By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

In response to Hamas’s October 7 attack last year, the Israeli government launched a regional war meant to reshape the Middle East. Israel specifically targeted the so-called Axis of Resistance, a network of groups allied with Iran that includes Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, and parts of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq. Working on a scale that dwarfs previous efforts against the Axis, Israel has spent the past year trying to destroy the network’s political, economic, military, logistical, and communications infrastructure. It has also undertaken an unprecedented campaign against the axis’s leadership, killing the leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah and several senior commanders in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The ferocity of the Israeli offensive, which has been bolstered by advanced technologies and a strategy of total war that flattens and depopulates neighborhoods and cities, will significantly alter the balance of power in the Middle East. Yet for all its undeniable military superiority, not to mention its support from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe, Israel is unlikely to eradicate the organizations and regimes that belong to the axis in the way it hopes. Time and again the axis has demonstrated an adaptability and a resilience that attest to the deep connections its member groups maintain within their own states and societies. What’s more, the transnational relationships that compose the axis mean that Hamas, Hezbollah, and the other member organizations are best understood not merely as discrete nonstate actors or insurgent armed groups but as interlinking nodes of durable political, economic, military, and ideological networks.

These networks, which are regional and sometimes even global, have allowed the members of the axis to accommodate various shocks, including military setbacks, such as the assassination by the United States of its de facto leader, Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, in January 2020; economic collapses, such as the crippling sanctions from U.S. President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign and the Lebanese banking crash of 2019, which dissolved the financial accounts of many member groups; and popular uprisings, such as the protests that at various times contested the authority of the axis in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza. Despite these challenges, axis members—and the axis as a whole—have drawn on support from their local states and communities and one another to survive.

The historical resilience of the Axis of Resistance suggests that Israel will find it difficult to eliminate groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah. In all likelihood, the Israeli strategy of total war will continue to yield short-term tactical victories that degrade the capabilities of militant groups and states, forcing them into a kind of survival mode for a time. But without a political solution that comes to terms with the social embeddedness of the groups, the axis will likely draw again on local sources of influence, along with its transnational connections, to reconfigure itself at the local and regional levels. Since October 7, smaller groups within the Axis have seized the moment to strengthen their alliances. While Hamas, Hezbollah, and the IRGC endure the brunt of the Israeli offensives, groups such as Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen have capitalized on the turmoil to emerge as formidable regional players.

Demonstrators rallying to show solidarity with Palestinians and Hezbollah, Sanaa, Yemen, November 2024

 

Resilience Through Adaptation

The axis of resistance as it exists today differs significantly from the network that was initially established in the 1980s. Back then, the nascent Islamic Republic of Iran founded and fostered Hezbollah in Lebanon as a means of projecting power. It aimed to “export the revolution” and employ “forward defense” through asymmetric deterrence against perceived threats, namely Israel. Iran strategically replicated this model across various countries. Around the same time that it founded Hezbollah, for instance, Iran established Iraqi Shiite groups such as the Badr Organization, which played a role in toppling Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s regime and seizing power in post-2003 Iraq. In the 1990s, Iran bolstered Palestinian factions such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hamas, thereby helping enhance their influence. In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings, Iran extended its support to Assad in Syria and the Houthis in Yemen, further solidifying its regional network.

What fundamentally sustained these groups was a deep reliance on their local governing regimes and social bases. They embedded themselves within the fabric of their respective states to such an extent that the formal heads of government in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, and Gaza are all either members of groups that belong to the Axis or were chosen with those groups’ support. Furthermore, transnational ties among the groups have served as a crucial insurance policy during periods of shock.

An early test of the Axis came in 1992 when Israel assassinated Abbas al-Musawi, who was the secretary-general of Hezbollah. At the time, a major Israeli newspaper proclaimed that “the era of conflict with Hezbollah in its comfortable playground has ended.” Despite the attack, however, Hezbollah was able to reconstitute itself. The party leveraged local support by rallying the Lebanese Shiite community and securing backing from Iran, which provided financial aid, military training, and strategic guidance. This robust support network enabled Hezbollah to not only recover but also expand its influence. Under the guidance of its Shura Council and Hassan Nasrallah, Musawi’s successor, Hezbollah eventually became strong enough that it was able to force Israel from Lebanese territory in 2000. This triumph, coupled with the 2006 war in which Hezbollah fought Israel to a standstill—an unprecedented feat for Arab militias—greatly enhanced its reputation. It also ushered in a formidable new incarnation of the axis of resistance.

