By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Hitler's Aristocrats

As we have seen in part one, the history under discussion was not only one of appeasement but also of active collaboration that demonstrated how far the aristocratic ruling class would go to protect their position.

As seen King Edward VIII, subsequent Duke of Windsor, was initially influenced by his family members among the German aristocracy during the Nazi period, which also led to Hitler's idea of an Anglo-German collaboration.

But also arriving in London in early 1938, with Nazi sympathies, was the newly-appointed U.S. Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy, including his friend Nancy Witcher Langhorne. In England, she married Waldorf Astor. Upon their marriage, Waldorf and Nancy were given Cliveden House. She became a prominent member of the earlier mentioned "Cliveden Set" that pre-war group that met at her family's home. Many of Astor’s social circle were supporters of appeasement and were accused of influencing foreign policy. Chamberlain, known for his Appeasement towards Hitler, spent a late March weekend at Cliveden House.

After her husband succeeded to the peerage and entered the House of Lords, she entered politics as a member of the Conservative Party. She won his former seat of Plymouth Sutton in 1919, becoming the first woman to sit as an MP in the House of Commons. She served in Parliament until 1945, when she was persuaded to step down. Astor has been criticized for her antisemitism and sympathetic view of Nazism.

As fiercely anti-Communist as they were anti-Semitic, Kennedy and Astor looked upon Adolf Hitler as a welcome solution to both of these "world problems" (Nancy's phrase). No member of the Cliveden Set seemed much concerned with the dilemma faced by Jews under the Reich. Astor wrote Kennedy that Hitler would have to do more than just "give a rough time" to "the killers of Christ" before she'd be in favor of launching  "Armageddon to save them. The wheel of history swings round as the Lord would have it. Who are we to stand in the way of the future?" Kennedy replied that he expected the "Jew media" in the United States to become a problem, that "Jewish pundits in New York and Los Angeles" were already making noises contrived to "set a match to the fuse of the world."

In May of 1938, Kennedy engaged in extensive discussions with the new German Ambassador to the Court of St. James's, Herbert von Dirksen. Amid these conversations (held without approval from the U.S. State Department), Kennedy advised von Dirksen that President Roosevelt was the victim of "Jewish influence" and was poorly informed about the philosophy, ambitions, and ideals of Hitler's regime. (The Nazi ambassador told his bosses that Kennedy was "Germany's best friend" in London.)

Columnists back in the states condemned Kennedy's fraternizing. Kennedy later claimed that 75% of the attacks made on him during his Ambassadorship emanated from several Jewish publishers and writers. ... Some of them in their zeal did not hesitate to resort to slander and falsehood to achieve their aims. He told his eldest son, Joe Jr., that he disliked having to put up with "Jewish columnists" who criticized him for no good reason.

Like his father, Joe Jr. admired Adolf Hitler. Young Joe was impressed by Nazi rhetoric after traveling to Germany as a student in 1934. At the time, Joe applauded Hitler's insight in realizing the German people's "need of a common enemy, someone of whom to make the goat. Someone by whose riddance the Germans would feel they had cast out the cause of their predicament. It was excellent psychology,  and it was too bad that it had to be done to the Jews. The dislike of the Jews, however, was well-founded. They were at the heads of all big business, in law, etc. It is all to their credit for them to get so far, but their methods had been quite unscrupulous ... the lawyers and prominent judges were Jews. If you had a case against a Jew, you were nearly always sure to lose it. ... As far as the brutality is concerned, it must have been necessary to use some ...."

Brutality was in the eye of the beholder. Writing to Charles Lindbergh shortly after Kristallnacht in November of 1938,  Joe Kennedy Sr. seemed more concerned about the political ramifications of high-profile, riotous anti-Semitism than he was about the actual violence done to the Jews.  "... Isn't there some way," he asked, "to persuade [the Nazis] it is on a situation like this that the whole program of saving western civilization might hinge? It is more and more difficult for those seeking peaceful solutions to advocate any plan when the papers are filled with such horror." Kennedy's chief concern about Kristallnacht was that it might harden anti-fascist sentiment at home in the United States.

