By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

How The Conflict In The Middle East Came About P.1

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken arrived in Tel Aviv, Israel, on Thursday, where he met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to reiterate Washington’s unyielding support for Israel’s fight against Hamas. “You may be strong enough on your own to defend yourself, but as long as America exists, you will never, ever have to,” Blinken said during a press conference with Netanyahu.

Another key goal of Blinken’s trip is to try to secure the release of hostages captured by Hamas during its assault. As many as 150 hostages are being held by the Islamist militant group, including an unknown number of Americans. The U.S. deputy special envoy for hostage affairs and other U.S. officials accompanied Blinken on his trip.

The group will also be visiting Jordan, Qatar, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia in the coming days, where Blinken said they “will continue pressing countries to help prevent the conflict from spreading and to use their leverage on Hamas to immediately and unconditionally release the hostages.”

In Jordan, Blinken will meet with King Abdullah II and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. The three leaders are expected to discuss humanitarian relief for the Gaza Strip and stopping Hamas’s attacks. Abbas condemned the violence on both sides on Thursday, calling killing civilians a violation of “morals, religion, and international law.”

 

Earlier Attacks On Jordan And The Middle East Complexity

The November 2005 bombings in Amman by Salafi-Jihadists had planned to attack the Hashemite Kingdom with self-described ‘martyrs.’ In 2004, Fahd Nouman Suweilem al-Faqihi, a Saudi national, attempted to blow himself up on the Saudi-Jordanian border.1 In July 2005, a cell of five Iraqis, a Libyan, and a Saudi were involved in a plot to conduct SAs against Jordan’s Queen Aliya International Airport and hotels in the Dead Sea and the Red Sea resort of Aqaba. Four of them were arrested in February 2006. According to the charge sheet, some of the suspects rented apartments in Zarqa and Jabal Hussein, and they said they chose the hotels because Americans and Israelis frequented them. They said they acted on behalf of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Authorities had also seized roughly 7 pounds of PE-4A heavy explosives, which one of the suspects had concealed in a children’s game in a rented Amman apartment.2

Mainstream Salafism had existed in Jordan since the 1960s when young students who studied in neighboring Arab countries introduced the stream to the Hashemite Kingdom. Their chief exponent in the 1970s was a Syrian scholar named Nasr al-Din al-Albani, who moved to Jordan in 1979 and helped create an informal network that continued to exist.3 Albani’s branch of Salafism, sometimes referred to as traditionalist Salafism, rejected violence and political activism. Many jihadists from Jordan, like those from other Arab countries, were radicalized during the 1980s when a few hundred of them joined the mujahideen in Afghanistan in their war to oust the Soviet Army from their lands. One of the key figures who helped organize the arrival of foreign Arab fighters, the so-called Afghan Arabs, was Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden’s mentor and the founder of Makhtab al-Khidamat, the precursor of Al Qaeda. Azzam himself was a Jordanian of Palestinian origin. The Jordanians who went to Afghanistan to participate in the jihad against the ‘godless Soviets’ were poorly educated. Eager to rid itself of problematic elements within its territory, the Jordanian regime encouraged the Jordanian contingent of the Afghan Arabs to leave for Afghanistan. One of them was a young man named Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaileh, better known as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. When these Jihadists returned to Jordan from Afghanistan in the early 1990s, the GID kept a close watch over them, knowing that they had received ideological indoctrination that could eventually help turn the returnees against their home state.4 The Jordanian ‘Afghans’ return came shortly after the influx of some 250,000 Palestinians who had arrived from Kuwait, which had expelled them for their support of Saddam Hussein during Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Of the quarter million immigrants from Kuwait, an estimated two-thirds settled in Zarqa, a poor town east of Amman that in subsequent years became a breeding ground for Salafists, including many individuals that would later affiliate themselves with Zarqawi.5 Others settled in Salt (and fewer in Irbid). Originally a place ravaged by problems of alcoholism and drug abuse, after the 1990s, Salt witnessed a religious resurgence and produced many Jordanian suicide bombers and insurgents in Iraq.6 It was in this city where, in March 2005, the family of a suicide bomber reportedly celebrated the ‘martyrdom’ of their son in Iraq in a SA in Hilla, in which 125 Shii civilians died, thus temporarily causing a rift in Jordanian-Iraqi relations.

However, when the Kuwaiti immigrants first arrived, their relative prosperity exacerbated existing social cleavages between the rich and poor in Jordan. The returning ‘Afghans’ were disillusioned at the sight of these Palestinians and wondered whether this was why they had been fighting a holy war.7. They also faced a generally high unemployment rate in Jordan. They were disappointed by the result of the 1991 Gulf War and the normalization of ties between Jordan and Israel. Many faced problems integrating into Jordanian society, went to Europe, and became part of the European Muslim diaspora. Others went underground to organize themselves for the struggle against the ‘apostate’ Hashemite regime. The immigrants from Kuwait also included Salafi-Jihadist preachers such as Issam Muhammad Taher al-Barqawi, better known as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a key Salafi figure who would later become the religious mentor of Zarqawi. Maqdisi was primarily responsible for spawning the violent Salafi-Jihadist stream, which grew out of rejecting the traditional, nonviolent Salafism associated with al-Albani.8 Once Maqdisi settled in Jordan in 1992, he traveled to preach. With his protégé Zarqawi, he formed a group called Al-Tawhid (Unity of God) in 1993, which later became Bayat al-Imam. The group aimed to mobilize the Jordanian returnees from Afghanistan.9 After forming Bayat al-Imam and as a response to it, Maqdisi and Zarqawi were arrested. They moved around several prisons, eventually ending up at Suwaqa prison south of Amman. Maqdisi became the emir of the imprisoned jihadists and published several books while behind bars. Zarqawi, meanwhile, deepened his religious education and increased the number of his followers. Many would die years later under his command in Fallujah and other places in Iraq.10

