Encompassing the years from Hitler's assumption of the leadership of the NSDAP until the handover of power, the notion of international Bolshevism as an integral part of a jewish-led 'world conspiracy' was assimilated relatively swiftly into the movement's political philosophy, and had emerged by 1933 as the ideological leitmotiv of the regime's foreign policy and external propaganda programme. In the second stage, which ran from Hitler's accession as chancellor until the winter of 1937-38, an attempt was made to configure international alignments and influence world opinion with a view to isolating the Soviet Union in preparation for the destruction of jewish Bolshevism' and the conquest of living space in the east. During the third stage, from 1937-38 until 1940, Hitler's plans went seriously awry, notably with regard to his original intentions towards Great Britain and Poland, so much so that in September 1939 he found himself in the grotesque circumstance of being at war with two powers earmarked as potential allies against Bolshevik Russia, with whom he had been compelled to conclude a pact of non-aggression.

By the start of 1936 it could hardly be contended that Hitler had made any significant headway in his quest to align the major powers in a front against international Bolshevism. Despite the seemingly promising beginnings that had been made with Poland in January 1934, the death of Pilsudski the following year, and the steadfast refusal of the Poles, even while the marshal was still alive, to be drawn into closer cooperation with Germany against the Soviet Union, meant that so far German expectations in that direction remained disappointingly unfulfilled. Equally, in so far as western Europe was concerned, Britain's sustained commitment to a general settlement and failure to acknowledge the political significance of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement served to demonstrate that the path to a partnership with Britain would be far more difficult to navigate than the German leader had initially hoped or believed.

Within 12 months, however, the situation had radically altered and, though progress with London and Warsaw remained problematic, the year ended with Germany having formalized friendships with Italy and Japan, which, in their public manifestations at least, appeared to rest largely on the hostility each of the three powers felt towards the USSR and its global instrument of political subversion, the Communist International. Hitler's original intentions towards and expectations of Italy have already been sketched and will be explored in greater depth in the following pages. First, it seems appropriate to examine the path to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1936, which, arguably, furnished the Third Reich with its only credible ally against Bolshevik Russia before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war in 1941.

Already in the 1920s Hitler had expressed his warm admiration for the Japanese, not least in view of their strident nationalism, invulnerability to the machinations of world Jewry and, in consequence thereof as he saw it, their implacable hostility to Bolshevik Russia.! By the early 1930s both he and Rosenberg were in regular contact with Japanese circles in Germany and placed special value on the Japanese army's hostile attitude towards the USSR.2 By 1932 the contacts established between the Japanese military and the Nazi Party had become a serious concern to Ambassador Obata Yukichi in Berlin,3 while during the Manchurian crisis the NSDAP was the only German political party openly to support Japan's actions. Not only did Hitler view with approval this expression of the increasingly important role played by the Japanese military in national politics, and its willingness to challenge the established order, he also saw it as a laudable example of a nation vigorously defending its national interests.4 In this connection there was perhaps more than a tentative link between Hitler's views on race and space and Japan's martial spirit and pursuit of Lebensraum. By the time he assumed the chancellorship therefore Hitler had expressed a considerable interest in and admiration for Japan, more so in fact than for any other extra-European country, and, as he clearly had no intention at that time to seek to mobilize it against the Western powers, it can be assumed that his chief preoccupation with Japan was the role it might play in assisting his planned isolation of the USSR. Indeed, Hitler's first initiatives in Far Eastern affairs, coupled with the nature of the discussions that in 1936 resulted in the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact, amply bear out this interpretation.

Nevertheless, Hitler refrained from serious meddling with German policy in the Far East for some time after he came to office, even though White Russians in Berlin greeted the advent of the NSDAP by lauding the resultant German-Japanese containment of the 'Bolshevik colossus', in which sense they had interpreted Japan's recent actions in China.5 Hitler, however, concentrated on his domestic consolidation and, in a further affirmation of his attachment to an understanding with Britain, even sought to profit from the tension in the Far East by intimating through his propagandists in London a willingness to collaborate against future Japanese aggression.6 Yet the importance of Japan for his plans against the USSR is clearly confirmed by his instructions to the new German ambassador to Tokyo, Herbert von Dirksen, who was received shortly before his departure to Japan in October 1933. Speaking four days after Germany announced its intention to leave the League of Nations, a step that built a further bridge between Berlin and Tokyo, Hitler authorized the new appointee to negotiate the possible recognition of Manchukuo in return for economic concessions, and stated that he was being sent to Japan specifically to 'effect a consolidation and development of German-Japanese relations' as Japan was 'an important counterweight for us now that relations with the Soviet Union had radically changed'.7 Whatever his propagandists were saying to the British, therefore, the prospect of cooperation with Japan against Russia was not far from Hitler's mind in late 1933, while from the Soviet Union it was reported that influential circles feared that a German-Japanese political rapprochement was rapidly developing and that Germany 'would utilize the opportunity of a commitment of Soviet means of power in the Far East in order to adjust its own desires for territorial revision at the expense of the Soviet Union'.8

Despite Hitler's obvious enthusiasm for Japan by 1933, there were several reasons why prudence prevailed in German dealings with the Far East during the first months of Nazi rule, not least of which, as the army and ministry for foreign affairs urgently advised him, was the importance of the China trade for purposes of rearmament. Nevertheless, Hitler soon began to make overtures to the Japanese through channels other than those provided by Wilhelmstrasse and other bastions of the national-conservative elites. Key to this process was Joachim von Ribbentrop, Hitler's primary foreign policy adviser by 1934 and head of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, the Nazi foreign policy agency that played the crucial role on the German side in the negotiations that led to the Anti-Comintern Pact. Ribbentrop subsequently testified at Nuremberg that Hitler had discussed with him as early as 1933 whether 'a closer contact with Japan could be established in some form or other', to which Ribbentrop had replied by offering to take soundings on the subject from his Japanese contacts in Berlin. From the outset it was clear what the ultimate purpose of these dealings would be. The question, according to Ribbentrop, was of an ideological nature, and centred on discovering ways and means of winning over other countries to counter communist tendencies. 9

