By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
The Israel-Iran War Is Just Beginning
Israel carried out a
wave of attacks against Iran early on June 13 local time, hitting key nuclear and
military targets and meaningfully setting back Iran’s nuclear program. What
comes next? If Israel is willing to maintain its current policy, then the
answer is a major foreign-policy victory for Jerusalem and Washington.
The administration of
US President Donald Trump has not critiqued the weeks-long timeframe in private
discussions, an Israeli official told CNN. A White House official said the administration was aware and implicitly
supportive of Israel’s plans. When asked about how long the conflict could
continue, the official said it depended on Iran’s response.
The Israel-Iran war
is just beginning. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has announced that Israel
will continue strikes for “as many days
as it takes” -
likely amounting to several weeks - seeking to continue to degrade Iran’s
nuclear program and devastate its military. Iran has already launched drones
and ballistic missiles at Israel and has a range of other
retaliatory options, albeit
limited ones. Although more bloodshed is likely, even inevitable, it is not too
soon to think about de-escalation and ways in which this war might end.
Here are a few possibilities.
The first is that
Iran conducts several high-visibility military strikes on Israel, claims to its
people that it has punched back and bloodied Israelis, but quickly accepts U.S.
and international efforts for a cease-fire. In short, a grudging surrender with
a facade of face-saving.
In essence, this is
what Iran’s close ally, the Lebanon-based Hezbollah, accepted after the September and
October Israeli campaign against
the group. Indeed, the Israeli campaign in Iran today bears many similarities
to that effort: devastating strikes on military infrastructure accompanied by
numerous assassinations and leadership strikes that demonstrate a thorough
intelligence penetration of Israel’s adversary. Hezbollah, which had a massive rocket arsenal and tens of thousands of fighters
under arms, agreed to a cease-fire largely on Israel’s terms without having
launched an effective counterattack.
Iran may be in a
similar situation to Hezbollah in 2024. Its drone and
missile attacks on
Israel in 2024 fizzled, and key proxies, notably Hezbollah, are a shell of
their former selves, suggesting its once-reliable deterrence is ineffective.
The devastating leadership attacks Israel has conducted may put Iran’s
leadership in disarray, making it difficult to coordinate missile strikes or
even make basic decisions in real time. Although Tehran has announced it
is quickly
replacing top commanders,
the effectiveness of this new leadership during the ongoing conflict is
unclear, and Israel is likely to strike the replacements and the replacements
of the replacements. Iran, of course, does not want to surrender under fire,
but it might seek to live and fight another day rather than take a continued
pounding.
Technicians work at a uranium processing site in
Isfahan, Iran.
A second possibility
is that Iran hangs on and even gets in a few blows against Israel, whether in
the form of terrorism, a few missiles that make it through Israel’s defense, or
other means, while international pressure builds on Israel to halt the war. Its
nuclear facilities at Natanz and elsewhere sustain damage, but Iran can make
repairs relatively quickly.
In general, when
Israel strikes its enemies, there is often short-term support from the United
States and even key European allies, but these countries quickly call for an
end to hostilities even as Israel seeks to continue attacks. France and the
United Kingdom have already called for de-escalation. Israel may care little about
Europeans’ opinions - they’ve been calling for an end to hostilities in Gaza
for many months now - but it worries more about U.S. opinion, especially that
of President Donald Trump. Should he put real pressure on Netanyahu, Israel
might cut operations short, hoping that the damage done is good enough for now.
Whether this would
lead to productive diplomacy is unclear. The United States under Trump has
pushed for a negotiated deal over Iran’s nuclear program (even though what was
on the table seems
painfully similar to
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which Trump withdrew
from in 2018). Iran
was taking the negotiations seriously, with apparent
support from the
country’s leadership, although tensions remained over uranium enrichment. Trump
has already called for a return to negotiations after the strikes, writing
on Truth Social that “Iran must make a deal, before there is
nothing left, and save what was once known as the Iranian Empire. No more
death, no more destruction, JUST DO IT, BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE.”
Underneath Iranian president vowed a 'harsher
response' to Israel.
Such negotiations
hold a certain appeal for Tehran: The country’s economy is in shambles, and the
promise of reduced sanctions is attractive. In addition, after Israel’s
destructive campaign, Iran would be giving away less at the table. Doing so in
the face of Israeli attacks, however, is more difficult politically. Trump
would trumpet any concessions, and Iran would look as if it was caving in under
pressure, which it would be.
Darker scenarios are
also possible, and probably more likely. One is that the Israel-Iran war
expands into a regional war. Before the Israeli strikes, Iran
threatened to attack U.S. facilities in the Middle East—attacks that, if they
occurred, would make it far more likely that the United States would join in
the bombing. Long-standing U.S.-Israel security cooperation and U.S. support
for Israel in air defense and other areas also may convince Iran that the
United States is already at war with it. While the United States has denied
involvement in the attacks, Iran may view Washington as being complicit,
with negotiations
acting as a cover for
Israeli military preparations. Although Israeli and U.S. officials had warned
that Iranian refusal to a deal would result in military action, mere hours
before the operation, Trump confirmed that the United States was committed to a
diplomatic solution and
that attacks were not imminent. If Tehran views negotiations as a cover, U.S.
targets may be at increased risk of what Iran would view as “retaliatory”
attacks.
The United States,
for its reasons, may also escalate. U.S. officials may view Israel as
having done half the job already, and the United States can finish the
work, bombing Fordow with deep penetrating munitions and otherwise taking care
of what is left after Israel’s initial attacks.
Iran is likely to
call on its proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and elsewhere to do what they can
to attack Israel, and they might add U.S. targets to their list if the United
States enters the fray for whatever reason. Thus, the United States could find itself
attacking targets in Yemen (an unattractive option after the U.S.-led Operation
Rough Rider against the Houthis ended in a
cease-fire), Iraq,
and elsewhere. Iran may also use international terrorism, having in the past
demonstrated the ability to strike around the world.
It is possible,
though for now unlikely, that U.S. Arab allies might become involved. The
Jordanian Armed Forces have already reported intercepting Iranian missiles and
drones that entered
their airspace on June 13. This is similar to the country’s interception
of Iranian missiles launched
at Israel in 2024. Although Jordan’s actions can be couched as self-defense, if
the United States becomes involved, it might use its bases in several regional
countries or otherwise draw on them.
A final possibility
is that the war doesn’t ever end, at least not in a formal sense. Although the
waves of massive Israeli strikes might stop at some point, a lower-level
conflict might continue for months to come. Israel might launch the occasional
missile or airstrike on Iran, along with assassinations and sabotage in Iran
itself. Iran would fire salvos at Israel from time to time, along with
terrorism and other attempts to strike back. It’s not all-out war, but it’s not
even an uneasy peace.
Amid continued
back-and-forth attacks and responses, Iran may develop a clandestine
nuclear program outside
of arms control commitments and international inspections, using Israeli
strikes as justification. If Israel does not hit all three enriched uranium
storage locations, this task will not be difficult for Tehran.
Combinations, of
course, are possible. Similarly, a U.S.-brokered cease-fire might be a first
step toward a larger nuclear deal. Iran may concede in the short term, but it
believes revenge is a
dish best served cold,
launching terrorist attacks in the months to come as a form of retaliation and
thus accepting a back-and-forth forever war.
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