By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
After Hamas’s
horrific terrorist attack on Israel on October 7, it
seemed inevitable that Israel would retaliate in a devastating fashion. The
first, natural reaction to such an attack is revulsion, accompanied by a desire
for revenge and exemplary punishment. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
acted on that desire, vowing to “destroy” Hamas, bombarding the Gaza Strip, and
launching a ground invasion of the territory—even though it remains unclear
how, if at all, Israel can eliminate Hamas militarily or ideologically.
But choosing to meet
violence with violence is a choice. In fact, not all victims of terrorism
choose retaliation. On November 26, 2008, ten Pakistani terrorists
stealthily landed by sea in Mumbai. The carnage they unleashed over the
next two days in attacks on hotels, cafes, a major train station, and a
community center killed at least 174 people and injured over 300. Indian
authorities swiftly realized that the terrorists came from Pakistan and enjoyed
the backing of the country’s security establishment. All this while
India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced on TV that the perpetrators
were based "outside the country" and India would not tolerate
(in a clear reference to Pakistan) "neighbours" who provide a haven to militants targeting it.
But Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh’s government ultimately opted not to undertake an overt military
strike on terrorist camps in Pakistan. Instead, New Delhi responded to the
terrorist atrocity in Mumbai through diplomatic and covert channels. In public,
the country chose restraint, not revenge. That decision brought India
international support, prevented a potentially catastrophic war, minimized
civilian casualties, and arguably prevented more terrorism. At least so far,
India has not experienced another Pakistani-backed attack with mass casualties
on Indian soil.
India and Israel are,
of course, two very different countries. And Pakistan and Gaza are not
equivalent. Different contexts shape a state’s response to a terrorist attack.
In different circumstances in 2016 and 2019, when faced with cross-border
terrorist incidents, India chose to retaliate militarily against clearly
defined targets in Pakistan. However, the Indian experience is a powerful
reminder of the limitations of dealing with terrorism as a purely military
problem requiring a military response. As Israel levels parts of Gaza, sowing
the seeds for future hatred, it is instructive to consider the benefits of not
replying to terrorist violence with greater violence.
The Enraged Samurai
The mythographer
Joseph Campbell retold a Japanese folktale that follows the quest of a samurai
intent on avenging his slain master. After hunting down his master’s killer,
the samurai was preparing to decapitate him when the assassin spat in his face.
The samurai immediately sheathed his sword and walked away. His master had
taught him never to act out of blind anger; retribution should be exacted from
an objective, righteous distance. Campbell’s tale illuminates one possible
response to terror: restraint.
After the terrorist
attack on Mumbai in 2008, India reasoned that a military strike was unlikely to
solve the problem of cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan; it would
divert international sympathy from the Indian terror victims, suggesting that
the affair was a quarrel between India and Pakistan in which both states were
made equivalent. And it would give the terrorists and their sponsors precisely
what they had hoped the attack would yield: an angry, divided India and
possibly even a war.
Restraint appeared to
be the least bad of India’s available choices. There were costs: many of the
attack’s high-level sponsors in the Pakistan army and in the leadership of the
anti-Indian militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba,
which was responsible for the violence, escaped retribution. To be sure, India
is not a pacifist power, and in other cases, it has responded to terrorist
violence with force. When terrorists sponsored by Pakistan attacked an Indian
army camp at Uri in 2016 and a security convoy in 2019 at Lethpora,
India chose to retaliate across the line militarily, hitting the terrorists’
launching pads and bases. Neither retaliatory action had a huge effect on
suppressing cross-border terrorism or eliminating its instigators and leaders.
The goal of terrorist
violence is often to throw a more powerful state off-kilter and incite
bloodshed. History offers cautionary examples of terrorists successfully
baiting powerful countries into strategic blunders. The Austro-Hungarian
reaction to the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand led to World War I and the
end of the Habsburg empire. After the 9/11 attacks, the United States chose to
wage an unwinnable global war on terror, invading and getting bogged down in
Afghanistan and Iraq; one could argue that both countries and the wider region
ended up in worse shape than they were to begin with. The war on terror birthed
even more lethal terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State, and the high
civilian death toll and the abuses committed by the U.S. military damaged the
United States’ reputation.