Like his friend Charles Coughlin, Kennedy always remained convinced of what he believed to be the Jews' corrupt, malignant, and profound influence in American culture and politics. "The Democratic [party] policy of the United States is a Jewish production," Kennedy told a British reporter near the end of 1939, adding confidently that Roosevelt would "fall" in 1940.

But it wasn't Roosevelt who fell. Kennedy resigned his ambassadorship just weeks after FDR's overwhelming triumph at the polls. He then retreated to his home in Florida: a bitter, resentful man nurturing religious and racial bigotries that put him out of step with his country and out of touch with history.

 

The Windsor's trip to Germany

The British government quickly shared news of the impending trip with its American counterparts because America was the duke and duchess’s next destination after their trip to Germany. In a cable to Sir Alexander Hardinge sent to Balmoral Castle, Robert Vansittart, a former private secretary to the prime minister and current undersecretary at the Foreign Office, insisted that although he was letting the prime minister know, “[I] imagine that his view, as in the case of the German visit, will be that nothing can be done to prevent it but that his Majesty’s Representatives should not take any action which could be regarded as countenancing it.” He added that such a tour, arranged without consultation with the Foreign Office, was “a bit too much” and that he hoped that “our missions abroad will be instructed to have as little as possible to do with them.” Similar instructions were issued to embassy officials in America. However, a discussion followed that it would be noted by the local press if consuls were not allowed to meet with the duke and duchess at their various American stops.

The response to the duke and duchess’s proposed trip to Germany was much fretted over and is well documented in the Foreign Office classified archives. It was reported that, while the trip could not be prevented, care should be taken to stop H. M. representatives from taking any action which could be regarded as countenancing the visit.” A recommendation was made by Phipps, the ambassador to France, that one way for the British government to distance themselves from the trip would be to have a member of the embassy staff meet the duke and duchess at the train station in Berlin. Even this proposal was met with indignation, cautioning that it would give the impression that the duke was traveling on official British business. Further instructions were given that embassy staff members should not accompany the duke and duchess on any of their visits and that it would be “preferable” that they not even be entertained privately in the embassy, especially given the convenient absence of the ambassador. The ambassador and embassy staff were instructed not to accept invitations by the duke or the German government during the visit. However, if the duke invited the ambassador, he “should not decline.” The embassy requested that, given the expectation that the visit would be front-page news and likely the subject of the prime minister’s weekly public questions in Parliament, it should be clearly stated that the British government “in no way approves of the visit.” The matter also escalated to the Prime Minister’s Office, and noted Chamberlain’s view “that it is not possible to stop the Duke of Windsor going to Germany.”

The duke and duchess arrived by rail in Berlin on October 12 and were whisked off to lunch at Carinhall, the country estate of Hermann Goering and his second wife, a German actress, Emmy Sonnemann. While in Berlin, the Windsors also met SS Commander Heinrich Himmler, Rudolf and Ilsa Hess, as well as Joseph and Magda Goebbels, who remarked that the duke was “a charming, likable chap; open, clear with a healthy common-sense approach, an awareness of contemporary life and social issues. . . . What a shame he is no longer King! With him, an alliance would have been possible. . . . A great man!” On October 20, the duke’s cousin, Carl Eduard, Duke of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, hosted a dinner for the duke and duchess at the Grand Hotel in Nuremberg. Attended by the princes of Germany, dinner was an especially memorable event for the duchess. As she stood at the head of the receiving line, it was the first time that ladies curtsied and addressed her as “Your Royal Highness.”                        

In addition to a full schedule of social engagements during their eleven-day trip, the Windsors also visited a concentration camp. Dudley Forwood, a member of the duke’s equerry who traveled with the duke and duchess, noted that “we saw this enormous concrete building which I now know contained inmates: The Duke asked ‘what is that and our hosts replied, ‘it is where they store the cold meat.’” 

