By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

The U.S. Can Make a Good Deal With China

Amid an intensifying pressure campaign, Taiwan’s citizens have further soured on Beijing. When Taiwanese voters elected Lai Ching-te, Tsai’s former vice president, as president in January 2024, Beijing made clear that it would not work with him, labeling him a “dangerous separatist” intent on destroying cross-strait peace. China’s military called Lai a “parasite” and depicted him in a propaganda video as a bug hovering over a Taiwan engulfed in flames. Although Lai has adopted a more defiant stance on Taiwan’s relations with China than Tsai did, for instance, by labeling China a “hostile foreign force,” Beijing’s preemptive rejection of Lai has removed any incentive for him to take a more accommodating approach. Beijing is not looking for a way to break this impasse; instead, it is seeking external validation for its efforts to undermine Taiwan’s leadership.

When U.S. President Donald Trump meets with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in the coming weeks and months—likely starting next week at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in South Korea—the immediate focus will be on how to de-escalate the latest round of export restrictions and tariff threats that the United States and China have wielded against each other. But Trump and Xi are also likely to consider a more ambitious deal to reset bilateral relations, which would seek not only to stabilize economic ties but also to reevaluate geopolitical flash points—above all, Taiwan. Indeed, this week, Trump acknowledged to reporters that Taiwan is likely to come up in talks with Xi.

Chinese leaders have made no secret of their desire to assert control over Taiwan, by force if necessary, and they frequently remind their American interlocutors that the island remains the most sensitive and important aspect of U.S.-Chinese relations. Xi is likely to use negotiations to ask the United States to reduce its support for Taiwan, as Beijing believes that this would help China achieve its goal of bringing Taiwan more firmly under its control. Xi could even go so far as to see whether Trump would be willing to fundamentally alter U.S. policy toward Taiwan—by asking the United States to formally oppose Taiwan’s independence, for example—in exchange for lucrative Chinese trade and investment promises. China may be willing to offer more market access to U.S. firms and increased purchases of American goods if Trump is willing to agree to Beijing’s requests.

But accepting such a deal would be a grave mistake for the United States. Even subtle changes to U.S. policy that would shift it closer to Beijing’s position would destabilize the region. A strong Taiwan that is confident in American support is a critical factor in maintaining peace in the region. Trump should not shy away from bringing up Taiwan in his negotiations with Xi, but he should use his leverage to push back on China’s encroachment and reestablish norms in the Taiwan Strait that have proved successful in reducing the possibility of miscalculation. A good deal with Beijing would ensure Taiwan’s safety, not set the island adrift.

A flag flying in Taipei, Taiwan, October 2025

 

False Promises

Beijing’s demands to the United States on Taiwan are rooted in the claim that it is Taiwan and the United States, not China, that are the principal drivers of regional instability. But in reality, it is China’s increasingly aggressive actions, both militarily and politically, that have inflamed tensions. China has engaged in an unprecedented peacetime military expansion aimed at developing the ability to take Taiwan by force. It has intensified the tempo and scale of military exercises and training in amphibious operations, and it has rapidly expanded its arsenal of nuclear weapons. And it has attempted to isolate Taiwan internationally and intervene in its domestic politics.

Formularbeginn

Beijing says that its actions were a response to Taiwan’s 2016 election that led to the presidency of Tsai Ing-wen, a member of the Democratic Progressive Party, which takes a firmer line toward Beijing. But China had been increasing its military posturing even before her election. Tsai’s predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, of the Kuomintang, encouraged closer cross-strait ties and signed two dozen agreements with China on issues such as trade and tourism. Ma even met with Xi in Singapore, which marked the first time that political leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait had engaged directly since the Kuomintang fled to Taiwan at the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. But despite Ma’s Beijing-friendly positions and this historic rapprochement, China significantly expanded its arsenal of ballistic missiles and its fleet of fighter jets stationed within range of Taiwan during his tenure. Taiwan’s defense spending, by contrast, stagnated and even declined for much of Ma’s presidency. Thus, by the time Tsai took office, China’s military spending outstripped Taiwan’s by a factor of 14.