One of Ribbentrop's Japanese acquaintances, the Japanese military attache Hiroshi Oshima - who was highly impressed by Hitler and Nazism and, true to the contemporary spirit of the Imperial Japanese Army, fanatically anti-Russian and anti-Bolshevik - went on to become the key Japanese figure in the negotiation of the Anti Comintern Pact. During 1934-35 a series of informal soundings took place between Oshima, Ribbentrop, Hermann von Raumer, the head of the Far Eastern Referat of Ribbentrop's Dienststelle, and Friedrich Hack, a shady German arms dealer with a wide range of contacts in the Far East, in the course of which much of the groundwork towards the eventual German-Japanese Anti Comintern Pact was accomplished. In the summer of 1935 a declaration by the seventh world congress of the Comintern denouncing Germany, Japan and Italy as aggressor nations and aiming stinging criticisms at Britain and Poland, provided these discussions with further impetus.1o These denunciations not only played into Hitler's hands by arousing hostility towards the Comintern among the very powers Hitler was seeking to enlist against the Soviet Union/1 but also led to rapid progress in the talks between Ribbentrop and Oshima over the next few months. Consequently, by late November the Anti-Comintern Pact had been both christened and drafted in its original form. The initial draft of the agreement, drawn up by Raumer, was received with enthusiasm by Ribbentrop and approved by Hitler on 25 November 1935, one year exactly before the pact's formal conclusion. One of the main features of the proposed agreement was that it was hoped that Britain and Poland might be willing to accede to a treaty that, on the surface at least, purported to target communism as opposed to the USSR.

The Soviet authorities, however, who were being kept abreast of developments through their intelligence network, could hardly be expected to see things that way or to accept the distinction implied by the use of the term Anti-Comintern in the communications being exchanged between Oshima, Ribbentrop and the latter's representatives. Indeed, at the turn of 1935-36 the pace of the German-Japanese negotiations slowed considerably, not least because, whatever cover they had enjoyed over the preceding months, the discussions had recently become known outside the inner circle and had led to considerable speculation in the foreign press about the imminent conclusion of a German-Japanese alliance directed against Russia.12 In diplomatic circles William Dodd, the US ambassador to Germany, had long since suspected some form of German-Japanese collusion, and in December 1935 he wrote of his 'conviction that there is an entente between Germany and Japan ... based upon the assumption that Germany is bound to make war upon Russia'13 Raising the issue with Neurath a few days later, Dodd was assured that Germany would not be drawn into a war with the USSR on Japan's account, but, despite the German foreign minister's dismissive attitude, he too was concerned at the progress of the Ribbentrop-Oshima talks, about which the Wilhelmstrasse had first heard during the autumn of 1935, and had already registered his objections to any decision in favour of Japan during an interview with Hitler in December.14 The international speculation about a possible German-Japanese agreement, the representations made by Neurath, and, not least, the desire expressed by Oshima's superiors for clarification about the state of the negotiations, for which purpose they dispatched a special mission to Germany, combined to stall the negotiations in early 1936,15 but it would not be long before external developments provided them with renewed momentum.

In spring 1936 the Japanese authorities, impressed by Germany's success in reoccupying the Rhineland and concerned by the probable general strengthening of Russia's position, which would follow from the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact, and not least by the Soviet-Outer Mongolian mutual assistance treaty signed in April, appear to have convinced themselves that the time was ripe to take the talks one step further.16 On 9 June, Hitler received the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, Kintomo Mushakoji, who announced that Japan had great respect for Germany's fight against Bolshevism and that, as a 'spiritually related country', it desired 'the closest cooperation' with the Reich. Hitler, perhaps influenced by recent developments in France where a Popular Front government had taken power the previous month, and encouraged by positive news from Ribbentrop about Britain's growing appreciation of the communist danger, responded with some enthusiasm. The Reich chancellor, recorded Otto Meissner, head of the Presidial Chancellery, was 'happy to take note of this and was prepared for this :ration', not least as he had 'always considered Europe's only ion to lie in an uncompromising struggle against Comm'. It was impossible, he averred, to 'reject Communism as ~ology and at the same time maintain friendly relations with t Russia, because in doing so one transplanted the poison of Jlshevist idea into one's own country'.17

The following month Oshima informed Raumer that the Japanese wished to supplement the proposed pact against the ntem with an additional agreement that would provide for ality in the event of either signatory becoming involved in war the USSR. Although Hitler's initial reaction to this suggestion known, the outbreak of the civil war in Spain shortly after it lrst mooted appears to have sufficed to clinch Hitler's decision our of a neutrality agreement, and, indeed, to open up further I possibilities of collaboration with Japan against Bolshevik a. In a revealing interview with Oshima at Bayreuth on 22 July the German leader, who had personally summoned the miliattache, agreed without further hesitation to the recent lsal and spoke at length about the danger Russia posed to Europe. Raumer, who was present at the interview, recorded the [rama of the moment and the significance of Hitler's state. Following reports by Oshima of the situation in Japan, and :ed for Lebensraum, the military attache was set to proceed to :ss the China problem when Hitler suddenly interrupted him launched into a heated denunciation of the USSR whose Isionist tendencies represented the greatest danger not only to lany but also to Europe and the entire Western world. The Jean continent, he continued: as like a mountain valley from whose heights a huge rock threatening to break off at any moment, plunge to the lttom and bury all life beneath it. It is my view that this mger can be countered in no other way than to split the Ige Soviet block into its original historic components. I am erefore determined to do everything I can to hasten and ·omote this development irrespective of on which flank of e Soviet Union it may occur.18

Hitler's statements during this conversation and his subsequent drafting of the celebrated memorandum on the four-year plan were no doubt conditioned primarily by the events in Spain, which not only had a profound impact on him from an ideological viewpoint but also opened up a range of opportunities for the development of German policy towards the USSR. Although Spain had featured very little in Hitler's foreign policy programme before the mid-1930s, and certainly never in an antiBolshevik context,19 by the summer of 1936 it had of necessity assumed a central position in his calculations. Indeed, even before the outbreak of the civil war there had been some concern in Berlin at the employment by leftist groups of the Popular Front tactic that in February and May 1936 had already resulted in electoral successes for the socialists and communists in Spain and France. It was only natural that Hitler should have viewed with alarm the success of a policy that was clearly designed to establish an anti German front by reinforcing and extending the Soviet Union's political ties with western Europe. That alarm might well explain why in early May 1936 the Gestapo, having recently concluded an agreement with the Italian police for combating Bolshevism, organized a clandestine mission to Spain through the German foreign ministry, the purpose of which was to observe the progress of communism.20 The Italians were similarly anxious. In mid-May Mussolini informed Hitler of his grave concern that Spain was 'inclining more and more to the Left'Y For the present, however, both Hitler and Mussolini were forced to watch from the sidelines as events took their course. Although Hitler had already decided that anti-Bolshevism would be the main theme of the 1936 Nuremberg rally,22 there was as yet no direct opportunity to respond to the Bolshevik challenge.

