By Eric Vandenbroeck
and co-workers
The Question About Hu Jintao
Xi Jinping officially
got his third term, consolidating his absolute power over the Party and the nation.
The list of the central committee's newly “elected” members shows that his
supporters dominate the body.
What was dramatic was
that halfway through the last day of the congress Hu Jintao, the former
president of the country, was seen unwillingly led away to the exit of the
hall, leaving a lot of puzzles behind. The BBC reports that:
The two most likely
reasons for his departure are that it was either part of China’s power politics
on full display, with a leader representing a former time being symbolically
removed, or Hu Jintao had severe health problems…. However, why did this happen
so suddenly if he was led away at the end because of ill health? Why in front
of the cameras? Was it an emergency?
On Monday 24th, a
further news update showed that before Hu Jintao was led away, his
files were taken away by Li Zhanshu, the former
member of the Standing Committee of the Polibureau.
When Hu tried to take back his files, Xi Jinping called someone to his side and
talked to the latter. Soon Hu was escorted away. This showed that the official
explanation for Hu being escorted out of the hall because he was unwell was
untrue.
The Myth Of Reform
Certain
liberal/neo-liberal dissidents, domestically or abroad, once argued that there
was a struggle between the “reformist faction” and “conservative faction”
within the CCP and put their hope of change on the former. Although without
much proof, they put their hope in this or that party leader, Hu Jintao, only
to be bitterly disappointed afterward.
After Xi Jinping took
power in 2012, some continued to seek salvation from Premier Li Keqiang, but Li
exhibited no signs of fighting against Xi. Despite this, when the Taiwan
newspaper United Daily News reported this August (soon withdrawn) about a supposed
“insider’s news” that while Xi would get his third term as president of the
country and also as chairman of its Military Commission, Li would be promoted
to the post of party secretary. This suspicious report again raised hope among
many, but they were soon disappointed again.
At least since 1989,
we see no circumstantial evidence that serious political factions have formed
within the party leadership. Political factions would require a more coherent
ideology or agreement over basic principles. In contrast, there have always
been cliques around individual leaders, and because of this, there must have
been differences in approaches, but these are not political factions, at least
not yet. Cliques fight for power or over certain decisions yet to be made.
There have been three
most powerful cliques since 1989, each grouped around a successive top leader;
Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping. It seems that they have no serious
difference over one basic principle among themselves – the Party must tighten
its screws over the whole nation further in its rapid rising, even if some of
them, in different periods, might opt for a slightly more dovish version.
Whereas the two
predecessors of Xi might tolerate, in practice, individual dissidents (as long
as they are not very well known), Xi’s more hawkish approach went so far as to
ban this as well. Regardless of the minor differences, all three share a
consensus of never allowing an organized opposition to exist, either realistically
or potentially, because this is the first prerequisite of their Orwellian
state.
Xi And His Cronies
Xi’s third term does
signify new development, however. Congress passed the Resolution on Party
Constitution amendments, according to which “the congress resolved that another
amendment, which enshrined “developing fighting spirit, strengthening fighting
ability,” be added to the constitution. The resolution further elaborated on
the point, saying:
Adding this point
would encourage the whole Party’s historical self-confidence…and helps to pass
down its red genes.
The term “passing
down the party’s red genes” had already been used multiple times in the past
ten years by the Party or Xi himself. This congress reiterating the same term
signifies a dangerous trend since 2012, which is now finally consolidated by
Xi’s third term – the “second red generation” taking over all power by building
an autocracy around Xi.
Xi began his first
term in an unfavorable situation compared to his predecessors. Jiang Zemin and Hu
Jintao were appointed top leaders by two compelling leaders, Deng Xiaoping and
Chen Yun, in that order (with Chen nominating Jiang and Deng Hu). This earned
Jiang and then Hu the CCP’s style of “legitimacy” – being blessed by Deng or
Chen.
