By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

India’s Massive Military Restructuring

India’s strategic posture has been in a state of churn for several years, compelling New Delhi to embark on the most significant military reorganization since the country’s founding in 1947. The South Asian giant is moving away from its historical focus on its western flank with nuclear rival Pakistan to focus on the bigger challenges of dealing with the growing threat of conflict with China and building up its power projection capabilities in the Indian Ocean basin. Addressing these emerging challenges is the principal driver behind the Indian military’s move to establish three new tri-service theater commands – i.e., centers that involve all three military branches (the army, air force, and navy). The sheer magnitude of the military restructuring and the usual bureaucratic inertia means it will be many years before the process is completed – though the country’s rapid economic growth will help propel its defense capabilities in the future.

India is set to launch the first of three integrated theater commands next month when the country celebrates the 76th anniversary of its independence. According to Indian media reports, the Jaipur-based Southwestern Command will focus on the western border with Pakistan. A second Lucknow-based Northern Command will focus on the increasing threats from China along the Himalayan border. Meanwhile, The Maritime Command will be headquartered in Karwar, in the southwestern state of Karnataka, focusing on the defense of the southern coast and power projection capabilities in the Indian Ocean basin and beyond.

Four-star Army and air force commanders will head the first two commands rotationally. In contrast, the third will be headed by a naval officer reporting directly to the country’s top military officer, the Chief of Defense Staff, a post created just four years ago. These senior officers will effectively lead military operations, while each of the three service chiefs will be responsible for recruiting and maintaining their respective military branches. Before this reorganization, the military had only two tri-service commands – the Andaman and Nicobar Command, responsible for the maritime area bordering Myanmar, Thailand, and Indonesia, and the Strategic Forces Command, in charge of the country’s nuclear arsenal. The new integrated platforms will comprise 17 existing commands across the military, seven each from the Army and air force and three from the Navy. There are also plans for other joint commands led by three-star officers responsible for logistics, training, cyber, space, missiles, and intelligence. They will report to the chief of Integrated Defense Staff under the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

These massive changes to the structure and functionality of the Indian armed forces reflect shifts in the regional and global security situation over the past 15 years or so. India’s main security challenge from Pakistan is not what it was decades ago when the two neighbors fought four wars in 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999. This is mainly due to the emergence of social, political, and economic crises that have weakened Islamabad to unprecedented levels. Its military leadership, which dominates many elements of Pakistani society and politics, has recently tried to steer the country toward normalizing relations and trade with India. Pakistan is increasingly focused on its western flank, which in recent years has supplanted its eastern border with India as its main security threat due to the rising insurgencies led by Islamist rebels and Baloch separatists. Over the past quarter century, the threat to India from Pakistan has emanated largely from proxy Islamist non-state actors, which, since the late 2000s, have gone from being an asset to a significant liability for Islamabad.

Still, New Delhi can’t lower its guard too much, given the uncertainty surrounding the security situation in Pakistan in the long term. Meanwhile, India is also concerned about the threat from China, which has been increasingly hostile for the past decade. New Delhi faces security challenges from Beijing in three strategic sectors: the northwestern, central, and northeastern regions straddling the 2,200-mile-long India-China border. This border will likely heat up as U.S.-China competition intensifies and as U.S.-India alignment grows, especially considering that India is the one area in the world where the Chinese have the experience and capabilities to act militarily.

While it faces no immediate threats from the Indian Ocean, New Delhi must still dedicate resources to its southern flank. This will be crucial to India’s ability to become a major military ally of the United States in the broader Indo-Pacific region. Even its own imperative to move from regional to global power necessitates force projection capabilities on the maritime front. For India, maritime security has become a more significant focus since Beijing launched its so-called String of Pearls strategy – a push to build military and commercial assets along the Indian Ocean. However, this strategy has been largely unsuccessful, one reason Beijing has been trying to keep India focused on its shared border in the Himalayas instead of its southern flank.

Ultimately, the new command structure is designed to allow India to protect against any threats from Pakistan and China, especially if the two countries collude against New Delhi. It’s also aimed at preparing India for a major partnership with the United States and other allies to ensure regional security. But despite India’s projected growth in the years ahead, this will be a herculean task for the world’s fourth-largest military.

 

 

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