When civil war broke out in Spain on 17 July 1936 there was immediate and widespread concern about the international threat a left-wing victory would pose, and it is in that context that Hitler's famous meeting with Franco's envoys, Johannes Bernhardt and Alfred Langenheim, and his decision to intervene on the side of the rebels, should be considered. The determinants of German policy during the Spanish Civil War have been the subject of sustained historical debate; whereas some have emphasized the military advantages to be gleaned from German intervention, others have cited as especially significant the economic factors, particularly German requirements for Spanish raw materials to assist Germany's rearmament programme.23 There can be no doubt that German involvement in Spain would bring numerous economic and military advantages, but it was ideology that initially drove Hitler to help the nationalists.24 Hitler agreed to support Franco within hours of meeting the two German envoys, and the crucial decision had already been taken when he invited Hermann Goring and Blomberg to join in the discussions.25 According to Bernhardt's account, which stresses Hitler's preoccupation with the threat of Bolshevism, both Goring and Blomberg were initially reluctant to provide Franco with any help at all, and it was only in the face of Hitler's determination that they changed their minds.26 A few days later Ribbentrop, who felt wary of involvement in the Spanish conflict, was told that Germany could 'in no' circumstances tolerate a Communist Spain', for, if France too succumbed to Bolshevism, Germany would be 'finished' 27

In the weeks following the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War Hitler continued to emphasize the ideological impetus that had governed his decision to support Franco, treating a string of visitors to Berlin and Berchtesgaden to sustained harangues on the danger of Bolshevik 'contagion' and the inevitability of conflict between those countries that had already fallen victim to Bolshevism and those ruled by authoritarian-bourgeois governments.28 While the British Foreign Office did not go so far, it was nevertheless admitted that the Spanish Civil War might yet succeed in dividing Europe into two blocs, 'each based on a rival ideology', a prospect that was considered far more worrying than the creation of groups of satisfied and dissatisfied powers, for any such development 'would not merely divide Governments from one another far more deeply than any political dispute, but would also cut across the domestic politics of each individual country'. 29

Whereas Hitler held that the British were still in a position to choose which path to take in this projected ideological division of the continent,30 the appearance of the French Popular Front regime in mid-May 1936 had finally put paid to any notion of German collaboration with France on the basis of common opposition to Bolshevism. As unlikely as such a prospect might seem, not least in view of the deep-seated mutual antagonisms between the two countries, there are grounds to believe that tentative hopes of a FrancoGerman agreement were entertained in Berlin following the hand over of power, certainly by some of the new chancellor's advisers, including Ribbentrop, and even by Hitler himselfpl Although the brunt of Germany's diplomatic effort towards the Western powers had been directed towards Britain, which for Hitler had always been the crucial element in the equation, numerous overtures were made to the French during 1933-35 with a view to exploring the possibilities of a rapprochement that would serve German interests in two ways. First, any perceived thaw in Franco German relations was bound to agitate France's allies in eastern Europe and, in particular, strike a further blow at the prospects for the Eastern Pact. Second, it clearly made no sense to seek a future conflict with France, if one could be avoided on terms compatible with German aims in eastern Europe. It was partly for that purpose that Hitler showed an interest in holding personal conversations during 1933-34 with senior French politicians, including Daladier and Barthou.32 Although nothing came of these projects, Hitler's interest in a possible settlement with France did not appear to wane even when Barthou's successor as foreign minister, Pierre Laval, committed his country to an alliance with the USSR in May 1935. The following October Hitler told Laval's personal emissary, Fernand de Brinon, that a French agreement with Germany was indeed possible, but only on condition France abandoned its ties in the East, and especially its association with the Bolsheviks. Europe should unite against the red menace, advised the German chancellor, 'but, as long as France continued "to hinge its policy on what the Russians and their Slav allies do", there was no possibility of agreement'.33

How sincere Hitler's repeated professions of friendship for France were by that stage remains an open question. It may well be that the Franco-Soviet Pact had finally damned France in his eyes from the moment it was signed. As he said later, the alliance with Russia had been a sure sign that France was securely on its way to becoming a Bolshevist state.34 The accession to power of Blum and his associates, and their policy during the opening phase of the Spanish Civil War, certainly convinced Hitler that the French had made their choice on the burning issue of the day, but, unlike the USSR, with its formidable armaments and world revolutionary aspirations, France was no longer considered to pose a serious threat to the Reich. If nothing else, its feeble response to the remilitarization of the Rhineland testified to that. Nor, of course, did it dispose of the Lebensraum the National Socialists sought. Hitler's intentions towards France after 1935-36 are certainly difficult to fathom. On the one hand, it is clear that he no longer considered it a particularly significant factor in European politics, a fact that plainly emerged from his conversation with Ciano in October. 'Of France the Fuhrer spoke - as do the other Germans only superficially and with slight contempt,' noted the Italian foreign minister. 'Some abuse of the Jews who govern her and nothing further. In their opinion France has ceased - at least for the moment - to be an active factor in foreign policy.'35 On the other hand, there are signs that later, in 1937, he returned to his initial aggressive intentions towards his western neighbour. As Klaus Hildebrand relates, when in October 1937 General Milch told the chancellor of the 'many friendly gestures made to him by French military and political leaders during his visit to Paris, which made him hopeful of a Franco-German agreement, Hitler simply replied:

"But one day I will thrash them. ",36

If by mid-1936 France was as good as finished as far as Hitler was concerned, the new conditions the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War created appeared to rekindle his hopes of basing an Anglo German partnership on common opposition to Bolshevism. When in early September he received Lloyd George he reiterated his hopes that Britain and Germany could work together against the common menace of Bolshevism, which was not a 'fanatical obsession', but a 'real danger' against which western Europe should unite.37 'The obsession with Bolshevism and the menace of Russia,' noted Tom Jones, Lloyd George's travelling companion, 'the danger of Germany finding herself alone and encircled by communistic nations, the imperative need of collaboration with England if Europe is to be saved - we had read it all before, but now heard it with burning conviction from the Fuhrer himself.'38 While Hitler had experienced considerable disappointment in his relations with Great Britain since the signature of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, and despite his bewilderment at British policy during the Abyssinian crisis, the events of the summer of 1936 clearly sparked a renewed drive to pursue the possibility of British collaboration in his European schemes. Now, however, it would be pressure rather than concession that would determine his approach to Britain, a point he articulated with great clarity to the Italian foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, in October 1936, to whom he spoke of uniting Germany, Japan, Italy, Britain, Poland and Brazil 'under the banner of anti-Bolshevism'.39

This use of anti-Bolshevism in Germany's relations with Great Britain during 1936-37 was intended to serve a double function: first to force British cooperation with Germany; second to recruit Britain to the ranks of the anti-Bolshevik powers, thus achieving Hitler's original goals in Anglo-German relations. That Hitler's use of the 'red scare' in both his domestic and international policy was geared towards the achievement not of a series of essentially unrelated aims, such as friendship with Britain and, in domestic terms, the extension of military service to two years,40 but rather a grand vision is demonstrated by the celebrated memorandum on the four-year plan, which he wrote during August 1936, and his revealing statements at a crucial meeting of the German cabinet less than three months later.