The highlight of the Windsor visit to Germany was lunch on October 22 at Berchtesgaden, Hitler’s private residence in the Bavarian Alps. The duke and duchess traveled by private train, accompanied by Hitler’s deputy, Rudolf Hess. They were met by a convertible Mercedes-Benz at the station and completed the journey up the mountain escorted by a motorcade of armed Nazi officers and police. Hitler met them dressed in his brown SS jacket. Wallis recalled that “his face had a pasty pallor and under his mustache, his lips were fixed in a mirthless grimace. Yet, at close quarters, he gave one the feeling of great inner force. His hands were long and slim; a musician’s hands and eyes were extraordinary—intense, unblinking, magnetic, burning with the same peculiar fire.” A translator, frequently corrected by the duke, was present throughout the meeting for the duchess’s benefit. 

According to the New York Times coverage of the visit, the duke gave a Nazi salute to Hitler upon arrival at Berchtesgaden. The same article recounts that Wallis was “visibly impressed with the Fuhrer’s personality, and he indicated that they had become fast friends by giving her an affectionate farewell. Hitler took both their hands in his, saying a long goodbye, after which he stiffened to a rigid Nazi salute that the Duke returned.” The duke admitted to the Nazi salute and defended it: “I did salute Hitler, but it was a soldier’s salute.” Regardless, Churchill congratulated the duke on a visit conducted with “distinction and success,” despite the prohibition of any government involvement. The New York Times coverage of the German trip noted that Germany had lost “a firm friend, if not indeed a devoted admirer on the British throne.” One outcome of the visit was establishing a line of secret communication between Hitler and Edward, passed back and forth by an intermediary. In these cables, Hitler addressed Edward as “EP,” shorthand for “Edward Prince.” 

The British ambassador to Washington, Sir Ronald Lindsay, was less sanguine than Churchill about the trip, describing it to the US secretary of state as evidence of a “semi-fascist comeback in England.” At the request of J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI undertook an investigation of the duke. A September 1939 report to Hoover by Agent Edward Tamm concluded that “for some time the British Government has known that the Duchess of Windsor was exceedingly pro-German in her sympathies and connections, and there is strong reason to believe this is the reason why she was considered so obnoxious to the British Government that they refused to permit Edward to marry her and maintain the throne.” 

The Windsors fled their home in Paris when France fell to the Nazis, leading them to Spain and eventually as houseguests of a pro-German Portuguese banker and Nazi agent in Lisbon during the summer of 1940. Following the fall of France in June 1940, Franco proposed to Hitler that Spain join forces with Germany. When the Windsors arrived in Madrid, the city was Nazi administered to enlist Edward to assist the Nazi regime in what they believed would be Britain's inevitable and swift conquering. According to documents declassified in 2003, Germany considered the duke “the only Englishman with whom Hitler would negotiate any peace terms, the logical director of England’s destiny after the war.” 

While there are both German and American files about the wartime activities of the Duke and Duchess of Windsor, only the British held a copy of a German file innocuously labeled as “Matters relating to the Royal Household 1940–66.” This includes a top-secret file dated August 24, 1953, containing the German correspondence relating to the Nazi plan for the Duke and Duchess of Windsor during their stay in Madrid and Lisbon during the summer of 1940. This file was recovered at Marburg Castle at the end of the war. The “Marburg Files” mainly consist of an exhaustive list of the trove of stolen paintings and decorative artwork that was hidden there. When the Marburg site was closed in 1946, the artworks were sent to Wiesbaden for identification and eventual restitution. The files about the duke and duchess were handed to the British, where Churchill promptly classified them. The files were reclassified periodically and again as recently as 2000 under the UK Freedom of Information Act. 

When the American surveillance files were slated for publication in the early 1950s, Churchill again intervened with President Eisenhower to suppress their publication. 

The Marburg Files reveal in detail the vulnerability of the duke and duchess to the Third Reich and the perilous state of British democracy. The episode began with a secret cipher from Ribbentrop dated June 24, 1940, inquiring if it was “possible to keep the Duke and Duchess of Windsor in Spain for at least a few weeks before granting them a further exit visa? It would of course, be necessary that it should not in any way leak out that the suggestion comes from Germany.” The German ambassador, Hoyningen-Huene, cabled Ribbentrop to tell him that the duke “is convinced that had he remained on the throne, war could have been avoided,” describing himself as a “firm supporter of a peaceful compromise with Germany. The Duke believes continued heavy bombarding will prepare England for peace.” 

