By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Hamas Rise To Power Part One

The scenes unfolding in Israel and Gaza mark a new chapter in the Middle East conflict. Today’s great powers, China, Europe, Russia, and the United States, will undoubtedly have a role to play in the conflict between Israel and Hamas. Whether any of these powers will be able to resolve or contain that conflict is far less specific. The notion that great-power competition defines geopolitics has come back into vogue after it fell into obscurity at the close of the Cold War.

Last weekend, families, festivalgoers, soldiers, and foreigners were killed in Hamas attacks. And Hamas confirmed that more than 120 civilians are being held captive in Gaza, which they treated to kill. With the following research, we now trace the development of Hamas.

 

The Hamas File

Ephraim Sneh was Head of the Civil Administration in the West Bank between 1985 and 1987 under the Labour government of Yitzhak Rabin, just as the nascent Hamas movement was about to emerge onto the world stage. According to Sneh,l his role at that time 'was to encourage moderate Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to come out against the hardliners. I had an open door to those whom I would describe as the pragmatic elements of Fatah.' In this camp, Sneh placed people like Helmi Hanoun, known as Abu Youssuf, the Mayor of Tulkarem, Palestinian academic Sari Nusseibah, Hannah Saniora, editor of Al Fajer newspaper, lawyer Jameel Al Tarifi and intellectual Faisal Husseini, who eventually became a minister, in charge of Jerusalem affairs, for the Palestinian Authority. All were identified as Fatah moderates who later became key political figures in the PLO.

Sneh, who believed he was one of those closest to the late Rabin, didn't recall any alarm bells ringing at the mention of Hamas. At that time, he said, 'it was not considered a dangerous movement. It was a rising force. They were neither prominent nor important politically nor considered a significant military organization.' Elected to the Knesset in 1992, where he represented the Labour Party, Sneh has served as a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee.

He believes the problem in the Middle East 'is not between Israel and the Palestinians but between the moderates and the fanatics'. He wants the moderates to join hands as soon as possible to implement a permanent agreement on a two-state solution and build a new Middle East 'of modernity, progress and economic development'. In doing so, he cautioned, 'we must contain the hardliners who want to turn all of the Middle East into a Mogadishu. I don't know if [Olmert] is willing, but he must. The alternative is horrifying. Compromise and moderation are the only answer.'

Sneh was resolute that:

Hamas will not change. I have no illusions about that. But I would like to see most Palestinian people represented in the government sooner or later. It is not my business but I care about it. I think the only way to defeat Hamas, which is as dangerous or almost as hazardous as Hezbollah, is to give the Palestinian people hope for a political future by implementing and fulfilling their vision of an independent Palestinian state. Without this prospect, Hamas cannot be defeated because Hamas is building on despair and poverty.

Sneh's opinion is not shared throughout the Israeli establishment. Politician and Knesset member Israel Hasson participated in many peace negotiations, including Wye River, Taba, and Ehud Barak's Camp David negotiations. The former deputy director of the Shabak had an altogether different perspective from Ephraim Sneh's. The Civil Administration in Gaza's attitude towards the Islamic movement, which nurtured Hamas in the early 1980s, was 'to turn a blind eye'. This remained until 1983, when Sheikh Ahmed Yassin was arrested for possessing weapons.

In fluent Arabic, Hasson, born in Damascus before emigrating to Israel, told me that Hamas first became a significant blip on the political radar around 1992. At that time, Shabak and other intelligence agencies warned the Israeli government and the Civil Administration that the movement should be treated as a terrorist organization. Hasson went on to say that, after the signing of the Oslo Agreement in 1993, We advised the government to pressure the Palestinian Authority to take action against Hamas, but not only would Arafat not cooperate with us, but he even allowed Hamas' military wing to take revenge for the assassination of their leader, Yehia Ayyash. It was only when Netanyahu was elected that Arafat began mass arrests of Hamas members. Around 2,400 were rounded up and incarcerated in Palestinian jails.

Hasson suggested that the general feeling within the intelligence community was that the Israeli government would only establish contact or negotiate with Hamas if the movement changed its charter and abandoned its threats to destroy Israel. He believed there was a strong feeling inside Israel that Hamas' 2006 election was merely a temporary victory, adding that the Palestinians in general 'are not militant and prefer to live peacefully. We don't know what the future will reveal. Hamas will consider the outcome of Israel's war in Lebanon against Hezbollah and whatever steps Israel might take in the future concerning Syria and Iran.