In Hitler's eyes the Spanish Civil War and its impact on the European situation appeared to herald the opening of the inevitable showdown with communism that he had long since prophesied. Such was the essential message of the preamble to his memorandum on the four-year plan, which was drawn up some time towards the end of August 1936.41 This source is of very considerable significance in discerning Hitler's general outlook and future expectations during the summer of 1936, not least because it is one of the few documents in which the Fuhrer set down his views in writing.42 Although it dealt primarily with econo~ie issues, the memorandum began with a revealing statement of current and future' political factors, which dictated why Germany must be ready for war by 1940. Using the ideological rationale of the 1920s and, influenced by recent events in Spain, warning against the growing threat from the USSR, Hitler outlined his concerns, current evaluations and proposed solution in what the Nazis were wont to call 'world-historical' terms. Since the outbreak of the French Revolution, he began: the world has been moving with ever increasing speed towards a new conflict, the most extreme solution of which is called Bolshevism, whose essence and aim, however, is solely the elimination of those strata of mankind which have hitherto provided the leadership and their replacement by world-wide Jewry. No State will be able to withdraw or even remain at a distance from this historical conflict. Since Marxism, through its victory in Russia, has established one of the greatest empires in the world as a forward base for its future operations, this question has become a menacing one.43

Hitler then proceeded to emphasize Germany's position at the vanguard of the Western world in the face of Bolshevist attacks. It was not his aim, he declared, to prophesy the time when the untenable situation in Europe would become an 'open crisis', but it was his conviction that this crisis could not and would not fail to arrive. The collapse of western Europe into Bolshevism would probably be the most 'gruesome catastrophe' that had been visited upon mankind. 'In the face of the necessity of defence against this danger, all other considerations must recede into the background as being completely irrelevant.'44

Assessing the current situation, and in paying particular attention to the relative means of resistance disposed of by the European powers, he continued: Europe has at present only two States which can be regarded as standing firm in the face of Bolshevism: Germany and Italy. The other countries are either disintegrated through their democratic form of life, infected by Marxism, and thus likely themselves to collapse in the foreseeable future, or ruled by authoritarian Governments whose sole strength lies in their military means of power. ... All these countries would be incapable of ever conducting a war against Soviet Russia with any prospects of success. In any case, apart from Germany and Italy, only japan can be regarded as a Power standing firm in the face of the world peril.45

In the coming conflict with Bolshevism there were thus only two countries Germany could rely on: japan and Italy. By this stage the Anti-Comintern Pact had essentially been negotiated, and through it japan had pledged its support against the USSR. At the same time there had been a considerable improvement in German relations with Italy, the other staunchly anti-Bolshevik power mentioned by Hitler, and it is to those developments that we must now turn.

Hitler's original interest in an Italian alliance, which he first mentioned in 1920, revolved exclusively around considerations of Realpolitik and was based on the potential exploitation of Franco Italian differences arising from the Paris peace settlement. For several years thereafter similar considerations would determine Hitler's attitude to Italy, for whose friendship and cooperation he was famously prepared to sacrifice the South Tyrol, much to the disgust of German nationalists, or, as he termed them, jewish-led bourgeois patriots'.46 The triumph of fascism in Italy in 1922 did not therefore provide the initial stimulus for the pursuit of the Italian alliance that would be such a central feature of Hitler's foreign policy agenda during the 1930s, but it was an important development because it provided him with an ideological platform for Italo-German cooperation. Although the notion of friendship with the Italians had its opponents in the NSDAP, where Italy was viewed as an upholder of the territorial status quo, at least in so far as it concerned Germany, the successful fascist 'March on Rome' demonstrated to Hitler that Italy had triumphed in its own battle against international Jewry, which in turn led him to the conclusion that no state was 'better suited than Italy as an ally for Germany'.47 As such, the appearance of Mussolini, an event that coincided approximately with Hitler's final rejection of the idea of an alliance with Russia, meant that the first link had been made between the desire for Italian friendship and a future policy based on opposition to Bolshevism.

Mussolini, however, did not share Hitler's view of the international threat Bolshevism posed. As he stated on 23 March 1919, the day the fascist movement was founded, it was a 'typically Russian phenomenon' to which Western civilization was resistant.48 More seriously, as far as the Nazis were concerned, fascism lacked the vehement anti-Semitism that lay at the core of Nazi doctrine. On the contrary, as the Volkischer Beobachter was claiming as late as July 1922, Jewish money had financed Mussolini's movement and II Duce was little more than a 'hired traitor'.49 Having already determined on the need for Italian friendship, however, Hitler refused to be deflected and merely noted that Mussolini's struggle against the 'Jewish world hydra' was 'perhaps fundamentally subconscious'.50

Despite Hitler's hopes that Italy would join Germany's mission to save Europe from the 'nightmare of Asiatic Bolshevism', as he put it to an Italian journalist in 1931,51 common enmity to the USSR did not feature as a determinant of German relations with Italy between 1933 and 1936. Mussolini had welcomed Hitler's accession to power and for a while there were considerable hopes on both sides that the regimes might be able to effect a close cooperation in foreign policy. 52 At heart, however, the respective aims of any such cooperation were diverse and in some senses contradictory. For while Hitler had a grand vision with distinct end goals in view, Mussolini, for all his dreams of turning the Western powers out of the Mediterranean, was concerned to make piecemeal gains at the expense of Britain and France, and, at the same time, exercise some control over Germany, whose ambitions in southeast Europe he had cause to fear.