Tsai originally sought to downplay tensions with China, but China rebuffed these overtures and instead increased pressure. Ma’s so-called 1992 Consensus, which set the basis for cross-strait relations by agreeing that there is only one China but offering room to interpret this in multiple ways, had grown hugely unpopular in Taiwan. Tsai nonetheless stated in her inaugural address that she respected the “historical fact” of the understandings reached in 1992 and offered a creative formula that embodied a “one China” framework that could, in theory, respect Beijing’s bottom line while satisfying the Taiwanese population. But Chinese leaders rejected that approach, passing up an opportunity to improve cross-strait relations and blaming Tsai for not going far enough.

Since 2022, when the U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi carried out a visit to Taiwan that Beijing saw as provocative, China has broken many long-standing norms of conduct in the Taiwan Strait. It has been routinely flying aircraft and sophisticated military drones across the centerline of the strait—a demarcation that both sides respected for decades—and stationed military and coast guard vessels around Taiwan. China has been challenging the boundaries of Taiwan’s contiguous zone—an area of 24 nautical miles around the island—and is threatening to violate its territorial waters, which stretch 12 nautical miles from its shores. China has also increasingly sought to coerce Taiwan through nonmilitary means. It has pressured the few remaining countries that maintain formal diplomatic ties with Taipei to instead recognize Beijing, imposed sanctions on Taiwanese products, and launched cyberattacks on Taiwanese infrastructure.

Meanwhile, amid this intensifying pressure campaign, Taiwan’s citizens have further soured on Beijing. When Taiwanese voters elected Lai Ching-te, Tsai’s former vice president, as president in January 2024, Beijing made clear that it would not work with him, labeling him a “dangerous separatist” intent on destroying cross-strait peace. China’s military called Lai a “parasite” and depicted him in a propaganda video as a bug hovering over a Taiwan engulfed in flames. Although Lai has adopted a more defiant stance on Taiwan’s relations with China than Tsai did, for instance, by labeling China a “hostile foreign force,” Beijing’s preemptive rejection of Lai has removed any incentive for him to take a more accommodating approach. Beijing is not looking for a way to break this impasse; instead, it is seeking external validation for its efforts to undermine Taiwan’s leadership.Formularende

 

Bad Deal Rising

In upcoming negotiations, Xi could make a range of requests that seek to shift U.S. policy on Taiwan. These could include asking Trump to publicly oppose Taiwan’s independence, to refrain from advocating for Taiwan’s participation in international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), or even to restrict arms sales to the island. But granting these requests would bolster Beijing’s position and harm U.S. interests.

Washington’s long-standing position on Taiwan—which is based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, three joint communiqués between the United States and China signed between 1972 and 1982, and the Six Assurances that U.S. President Ronald Reagan conveyed to Taiwanese leaders in 1982—is that the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence and does not take a position on its legal status. If Trump were to shift from this neutral stance to one that openly opposes Taiwanese independence, it would upend the carefully crafted neutrality that has helped maintain peace in the strait for decades. China would attempt to cast this move as a vote of no confidence in Lai and would use it to bolster a narrative that Taiwan cannot rely on the United States and should instead seek the best deal it can with Beijing. This would put pressure on Taipei, rather than Beijing, to reduce cross-strait tensions. But given that it is China that is primarily responsible for growing risks, this would back Taiwan’s leaders into a corner and embolden China’s aggressive behavior.

Any agreement that limited Taiwan’s participation in international forums would also reverse three decades of U.S. policy and further undercut Taiwan’s geopolitical space. Since U.S. President Bill Clinton completed a comprehensive review of American policy toward Taiwan in 1994, the United States has consistently called for Taiwan’s membership in international organizations that do not require statehood to join and for its meaningful participation in those that do. During Ma’s presidency, from 2008 to 2016, Beijing allowed Taipei to participate in meetings with UN specialized agencies such as the WHO and the International Civil Aviation Organization, which sets global standards for air navigation. China’s demand that the United States cease advocating on Taiwan’s behalf would thus merely be an attempt to selectively isolate and pressure Lai.