Ribbentrop also engaged the German ambassador to Spain, Stohrer, in a cable to be kept “under lock and key,” that “the Duke must be informed at the appropriate time in Spain that Germany on her side wishes for peace with the British people, that the Churchill clique is standing in the way of this, and that it would be a good thing if the Duke would hold himself in readiness for further developments. Germany is determined to compel England to make peace by using all methods. It would be prepared in such an event to pave the way to the granting of any wish expressed by the Duke, in particular concerning the ascension of the English throne by the Duke and Duchess.” According to the agent who communicated this offer to the duke and duchess, they first did not understand the Nazi offer, pointing out that a return to the throne was impossible according to the British constitution following an abdication. The same Nazi go-between “then remarked that the course of the war may produce changes even in the British constitution,” at which point “the Duchess, in particular, became very thoughtful.” 

Churchill and the English intelligence services followed the royal couple’s migration to Spain. They understood the duke’s vulnerability to Ribbentrop’s plan, especially after having sought refuge in Madrid, and learned of the couple’s role in passing strategic government information to the enemy. Lord Caldecote, secretary of state for Dominion Affairs, petitioned Churchill directly to send the duke and duchess to the Bahamas for the duration of the war, where they would not have access to sensitive government and military information. He wrote to Churchill that “the activities of the Duke of Windsor on the Continent in recent months have been causing HM and myself grave uneasiness as his inclinations are well known to be pro-Nazi, and he may become a center of intrigue. We consider it a real danger that he should move freely on the Continent. Even if he were willing to return to this country, his presence here would be most embarrassing to HM and the Government.” 

They declined when Churchill asked the duke and duchess to return to England. In response, Churchill insisted that any refusal to follow the orders of the British government would be considered a severe breach and urged the duke to comply with government wishes to go to the Bahamas. In addition to a swiftly imposed departure from Europe with the appointment of the duke as the governor of the Bahamas, the British government also enforced a news embargo on the royal couple in both local and international media. Ribbentrop noted that according to a Swiss agent with close ties to the British Secret Service, the intent in sending the duke to the Bahamas was “to do away with him at the first opportunity.” 

The Nazi high command in Spain informed Berlin in a series of top-secret cables that “Windsor told the Foreign Minister that he would only return to England if his wife were recognized as a member of the Royal Family and if he were given an influential post of military or civil nature. Fulfillment of these conditions was as good as impossible.” After this unsatisfactory ultimatum was presented to the duke, the Germans planned to notify him about the threat to his life, with an offer from Spain, as negotiated by Ribbentrop, “to accept Spanish hospitality and if necessary financial assistance,” on behalf of Germany. 

Ribbentrop followed developments in Madrid and then Lisbon, where the duke and duchess were the houseguests of a pro-German Portuguese banker, laying the foundations for the royal couple to remain in Spain. He even vetted the plan with the Spanish minister of the interior, the brother-in-law of the “Generalissimo,”. The latter eventually acted as an intermediary between the Nazi high command and the duke. Ribbentrop noted that Churchill had issued a verbal ultimatum to the duke threatening court-martial if the couple did not leave Europe for the Bahamas immediately. 

While secret cables crisscrossed Europe updating the Reich on overtures to the royal couple, Ribbentrop also sent an agent to Lisbon to speak with the duke and duchess about an attractive alternative offer made by Ambassador Stohrer on their behalf. In a lengthy cable to Ribbentrop marked “Urgent and Top Secret,” the ambassador summarized two meetings in Lisbon, one with the duke alone and a second meeting with the duke and duchess. Stohrer noted that at both meetings, the “Duke expressed himself most freely,” elaborating on his interest to “break with his brother” the king, whom he finds to be “altogether stupid,” and with “the clever Queen,” whom he believed was conspiring against both himself and Wallis. “The Duke and Duchess declared that they would much like to return to Spain and expressed thanks for the offer of hospitality.” Stohrer recommended that the duke and duchess “leave Lisbon in a car as if he were going on a long pleasure jaunt, and then cross the border at a specified place, where Spanish secret police will ensure a safe crossing.” In a follow-up cable to Ribbentrop the following day, he confirmed that the “Duke and Duchess are prepared to return to Spain.”