It was partly for these reasons, and possibly also because he had succeeded in defeating Bolshevism in Italy, that Mussolini had an entirely different approach to dealing with the Soviet problem. Although his perceptions of the Bolshevik threat had admittedly hardened since the 1920s, Mussolini did not share Hitler's zeal for a policy of confrontation. Indeed, his suspicion of Germany led him in the opposite direction, and until the onset of the Abyssinian crisis he was engaged in a rapprochement with the USSR that was clearly against the Third Reich.53 In 1933 he advised Hitler not to break with Moscow but to support and copy his own efforts to accommodate Russia, not for any love of the Soviets, but for fear that a German-Soviet breach would lead to a Franco-Soviet combination, which, though primarily directed against Germany, would inevitably strengthen France and have consequent repercussions for Italy's position in Europe.54 Moreover, although he could accept the possibility of a 'Jewish danger', Mussolini also thought Hitler mistaken in provoking international Jewry in a 'head-on collision' .55 Nazi theorists, particularly Rosenberg, were out of touch with the realities of politics; in private Mussolini was scathing about the racial 'nonsense' Hitler spouted that served only to swell the ranks of his enemies. 56 These differences of opinion, considerable though they were, remained relatively unimportant compared with the Austrian question, which dominated Italo-German relations to such an extent that it was not until 1936, and then more by chance than design, that anti-Bolshevism became a significant factor in the formation of the Rome-Berlin axis.

In the intervening years Hitler remained undeterred by the coolness in Italo-German relations, confident that the 'mutuality' of ideas between Italy and Germany would eventually bring about a reconciliation. 57 Changes to the European diplomatic scene provided the first openings in this process. These were occasioned by Soviet pacts with France and Czechoslovakia, the Abyssinian crisis, which led to a distinct cooling of relations between Italy and the Western powers and, also to Hitler's advantage, a breach in the Italo-Soviet rapprochement. 58 As Italy's diplomatic isolation increased during the winter of 1935-36, Mussolini became ever further estranged from his former partners in the Stresa Front and almost inevitably more attuned to the idea of an accommodation with Germany. Seizing on what in 1933 he had described to the French ambassador as one of the few areas of common outlook between his own and Hitler's movements,59 opposition to Bolshevism was now purposefully pushed to the forefront of the agenda in Mussolini's dealings with Berlin. When in January 1936 a visiting German envoy enquired about his view of the Stresa Front, II Duce responded: 'We have the same enemies, don't we? And Russia! This Russian Army - Bolshevism. Only we two know about it. I and Herr Hitler.,6o By the following March he professed not only to welcome the idea of a 'front of authoritarian states against the Bolshevik and Jewish democracies', but also made clear that Italy would be willing to enter into 'clear and definite obligations with Germany against France and Russia as well'.61

Although Mussolini's main priority at the time was certainly not an association with Germany based on opposition to Bolshevism, it is nonetheless interesting to note that he was becoming increasingly disturbed by the leftist political trends apparent in both France and Spain, and their possible repercussions in international affairs. This is all the more significant given that, generally speaking, Italian foreign policy under the fascists had until this point been determined almost exclusively by considerations of Realpolitik. The appearance of the Blum administration in France and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War inevitably reinforced anxieties about the growth of Bolshevik influence, with the result that by the summer of 1936 there was a distinct ideological dimension to Italian diplomacy. This point was recognized by the German ambassador in Rome, Ulrich von Hassell, who believed that Mussolini's hostility to communism was based partly on ideological considerations and partly on the fear of a growth of French and Soviet influence in the Mediterranean.62

The Spanish Civil War was in this sense just the opportunity Hitler had been anticipating to initiate collaboration with Italy on the basis of anti-Bolshevism. In this respect, although Italy and Germany often pursued conflicting and competing policies in Spain between 1936 and 1939, there was absolute sincerity behind Hitler's statement to Ciano shortly after the outbreak of the civil war that by assisting Franco Italy and Germany had 'together dug the first trench against bolshevism'.63 When Hans Frank, minister without portfolio in the Nazi government, visited Mussolini in September 1936 there was much talk of the need for the two regimes to stand together in the face of the red threat. Through his envoy Hitler assured II Duce that Germany's actions in Spain were dictated 'solely because of solidarity in the field of political ideas', and he was clearly anxious to impress on the Italians that he considered the Mediterranean a purely Italian sphere of interest. Mussolini, too, stressed that Italy's involvement in Spain was 'an effective proof of our involvement in the anti-Bolshevik struggle'.64

The following month, when Ciano met Hitler at the Berghof, the main topics of conversation were Bolshevism and British hostility to the dictatorships, a factor Hitler deliberately played up to impress the Italian foreign minister.65 Irrespective of his denunciations of Britain on this occasion, it is clear that Hitler placed considerable emphasis on mobilizing Italy against the USSR by early winter 1936. In that sense, in view of Mussolini's smouldering resentment of the British for their part in the Abyssinian crisis, anti-Bolshevism held far more significance for Hitler than for Mussolini as a 'structural principle' of the Axis, as one commentator has termed it.66 Indeed, far from wishing to alienate Britain, Hitler was about to embark on a renewed effort to seek its friendship. On the very day he received Ciano, the chancellor had also dispatched to London his new ambassador, Joachim von Ribbentrop, who had been instructed to 'get Britain to join the Anti-Comintern Pact' as 'that is what I want most of all'.67

The role of anti-Bolshevism in cementing Germany's relations with Italy during 1936 should not be underestimated. It cannot be disputed that there was a more significant development in those relations in that year than those of any other country with which Germany dealt. As the British ambassador to Berlin pointed out in his annual report, this development was 'symptomatic of the year's peculiar characteristic in foreign affairs, namely the increasingly acute division of the powers on ideological lines'.68 The events in Spain had decisively influenced German cooperation with Italy, concluded Phipps, not least because the outbreak of the civil war had finally alerted Mussolini to the danger represented by the Soviet Union.69 By mid-November 1936 Italo-German cooperation against Bolshevism had been enshrined in the October protocols, which designated communism the 'greatest danger threatening the peace and security of Europe'. These were formally proclaimed by Mussolini's declaration of the Rome-Berlin Axis, and confirmed by the two powers' recognition of Franco as the legitimate head of the Spanish state.70

Meanwhile, on 25 November 1936, Ribbentrop and Ambassador Mushakoji finally signed the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact. Ostensibly directed against the Comintern, the pact contained a secret supplementary protocol that pitched it directly against the USSR. Of those sections of the agreement made public the most significant was Article II inviting other powers to accede to the agreement, which amounted in effect to an invitation to line up against the Soviet Union.71 This was by far and away the most important aspect of the Anti-Comintern Pact, which, it might be argued, constituted a nucleus around which an anti-Soviet alliance might be built.