Xi, in contrast, was
selected as Hu’s successor, for the first time, by 400 top party leaders in
2007 because by then, both Deng and Chen were long dead. According to a
Japanese reporter from the Asahi Shimbun (well known for its connection to
insiders news in China), Hu invented this CCP-styled “election” with his agenda
to get Li Keqiang elected as a top leader but was sabotaged by Jiang Zemin, who
got enough votes for Xi instead. Jiang’s success was based on Xi’s unique
advantage over Li; however – Xi is the “second red generation,” hence genzhengmiaohong (which means “blue blood”), while Li is
not.
How far this is true
is unclear, but what we do know is that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the
most reactionary old leading cadres had tried very hard to pass their power to
their children, with the pretext that only this measure could enable the Party
to survive in a period when the Soviet bloc was collapsing, claiming the
“children of the revolutionary cadres would never betray their parents.” Their
plan worked quite successfully.
In 2007 the “second
red generation” and their cronies (themselves not necessarily blue blood) first
succeeded in transforming themselves into a “revolutionary aristocracy” and
“kingmakers.” In 2018 they further succeeded in overthrowing the rule of Deng
Xiaoping that the nation's top leader could only serve two terms.
With the 2022 party
congress, they, through Xi’s dictatorship, can now grasp all power in the country
at the expense of other ruling cliques. If there is one moment that symbolizes
this event, it would be when ex-President Hu Jintao was shown the door of the
congress hall and unceremoniously bundled out by officials.
Forget about all
illusions of “gradual reform from within the establishment.” Xi will only
further deepen and refine the Orwellian state. From his perspective, this is
even more necessary now the economy is encountering serious problems. Any
democratic transformation has to come from the toiling classes. Yet, with such
a level of state control, it is tough for social protest to rise and sustain
itself. The severe lockdown during the Covid pandemic, which resulted in
widespread violation of basic human rights (like locking up people in their own
homes), and the fear of repression in general, has also created a very
depressed mood across Chinese society.
The One-Person Protest
But this Congress
will go down in history forever with a single-person protest as its backdrop.
It was another and earlier moment that symbolized the people’s hatred against
Xi and his red gene buddies. On the morning of 13 October, Peng Zaizhou, or Peng Lifa, staged a
one-man protest at the Sitong bridge in Beijing
(see report). He is reportedly a science and technological
worker.
He hung two banners
over the bridge, one with the words “We want food, not PCR tests. We want
freedom, not lockdowns. We want respect, not lies. We want reform, not a
Cultural Revolution. We want a vote, not a leader. We want to be citizens, not
slaves,” The second banner was even more radical, calling for a “boycott of
schools, strikes to oust the dictator, traitor Xi Jinping.” He called for a day
of action on 16 October. Nothing happened on that day; rather he was arrested
on the day of his protest.
On top of hanging
banners, he also posted a detailed “action program” and a “toolkit” for
political actions. He called for a “non-violent and popular color revolution” –
not to topple the CCP regime but to oust Xi Jinping. His ambition was that a
reformed government would do the following:
Peng refers to Liu
Xiaobo and his “Charter 08”, showing he is following in the footstep of Liu’s
liberal program. What differs from Liu is that the latter was never keen on
agitating for strikes and widespread social protests. After the crackdown on
the 1989 democratic movement, the liberal and the “new left,” although bitterly
opposing each other, shared the common ground of rejecting the working people
as the agent of social change altogether. Instead, they saw social protest as
dangerous, so reform must come only through the Party. This leads both sides to
see themselves as mere lobbyists of the CCP.
Liu was a bit
different because he went on to publicly campaign for a liberal/neo-liberal
transformation (prioritizing “market reform” over the struggle for democracy,
however). Because of this, he was jailed and later died in prison. Liu had not
publicly agitated for a national strike to bring down the top party leader –
this difference between the two men makes Peng unique.
Calling for strikes
and public attacks on the top leader are grave crimes in China. Demanding the
disclosure of officials’ assets is also a slap on the face for Xi – he was
boosting his “overwhelming victory” in eradicating corruption in Congress.
Peng’s demand for the disclosure of officials’ assets would expose Xi’s
hypocrisy – isn’t this measure a more efficient way of getting rid of
corruption than executing corrupt officials?
Hong Kong
Peng must have
prepared for the worst when he started his action plan that day. But what is
worth attending to is not only this brave act. Once the pictures of his banner
were posted on social media (the only outlet where the public could voice out
now, even if they only lasted a brief period), it was echoed by many netizens.
