By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Can Iran Save Itself?

The goal of Iran’s measured (and reversible) social reforms is to consolidate support at home to resist pressure from abroad. setbacks. Hamas and Hezbollah, Tehran’s long-standing nonstate regional allies, have been weakened by Israel. President Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria collapsed suddenly and spectacularly. The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency, meanwhile, signals a revival of the maximum pressure policies that hobbled the Iranian economy starting in 2018. These looming challenges have led many U.S. officials and analysts to argue that the Islamic Republic is facing a strategic defeat. Iran is weaker and more vulnerable than it has been in decades, likely since its decade-long war with Iraq or even since the 1979 revolution. 

Iran has presented its opponents with an opportune moment to target its nuclear facilities or extract major concessions for a new nuclear deal.

The prevailing belief that Iran is now more susceptible to U.S. coercion or Israeli attack, however, is not shared by Tehran. The Islamic Republic views these external challenges as temporary setbacks, not signs of defeat. In Iran’s view, Hamas and Hezbollah, despite being badly beaten, have actually emerged as winners in their asymmetric conflict against Israel. They survived as guerrilla organizations against a powerful U.S.-backed conventional army. Critically, Hamas has retained at least some popularity in among Palestinians, and Hezbollah continues to enjoy the backing of Shiites in Lebanon. In Yemen, the Iran-aligned Houthis have solidified their role as a steadfast supporter of the Palestinian cause and a key member of Tehran’s so-called axis of resistance by attacking Israel and disrupting shipping in the Red Sea.

Still, Iran realizes that its network of partners is not as powerful today as it was before Hamas’s October 7 attacks. And it was alarmed by the sudden fall of the unpopular Assad. As a result, it has taken steps to shore up its domestic support by making limited internal concessions to a population fed up with authoritarian, theocratic governance. The regime has eased the enforcement of the mandatory dress code for women and relaxed restrictions on social media platforms, allowing increasingly critical discussions of the government’s policies. In doing so, the Islamic Republic hopes it can lessen the risk of domestic unrest and foster public trust.

But these domestic shifts should not be understood as harbingers of a grand reopening to the West. In fact, the goal of Iran’s measured (and reversible) social reforms is to consolidate support at home to resist pressure from abroad. Trump has suggested an openness to negotiations with Tehran but also a willingness to attack the country. With the public behind Tehran, or at least less opposed, the government hopes it can withstand whatever the U.S. president has in store.

Over the past year, Iran has grappled with a series of setbacks. Hamas and Hezbollah, Tehran’s long-standing nonstate regional allies, have been weakened by Israel. President Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria collapsed suddenly and spectacularly. The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency, meanwhile, signals a revival of the maximum pressure policies that hobbled the Iranian economy starting in 2018. These looming challenges have led many U.S. officials and analysts to argue that the Islamic Republic is facing a strategic defeat. Richard Haass, writing in Foreign Affairs in January, suggested that “Iran is weaker and more vulnerable than it has been in decades, likely since its decadelong war with Iraq or even since the 1979 revolution.” According to this view, Iran has presented its opponents with an opportune moment to target its nuclear facilities or extract major concessions for a new nuclear deal.

The prevailing belief that Iran is now more susceptible to U.S. coercion or Israeli attack, however, is not shared by Tehran. The Islamic Republic views these external challenges as temporary setbacks, not signs of defeat. In Iran’s view, Hamas and Hezbollah, despite being badly beaten, have actually emerged as winners in their asymmetric conflict against Israel. They survived as guerrilla organizations against a powerful U.S.-backed conventional army. Critically, Hamas has retained at least some popularity in among Palestinians, and Hezbollah continues to enjoy the backing of Shiites in Lebanon. In Yemen, the Iran-aligned Houthis have solidified their role as a steadfast supporter of the Palestinian cause and a key member of Tehran’s so-called axis of resistance by attacking Israel and disrupting shipping in the Red Sea.

Still, Iran realizes that its network of partners is not as powerful today as it was before Hamas’s October 7 attacks. And it was alarmed by the sudden fall of the unpopular Assad. As a result, it has taken steps to shore up its domestic support by making limited internal concessions to a population fed up with authoritarian, theocratic governance. The regime has eased the enforcement of the mandatory dress code for women and relaxed restrictions on social media platforms, allowing increasingly critical discussions of the government’s policies. In doing so, the Islamic Republic hopes it can lessen the risk of domestic unrest and foster public trust.

But these domestic shifts should not be understood as harbingers of a grand reopening to the West. In fact, the goal of Iran’s measured (and reversible) social reforms is to consolidate support at home to resist pressure from abroad. Trump has suggested an openness to negotiations with Tehran but also a willingness to attack the country. With the public behind Tehran, or at least less opposed, the government hopes it can withstand whatever the U.S. president has in store.

 

A Warning from Damascus

Israel may be celebrating its military triumph over Hamas and Hezbollah. But Iran is relatively unconcerned about the two organizations. Despite the devastating losses each incurred, Tehran expects that Hamas and Hezbollah will rebuild themselves, bolstered by grassroots support and hatred of Israel. It even expects that the battlefield deaths of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah will reinforce the organizations’ ideological commitments and resonate with a sympathetic public for years to come.