It is not just in Israel that Hamas is seen as an implacable force, almost a force of nature, which came out of nowhere. Dennis Ross was the first to tell me of America's fears about the new movement in the Palestinian territories, which, he said, 'first rang anxiety bells' at the time of the kidnapping by Palestinians of the nineteen-year-old Israeli-American Corporal Nachson Waxman in 1994. Ross shuttled between the region's capitals to alert Arab and Israeli leaders to 'the danger ahead', as he described Hamas. Ross gave the same message to every leader, from President Mubarak of Egypt and the late Hafez AI Assad of Syria to Arafat and Rabin: his peace plan had to remain on track. When he visited Damascus in the early 1990s, no one from Hamas was seriously operational. According to Ross:

The late Hafez AI Assad told me he was giving them [Hamas] refuge 'because I owe it to the Palestinians', but he kept them on a tight leash. In '96, we couldn't even get the Syrians to condemn the suicide bombings when we had these agreements going on at Wye River. I tried to say to Farouk AI Sharraa, the Syrian Foreign Minister at that time, that at the end of the day, these people will subvert what you say, so you really must get them out. But Damascus didn't want them out.

In late 1995, following the assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, and the series of suicide bomb attacks that brought Netanyahu to power, Ross recalled Mohammed Dahlan, who was head of the Preventive Security Services and Fatah at that time, telling him that, out of concern about Hamas, 'he went to Arafat saying to him: "Look, let me go after Hamas because they are building themselves up too much." He wanted written instructions from Arafat, but the Palestinian leader wouldn't give him written instructions; he said, "Yeah, you can do it, but I'm not going to say so in writing".

Looking back, it is possible to trace the shift in strategy from the desire to promote Islamic resistance to the desire to knock the PLO off its perch in 1993, when Hamas announced its rejection of the Oslo Accords and began the campaign of 'martyrdom operations' in the region to impede any consensus between the two sides—the period between 1994 and 2002 witnessed the climax of Hamas' suicide missions, preventing any possibility of a reconciliation with Israel. The impact of those operations eventually resulted in the humiliating Israeli siege of President Arafat inside his headquarters in Ramallah and the thorough destruction of the national infrastructure in the territory, including the newly built international airport.

Although Mahmoud Abbas was democratically elected on the strength of his program of peace with Israel and the demilitarization of the Intifada, Israel, with US support, not only isolated him but also suppressed his efforts and ignored his opinions and suggestions for peace, leaving him incapable of solving his people's problems.

As the Palestinian Authority weakened politically, economically, and socially, the way was paved for Hamas to show its mettle. The movement had been energetic in its benevolent works in the West Bank and Gaza, earning significant popularity and moral strength in the region. Not only did Hamas defy the Legislative Council, it also had the gall to ask for a share of office, claiming the movement had sacrificed considerable blood in its struggle against the enemy. Hamas is not a gang, although it sometimes behaves as such. Hamas is part of an Islamic society. The USA has committed a grave error in writing it off as an organization with whom there can be no negotiation. The movement will not change its Islamic dimension, which is a constant. This is not to say that a Hamas government is the future; simply attacking and isolating Hamas, as has been done, is merely making the movement more popular.

Fatah is still influential in Palestinian society, its roots being entrenched in the Palestinians' recent history. Its political prof suffered a knock when it proved incapable of protecting its 0\ leader when Yasser Arafat was under siege; it suffered another because it failed to call for an open and serious investigation into his death. Fatah's only hope is for Hamas to fail to make headway in government, giving Fatah a chance to retrieve its power base. The powerlessness of Mahmoud Abbas is undermining Fata. It still has a robust grassroots network, which could help it recover majority support for its policies in the future if it reforms its structure.