In 1997, Zarqawi and Maqdisi were transferred to a prison in Salt and established an informal recruitment network using mostly petty criminals who went in and out of prison. Zarqawi and Maqdisi were eventually moved to another prison and released in 1999 as part of a general amnesty declared by the newly crowned King Abdullah. Zarqawi left Jordan, first to Pakistan and later to Afghanistan. After his departure, and especially after 2004, Maqdisi began to criticize Zarqawi, warning him not to use violence as an end in itself.11 As in other parts of the world, religion is resurgent in Jordan.

Fuad Husayn points out that whereas 30 years ago, people in mosques were mostly in their 50s, today’s mosque-goers are very young. “Religion resonates with young people these days,” the Zarqawi biographer adds.12  Many have turned to violence. There are 180 Salafi-Jihadists in Jordan, most of them in Jwaideh prison. The prisons have proven to be a hotbed of Islamist extremism. In the last year, several riots have revealed the remarkable organizational power of the Salafi-Jihadist movement in Jordan. In April 2006, rioting broke out in Qafqafa prison, about an hour north of Amman. A month earlier, a riot erupted first at Jweideh prison and spread to Swaqa and Qafqafa prisons in what was a well-organized mutiny in which inmates in the three prisons coordinated their actions through a sophisticated system that included cell phones, internet communications, and messages passed along to visiting relatives.13 The prison riots, which Jordanian analysts say have been staged by Jayousi, coincided with a mutiny in an Afghan prison, suggesting transnational links among the Salafi-Jihadists. Prisons used to be a main recruiting ground. Still, now Jordanians keep the prisoners in one larger cell, as a result of which recruiting and inspiring others has become more complex.14

Which factors led to the Amman bombings, and what motivated the bombers and other Jordanians who have opted to martyr themselves for the sake of Islam? Concerning the suicide attackers of Amman, little information is available. From what is known, it appears that Sajida al-Rishawi, the failed woman bomber, acted out of revenge, given that four of her family members have died fighting U.S. troops in Iraq. Reciting Quranic verses before her failed bombing does not necessarily prove that she was very religious. The citing of farewell videos, including the reading of Quranic verses (see more here) is a common procedure for suicide attackers to use for propaganda purposes and to commit the bomber to carry out his act psychologically. From this point, the martyr reaches what Ariel Merari has called a “point of no return,” when the volunteer for martyrdom becomes a “living martyr.”15 Given the dearth of biographical information about the Amman bombers, we can learn more about the individual motivations of Jordanian suicide bombers from the biographies of six Jordanian jihadists who traveled to Iraq mentioned above. The backgrounds of these martyrs should disabuse us of the commonly held belief that suicide bombers have a single profile, that of a young, single, unemployed, and religious individual. Abu Hammam, the first martyr, was married with a daughter and worked at a factory. Anas Jamal al-Ashkar was an electronics student, and Safwan al-Abadi was a lawyer. The martyrs did not necessarily come from a religious background. Safwan was not religious but turned increasingly so following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, while Abu al-Waleed was a Christian convert. Another striking characteristic is that several of the six Jordanians described in the document tried to join the Jihad elsewhere before ending up in Iraq. Abu Yihye tried to join jihadist groups in Chechnya, and Safwan al-Abadi desperately tried to fight in Afghanistan and Chechnya but failed to reach these countries. Hence, we can assume that although Iraq is likely to have intensified Muslim notions of victimization and the subsequent decision to join the jihad, jihadists regard their program as a global initiative. As the biographies suggest, many young Muslims are not only enticed to join the jihad when they perceive aggression toward Muslims but also when they sense success. Raed Mansoor al-Bana, for example, is said to have been influenced to join the jihad after the 9/11 bombings, which he may have sensed as a moment of empowerment for Muslims. Five of the six martyrs mentioned expressed an interest in volunteering for suicide operations when they reached Iraq, which, together with the desperate attempt of some of them to fight the jihad wherever they could, suggests that these Jordanian martyrs, and possibly a large part of today’s globalized jihadists, are intensely committed to sacrificing their own lives for their cause. At the group level, the reason for the Salafi-Jihadists’ attacks against Jordan, the particular target selection, and the choice of modus operandi can be more easily grasped. The Salafi-Jihadist movement has long focused on Jordan, and some of the leading contemporary exponents of Salafi-Jihadism were Jordanians, including Abdullah Azzam, Maqdisi, and Zarqawi. Stephen Ulph suggests that another reason for Al Qaeda in Iraq’s selection of Jordan as a target can be found partly in the rising pressure of U.S. forces on insurgents active in Iraq’s Anbar province.16 From a practical point of view, Zarqawi openly admits to employing suicide operations for their obvious tactical benefits “in order to hit the targets with accuracy and cause the maximal number of deaths.”17 Clearly, suicide attacks are also used for their ability to cause economic harm to Jordan, and indeed, many Jordanians believe that one or two additional attacks, like the November 2005 bombings, will cause economic harm on a catastrophic scale to Jordan.18  Fuad Husayn believes that SAs may also be a way for Zarqawi to examine the extent of commitment of a volunteer for jihad, and identify possible infiltrators into his organization. Those who come to Zarqawi and ask to contribute to jihad may be asked to give their life in a martyrdom operation. Those who disagree may be regarded as spies.19