Following the ceremony at the Wilhelmstrasse, foreign press representatives were summoned to the propaganda ministry where Ribbentrop read a prepared statement. After reminding his audience of the belligerent declarations that had been made at the Comintern's seventh world congress, particularly its stated aim of 'revolution in all states and the "erection" of a Bolshevik world dictatorship', Ribbentrop discussed the Comintern's activities in Spain. Here he declared that it had 'no other objective than the erection by propaganda and force of a Soviet Republic' from which it would proceed 'further to undermine Europe'. 'Who', he asked rhetorically, 'would be next?' As the present agreement served to demonstrate, Germany and Japan were no longer willing to tolerate the activities of communist agitators and had thus 'gone over to deeds'. The conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, he concluded, represented an 'epoch making event', a 'turning point in the defensive war ... against the powers of disintegration', which future generations, even those who had 'not yet appreciated the Bolshevik danger', would surely come to appreciate.71

In private, however, there was no emphasis whatsoever on the supposedly defensive nature of German policy towards the USSR, or on the need, provided for by the terms of the German-Japanese agreement, to combat the activities of the Comintern within the frontiers of the Reich. Indeed, quite the contrary, for several weeks before the pact's conclusion Goring had gone so far as to announce to a meeting of the German cabinet that war with the Soviet Union was inevitable.73 This is not to say that the Anti-Comintern Pact was in any way conceived as a potential military alliance to provide for the contingency of imminent conflict with the USSR, far from it. Nevertheless, through this very public association Germany and Japan had provided an example for others to follow; Italy had made its position clear; in his memorandum on the four-year plan Hitler had decreed that the showdown with Bolshevism was unavoidable. It now remained to be seen what impact this 'epoch making event' would have, and how in particular the other powers would respond to the German-Japanese initiative.

That some form of response was expected is clearly evident from a series of statements Hitler made to a further meeting of the Reich cabinet on I December 1936. This remarkable declaration, unknown before the publication of Goebbels's diaries in the early 1990s, provides a revealing insight into the contemporary concerns with Bolshevism, and thus, by inference, the significance of the Anti Comintern Pact in German diplomacy as 1936 drew to a close. 'Europe is already divided into two camps,' noted Goebbels, paraphrasing Hitler: There is no going back. He outlines the tactics of the Reds. Spain elevated to a global question. France the next victim. Blum a convinced agent of the Soviets. Zionist and world destroyer. Whoever is victorious in Spain secures the prestige for himself. Either way the repercussions are great for the rest of Europe; which explains German military aid. The churches have failed completely. There is danger ahead in France. Germany can only wish that the danger is deferred till we are ready. When it comes, act fast. Get into the paternoster lift at the right time. But also get out again at the right time. Rearm, money can play no role .... The authoritarian states (Poland, Austria, Yugoslavia, Hungary) are not secure against crises. The only committed anti-Bolshevik states are Germany, Italy, Japan. Therefore agreements with them. England will come over when the crisis breaks out in France. Not a love match with Poland but a reasonable relationship. Enabled us to re-arm. Smaller questions playa subordinate role before the world decision. So disregard them if possible.74

 

1. See Hitler, Mein Kampf, pp. 173, 318-9, 723-4. Hitler's first foreign press chief, Ernst 'Putzi' Hanfstaengl, cites him as early as 1924 as espousing the view that it was 'only in alliance with that hard-working, martially aware and racially unspoiled people, the Japanese, which is "without space" just like the German people and consequently our natural partner in the struggle against Bolshevik Muscovitism' that he could 'lead Germany into a new future'. See E. Hanfstaengl, Zwischen Weissem und Braunem Haus: Memoiren eines politischen Aussenseiters (Munich, 1970) pp. 167-8. Hitler's view of Japan in the 1920s is generally thought to have been influenced by the Munich-based geopolitician, Professor Karl Haushofer. See, for example, H. H. Herwig, 'Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum', Journal of Strategic Studies, 22 (1999) pp. 218-41. For Haushofer's theories of geopolitics and the question of a German-Japanese alignment see E. L. Presseisen, Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy, 1933-1941 (The Hague, 1958) pp. 13-14.

2. Certain Japanese groups had made Hitler aware of their support and readiness for cooperation against Russia before the NSDAP came to power. See the reflections on a 1932 meeting between Hitler and Dr Okanouye in BBL, R43Il/440, unsigned memorandum, 25 January 1935. On the general background to German and Nazi contacts with Japanese circles in Berlin in the later 1920s and early 1930s see]. W. M. Chapman, 'A Dance on Eggs: Intelligence and the "Anti-Comintern"', journal of Contemporary History, 22 (1987) pp. 333-72. Curiously, in view of his supposed concerns, even the Japanese ambassador is alleged to have raised with Nazi officials the issue of future collaboration against the USSR should the NSDAP ever come to power. See BK, ZSg. 133/42, Schickedanz to Rosenberg, 21 February 1931.

3. O. Tokushiro, The Anti-Comintern Pact 1935-1939', in J. W. Morley (ed.) Deterrent Diplomacy: japan, Gennany and the USSR, 1935-1940 (New York, 1976) p. 23. See also, Krebs,japans Deutschlandpolitih, I, p. 25.

4. E. Kordt, Nicht aus den Ahten (Stuttgart, 1950) pp. 122-3. Speaking to a representative of the Japanese press in January 1932, Hitler gave no hint of his growing enchantment with Japan's martial spirit, but simply proclaimed that his movement necessarily opposed Bolshevism, expressed understanding for Japan's need to defend its national interests, and stated that the Nazi attitude towards Japan would be determined by nothing other than the amount of support it felt able to give to German attempts to overturn the Treaty of Versailles. RSA, IV/3, no. 2, Interview with Tokio Asahi Shimbun, 3 January 1932.

5. BBL, R43IV1454, Denkschrift Nr. 2 von Victor Spielmans, 'Die Lage im Fernen Osten und ihre Bedeutung', 6 January 1934.

