By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Israel's new strike on Iran

Israel hit a missile defense site near an international airport, and an air base is seen in Isfahan, Iran.

The summer war stripped Iran of many of its air defenses and destroyed roughly half of its surface-to-surface missile launchers. While Iran took to rebuilding its air defenses soon after the conclusion of the war, it still has not fully recovered from this loss. As former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani remarked in early December, “The skies over Iran have become completely safe for the enemy.” From an operational standpoint, it was expected that Israel would likely prefer to strike while this window remains open.

The summer war stripped Iran of many of its air defenses and destroyed roughly half of its surface-to-surface missile launchers. While Iran took to rebuilding its air defenses soon after the conclusion of the war, it still has not fully recovered from this loss. As former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani remarked in early December, “The skies over Iran have become completely safe for the enemy.” From an operational standpoint, Israel would likely prefer to strike while this window remains open.

Satellite photos taken Monday suggest an apparent Israeli retaliatory strike targeting Iran’s central city of Isfahan “precisely” hit a radar system for a Russian-made air defense battery, contradicting repeated denials by officials in Tehran of any damage in the assault.

The strike on an S-300 radar in what appears to have been a very limited strike by Israel would represent far more damage done than in the massive drone-and-missile attack Iran unleashed against Israel on April 13. That may be why Iranian officials, up to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have been trying to dismiss discussing what the attack actually did on Iranian soil.

Israel hit a missile defense site near an international airport, and an air base is seen in Isfahan, Iran.

Analysts believe both Iran and Israel, regional archrivals locked in a shadow war for years, are trying to dial back tensions following a series of escalatory attacks between them as the Israel-Hamas war in the Gaza Strip still rages and inflames the wider region. But a strike on the most advanced air defense system Iran possesses and uses to protect its nuclear sites sends a message, experts say.

If there is a single through line of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s foreign policy, it has been his hard-line stance on Iran. For decades, he has been warning of the dangers posed by nuclear weapons in the hands of the ayatollahs. Understandably, he sees a regime whose refrain is “death to Israel,” and that has a countdown clock to Israel’s destruction prominently displayed in the middle of Tehran as a threat to his country’s survival. Israel and Iran fought a shadow war for many years, since the Oct. 7, 2023, massacre perpetrated by Iran-supported Hamas, three bouts of confrontation that culminated in a limited 12-day war last June. And the conflict shows no signs of being over.

But as occasionally happens in the Middle East, the unexpected transpired. As Iran faced widespread unrest spurred by high inflation and popular dissatisfaction with the regime, longtime Iran hawk Netanyahu backed off. Israel reportedly cut a deal with Iran for neither to attack the other and, together with Gulf states, helped talk U.S. President Donald Trump out of bombing Iran this time. Israel also faces more immediate threats. Israel has long worried that Hezbollah, Iran’s premier proxy on Israel’s borders, could pull off a similar attack as Hamas did in northern Israel, but on an even grander scale. While the Israeli military killed some 4,000 Hezbollah operatives in its campaign in Lebanon in the fall of 2024, the group still retains tens of thousands of fighters. Israel continued to exert military pressure on the group even after a cease-fire went into effect in November 2024, and Iran still funneled some $1 billion to the group in 2025, according to U.S. officials.

Burn marks surround what analysts identify as a radar system for a Russian-made S-300 missile battery, center, near an international airport and air base is seen in Isfahan, Iran

Couple these practical factors with a general skepticism about whether airstrikes would have collapsed the Iranian regime during the protests, and it seems that Israel had other priorities before engaging in another bout with Iran.

Netanyahu’s calculus, however, may soon change again. Israeli Defense Ministry officials already promised to “significantly accelerate” Arrow interceptor production over the summer, and the military recently tested the new Arrow 4 air defense system. As for Israel’s northern front, the Lebanese government gave Hezbollah until the end of last year to disarm, as agreed to in the cease-fire, and began deploying its forces southward. Netanyahu’s office called these efforts an “encouraging beginning, but they are far from sufficient.” In other words, Israel will soon face a choice whether to let the disarmament process play out or attempt to “finish the job” militarily itself.

Once either option plays out, Israel’s focus inevitably will turn back to Iran. While Israeli and U.S. air operations over the summer set the Iranian nuclear program back by several years or more, the Iranian regime has not abandoned its nuclear ambitions. A report by the Italian Institute for International Political Studies, published late last year and which cited unnamed sources in Iran, said Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had privately given his approval to develop miniaturized nuclear warheads. And while an Institute for Science and International Security study concluded in late November that Iran’s primary nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan had been “largely destroyed and have seen little significant activity since the war,” other assessments noted a new nuclear site, dubbed Pickaxe.

From an operational standpoint, it looked likely that Israel would prefer to strike while the current window remained open.

Once either option plays out, Israel’s focus inevitably will turn back to Iran. While Israeli and U.S. air operations over the summer set the Iranian nuclear program back by several years or more, the Iranian regime has not abandoned its nuclear ambitions. A report by the Italian Institute for International Political Studies, published late last year and which cited unnamed sources in Iran, said Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had privately given his approval to develop miniaturized nuclear warheads. And while an Institute for Science and International Security study concluded in late November that Iran’s primary nuclear sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan had been “largely destroyed and have seen little significant activity since the war,” other assessments.

