By Eric Vandenbroeck
and co-workers
Iran's question of Legitimacy
As argued elsewhere, the recent women-led
demonstrations in Iran underscore how
isolated the country has become.
Early this month, the
Iranian rumor mill cranked into overdrive amid reports that Iran's 83-year-old supreme
leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who survived prostate cancer surgery in 2014,
was again gravely ill. On September 16, the New York Times body
of 88 Islamic jurists who chose the supreme leader would select Khamenei's
successor, and lively debate over the relative merits of the clerics jockeying
for the role.
Reports of Khamenei's
death soon proved to be greatly exaggerated. On September 17, the ayatollah
made a televised appearance at a mourning ceremony for Arbaeen,
the national holiday commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, whose death
during the seventh-century Battle of Karbala is a foundational event in Shiite
history and theology. At the ceremony, Khamenei could be seen not just sitting
upright but standing, waving and striding around with a microphone exhorting
his audience to ignore "bandits" whose lies might undermine their
faith. The cane Khamenei has used in public for more than 40 years was nowhere
to be seen.
But within hours,
Khamenei's carefully choreographed reemergence had been overshadowed as protests
erupted in northwestern Iran that morning at the funeral of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini—whose death following
her arrest by Tehran's religious police over an improperly tied headscarf sparked widespread outrage—began to spread to nearby
cities. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi's government,
distracted by the president's first appearance on the world stage at
the UN General Assembly in New York, was caught off guard. Over the
next few days, as Khamenei made several more public appearances, all
exhaustively covered by Iranian state media, the demonstrations—many of them
led by young women, some of whom brazenly burned their headscarves in public to
protest the mandatory veiling requirements—spread to more than 80 cities across
Iran. The protests have continued to intensify, and calls to abolish the
religious police have given way to full-throated attacks on the clerical
establishment and the supreme leader. The current protests are believed to be
the most severe challenge Iran's government has confronted since the Green
Movement protests in 2009. A series of challenges facing the Iranian
regime—widening frustration over social restrictions; outrage over economic
collapse and mismanagement; and seething anger at Khamenei and a clerical
establishment that has shown little regard for the needs of the people—have now
converged into a crisis of legitimacy for the Islamic Republic.
The protests entered
their 11th day on Tuesday, even as authorities continued to restrict access to
the internet. State-affiliated media also reported late on Tuesday that
Faezeh Hashemi, the daughter of late President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, has
been arrested by intelligence authorities for inciting rioters to street
protests in eastern Tehran.
The protests present
the Iranian regime with a far more immediate crisis than Khamenei's eventual
successor selection. But the opaque succession process—and the underlying
questions over its legitimacy and lack of accountability—will haunt Iran's
political system long after the unrest has been quelled. Having succeeded
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, Khamenei is now the longest-ruling leader
of a Middle Eastern state. His death will herald a significant transition for
Iran and the wider region. Competition to succeed him will be intense. Whatever
the outcome, the way the transition unfolds will have far-reaching consequences
for Iran's relationship with its Arab neighbors and Western
adversaries. Iran's succession process has formal and informal
components that reflect the elected and unelected bodies in its hybrid
religious system, where the supreme leader sits above the fray yet maintains
overarching power and influence. Iran's constitution codifies that the Assembly
of Experts nominates and elects the next leader. The assembly will convene an
emergency session when Khamenei dies or becomes incapacitated. As was the case
in 1989, candidates will be nominated, most likely from the assembly itself,
followed by speeches and voting. Khamenei was formally recognized after
receiving a two-thirds majority, which in his case came with the backing of
high-level clerics and the deathbed blessing of Khomeini.
To prepare for the
forthcoming succession process, leaders of the Assembly of Experts announced in
2016 that they had assembled a committee to delineate the ideal candidate's
qualifications and identify a shortlist of contenders. But there has been no
public distribution or discussion of that list. Khamenei has said before that
the next candidate should be nothing short of "revolutionary"; the
constitution lays out the following characteristics: "just, pious, aware
of his age, courageous, resourceful, and with an administrative ability."
In 1989, before the
voting process began, the Assembly of Experts first discussed the possibility
of electing a leadership council instead of choosing a single successor. At the
time, the assembly voted against that outcome, believing that a council would
further embed factionalism in Iran's political system. The constitution was
amended to remove the possibility of a shared leadership council from future
succession discussions. Nevertheless, the constitution makes clear that until
the election concludes, a council composed of Iran's president, the head of
Iran's judiciary, and one representative from the Guardian Council, the body
that holds veto power over legislation, will temporarily assume leadership
duties.
And in considering
future scenarios, the idea of a leadership council is often mentioned as a
potential post-Khamenei development. Although a leadership council could
provide a compromise solution that brings together critical factional figures
to manage Iran's fractured political system, constitutional revisions are
needed to make this a real possibility. Without a consensus on the path
forward, the jockeying seems most likely to produce a candidate acceptable to
the clerical establishment and Iran's "deep state," which has gained
significant power under Khamenei.
Beyond the formal
façade, Iran's deep state informally guides the succession process. Although
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the military entity empowered to
protect Iran's national security, is often considered synonymous with Iran's
deep state, there is more to it. Intricate security, intelligence, and economic
superstructure bring together individuals and institutions whose goal is to
preserve the fundamental revolutionary nature, vision, and security of the
Islamic Republic. The deep state includes the judiciary, some members of the
religious bureaucracy, charitable parastatal foundations, various semi-private
entities critical for financing, and, most importantly, the powerful office of
the supreme leader. This entity wields detailed oversight over all of Iran's
political systems and processes.