Soon their support for him was further spread to Hong Kong and other parts of
the world, where college students, especially those Chinese overseas students,
began to repost Peng’s banners.
All these actions of
re-posting Peng’s slogans ended in a few days. Below are three online posts
from people on the Mainland that are worthwhile quoting at length:
This valiant effort
is excellent, but not many people will respond to his call and take to the
streets….I am now studying in a college, and people around me do nothing but
focus on their lessons provided by the communist bandit university and play
online games when they are free. Take the lockdown on the campus as an example,
they are frustrated by the lockdown, but no one came out to protest. People who
did that or just sent letters to the president of the university’s email
address (to complain) would be punished….
The communist bandits
use examination to control the students who do not have much free time to be
concerned about social events. People may break the campus regulation or act
against the counselors there, but the campus and the counselors can also punish
them as well…… I am not interested in the curriculum, and I’m not too fond of
the campus’s highly repressive management, and every day I have been thinking
of all kinds of things about China. If ever people are willing to mobilize and
charge against the tower offline (acting against the authorities in real life –
Au), I will come out to support them.
He (Peng) is not the
first person…. to demand freedom. Several months ago, there were considerable
charges against the tower in Shanghai, Zhejiang, Yiwu,
and Wuhan. Eventually, they were brought under control, but these will not be
the last. The rapid economic downturn is visible, and the instability entails
an expensive cost to maintain stability, and there is always an upper limit to
this kind of spending. For those who want to resist, do so. For those who do
not dare to resist, they can at least tangping
(literally “lying flat,” a popular counter-culture to the official ideology,
for instance, boycotting the lifestyle of working hard to climb up the social
ladder—Au), refuse to comply, decline to consume and to work hard, refuse to
get married and have children, to accelerate the collapse of this rotten
society.
I am in despair about
people like Li Keqiang (former premier) and Wang Yang (former member of the
Standing Committee of the Politbureau). Surely we
should not have cherished any stupid hope in anyone inside the Communist party
in the first place. Anyone who wants change must bleed oneself to do it…….. My
previous stupid idea is simply a joke.
Promoting Modernization
Xi boasts of his
success in controlling the Covid pandemic and vows to continue his zero Covid
policy. Covid is indeed under control. The Party is good at delivering results
if by results you mean imposing control – it is a control freak. It has
perfected its social and political control tools since 1949, and they have now
been upgraded to a 21st-century digital version.
Yet it also faces a
dilemma. Its commitment to industrialization and modernization allows it to
improve its grip over the country and enrich itself significantly. But on the
other hand, the same process is raising the country's cultural level, empowering
people to commu,nicate immediately over great
distances, and allowing a more significant proportion of people to be
increasingly aware of the crimes of the Party. Since the lockdown over Covid
even the middle class is beginning to question the Party's legitimacy.
Another dilemma the
Party now faces is that its modernization project is led by a ruling clique
that still carries strong pre-modern political culture – an incredibly arrogant
top leader and slavish conformism for all those under him (of course, never a
“she”). This constitutes the best recipe for making significant mistakes.
Could you take the
lockdown policy as an example? Xi’s success in 2021 has long turned sour.
Lockdown should only be the first step in dealing with a pandemic. It is meant to
buy time for the invention and mass production of an effective vaccine and earn
the public's trust. In these two endeavors, Xi failed miserably. Managing a
modern society without unnecessary pain and social cost is much more
complicated than imposing control, but the former is something that Xi is
ignorant of.
Now his overdoing of
the lockdown has resulted in the backlashes of widespread discontent. No wonder
Peng’s first slogan, “we want food, not PCR tests,” won the heart of many
people.
A second backlash is
that when more and more countries have been opening up after vaccinating a
great majority of the population, China still closes its door. The domestically
produced vaccine does not work well, and people do not trust the Party. Even if
Beijing chooses to open up China in the future, this could be dangerous to
people’s health. On the other hand, continuing a zero Covid policy will further
hit the economy hard. But Xi and his “second red generation” continues to
believe in their omniscient. Precisely because of this, China is now entering
the most dangerous period.
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