6. PRO, F0371/16751/CI0679, Kell to Vansittart, 4 December 1933.

7. ADAP, ClIV2, no. 237, Dirksen to Bulow, 4 February 1934; ibid., no. 267, Dirksen to AA, 17 February 1934. See also Hitler's remarks to Eugen Ott recorded in J. P. Fox, Gennany and the Far Eastern Crisis 1931-1938: A Study in Diplomacy and Ideology (Oxford, 1985) p. 101. Dirksen represented something of an exception in the Wilhelmstrasse as an exponent of a close association with Japan. Although he was not a member of the NSDAP, he had socialized before 1933 with Goebbels from whom he may conceivably have acquired information about Hitler's views on Soviet and Far Eastern affairs. See TBjG, Samtliche Fragmente, V2, 4 and 21 January 1931. On Dirksen's views on policy towards Japan at the time of the negotiation of the Anti-Comintern Pact see, ADAP, ClIV/2, no. 479, Dirksen to Erdmannsdorf, 1 January 1936.

8. ADAP, ClIVI, no. 148, memorandum by Twardowski, 26 December 1933.

9. IMT, X, Ribbentrop testimony, 29 March 1946, p. 239. In an affidavit written the day before his execution Ribbentrop still maintained that the Anti-Comintern Pact was 'primarily an ideological pact' with a 'political weight against Soviet Russia'. Hoover, G. Henderson Papers, Csuz 79053-A, Joachim von Ribbentrop Affidavit, 15 October 1946.

10. The counsellor of the American embassy in Berlin noted that the inflammatory declarations made at the congress had 'afforded a welcome opportunity to the German press to enlarge on the duplicity of Soviet policy, which on the one hand fraternizes with the bourgeoisie on the Council of the League and elsewhere, and on the other through the Comintern continues to preach world revolution'. NARA, State Department Decimal File 761.62/359, White to Hull, 5 August 1935.

11. Apart from the references made to the Bolshevik threat in discussions with official British representatives, most recently evident in Hitler's conversation with Simon in March 1935, and Ribbentrop's statements during the naval negotiations, the attraction of Germany's very public stand against Bolshevism was advertised in conversations conducted through private channels, and correspondence with prominent British personalities, As examples see PRO, F0800/295, Rennell to Hoare, 26 September 1935; PRO, F0800/290, Rothermere to Simon, 7 May 1935. For a summary of the various reactions to the declarations of the seventh Comintern congress see BK, ZSg. 121/334, unsigned memorandum, September 1935. The Japanese generally complained about the 'malicious' anti-Japanese nature of the speeches. The predictable Soviet response to British complaints was that 'the Comintern was not a Government institution or under Government control'. See Daily Mail, 4 September 1935.

12. For representative summaries see PAB, R85852, 'Russisches Lektorat.
Die deutsch-japanische Geheimdiplomatie', 2 January 1936; ibid., unsigned and undated memorandum. Internal evidence suggests shortly after 8 January 1936.

13. Library of Congress, Washington D.C., [hereafter LoC], Dodd papers, Box 46, Dodd to Davis, 11 December 1935.

14. Presseisen, Germany and Japan, pp. 89-90; Weinberg, Foreign Policy, I, p. 244; ADAP, ClIV/2, no. 479, Dirksen to Erdmannsdorf, 1 January 1936. See also ibid., no. 416, memorandum by Erdmannsdorf, 18 November 1935.

15. Sommer, Deutschland und Japan, pp. 28ff.; Boyd, The Extraordinary Envoy, pp. 33ff.

16. On these developments see Sommer, Deutschland undJapan, pp. 29ff. In addition, the Japanese had their own reasons for wishing to proceed with the negotiations, including renewed difficulties with Russia on the Russo-Manchurian border. See, for example, PAB, R85851, DNB report, 4 May 1936.

17. ADAP, ClV/2, no. 362, memorandum by Meissner, 9 June 1936.

18. Raumer mss, fo1. 18.

19. For example, in the Zweites Buch the only reference to Spain's value as an ally was in the context of its potential usefulness against France. Hitler, Zweites Buch, p. 217.

20. PRO, GFM34/3092, memorandum by Bulow-Schwante, 4 May 1936. For details of the German-Italian police agreement see J. Petersen, Hitler-Mussolini: Die Entstehung der Achse Berlin-Rom 1933-1936 (Tubingen, 1973) pp. 438ff, p. 480. In 1937 the Germans organized a secret international police convention in Berlin, in which representatives from 15 nations took part, in order to discuss ways and means of suppressing Bolshevism. See BBL, NS19/256, memorandum by Bulow Schwante, 24 August 1937.

21. Wiskemann, The Rome-Berlin Axis, p. 57.

22. TBJG, V3/ii, 17 July 1936.

23. For further details on the economic exploitation of Spain during the Spanish Civil War see C. Leitz, Economic Relations between Nazi Germany and Franco's Spain, 1936-1945 (Oxford, 1996); GSWW, I, pp. 316ff.

24. This view is supported by both the major works in Spanish and German on Hitler's policy towards the Spanish Civil War. See H-H. Abendroth, Hitler in der spanischen Arena: Die deutsch-spanischen Beziehungen im Spannungsfeld der europäischen Interessenpolitik yom Ausbruch des Burgerkrieges bis zum Ausbruch des Weltkrieges 1936-1939 (Nurnberg, 1970); A. Vinas, La Alemania Nazi y el 18 de Julio (Madrid, 1974). For the German leader's own retrospective confirmation of his motives see Adolf Hitler: Monologe im Fuhrerhauptquartier 1941-1944. Aufgezeichnet von H. Heim. Herausgegeben und kommentiert von W. ]ochmann (Munich, 2000) [hereafter]ochmann, Monologe] 19-20 February 1941, p. 284. For an interesting overview of the motives for and results to date of German intervention in Spain, written from the perspective of a career diplomat and stressing both the anti-coqJ.munist political aspect and the economic benefits, see BBL, R901/61165, memorandum by Stohrer, February 1938.

25. H.-H. Abendroth, Mittelsmann zwischen Franco und Hitler: Johannes Bernhardt erinnert 1936 (Scraptoft, 1978) p. 32.

26. Ibid., pp. 33-34; Abendroth, Hitler in der spanischen Arena, pp. 87 ff. See also Leitz, Economic Relations between Nazi Gennany and Franco's Spain, p.12.

27. J. von Ribbentrop, The Ribbentrop Memoirs (London, 1954) pp. 59-60.

28.  See, for example, ADAP, ClV/2, no. 516, memorandum by Neurath of a conversation between Hitler and Horthy, 24 August 1936; DBFP, 2/XVII, appendix I, memorandum by Vansittart, 10 September 1936.