When the Nazis presented the duke with an official letter containing the details of their plan to return the royal couple to Madrid, the duke “became very thoughtful but finally only remarked that he must consider the matter; he would give an answer in 48 hours.” After receiving word that the duke and duchess were planning to depart for the Bahamas regardless of the German offer, Ribbentrop again implored his agent in Lisbon, in a telegram to be placed “personally under lock and key,” to tell the duke again that “Germany would be ready to cooperate closely with the Duke and prepare the way for the fulfillment of every wish expressed by the Duke and Duchess.” The telegram goes on, “[I]f the Duke and Duchess have other intentions but would be ready to cooperate in the restoration of good relations between Germany and England at a later date, Germany is equally ready to collaborate with the Duke and shape the future of Duke and Duchess following their wishes.” 

The German cables became more urgent as news of a goodbye party for the duke and duchess at a Lisbon hotel, and close sailing dates for the Bahamas became known. The duke offered as an excuse that England was not yet ready for peace and that, therefore, the job of reconciliation with Germany would not succeed at his initiative alone. He proposed to maintain contact with a German agent from the Bahamas, agreeing on a code word that would initiate his return to Europe aided by the Nazis. It was also noted that as part of this discussion, the duke “expressed admiration and sympathy for the Fuehrer.” 

While all indications were that the duke planned to leave for the Bahamas, the German high command, in a lengthy “Urgent” telegram “to the German Foreign Minister Personally,” set out a detailed contingency plan to spirit the duke and duchess safely from Lisbon to Nazi-controlled Spain as well as last efforts to “aggravate a motive of fear and persuade the Duke and Duchess to remain in Europe.” Among the plans were to fire shots near the couple’s Lisbon hotel, an idea that might backfire and encourage them to leave for a safer place, or a bouquet delivered to the duchess with a note of warning about the perils that awaited them in the Bahamas. 

The Nazi high command believed that the strongest argument to coerce the Duke of Windsor to decide to officially help Germany would be to play on the duke’s anti-Semitism: “as the Duke is particularly impressed by the Jewish danger, a list was handed to his private secretary, Philipps, of the Jews and emigrants traveling on the same ship, emphasizing the fact that Security Police could offer no guarantees.” In the end, the Windsors boarded the steamship Excalibur to the Bahamas, wavering on the decision until the very last minute, even causing a delay in the ship’s departure, but persuaded one last time by Sir Walter Monckton. He had traveled on behalf of Churchill to Lisbon to ensure they had left. The German high command believed that the Duke of Windsor departed with the conviction that he would still be able to intervene on behalf of Germany from his post in the Caribbean. A secret telegram to Ribbentrop reported that two weeks after their departure, our “Agent has just received a telegram from the Duke in Bermuda asking him to let him know as soon as action is necessary on his part. Shall any answer be sent?” This was the last communiqué on this topic. 

The American intelligence file on the Windsors was dormant until June 1953, when a secret and personal letter from Churchill to Eisenhower was added as an addendum. Starting with “My dear Friend,” Churchill goes on to refer to the microfilm of the German telegrams that were found in German archives and were about to be published in the United States as part of an official history of the war. In his letter, dated some thirteen years after those events, Churchill warned that if this file of telegrams between the Nazis and their agents in Spain and Portugal “were to be included in an official publication, they might leave the impression that the Duke was in close touch with German Agents and was listening to suggestions that were disloyal.” Churchill said he had convinced the king to appoint the duke and duchess to a post in the Bahamas to prevent their entrapment by the Germans and even potentially a plan to kidnap the duke. Churchill ends the letter by saying that he intends to ask the French government to support his request to “prevent the publication” of this information. 

