these limits have little effect when the
government engages in “bulk collection,” a type of dragnet collection with no
specific targets. Bulk collection is prohibited under Section 702 but permitted
under Executive Order 12333.
Moreover, even when
targeted at specific foreigners rather than conducted in bulk, surveillance
under Executive Order 12333 results in the “incidental” collection of
Americans’ communications, just as Section 702 surveillance does. Yet privacy
protections for this information are left almost entirely to executive branch
policies, with no court review to ensure that the procedures comply with the
Constitution—or that agencies comply with the guidelines. Agencies can perform
backdoor searches of data obtained under the executive order.
In 2022, The New
York Times reported that the CIA is conducting bulk collection
activities under Executive Order 12333 that pull in American data, which CIA
agents may retrieve through U.S. person queries. One group of programs collects
information about financial transactions. Another program remains so heavily
classified that the type of data being collected remains unknown, although the
CIA’s scant public statements suggest that the information pertains to
communications.
Americans’
constitutional rights should not depend on the accident of where their digital
data happens to travel. To complete the modernization of FISA that began with
Section 702, Congress should extend FISA’s protections—including new
protections resulting from Section 702 reforms—to any surveillance that
acquires Americans’ constitutionally protected information, regardless of where
that surveillance occurs. Without this step, the government could
undermine the impact of Section 702 reforms by shifting at least some domestic
management overseas.
Fourth Amendment Rights For Sale
In cases where overseas
collection proves impracticable, the government has another avenue for
obtaining Fourth Amendment–protected data without a warrant: buying it.
In 2021, a series of
investigative reports revealed that federal agencies—including the FBI,
the Drug Enforcement Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Customs, and Border Protection, the Secret Service, and the Department of
Defense—were paying data brokers to obtain access to Americans’ cell phone
location information, sometimes in massive amounts. Even the Internal Revenue
Service, according to The Wall
Street Journal, “attempted to identify and track potential
criminal suspects by purchasing access to a commercial database that records
the locations of millions of American cellphones.”
This practice would
seem to violate Carpenter v. United States, a 2018 case in
which the Supreme Court held that police needed a warrant to acquire a week’s
worth of geolocation information from a cell phone company. The decision broke
new ground: courts had previously ruled that people have no Fourth Amendment
rights regarding information they voluntarily disclose to third parties, such
as phone companies. But the Court reasoned that detailed geolocation data could
reveal the most intimate details of people’s lives, including their
associations, habits, and even beliefs. And there is nothing genuinely
voluntary about disclosing it, as owning a cell phone is necessary to
participate in modern life.
Government lawyers,
however, have found a way around the case law. They have construed Carpenter
to apply only when the government compels companies to produce the data. They
argue that the warrant requirement disappears when the government merely
provides a cash incentive for such production. Questionable as this analysis
may be, it could take years for the courts to resolve the issue.
Some privacy laws
limit these types of purchases, but they include gaping loopholes. For
instance, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act prohibits telephone and
Internet companies from voluntarily disclosing customer records to government
agencies. But the prohibition does not extend to digital data
brokers—unsurprisingly, as these entities barely existed in 1986 when the law
was passed. This gap creates an easy end-run around the law’s protections:
companies barred from directly selling data to the government can effectively
launder it through data brokers.
Congress should
expressly prohibit the government from evading FISA’s requirements through the
use of data brokers. But Congress should not stop there. Most laws that protect
Americans’ privacy do not come with sunset provisions (which cause the
legislation to expire unless Congress extends it). The political stars rarely
align to prompt reforms to such laws or even essential updates to ensure that
they keep up with technology. Lawmakers should use the leverage provided
by the expiration of Section 702 to close the data broker loophole for all
investigations, not just those involving foreign intelligence. Specifically,
Congress should bar the government from purchasing information if the compelled
production of that information would require a warrant, court order, or
subpoena under U.S. law.
Window Of Opportunity
Indeed, lawmakers who
care about civil liberties would be wise to seize the rare political moment
presented by this year’s reauthorization of Section 702 to address surveillance
practices more broadly.
In the past two
decades, Congress and the executive branch have dramatically weakened many of
the legal restrictions on surveillance that were put in place to safeguard Americans’
constitutional rights. These legal changes have coincided with advances in
technology that have had the effect of putting surveillance on steroids. With
the arrival of intelligent devices, Americans generate mind-boggling amounts of
information, often without even being aware of it, and almost all the data is
stored by third parties. The Supreme Court has only begun extending Fourth
Amendment protections to such information. On the “demand” side of the
equation, the government’s technological ability to capture and store these
rich data streams, and to apply sophisticated algorithms to tease out highly
personal information, is nearly limitless.
This state of affairs
is a recipe for abuse, as we are beginning to see. Under Section 702 and other
authorities that allow the warrantless collection of sensitive data, law
enforcement, and intelligence are gaining access to sensitive information about
social justice activists, journalists, and politicians. Without fundamental
changes to the law, there will surely be more of these abuses—and perhaps
worse—in the future.
In short, the United
States is long overdue for the rightsizing of government surveillance. The
reauthorization of Section 702 provides the best opportunity Congress has had
since 9/11 and may have for a long time for that undertaking. Lawmakers will
almost certainly enact reforms to Section 702. At a minimum, they will place
restrictions on backdoor searches. But unless Congress is willing to attack the
other heads of the Hydra, it will have done little to rein in warrantless
surveillance of Americans.
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