Khamenei's office
vets the ministers of foreign affairs, intelligence, interior, and defense—as
well as Iran's ambassadors to Iraq, Russia, Syria, and other essential
allies—before their names can be sent to parliament for approval. The IRGC's
Intelligence Organization is also situated in the supreme leader's office and
has jurisdiction to police against infiltration. This cozy arrangement has
empowered the IRGC to detain citizens and dozens of dual nationals for
perceived national security violations. The deep state was nurtured under
Khamenei's leadership early in his tenure to compensate for his perceived
weaknesses as a religious authority and thus bolster his power within Iran's
factional political system. Over the years, Khamenei succeeded in marginalizing
political opponents such as his one-time champion President Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani, who played a critical role in Khamenei's election, and members of
the clerical establishment who did not support his leadership. The deep state
became more visible during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, from
1997 to 2005, when it viewed reform from within as a threat akin to PresidentMikhail Gorbachev's ideas of glasnost and
perestroika in the Soviet Union. Throughout Khatami's presidency, the deep
state began to assert itself beyond its security and economic base, gradually
interfering in politics to stymie internal dissent, as seen during student-led
demonstrations in 1999. Post-Khatami, Iran's government used the same playbook
to quell the 2009 Green Movement protests and the 2017–19 economic protests and
constrain successive presidents' agendas. Today, without a doubt, the deep
state is again leading the charge to crush the protests that are currently underway.
In preparing for the
succession of a new supreme leader, the deep state seeks, above all, to
preserve the status quo. Potential candidates are expected to come from within
the circle of trust. And they are expected to harbor conservative ideological
leanings and have a close relationship with Khamenei.
The leading contenders
In recent years,
Iran's president, Ebrahim Raisi, has often led
analysts' shortlists of contenders to replace Khamenei. Raisi's
religious credentials and past political positions signal his proximity to the
inner circle of influential clerics. In 2016, Khamenei appointed him as the
chair of Astan Quds Razavi,
the powerful Mashhad-based economic conglomerate, and in 2019, he was made the
head of Iran's judiciary. Yet Raisi lacked name
recognition. That changed with his 2021 election to the presidency, which gave
him a national platform, setting him up to follow in Khamenei's footsteps on
the path from the president to the supreme leader.
At the same time, Raisi's public profile also opens him up to greater public
scrutiny, which could weaken his stature within the deep state. Raisi won a presidential election with the lowest public
participation level in Iran's history. He took office at the apogee of
the United States' maximum pressure sanctions, which have taken an
economic toll on the Iranian economy. And Raisi has
yet to deliver any policy victories. Despite months of negotiations,
the Iran nuclear talks have not reached a positive conclusion that
would see sanctions relief and Iran's return to atomic compliance. To Raisi's embarrassment, Israel has infiltrated Iran and
killed its most prominent nuclear scientist. Successive waves of protests have
exposed the impact of economic and environmental mismanagement on the lives of
ordinary Iranians and the depth of their anger at the heavy-handedness of the
security state. With these challenges, Raisi could be
discredited as the competition for supreme leader intensifies.
Khamenei's second
son, Mojtaba, is another oft-mentioned, albeit regularly
discounted, candidate. Despite reports that Mojtaba
has nearly completed enough religious teaching and study to become an
ayatollah—a move that would give him critical religious credentials—internal
opposition figures suggest that hereditary leadership is coming to the Islamic
Republic to undermine the legitimacy of the clerical establishment further. But
Mojtaba is closely connected to the deep state's
security establishment and has the ear of his father. The deep state is also
acutely aware that keeping members of the Khamenei family close could be
essential to containing possible future opposition.
At the same time,
many doubt that hereditary rule could ever be institutionalized in Iran's
theocratic system after the dramatic 1979 revolution that toppled Iran's last
shah, the Pahlavi dynasty, and the hereditary monarchy. Iranians have long been
angry at the notion that Khamenei was grooming his son as a successor. Many
regard the idea of inherited rule as another betrayal of the revolution. In
recent protests across Iran, tens of thousands of marchers expressed their
anger at Khamenei and his son in unprecedentedly specific, personal, and
obscene terms.
Other candidates
whose names have circulated in the past, such as Sadeq Larijani, a scion of the
influential Larijani clan, have been discredited by accusations of corruption.
With Raisi and the younger Khamenei becoming weakened
candidates who might not muster a consensus, there is a chance that there will
be a surprise pick: a previously obscure senior figure from within the Assembly
of Experts who could emerge as an eleventh-hour candidate, someone the deep
state could manage. It is important to remember that in 1989, Khamenei was not
an obvious front-runner.
Alternatively, naming
a leadership council that brings together three key figures could be revived as
an attempt to salvage the process. As this uncertainty lingers without a clear
consensus-based path forward or a robust set of candidates, succession will
remain mired in conspiracy and opacity, further showcasing the state's
inability to take action on critical issues such as the Iran nuclear deal. One
consequence of the smoke and mirrors is the political stagnation and factional
competition that continues to weigh down Iran's political system. And as the
recent protests suggest, the old ways may not be able to withstand continued,
increased scrutiny from ordinary Iranians.
The sheer force,
velocity, and audacity of the latest protest movement and the speed with which
concern over Khamenei's health has given way to unprecedented public calls for
his ouster have shocked many observers, as has the rage many protesters have
directed at the broader theocratic system itself. Until recently, the clerical
elite may have hoped that the succession process would unfold entirely behind
closed doors, as in the past. But public anger has now squarely focused on
Khamenei's legitimacy and the legitimacy of the system he represents. Across
Iran, thousands of angry protesters continue to chant "death to
Khomeini," "clerics get out," and "Mojtaba,
may you die and not become Supreme Leader." As the deep state yet again
unleashes the full force of its coercive power to shut down the protests,
ordinary Iranians from all walks of life are watching closely. Should Khamenei
die while Iran is convulsed by a protest movement on this scale, the challenge
to the clerical system could become existential.
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