How a government
decides to respond to terrorism is often complicated by domestic political
factors and the public’s desire for revenge. Leaders who pride themselves on
their strength or their nationalist credentials tend to pick up the hammer. But
two wrongs do not make a right, and history does not favor those who succumb to
emotion and rely on military means to counter the threat of terror. Israel’s
actions against civilians in Gaza and the ongoing violence in the West Bank
have already cost it sympathy around the world. A “hard,” purely military
response is less likely to achieve Israel’s goal of eliminating Hamas than a
combination of military, covert, and political measures designed to fit this
specific case. Empirically speaking, most massive military responses to
terrorist attacks have led to long wars, unintended consequences, and a net
increase in the threat of terror. The Sri Lankan government’s elimination of
the secessionist Tamil Tigers as a military force in 2009 is often cited as an
example of the successful use of force against a terrorist group. But this
apparent victory displaced hundreds of thousands of people, failed to resolve
ethnic tensions, and distorted the country’s democratic processes—problems that
persist to this day.
A military
overreaction generates the oxygen of publicity that terrorists seek. It helps
to promote a terrorist group’s claim to represent a disadvantaged population.
Indeed, one of Hamas’s motives in carrying out the October 7 attacks may well
have been to create a situation in which Palestinians, most of whom did not
previously support Hamas, are driven into its arms by Israel’s punitive
actions.
The Insufficiency Of Force
Terrorism is
political in motive and goal, and it must be dealt with as such. A strictly
violent response falls in line with Israel’s response to terror over decades: a
strategy it calls “mowing the grass,” a euphemism for periodic punitive
campaigns that suppress, but do not eradicate, terrorist activity. The Israeli
scholar and military strategist Eitan Shamir, one of the authors of that
phrase, has now declared this tactic insufficient. Israeli deterrence has
failed, he argues, and the country can only survive if it uproots Hamas from
Gaza. How this can be achieved without horrendous casualties and suffering for
the civilians of Gaza is not clear. Ignoring the rights of the Palestinians and
their desire for statehood is precisely what produced the region’s present
sorry state. Israeli bombings, missile attacks, and tank fire are most likely
to push Gazans toward Hamas and other militant groups.
Hamas’s attack did
not pose a political challenge to Israel alone. The West, now, can legitimately
be accused of double standards and hypocrisy in its attitude toward foreign
occupation and attacks on civilians in Ukraine and Palestine. For many in the global
South and some in the North, the refusal of Western powers to press for a
cease-fire or to address Israel’s attacks on civilians makes a mockery of the
West’s avowed commitment to the laws of war and humanitarian considerations.
Only by dealing with
terrorism politically—isolating terrorists from the population they purport to
represent and offering a better alternative—can a way forward be found that
actually eliminates Hamas in its current rejectionist and nihilist form. Israel’s
own experience proves that repression alone does not destroy a terrorist
threat. The controlled application of force is useful, even necessary, to give
politics room to work. If peace is the end goal, restraint opens the space for
communication and negotiation. A purely military response to terror weakens
those for whom peace is the real goal.
The calculus is, of
course, further complicated when the terrorist is sponsored by a state or
states. In such cases, the already limited utility of massive force against
nonstate actors is compounded by the impunity that state protection gives them.
A government must craft an effective response, both military and political, to
the state sponsors of terror. India has considerable experience in dealing with
state-sponsored terrorism. And it has, by and large, contained the problem
through a combination of military, political, social, and other means internal
and external to India.
None of this, of
course, guarantees any country complete freedom from terrorist attacks.
Experience suggests that there is no perfect formulaic response to terrorism,
only less painful and more productive responses. Many Israelis and Palestinians
are equally convinced that their victimhood justifies extreme and inhumane
measures, and the rest of the world feels compelled to choose sides. The voices
of those seeking peaceful outcomes by political means seem to be drowned out by
those calling for revenge, punishment, and the use of indiscriminate force. But
if there is a lesson to be drawn, it is that governments need to understand the
limitations of repression and force. Choosing it alone can only lead to further
tragedy.
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