But Assad’s fall is harder for Iran to shake off. Although the former Syrian president’s unpopularity was widely recognized, the rapid disintegration of the Syrian army caught even Iran’s leadership—Assad’s primary patron—off guard. According to Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, the Islamic Republic intelligence community was “fully aware” of the imminent security threat against Assad. But Tehran was nonetheless surprised by the Syrian army’s complete inability to repel rebel forces. Iranian officials partially attribute the disintegration of Assad’s army to “psychological warfare” by external forces, including Israel, Turkey, and the United States. But Araghchi also pinned some of the blame on Assad’s disregard for public opinion. Iran, Araghchi claimed, had “consistently” advised Assad to boost military morale and “interact more with the people, as what ultimately secures a government is the people.” But Assad, Araghchi noted, had failed.

The sudden unraveling of Syria has prompted public anxiety within Iran, where persistent repression and corruption have also driven a wedge between the government and its populace (as has secularization). In January, Abbas Salehi, Iranian minister of culture and Islamic guidance, outwardly acknowledged that Tehran is facing a severe “social capital” deficit, as public trust in the government has fallen. Former President Mohammad Khatami warned that the Islamic Republic risks “self-subversion” by disregarding public resentment. Across the political spectrum, Iranian elites increasingly agree on the urgent need to build internal resilience.

Iran’s government has, accordingly, loosened some of its restrictions. Most notably, in December 2024, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council effectively paused the implementation of a controversial new veiling law that would impose financial penalties, prison terms, and other punishments, such as travel bans, on women who appeared in public without a headscarf or were judged to have worn “improper” attire. Despite calls from some ultraconservatives for strict enforcement of the country’s dress code—and occasional targeted crackdowns by the government to appease its religious base—women can now appear unveiled in public with less fear of harsh reprisal. And even the hardliners are not entirely united in their opposition: On March 15, conservative parliamentarian Mahmoud Nabavian acknowledged fears of Iran’s “Syrianization” as the motivation behind the suspension of the law, agreeing that it should be “put aside if it undermines the system.”

The sudden unraveling of Syria has prompted public anxiety within Iran.

This development reflects a tacit acknowledgment by the state that the veiling mandate is unpopular and, at least for now, impractical. It also comes three years after 22-year-old Mahsa Amini died in the custody of the morality police following her arrest for not properly wearing her veil. Amini’s death prompted mass street protests in 2022, which Iran snuffed out with unrelenting violence. Ultimately, the Islamic Republic temporarily removed the morality police from the streets to ease tensions. Now, Tehran seems increasingly willing to tolerate the relaxed enforcement of veiling laws, provided this shift does not escalate into a broader political movement challenging the regime itself.

In addition to this pause, the Islamic Republic is attempting to curry popular favor by allowing for relatively open and candid discussions on domestic media outlets. Social media platforms used in Iran now host a diverse array of commentators, including independent and dissident voices, both inside and outside the country. The government continues to quietly promote platforms connected to the state, and there are plenty of independent regime defenders. But online discussions about the veiling law, the collapse of Assad, and broader social, political, and economic issues are surprisingly frank and nuanced. Some commentators openly describe leadership as a disaster for the country.

At first, it might seem strange that Iran would let people hear anti-regime commentary for the sake of stability. But Tehran hopes that by opening domestic space, it can provide a safety valve for public frustration and diminish the appeal of satellite international media outlets such as the BBC—which is more critical of the Islamic Republic than Iranian voices. The regime has turned to this strategy at precarious moments before. At the height of the 2022 protests, it encouraged previously banned figures to appear on television, hoping that their criticisms would channel public discontent away from the streets. This time, Tehran believes that a relatively free flow of information, if carefully managed, could strengthen the regime’s own narrative on national security in the long term.

 

Setting the House in Order

Iran’s leaders hope that managing domestic stability through piecemeal reforms will create an atmosphere conducive to a national debate on major foreign policy issues, such as the nuclear standoff—one that it believes will result in national unity. The consensus among elites, at least, is that such a debate will enhance the government’s bargaining position as it pursues an agreement with the United States that could address Washington's concerns over the weaponization of the Iranian nuclear program but stop short of ending uranium enrichment, restricting conventional weapons, or weakening the axis of resistance. Domestic protests, after all, only create openings for adversaries such as the United States—which see cracks in Iran’s society as signs of weakness.

To Iranian leaders, forging such unity is especially important when facing Washington. The Biden administration, for example, sought to use the economic damage inflicted by Trump’s maximum pressure campaign to secure a “longer and better deal” than the original Iran nuclear deal, the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. But Iran, bolstered by a measure of internal cohesion in the face of an external threat from the United States, adopted an even harder bargaining position than before. Given the Trump administration’s belief that Iran has been weakened since October 7, the president likely thinks he can secure a deal with Tehran that is even more favorable to the United States. If he can’t, Trump has floated using force. “There are two ways Iran can be handled: militarily, or you make a deal,” Trump claims to have told Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in March. Trump has also said his administration is “down to the final moments with Iran.” For Iran, having a supportive public is essential to weathering this storm.

Trump’s threats, of course, could again be enough to create internal cohesion. But with the example of Assad seared into their minds, Iran’s leaders are leaving nothing to chance. “Think about this: On the day confrontation occurs, how united is Iranian society?” an adviser to Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, the conservative speaker of Iran’s parliament, wrote on X. “Who is to blame for the problems in the eyes of the people? The answers to these questions determine what constitutes service and what constitutes betrayal.”

Tehran is determined to prevent domestic divisions from weakening the country’s ability to withstand pressure. Limited social and political openings serve as a calculated strategy to diffuse public frustration before it escalates into mass unrest. If past is prologue, this approach could allow the Islamic Republic to frame any conflict with United States not as a struggle for regime survival but as a sovereign nation’s resistance against external coercion. But it does not portend a shift in the regime’s core strategy. Tehran, in other words, is not about to cast aside decades of defiance.

 

 

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