The attacks in Jordan are also consistent with the ideology of Al Qaeda, including that of its Iraq branch, and with Salafi Jihadism in general. There are several recurrent themes in statements attributed to Zarqawi and Al Qaeda in Iraq. First and foremost is the notion that Islam is attacked by a Crusader Zionist coalition that enjoys support from Jordan and other ‘apostate regimes.’ Real Muslims, the ‘defenders of the faith,’ must defend Islam and help reverse the ongoing humiliation of its men, the pillaging of its cities, and the raping of its women. Indeed, communiqués issued by Al Qaeda in Iraq are replete with calls to uphold the honor of Muslim men and women. The overthrow of Jordan and other ‘apostate regimes’ is at the top of the Salafi-Jihadists’ agenda because the ongoing control of Muslims by Western countries and Western institutions such as the UN, the World Bank, and NATO is perceived to be possible only thanks to the collaboration of these ‘treacherous’ regimes who have sold out to the United States and Israel. In light of the above, Al Qaeda in Iraq staged the SAs in Amman partly for strategic signaling to several audiences. Terrorist groups intend to create a state of extreme fear in the larger population, which is intended to signal to the various audiences of terrorism that the group’s threats are credible and that it is determined to use any means to achieve its goal. By creating fear and horror among its target audience, terrorist groups also display the potential for future violence. By raising the specter of additional attacks, terrorist groups hope to intimidate the targeted state to cave into the terrorists’ demands and to influence the larger population to exert additional pressure on its government to seek ways to address the terrorist group’s grievances. In the case of the Amman bombings, the attacks had multiple audiences. To its own audience, fellow Salafi-Jihadists and Muslims that it hopes to recruit to the cause, the attacks were meant to signal the empowerment of the group and help convince Muslims who are indifferent about the group to join the battle on the winning side.

To the West, the attacks were intended to convey that ‘true Muslims’ cannot be placated and will fight to the death to achieve their notion of justice. The attacks also sent a message to Jordanians and other Arab countries to refrain from collaborating with the United States and Israel, lest they pay a high price. Finally, the attacks were meant to warn Israel that the circle around it is closing and that soon, the ‘Zionist entity’ itself will be targeted. From an environmental point of view, the attacks and the emergence of Jordanian martyrs, in general, must also be seen in the context of the socio-economic hardships in Jordan and Iraq. In interviews this author conducted in Jordan in June 2006, every interviewee cited the socio-economic difficulties as a factor, though not necessarily the dominant one, in the pull of Salafi-Jihadism. Of perhaps even greater importance is the frontal clash between tradition on the one hand and modernity on the other. Zarqawi’s denouncement of “fornication and debauchery” in Jordan reflects this tension. It embodies a call to adhere to more traditional values, such as modesty and submission to God, and a patriarchal social and family structure in which the roles of man and woman, husband and wife, and father and children are clearly defined. The suicide attacks in Jordan in November 2005, carried out by Iraqis and the Jordanian martyrs who volunteered for Jihad in Iraq, exemplify the transnational movement typical of today’s globalization of martyrdom. In the past, the Hashemite Kingdom’s internal stability was challenged mostly by domestic elements. The “Iraqi nightmare,” however, as one Jordanian official termed it,20  led to a change in the constitution of the threat to Jordan, and non-Jordanians are just as likely to strike the regime of King Abdullah, and perhaps more so, than Jordanians themselves. Indeed, part of the reason why Jordanians are not believed to be involved in the Amman attacks is due to the tight grip that Jordan’s feared General Intelligence Directorate (GID) has on home-grown Jordanian Islamists and Salafi-Jihadists. Yet, the export of the jihad from Iraq to Jordan embodies more than merely operational expediency. Global jihad is, by definition, transnational, and the movement of jihadists goes in both directions. Fuad Husayn, for example, believes that as of June 2006, some 300 Jordanian fighters cross the border to Iraq each month.21 It appears that the bulk of the Jordanian jihadis would be willing to sacrifice themselves for what they call a martyrdom operation. It increasingly appears that the distinction between a suicide bomber and a jihadist has become blurred. Martyrdom operations appear today's preferred tactic for most individuals seeking to join the jihad.

 

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