Eisenhower responded about a week later in a cable marked secret and personal that he had been aware of the files since they were recovered by the US military in 1945 and agreed that “there was no possible value to them.” While he expressed surprise that the files had been converted to microfilm, Eisenhower said that he was not sure what, if any, classification they might have or whether, as a result, he would be able to control their publication, something he promised to look into. A month later, former British prime minister Clement Attlee also wrote to Churchill, agreeing that the “publication of these documents might do the greatest possible harm,” adding that he had made a similar request to Eisenhower to bar their publication. Churchill responded quickly to Atlee’s letter the following day: “I earnestly trust it may be possible to destroy all traces of these German intrigues.” While Churchill also wrote to the French foreign minister to enlist his support, there is no response in the file, which ends abruptly. In the end, Churchill did not succeed in having the files reclassified, or the book’s publication suppressed.

The Nazi high command was not alone in keeping a file about the Duke and Duchess of Windsor. The couple also captured the attention of the American intelligence community, likely because, in their Bahamas exile, they were only a stone’s throw and a security risk to the US mainland. At the request of President Roosevelt, the FBI opened intermittent investigations and surveillance of the couple, dating to their arrival in the Bahamas in 1940 and corroborating a shared interest in the couple’s recruitment by Ribbentrop. The FBI noted that the duke claimed to have only known Ribbentrop “in his official capacity and never saw him after 1937.” 

The FBI files tell a different story, one that was explosive enough to be actively suppressed by Churchill and repeatedly reclassified by the United States. The FBI file reflects comprehensive surveillance initiated by President Roosevelt and overseen by the FBI director, J. Edgar Hoover, confirming much of the Nazi correspondence in the Marburg Files, emphasizing the duchess’s duplicity and influence on her husband. In a confidential memo to Hoover, the lead agent on the case writes that “it has been ascertained that for some time the British Government has known that the Duchess of Windsor was exceedingly pro-German in her sympathies and connections, and there is strong reason to believe that this is the reason why she was considered so obnoxious to the British Government that they refused to permit Edward to marry her and maintain the throne.” It goes on to state that the duke “is in such a state of intoxication most of the time that he is virtually non-compos mentis.” The duchess had maintained “constant contact” with von Ribbentrop and because of the duke’s position, she was privy to sensitive information regarding both the British and French governments, which she didn’t hesitate to send along to the German high command. 

According to the FBI report, the British government was “always fearful that the Duchess will do or say something which will indicate her Nazi sympathies and support, and consequently, it was considered essential that the Windsors be removed to a point where they would do absolutely no harm.” The governor of the Bahamas was removed within two hours, and a plan put in place to send the couple to the farthest and most isolated part of the British Commonwealth, with extra care put in place to ensure that the duchess had no communication with Ribbentrop. 

The FBI began investigating the duke and duchess as soon as they arrived in the Bahamas. A memo in the FBI file dated October 1940 flagged that the duchess, “violently pro-German,” was sending her clothes from the Bahamas to a dry cleaner in New York City: “the possibility arises that the transferring of messages through the clothes may be taking place.” Another lengthier report detailed a tip from a female informant, name redacted, who was affiliated with the USO Club of Cincinnati. She said that the duchess was “an associate of von Ribbentrop,” and she was acquainted with a Scottish reverend named McCloud, whose son was a missionary in East London near Limehouse, where the British Union of Fascists was active. The reverend’s son said that drugs were sold across the street from the mission where he worked and that he had “observed the Duchess of Windsor enter one of these places to purchase ‘dope,’ which she supplied to the Duke, earning her the title of ‘Limehouse Bess’ among the British aristocracy.” The American file also includes a 1942 interview with a Benedictine monk in Boston, underscoring the lengths to which the FBI conducted surveillance on the duke of Windsor. Father Odo, the former German-born Carl Alexander, Duke of Württemberg, believed when the FBI arrived that he was being questioned about his friendship with Queen Mary. Only later did he realize that the Duke of Windsor was the real target of the interview. Father Odo told the FBI that he had never met the Duke of Windsor but had “seen the Duchess of Windsor on numerous occasions and is aware that she had formerly consorted with von Ribbentrop. . . . Father Odo further confided that he knew that von Ribbentrop, while in England, sent the Duchess seventeen carnations every day. The seventeen supposedly represented the number of times they had slept together.” 