Another challenge to the Axis came in 2011, when the Assad regime in Syria faced an existential threat in the form of a civil war. Protests against the regime, which initially sought reforms, were followed by an armed uprising fought by groups—with backing from Turkey and the Gulf states—demanding regime change. Once again, however, the axis was able to adapt in ways that allowed it to overcome this crisis. Assad was aided in part by important connections that the Axis made with states outside the region: most significantly, Russia came to Assad’s rescue and became an influential global partner for the network. But Assad’s regime also benefited from the assistance of other axis members. Under the strategic direction of Soleimani, the IRGC’s Quds Force, along with Iraqi Shiite armed groups, began constructing a vital land bridge to transport supplies, weapons, and personnel from Iran and Iraq into Syria. Hezbollah fighters were eventually deployed to the frontlines of the civil war, where they played a crucial role in quelling the armed uprising. (Although initially reluctant to enter the Syrian conflict because of opposition from its local supporters, Hezbollah was compelled by Iran to intervene.) As Assad’s government teetered on the brink of collapse, Hezbollah stepped in decisively to safeguard the regime and prevent the emergence of a new regime in Damascus that would be hostile to the Axis.

The 2011 uprisings also led to the Houthis’ formal integration into the axis of resistance. Following the overthrow of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Iranian support became instrumental in transforming the Houthis from a local armed group into a formidable military force. By providing financial aid, advanced weaponry, and military training, Iran enabled the Houthis to enhance their operational capabilities. This assistance, coupled with local support bases, allowed the Houthis to seize control of Sanaa, the Yemeni capital, in 2014 and to maintain their dominance against a Saudi-led coalition.

In addition to military attacks, the axis of resistance has also faced economic assaults in the form of sanctions. During the early years of this century, Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its growing influence prompted an international coalition led by the United States to levy new sanctions against Iran and its allies within the axis. The sanctions increased dramatically in 2018, when Trump reneged on the Iran nuclear deal and launched his maximum pressure campaign. This campaign was intended in part to reduce Iranian oil exports to zero, thereby stripping the regime of a crucial revenue source. The sanctions devastated Iran’s economy, but they did not halt the regime’s oil trade. Instead, Tehran found ways to sell its oil through informal markets. With the help of its allies in the axis of resistance, Iran used these markets to trade energy resources, fund military operations, and gain access to U.S. dollars. In Iraq, for example, Iran worked with the rest of the axis to combine Iranian and non-Iranian fuel before selling it to countries in Asia. The revenues from this trade allowed Iran to purchase weapons components and ship them to its allies throughout the region. It also gave the axis additional global connections in the form of Chinese oil buyers.

The last major challenge that the axis of resistance faced before Israel’s post–October 7 offensive against Hamas and Hezbollah was the assassination of Soleimani by the United States in January 2020. Soleimani had helped found the axis, and his role as its de facto leader, as well as his top-down command style, meant that his death was a major setback for Iran and its allies. Yet even though the attack sent shock waves through the network—axis member groups in Iraq went underground—in the end, it demonstrated the adaptability of the axis to deal with serious threats.

After Soleimani’s death, the axis transitioned from a top-down Iranian-driven network into a more horizontally integrated alliance. Iran retained a pivotal role in setting the axis’s strategic direction. But the new structure allowed the other members greater autonomy and more independent interactions with both Tehran and one another. In the reformed axis, Hezbollah’s Nasrallah became an important broker: he provided regular strategic guidance to Esmail Qaani, Soleimani’s successor. Qaani aimed to transform the axis into a more formal and coherent institution, empowering its members to take greater control and operate as equals. (This goal was helped, somewhat inadvertently, by the fact that Qaani had neither Soleimani’s deep-rooted personal connections nor his proficiency in Arabic, which made Nasrallah’s guidance even more crucial.)

In Iraq, for instance, Nasrallah and his representative, Mohammad al-Kawtharani, emerged as key advisers to the Baghdad government. They helped quell the Tishreen (October) Uprising that had erupted a few months before Soleimani’s assassination, in which protesters demanded an end to the Iran-allied post-2003 governing regime. Nasrallah and Kawtharani helped to fortify the regime against popular protest. During this period, Kawtharani also significantly expanded Hezbollah’s economic interests across Iraq, thereby filling the void left by Soleimani’s death. These changes, although driven by a negative shock, reshaped the axis once again.

