By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

The Kashmir Pahalgam Attack

 

Police in Indian-administered Kashmir say they identified three suspects, two of whom are Pakistani, in Tuesday’s Pahalgam Attack that killed 26 people. India has summoned Pakistan’s top diplomat in New Delhi as ties between the two countries continue to suffer.

One of the main attackers in the Pahalgam incident, a Pakistani national named Hashim Musa, also known as Suleiman, had been active in Jammu and Kashmir for the past year and was likely involved in at least three attacks on security forces and non-locals, Hindustan Times reported, citing officials.

Musa is believed to be hiding in the higher reaches of the Pir Panjal range with four other terrorists who carried out the attack on tourists at Baisaran meadow on Tuesday, officials said.

The Jammu and Kashmir Police identified the four terrorists as Ali Bhai, alias Talha (Pakistani), Asif Fauji (Pakistani), Adil Hussain Thoker (from Anantnag), and Ahsan (from Pulwama). Police also released sketches of the suspects based on descriptions provided by the survivors of the attack.

 

What has India's response been?

On Wednesday, April 23, India announced a raft of retaliatory measures against its neighbour, Pakistan. Here's a quick recap:

It has suspended its six-decade-long water treaty with Pakistan - the Indus Water Treaty - which allowed for the sharing of water between the two countries. India has also shut a key border with Pakistan, which allowed for movement between the countries.

This will impact not just the movement of people, but also goods, since it's an important land transit point.

Delhi has also cancelled a visa exemption scheme for Pakistani nationals. Visas that were previously issued under this scheme have also been deemed cancelled and Pakistani nationals who are currently in India under this scheme are required to leave the country within 48 hours. Pakistani military advisers in the country's high commission in India have been declared 'persona non grata' and they have been asked to leave the country within one week.

India will also withdraw its military advisers from its high commission in Pakistan. And lastly, India will also reduce its staff in its high commission in Pakistan and bring down the number of Pakistani diplomats in the Pakistan High Commission in India to 30 from 55 from 1 May. Pakistani officials, who have denied the country's role in the attack, are meeting on Thursday to come up with a response.

Delhi has also cancelled a visa exemption scheme for Pakistani nationals. Visas that were previously issued under this scheme have also been deemed cancelled and Pakistani nationals who are currently in India under this scheme are required to leave the country within 48 hours.

Pakistani military advisers in the country's high commission in India have been declared 'persona non grata' and have been asked to leave the country within one week. India will also withdraw its military advisers from its high commission in Pakistan.

And lastly, India will also reduce its staff in its high commission in Pakistan and bring down the number of Pakistani diplomats in the Pakistan High Commission in India to 30 from 55, from 1 May. Pakistani officials, who have denied the country's role in the attack, are meeting on Thursday to come up with a response.

Kashmiri boatmen hold placards during a protest following an attack on Indian tourists

The attack in Pahalgam was one of the deadliest in recent memory for the restive region, and is threatening to aggravate already icy bilateral ties.

Pahalgam shuts down

M Narendra Modi has said India will punish "every terrorist and their backers" following an attack that killed 26 people in Indian-administered Kashmir. The country has closed its main border crossing with Pakistan, expelled its military diplomats and suspended a landmark water-sharing treaty, Pakistan has denied involvement in the attack.

Kashmiri traders hold a candlelight vigil to denounce the attack on tourists in Pahalgam, on April 23, 2025 in Srinagar, India

The Indian government has responded furiously to the attack and has signaled it holds Pakistan indirectly responsible. India has long accused successive governments in Islamabad of supporting armed groups in the region, which Pakistan strongly denies. "Those behind this heinous act will be brought to justice," Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in a post on X. "Our resolve to fight terrorism is unshakable, and it will get even stronger."

India also said it would suspend the Indus Water Treaty, a treaty that has been in place since 1960 and survived decades of hostile diplomacy. The treaty gives India control over the eastern rivers, and Pakistan the western ones, of the Indus River and its tributaries. The agreement stipulates that India must, with few exceptions, allow water from the western rivers to flow downstream into Pakistan.

Indian security agencies believe a group called the Kashmir Resistance was behind the attack, though BBC News has not independently verified that.

A manhunt for the gunmen responsible was continuing on Wednesday evening.

Pakistan's government said its National Security Council, the country's highest military and security body, would meet on Thursday. In the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack, the Pakistani foreign ministry said it was "concerned at the loss of tourists' lives" and expressed condolences.

Under the measures announced by India on Wednesday, Pakistani military advisers based at the Delhi embassy were told to leave immediately, and more diplomatic expulsions are planned for next week, a statement said.

The Pahalgam attack risks reigniting long-running tensions between the nuclear-armed rivals.

Earlier, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh also signaled India's response would go beyond targeting the perpetrators. He said: "We will not only reach those who have perpetrated this incident but also those who, sitting behind the scenes, have conspired to commit such acts on the soil of India."