A second FBI interview with Father Odo further confirmed the complicity of the royal family in covering up the duke and duchess’s pro-Nazi agenda. According to FBI Agent Laughlin, Father Odo said that Queen Mary had told him that Wallis was Ribbentrop’s mistress and that the royal family forced him to abdicate “because of the scandal which he had brought upon his country by associating with a mistress, and secondly because of his fondness for Nazi ideology and his desire to rule England without a parliament. . . . The Duke wanted to suppress Parliament and head a party which in effect would make him the Dictator of England.” The FBI file of Father Odo’s interviews was immediately classified and reclassified in 1980 and 1990. 

The American files also detailed the case against the Duchess of Windsor, who, according to FBI sources, was a well-known German intelligence asset. One report, marked “Confidential,” references a source that claimed that Wallis “was being maintained and financed by von Ribbentrop and was on the payroll of the German Government at the time of her marriage . . . AND THAT IS THE REASON THAT EDWARD WAS NOT ALLOWED TO TAKE THE THRONE OF ENGLAND.”

Another FBI file details that Ribbentrop recruited Wallis Simpson early on and paid her handsomely to furnish the Nazi government with information about the British “social set.” It claims that Hitler and Ribbentrop brainstormed the idea of her marriage to Edward, who was already showing interest in their cause. They believed that Wallis “will see to it that Edward will never sign a declaration of war against Germany,” a plan that was scuttled by his unforeseen abdication, which also denied her the opportunity to be Queen. As “revenge, she took her husband the Duke of Windsor to Berlin to see Hitler, and there was a deal made between Hitler and the ex-King.” The deal outlined was that the duke would use his influence with the British military and the royal family to ensure that Britain did not resist a German invasion. In exchange, Hitler promised to install the duke as king of England after the war. The Nazi high command believed “this was easy for the Duke as many British high officials still think that he is their legal king and the British are not anxious to help the Russian Communists.” It explains that Hitler informed the Japanese of the duke’s role and urged them not to attack the United States since the British would not resist invasion, citing the evidence of the British withdrawal from Hong Kong, Singapore, Burma, and Libya. The American intelligence assessment also detailed that “there is no question about it that Churchill is being double-crossed” and that through the duke, the duchess is privy to all sensitive communications between the British and Americans—and passes the information to Hitler. It closes with the warning that “she may succeed, and if she does, it will cost the lives of millions of Americans.” 

While Wallis represented one line of inquiry, the FBI also turned its rigorous attention to the duke. In a confidential report dated April 1941 and marked “destroyed” in April 1960, an agent wrote directly to Hoover reporting on a debrief from an informant, William Rhinelander Stewart, who had visited with the duke and duchess in Nassau. Stewart relayed that the duke regarded Nassau as his exile in Elba and confirmed: “that there was current rumor and gossip in Nassau to the effect that when Hitler defeated England, he would then install the Duke of Windsor as the king and that, of course, under such circumstances there would be no question about his wife’s being queen.” Only under a Nazi regime would she finally have that chance. 

The proposed six-day trip by the duke and duchess to Florida in April 1941 for a dental visit triggered scrutiny by the FBI at the organization's highest ranks. A confidential memo to FBI director J. Edgar Hoover laid out the case for the FBI to add a clandestine surveillance unit in addition to the security detail given to the duke and duchess for their short visit. While the British government sought to isolate and suppress the publication of the information about the duke and duchess, the American government sought to investigate it actively.

In anticipation of their trip and light of the proximity of their Nazi connections, the assistant secretary of state, A. A. Berle Jr., wrote to the attorney general, Mr. Alexander Holtzoff, requesting “discreet observation . . . and a wider and less obvious cover” during the Windsors’ visit to Miami and Palm Beach. In response, Hoover clarified that this request was being made at the president's suggestion and would be further cleared by the Treasury Department, Secret Service, and other individuals “watching the Duke and Duchess.” Later classified correspondence underlines the president’s request for better surveillance of the duke, suggesting that was difficult to achieve until an agent proposed asking a British friend of the duke. The latter was trying to become a naturalized US citizen to serve as a go-between and introduce an FBI undercover agent into the duke’s Palm Beach golf foursome as a personal friend. This plan worked well and provided additional intelligence that the duke was golfing with Latham Reed, who had given a speech that had “praised the German government and the Hitler regime.”