The Palestinian Authority itself, as we have seen ample proof of this past month, has weakened Abbas because neither the Israelis nor the Americans have helped him implement reforms to improve the appalling security situation and standard of living for its citizens. Moreover, the Authority could not negotiate in the final leg framework. Unlike his predecessor, Arafat, Abbas was elected by d: people with unlimited American and Israeli support. The momentum was there for him to reach a deal with Israel, which George Bush and Ariel Sharon welcomed at their Jordan summit at the Dead Sea in June 2003. But Israel delivered nothing in exchange for Abbas' concessions; instead, the Israeli government dithered and stalled on the details. The momentum was lost, and ultimately, the concessions delivered nothing. A deadly cycle resumed.

Sharon shifted his tactics to unilateral solutions because the Palestinians provided 'no real partner.' Eventually, Sharon withdrew Israeli occupation forces from Gaza and dismantled it! The Jewish settlements. Sharon's new political party, Kadima, continues, but with Sharon out of the frame, his successors lose his real agenda.

Iran and Syria have the lowest profile but the most influence in the current stand-off. Neither has ever recognized Israel. Both have openly voiced their support for Hamas, but they are playing an even stronger hand behind the scenes. Khalid Mishal, the real leader of Hamas, is based in Syria. Any actions he takes will be influenced by the policies of Bashar Ai Assad and his government. Even the futures of Ismail Haniyeh, the Palestinian Prime Minister, and his successors are more likely to be decided in Syria than in Gaza.

Hamas cannot return the clock to its former days of championing a military struggle and encouraging suicide bombing. As Mishal sits in his apartment in a Damascus suburb, guarded by undercover Syrian intelligence agents who do their best to blend in with the locals, he mentally juggles his goals with Hamas and those of his allies and foes in the Middle East. Hamas' acceptance of a coalition government would give the movement the breathing space to assess what's happening in the region. It is clear that the Americans are not, for now, going to launch a new initiative, and it's challenging to see Mahmoud Abbas reaching an understanding with a Damascus-based Mishal. For Mishal, the best option for the time being would be to stick to the Syrian position allied with Iran. There are behind-the-scenes plans by Arab moderates to bring Syria into the fold by tempting Damascus with economic incentives and the guarantee of stability in exchange for breaking its alliance with Iran. If those plans succeed, Mishal may well have to reconsider his options.

The Syrian-Iranian alliance successfully challenged Washington in the playground of Lebanon in the summer of 2006. The strength of this partnership will no doubt be further tested in future confrontations. During the brief war between Israel and Hezbollah, Hamas galvanized the Sunni Arab world to support the Shia Hezbollah, which deepened the alliance between Syria, Hamas, Iran, and Hezbollah. There is a good chance this alliance will not dominate Palestinian political life. Still, suppose Israel wants to end its conflict with the Palestinians, which could take Iran and Syria out of a conflict between two peoples. In that case, the price will be to withdraw from the West Bank and reach an agreement on Jerusalem.

The facts are that whatever Hamas' political fortunes, they will not just melt into the background, nor will any military action succeed in eradicating them. The idea that the Israeli army could destroy Hamas by rolling in the tanks and raining down the missiles brings to mind a chilling American comment during the Vietnam War: 'We destroyed that village to save it.' This strategy did not work in Vietnam and it will not work with Hamas. Hamas is not some alien guerrilla force. It is someone's brother, neighbor, or the guy who gives your son money for his education. As long as these people represent the Palestinian people at the ballot box, the West and any future Palestinian Authority will have to accept it for what it is - a leopard unlikely to change its spots - and negotiate with Hamas.

The military wing's namesake, Ez Ed Din Ai Qassam, was born in 1882 in Jabla, a Phoenician settlement on Syria's Mediterranean coast, south of Latakia. At that time, there were no established schools in the area, so Ai Qassam's father, Abdul Latif, who was an expert on Islamic sharia, committed himself to teaching the Qur'an, Arabic language, and calligraphy, religious poetry, and music, and encouraged Ai Qassam and other youngsters in the town to understand the doctrine of jihad. Armed with this spiritual, cultural, and religious grounding, Ai Qassam traveled to Cairo, where he became a student at Ai Azhar University, the most famous institution worldwide for Sharia law and Islamic study. Lie became interested in some of the freedom movements in Egypt, where there was massive support for resistance against the British occupation. He was particularly drawn to writers like Mohammed Abdu, inspired by the Salafi school of Islamic thought.

 

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