South Africa sees
itself as the natural power in southern Africa. It is thus seeking to
re-establish its hegemonic position, which during the apartheid era reached as far
north as southern Angola and the Katanga province area in southern Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC). Namibia, Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique and
Zimbabwe were also in this sphere of influence.
The end of apartheid
in 1994 saw the African National Congress (ANC) party come to power in South
Africa, first under Nelson Mandela and then under Thabo Mbeki. While both
Mandela and Mbeki sought to reassure neighboring countries that South Africa no
longer held hegemonic designs, South African commercial interests -- dominated
by its mining sector but also including banking, construction and
telecommunications -- not only continued but also expanded their operations in
southern Africa.
South Africa's
almost-complete consolidation of democracy under ANC rule also means its era of
internal focus will be ending shortly, opening up room for maneuver elsewhere.
With no credible rival political party in sight, Mbeki's party will face
certain re-election in 2009. Mbeki's as-yet-unchosen successor -- or possibly
Mbeki himself, since he has not ruled out seeking a third term -- will be
expected to devote more resources to promoting South Africa as Africa's premier
power, able to involve itself internationally by mediating conflicts in Africa
and assuming leadership positions at the U.N. Security Council, the African
Union and the G-8.
Already Africa's most
sophisticated polity and greatest economy, South Africa's power soon will be
complemented by a series of military moves. South Africa's push for a Southern African
Development Community peacekeeping force, to be equipped and based in South
Africa but able to inject itself into any of the continent's conflicts, will be
reinforced by the procurement of Saab Grippen and BAE
Hawk fighter jets, A-400M aerial refueling and transport aircraft and German
submarines and corvettes. Delivery of this package began in 2006 and is
expected to end by 2012. This defense package will provide South Africa,
already Africa's leading military power, with an even more robust capability
that will far outstrip the capabilities of any other African military.
Outside of southern
Africa, South Africa has limited influence on the continent. During apartheid,
South Africa did not concern itself with regions outside of southern Africa. It
had enough going on domestically and in the southern region, from deal-making
in the mining sector to combating liberation-seeking insurgents and domestic
political opponents. Since the end of apartheid, South Africa's efforts to
mediate conflicts in Africa, such as the political crisis in Cote d'Ivoire,
have been blocked by countries such as Nigeria, which sees West Africa as its
sphere of influence. South Africa has not even tried to mediate conflicts or
become otherwise involved in the Horn of Africa.
West Africa and the
Horn of Africa, however, are of great interest to AFRICOM. Securing access to
energy assets in the Gulf of Guinea region is of core concern to Washington.
This region includes Nigeria's violent Niger Delta, where the Nigerian
government has struggled to rein in militant groups such as the Movement for
the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. Combating terrorism in West Africa's
largely ungoverned and violent Sahel is another of AFRICOM's core interests.
Similarly, ensuring that Somalian territory in the Horn of Africa region does
not fall prey to transnational jihadist fighters aiming to take advantage of
that country's weak government and vast ungoverned territory is a final AFRICOM
priority. This goal follows up on previous U.S. achievements through operations
of the Djibouti-based Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.
While a decision has
not yet been made on where to base AFRICOM -- which will begin as a subcommand
of European Command by October and stand up as a separate command by fall 2008
-- a series of lily pad bases will be used to allow contingency operations in
West Africa and the Horn of Africa. Administrative priorities aside, a single
meaningful location for troop basing will be ruled out in deference to twin
fears. One is the concern in Washington about committing large numbers of U.S.
troops far from a sphere of core U.S. interests. The second is a fear held by
African governments and populations that U.S. troops will serve as a colonizing
power there.
Compared to other regional
commands, AFRICOM will have a much more fluid, dynamic structure emphasizing
civil-military cooperation. Under this framework, and to deflect criticism of
imperialism, AFRICOM will work with other U.S. government agencies and with
African militaries to build up local capacities to respond to humanitarian
crises in addition to combating terrorism.
South Africa's
limited influence outside southern Africa means Pretoria cannot be expected to
block the bilateral agreements under which the United States will secure
AFRICOM basing privileges. Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, whose
nation enjoys a very close relationship with the United States, has been the
most persistent African promoter of AFRICOM. Sao Tome and Principe and the
Malabo archipelago of Equatorial Guinea are two possibilities for AFRICOM
basing in the Gulf of Guinea region. And Manda Bay, on Kenya's east coast, and
continuing operations at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti and in Ethiopia will figure
into AFRICOM's Horn of Africa activities.
Strategy and enforced
circumstances thus will result in a small but flexible AFRICOM footprint in a
limited number of locations in West Africa and the Horn of Africa, something
that does not directly clash with South African interests. Less pressing AFRICOM
priorities in southern Africa resulting in the U.S. command's focus being
directed elsewhere removes a possible major rival to South Africa's return as
the dominant power in southern Africa.
Other potential
rivals remain, however, and are contributing to South Africa's prickly posture.
China is such a potential rival, which prompted Mbeki to warn that Africa must
guard against a neocolonial relationship with Beijing. South Africa also is
keeping a close eye on Angola. Historically, Pretoria has had a conflicted
relationship with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, Angola's
ruling party. Flush with energy and diamonds, Angola also no longer faces an
imminent insurgency to distract it. That combination of circumstances means
Pretoria is keeping a close watch on Angola's behavior in neighboring Zimbabwe
and the DRC, which in turn means Pretoria must ensure that it remains fully
capable of maneuvering in southern Africa.
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