Once again, the duke and duchess slipped through whatever surveillance was put in place, departing Palm Beach on April 23 at 10:30 A.M. on a private plane belonging to William K. Vanderbilt. With no surveillance, the duke and duchess returned to the United States one more time before departing from the Bahamas.

After nearly five years as governor of the Bahamas, the duke resigned his post in March 1945, marking the end of the war, the defeat of the Nazi regime—and ostensibly, the couple’s liability to the British government. The duke announced that his “resignation does not mean a permanent severance from public life because after the war, men with experience will be badly needed, and I’ll fit in anywhere I can be helpful.” British newspapers speculated that rather than return to Britain, the duke and duchess would travel to the United States, perhaps visit their ranch in Canada, and ultimately return to their homes in Paris and Cap d’Antibes in the South of France.

At the war's end, the Duke of Windsor asked to tour the FBI facilities at Quantico, Virginia. J. Edgar Hoover personally undertook this tour, each moment carefully choreographed, with no reference to the fact that the duke was previously the subject of an intensive FBI investigation. The duke wrote a note of thanks for the tour, mentioning how impressed he was “by the scope of your activities.” In a short note, the duke also mentioned that he was in close touch with Captain Guy Liddell, the lead MI5 investigator during Unity Mitford’s repatriation from Nazi Germany and part of the Cambridge Five group of double-crossing spies on behalf of the Soviet Union. The note ended with irony, claiming, “I should like to say how pleasant it was to renew my acquaintance with you.”

Ribbentrop testified at Nuremberg that he believed that he had been close to reaching an even more comprehensive agreement than the Anglo-German Naval Agreement (1935) with the Chamberlain government. To this end, he had breakfast with Prime Minister Chamberlain at 10 Downing Street, at which Chamberlain “emphasized his desire to reach an understanding with Germany. I was thrilled to hear this and told him I was firmly convinced that this was also Fuehrer’s attitude. He gave me a special message for the Fuehrer that this was his desire and that he would do everything he could in this direction.” Subsequent meetings to work on the details followed, including an invitation to Foreign Minister Lord Halifax to return to Germany to conclude the final details with the promise that “another exhibition of hunting trophies could be arranged.” Halifax was an avid hunter. This exhibition offered a pretext for the real purpose of the trip, to discuss the matter with Hitler at Berchtesgaden. Ribbentrop concluded that while there were “many Englishmen who had a very positive attitude towards this idea,” it was one of Hitler’s great disappointments that the “policy did not materialize.” 

Ribbentrop’s reach into the halls of power in English government and high society is revealed by the list of prominent witnesses he attempted to call to his defense during the trial, including Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The list was so long and potentially incriminating that Sir Alexander Cadogan, the permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs and principal landowner in Central London, sent a classified letter to Churchill informing him that the list had already been shared with President Truman and Marshal Stalin. While Churchill downplayed the legitimacy of the witnesses he called, Ribbentrop’s testimony was long and detailed. He was found guilty and hanged at Nuremberg at 1:30 A.M. on October 16, 1946. In a group that included Julius Streicher, he was among the first defendants to be executed for his part in the Nazi regime. Hermann Goering and Martin Bormann were supposed to be part of the group but committed suicide first. The Duke and Duchess of Windsor never returned to Britain. After the war, they lived in a villa in the Bois de Boulogne in Paris. Their neighbors and lifelong friends were Oswald Mosley and his wife, the former Diana Mitford.

We will next see how contrary to the conventional history of a country united in opposition to Hitler, right-wing British MPs, Peers, and senior figures in the military clandestinely worked, individually and collectively, to hasten a German victory and supplant the elected British Government with a pro-Nazi puppet regime which if up to Hitler would be a re-instated King Edward VIII.pson.

 

Continued in Part Three

 

 

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