 

Responding to Israel's Total War

The previous threats to the axis of resistance pale in comparison to the total war that Israel launched in response to Hamas’s October 7 attack. As before, however, the axis was forced to adapt for its own survival. In particular, it has continued to transition to a more horizontal command structure and has further tightened its transnational connections.

To a much greater degree than in previous conflicts, Israel’s war against Hamas and Hezbollah has drawn a strong response from other allies within the Axis, such as the Houthis and Kataib Hezbollah, which has its roots in the Badr Corps of the 1980s and is currently linked to the PMF in Iraq. Previously, these groups were peripheral to the broader dynamics in Middle Eastern conflicts. Over the past year, however, they have deepened both their autonomy and their regional influence.

The Houthis, for instance, began for the first time to use anti-ship ballistic missiles to disrupt commercial shipping routes. They attacked ships traveling through the Red Sea, forcing freight companies to reroute around Africa, which led to increased costs and delays in the delivery of energy, food, and consumer goods around the world.

Kataib Hezbollah has also sought more involvement and influence in the transnational arena as Hamas and Hezbollah came under attack. In a move that challenged popular conceptions of its role as an Iranian proxy, the group killed three U.S. service members in January 2024 along the Jordanian-Syrian border in an attack on a U.S. military outpost known as Tower 22. This action was undertaken against the wishes of the IRGC, which subsequently pleaded with Kataib Hezbollah to call a cease-fire. The attack nevertheless revealed a new configuration of the axis that involved more proactive and autonomous decision-making from its members.

The post–October 7 reorientation has also fostered closer ties among some of the members of the axis of resistance. For several years, the Houthis maintained only a nominal presence in Iraq, with a single representative in Baghdad. That envoy’s work seemed more symbolic than substantive. In response to Israeli offensives against Hamas and Hezbollah, however, the Houthis deepened their collaboration with the PMF. This intensified cooperation saw an increase in weapons sharing and joint operations and showcased an enhanced capability to attack Israel.

Members of the axis also worked together across borders more concertedly following the assassination of Nasrallah in September. In the aftermath of his death, dozens of Hezbollah’s economic elites and their families relocated to southern Iraq, traveling by land through Syria with Assad’s assistance. They quickly found places to resettle, as Hezbollah had increased its business activities in Iraq after Soleimani’s death, including making investments in infrastructure, land, and residential complexes. These economic links allowed Hezbollah’s elites to move out of the direct line of fire in Lebanon while continuing to generate revenue. Once more, the axis’s transnational connections provided a crucial lifeline for its members during a period of profound difficulty.

 

The Need for Accountability

Israel, of course, understands the transnational nature of the axis of resistance. It is precisely because of this understanding that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government embarked on its total war strategy in response to October 7, a strategy that involved offensives of varying intensity not only against Hamas but also against Hezbollah, Iran, the Assad regime, and other axis members.

Yet its actions over the past year suggest that Israel has strategically underestimated the resiliency of the network and the extent to which a military solution, even one not constrained by international law, can bring about societal change in other countries. The past year has proved that the network is, to a meaningful extent, still able to adapt to military and economic challenges. While many of its member groups will remain underground or close to home during this period of intense conflict, they will nonetheless continue to draw on domestic support, on other members of the network across the region, and on global allies such as Russia and China. To eradicate the network fully is an impossible task and would likely require, at a minimum, demolishing, occupying, and reestablishing new states wherever the groups are embedded. For a country such as Israel, which has been accused of war crimes at the International Criminal Court and the UN, that sort of effort would prompt blowback from key allies and the international community.

History suggests that Israel’s military actions are unlikely to succeed without a comprehensive political solution, especially when those actions are conducted outside its territory. Instead, the Israeli campaign will probably result in an even more unstable Middle East, one in which genuine peace is only a distant possibility. Israeli massacres of civilians, which have been condemned by the United Nations and by human rights organizations, have proved devastating for civil society and are being used by axis groups to foster their ideology of resistance. Somewhat counterintuitively, the populations in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria will now find it even more challenging to insist on accountability from the Axis groups that govern their everyday lives, much less to demand reforms. These civilians, and not the members of the Axis, will be the greater long-term casualties of Israel’s total war.

Rather than enabling Israel’s ruthless strategy, therefore, international actors need to find a political settlement that begins with a cease-fire to the bloody wars in Gaza and Lebanon. The next step should be to bring in the governments linked to the axis to negotiate a broader settlement that takes into account the true nature of the power dynamics in the region. Without such an inclusive approach, regional conflict in the Middle East is destined to persist, to the detriment of future generations.

 

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