29. DBFP, 2/XVII, no. 84, minute by Sargent, 12 August 1936.

30. See PRO, F0371/408/66, Newton to Eden, 3 September 1936; PRO, F0371/19949IC6684, Newton to Eden, 25 September 1936.

31. On Ribbentrop's hopes in this direction see Michalka, Ribbentrop und die deutsche Weltpolitik, pp. 50ff; IMT, X, Ribbentrop testimony, 29 March 1946, pp. 230-2. For an assessment of Hitler's views on policy towards France between 1933 and 1936 see Hildebrand, Gennan Foreign Policy from Bismarck to Adenauer, pp. 12Iff.

32. See R. W. Muhle, Frankreich und Hitler: Die franzosischen DeutschlandundAussenpolitik 1933-1935 (Paderbom, 1995) pp. 97ff; pp. 247ff.

33. G. Wamer, Pierre Laval and the Eclipse of France (London, 1968) pp. 93-4.

34. Domarus, 112, 7 March 1936, speech to the Reichstag, pp. 590-1.

35. M. Muggeridge (ed.) Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, trans. S. Hood (London, 1948) [hereafter CDP] conversation with the Fuhrer, 24 October 1936, p.60.

36. W. Ritter von Schramm, Sprich vom Frieden, wenn du den Krieg willst: Die psychologischen Offensiven Hitlers gegen die Franzosen 1933 bis 1939. Ein Bericht (Mainz, 1973) p. 103.

37. T. Jones, A Diary with Letters 1931-1950 (London, 1954) 4 September 1936, p. 245.

38. Ibid., 16 October 1936, p. 274.

39. CDP, conversation with the Fuhrer, 24 October 1936, p. 58.

40. This measure, announced in late August 1936, was explained to the German public in terms of the growing military power of the USSR and its intervention in Spain. See jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik, p. 457.

41. For the text of the memorandum see ADAP, CN/2, no. 490, unsigned memorandum, August 1936. For a commentary on its provenance and significance, see W. Treue, 'Hitlers Denkschrift zum Vierjahresplan 1936', VfZ, 3 (1955) pp. 184ff. See further, especially for the role of Goring, whom Hitler made Reich plenipotentiary for the execution of the plan, Kube, Pour Ie merite und Hakenkreuz, pp. 140ff; S. Martens, Hermann Goring: 'erster Paladin des Fuhrers' und 'zweiter Mann im Reich' (Paderbom, 1985) pp. 66ff; R.]. Overy, Goering: The 'Iron Man' (London, 1984) pp. 46ff.

42. As Hitler said in October 1941, 'I write drafts ofletters only conceming matters of quite fundamental importance, such as at the time of the Four Year Plan or last year conceming the Eastern action.' jochmann, Monologe, 14 October 1941, p. 81.

43. ADAP, CN/2, no. 490, unsigned memorandum, August 1936 (emphasis in the original).

44. Ibid., (emphasis in the original).

45. Ibid.

46. Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 712.

47. Hitler, Zweites Buch, p. 223.

48. E. D. Susmel (ed.) Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini (Florence, 1953) vol. 12, speech of 23 March 1919, p. 325.

49. VB, 29 July 1922.

50. Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 721.

51. RSA, IV/I, no. no, Interview with II Popolo, [April] 1931. See also ibid., IV/2, no. 84, Interview with Sunday Graphic and Sunday News, 5 December 1931.

52. See, for example, DBFP, 2/V, no. 358, Hadow to Vansittart, 24 August 1933; ADAP, C/I/I, no. 98, Hassell to AA, 18 March 1933; ibid., C/I/2, no. 485, Hassell to AA, 6 October 1933.

53. On this aspect see J. Calvitt Clarke III, Russia and Italy against Hitler: The Bolshevik-Fascist Rapprochement of the 1930s (New York, 1991).

54. PAB, R83396, Hassell to AA, 22 December 1933.

55. D. Mack Smith, Mussolini (London, 1993) p. 182.

56. Starhemberg, Between Hitler and Mussolini, p. 93.

57. VB, 9 September 1935.

58. ADAP, C/IV/1, no. 120, Hassell to AA, 30 May 1935. For analyses of Germany's exploitation of the crisis see M. Funke, Sanktipnen und Kanonen: Hitler, Mussolini und der internationale Abessinienkonflikt 1934-36 (Dusseldorf, 1970); and Petersen, Hitler-Mussolini, pp. 435ff.

59. Documents Diplomatiques Francais 1932-1939, serie I, vol. IV (Paris, 1972) no. II3, Chambrun to Paul-Boncour, 15 August 1933.

60. BBL, NS8/II6, memorandum by Strunk, 5 February 1936.

61. ADAP, C/V/1, no. 90, Papen to AA, 13 March 1936. Mussolini also argued that countries that 'opposed a rising nation' played into the hands of Bolshevism and would bring about the 'downfall of the West'.

62. Ibid., D/III, no. 40, Charge d'Affaires in Italy to AA, 14 August 1936.
The newly appointed and pro-German Italian Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, believed that events in Spain were 'driving Europe directly to a split between Communists and anti-Communists'. See ibid, no. 30, Hassell to AA, 6 August 1936.

63. CDP, conversation with the Fuhrer, 24 October 1936, p. 57.

64. Ibid., conversation between Mussolini and Frank, 23 September 1936, pp.43-8.

65. Ibid., conversation with the Fuhrer, 24 October 1936, pp. 56-8.

66. M. Funke, 'Die deutsch-italienischen Beziehungen: Antibolschewismus und augenpolitische Interessenkonkurrenz als Strukturprinzip der "Achse"', in Funke, Hitler, Deutschland und die Maechte, pp. 823-46.

67. Raumer mss, fol. 36.

68. PRO, F0371/20743/C357, Phipps to Eden, 4 January 1937.

69. Ibid.

70. See ADAP, CNI2, no. 624, German-Italian Protocols, 23 October 1936; Daily Mail, 2 November 1936.

71. ADAP, C/VII/I, no. 57, German-Japanese Agreement against the Communist International, 25 November 1936.

72. BK, ZSg. 121/14, 'Erklarung von Ribbentrop's [sic)', pp. 7-8.

73. IMT, XXXVI, doc. 416-EC, Niederschrift des Ministerrates am 4 September 1936, pp. 489-91. Goring is alleged to have repeated this remark in an unpublished interview with a British journalist in December 1936. See S. Pons, Stalin and the Inevitable War 1936-1941 (London, 2002) p. 66.

74. TBJG, II3/ii, 2 December 1936.

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