Iran’s nuclear efforts may also be enjoying the support of outside actors, most notably Russia. While Russia officially opposes nuclear proliferation, the Kremlin, which has relied on Iranian drone technology in its war in Ukraine, repeatedly reaffirmed Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program, opposed Israel’s airstrikes in June, and left open the possibility of aiding Iran in any future confrontation with the West. Last September, the two countries signed a $25 billion deal for Russia’s state nuclear agency Rosatom to build four civilian nuclear reactors in Iran.

Iran is bolstering other military capabilities as well. Last fall, China reportedly shipped precursor ingredients for Iran’s ballistic missile program. In December, a media publication affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced ballistic missile tests, only for official state news to later deny the report. Also last month, an Iranian media outlet, citing unnamed military sources, claimed that Iran was working on chemical and biological warheads. Separately, Russia launched several Iranian communications satellites that reportedly serve civilian purposes, although some analysts suspect that they have a military function as well.

Adding to this dynamic is the fact that 2026 is an election year in Israel. Netanyahu has staked his political fortunes on guaranteeing security, particularly from Iran. Moreover, he will need to appease his hard-right coalition to govern. Already, several more hawkish members opposed the cease-fire that ended the June war and advocated for a more decisive end. Even if the Netanyahu government falls, it’s not clear that a more moderate Israeli government would take a softer line on Iran.

Israel has talked openly of another preemptive strike. In late December, Israeli army chief Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir warned that “Iran is the one that financed and armed the ring of strangulation around Israel and stood behind the plans for its destruction,” adding that Israel will strike back “wherever required, on near and distant fronts alike.” A few days later, Netanyahu floated the idea of another round of strikes during a visit to Trump’s Mar-a-Lago estate. Speaking after their meeting, Trump threatened to “knock the hell out of” Iran if it restarted its nuclear program.

Over the previous weeks, the Iranian regime has faced remarkable challenges and displayed remarkable unity. Hundreds of thousands of Iranians have taken to the streets to protest the Islamic Republic in what has become the most significant internal challenge the state has faced in its 47-year history.

The summer war stripped Iran of many of its air defenses and destroyed roughly half of its surface-to-surface missile launchers. While Iran took to rebuilding its air defenses soon after the conclusion of the war, it still has not fully recovered from this loss. As former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani remarked in early December, “The skies over Iran have become completely safe for the enemy.” From an operational standpoint, Israel would likely prefer to strike while this window remains open.

This war also might be more extensive than last June’s campaign. Iran and Israel are separated by some 900 miles, which constrains military operations. But one can easily imagine a more protracted and destructive air war. After the 12-day war, Iran stopped reporting the locations of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, and some analysts worry that Iran can relatively easily transport the material around the country. Moreover, if Iran actually has a chemical and biological program, then the manufacture of these weapons does not require the same large, specialized infrastructure, such as centrifuge assemblies, that is needed for nuclear weapons, and they can be produced in a variety of locations. All that means that Israel’s targets will not be concentrated on just a handful of large nuclear sites.

Similarly, facilities buried deeper underground, such as Pickaxe Mountain, require more powerful explosives to target them effectively. Given that Israel possesses neither bombers nor the required ordnance, it would need the United States’ help to destroy the site, potentially broadening the conflict. If U.S. support is not forthcoming, Israel would need to strike the site repeatedly.

Similarly, facilities buried deeper underground, such as Pickaxe Mountain, require more powerful explosives to target them effectively. Given that Israel possesses neither bombers nor the required ordnance, it would need the United States’ help to destroy the site, potentially broadening the conflict. If U.S. support is not forthcoming, Israel would need to strike the site repeatedly or conduct some sort of risky sabotage mission to destroy it. All of this points to a broader war than last June’s.

For its part, the IRGC argues that Israel won’t be able to sustain a longer and costlier campaign, suggesting it, too, would want a war to drag out. The prospect of another relatively quick, lopsided defeat not only would be a blow to Iran’s prestige but could further weaken the regime’s grasp on power. Still reeling from the largest anti-government protests in decades, the Iranian leadership cannot afford to look weak.

This is not to say that China will attack Taiwan immediately: there are no visible signs of troop mobilization, logistical preparation, or government policy changes that point to an imminent attack. Nonetheless, in the past, Beijing has delayed action on Taiwan because it knows it cannot risk action that would fail. It was confident in its strategy for “peaceful reunification,” believing that the rise of China would eventually make Taiwan want to unify with it. That calculation is now changing, both because the past several years of great-power competition have shaken Beijing’s timeline about its ascent and because its confidence about a forceful bid for Taiwan is growing. Washington must realize that the current combination of factors offers what Beijing could perceive as its best opportunity to take Taiwan.

Still, at present, the indicators suggest that the Iran-Israel detente will not last long. And when it breaks down, the next round could be even bigger and uglier than the previous ones.

 

 

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