A reduction in U.S. security cooperation with Taiwan would further erode the ability to deter a potential Chinese blockade or invasion of the island. The reality is that Taiwan does not have the capacity to meet its defense needs on its own, and the United States is the only country that is willing and able to provide the island with the defensive weapons it requires. Over the past three and a half decades, the United States has approved over $65 billion in arms sales to Taiwan, helped train Taiwan’s military, and assisted the island’s leaders in developing its defense strategy. To prevent China from attempting to take Taiwan by force, Washington must ensure that Beijing does not believe it can achieve its political aims at an acceptable military cost. Security cooperation between the United States and Taiwan sends a message to China’s leaders and gives Taipei confidence that it can withstand the threats emanating from Beijing.

Trump’s actions in the first year of his second term have already contributed to growing anxiety in Taipei about the durability of U.S. support. Concessions to Beijing would increase skepticism among the Taiwanese about the value of investing in deterrence and preparing for a potential crisis, which current leaders have called whole-of-society resilience. It would also further unsettle U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, prompting them to question the credibility of the United States. If U.S. support for Taiwan declines, other countries may feel that they have less room to pursue closer relations with Taipei, offering China another opportunity to try to push regional powers away from cooperating with Taiwan.

 

The Art of the Deal

American negotiators can make a good deal with China that reduces tensions in the Taiwan Strait without selling out Taiwan. The objective should be to take incremental steps to restore the status quo that existed before Pelosi visited Taiwan in 2022. Washington should press Beijing to pull its military, coast guard, and surveillance ships from Taiwan’s contiguous zone, reduce the frequency and scale of major military exercises around Taiwan, refrain from crossing the centerline in the Taiwan Strait, and decrease its military buildup in areas within range of Taiwan. In exchange, the United States could offer to make reciprocal changes to reduce its overall military buildup in the region. Such steps would reduce the chance of escalation and add much-needed stability to the Taiwan Strait.

Negotiations could start by seeking to limit offensive military capabilities around Taiwan. The United States could ask China to withdraw long-range and mobile ballistic missile systems currently stationed opposite Taiwan, so that attack systems on the mainland are not positioned within range to strike the island. It could also request that China restrict how closely People’s Liberation Army ships and aircraft operate near Taiwan. In exchange, the United States could pull back its own long-range weaponry, such as the Typhon missile system that it recently deployed to the Philippines, from China’s immediate periphery, while maintaining the ability to redeploy those capabilities if necessary. The United States could also refocus its regional military exercises involving aircraft carriers and bombers on defensive objectives, such as protecting U.S. and allied territory, rather than offensive missions that appear to target China.

The United States could also propose establishing a de facto buffer zone around Taiwan. Such a buffer would reduce the risk of incidents that could escalate into a major conflict. It would also restore early warning indicators that would make it easier for both Beijing and Washington to send and read strategic signals, which would allow them to differentiate between routine exercises and military escalation. As long as the United States maintains enough forces in the region to communicate its willingness to enforce boundaries, such a buffer zone would not undermine the ability of the United States and Taiwan to collectively deter China. China may be amenable to this arrangement because Xi, who continues to purge high-level military officials, appears not to fully trust the People’s Liberation Army or its readiness to take Taiwan in the near term.

Leaders in the United States and China should also explore mutual restraint in how they talk about Taiwan’s legal status. In recent years, the Chinese government has intensified its campaign to push an alternate interpretation of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, the 1971 measure that flipped the UN seat representing China from Taipei to Beijing. China claims that Resolution 2758 says that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China—a claim that Western legal scholars widely reject—raising concerns that Beijing is seeking to lay the legal foundation for attacking Taiwan. Meanwhile, the United States’ pushback against China’s position on Resolution 2758 is viewed in Beijing as an effort to promote Taiwan’s permanent separation from the mainland. The two sides should pursue a cease-fire in this war of words in which both sides refrain from discussing Taiwan’s legal status, a practice that has largely been followed for decades.

Although these are limited steps, any incremental progress in the Taiwan Strait would be a major achievement. Rather than merely reacting to Beijing’s proposals, Washington can set the agenda on Taiwan and stabilize the Taiwan Strait, which remains the likeliest venue of a war between the two nuclear-armed powers. If China balks at American suggestions, it would nonetheless clarify Beijing’s intentions and send an important signal to the region that the United States does not seek war in the Taiwan Strait—and is committed in both words and deeds to preventing one.

 

 

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