The attack has been widely condemned by international leaders and has generated outrage and mourning in India. Eyewitnesses have described chaotic and bloody scenes as holidaymakers, including entire families, fled for their lives. India and Pakistan both claim Kashmir in full but control it only in parts. Since India's partition and the creation of Pakistan in 1947, the nuclear-armed neighbors have fought wars over the territory.

Tourists wait near check-in desks at the airport in Budgam district, as they try to leave following an attack in Baisaran near south Kashmir’s Pahalgam, on April 24, 2025

 

The Larger Context

At the All-Kashmir People's Convention in 1968, a more understanding Sheikh Abdullah admitted that "it was fear and suspicions of one region regarding the other which prompted Jammu to opt for merger with India against Kashmiris wanting to join Pakistan" and assured that their regional interests would be safeguarded.1

The winter of 1989-90 marked the onset of the Kashmiri insurgency, while the Ladakhi Buddhists began their violent agitation for status as a union territory in August 1989. The next few years witnessed a growing communalization of the political idiom, strategies, and goals of various political movements in the state.

The Congress Party, under Kushak Bakula, had been agitating for the restoration of a direct central administration in Ladakh. This was first introduced in the NEFA after the Chinese aggression in 1962. 

Under this system, Ladakh was manned by the Indian Frontier Administrative Personnel. The deputy commissioner-cum-development commissioner of the district and the assistant commissioners of Kargil, Nubra, and Nyoma were also drawn from the same service cadres.2

In the 1967 Legislative Assembly elections, the Congress nominated Kushak Bakula's nominee Sonam Wangyal for the Leh seat, but unofficially, his opponent Kushak Thiksey enjoyed the patronage of the state government. 

With a large group of Buddhists, the Jammu and Kashmir Secretariat had only one Buddhist employee, and there was no Buddhist among the 18,000 employees of nine corporate sector units.3

Annoyed by some communal incidents in 1969 and fearful of being relegated to a minority within Ladakh, the Buddhist Action Committee decided to demand the status of a Scheduled Tribe. It also asked that Tibetan refugees be settled in Ladakh, the Bodhi language be made a compulsory subject up to high school, and that Ladakh's political representative be a full-fledged cabinet minister. 

Apart from the induction of Sonam Wangyal in the cabinet, most of these demands were rejected by the state government on account of strong opposition from the Muslim Action Committee, which feared that such changes would upset the ethnic balance in the region. 

As a result, the Muslims of Kargil, who were predominantly Shia, began to see their interests inextricably linked to those of Kashmir, even though the vast majority of its Muslims were Sunnis. Sheikh Abdullah's decision to divide Ladakh into two districts in 1979- Leh and Kargil- created yet another communal fault line in Ladakh, between its Buddhist and Muslim identities. This became much more pronounced during the agitation in 1989.

The trouble began with a minor scuffle between a Buddhist and some Muslim youth in Leh market in July 1989, which then snowballed into a violent separatist struggle by the Ladakh Buddhist Association. 

Its members demanded that Ladakh be given separate constitutional status as a union territory, accusing the "Kashmiri Sunni Muslims" of inciting the local Argon Muslims, who were decidedly in the minority, to "dictate terms" to the Buddhist majority and thereby dominate both the administration and economy. 

Buddhists also complained that the rich Bodhi language was being suppressed in favor of Urdu, now being imposed on Ladakhi children. 

Buddhist agitators called for a boycott of the Kashmiri Muslims. Valley traders soon vanished from the Leh market, and their hotels and restaurants were shut down. The machinery of government became paralyzed as Kashmiri officials fled the areas of Leh, Khalsi, Nubra, and Zanskar. Denouncing "Kashmir's imperialism" and "hegemonism," LBA activists called on the local population to "free Ladakh from Kashmir." 

The LBA president asserted that "the Kashmiri rulers have been systematically eroding the Buddhists' ethnic and cultural identity for the last forty-two years, and it can be saved only by making Ladakh a union territory." 

The social boycott against Kashmiri Muslims was soon extended to the local Muslims, rupturing the centuries-old bonds of amity. For the next three years, the Buddhists avoided Muslim-populated areas and did not enter hotels, restaurants, or shops run by Muslims. 

Farmers were prohibited from exchanging tools. No interreligious marriages were allowed, and meetings among relatives of different faiths were stopped.4

Throughout Kashmir's history, the world's great powers-most notably the United States, the former Soviet Union, and China-have accorded the state a place in their strategic agendas only insofar as it served their global interests or concerned their respective regional partners.  

The complex character of the Kashmir conflict does not make it amenable to an externally driven peace process.

With the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Kashmir became entangled in a dispute arising in part from two mutually exclusive ideologies. 

Pakistan has remained suspended between the ambiguity of the call for a Muslim homeland by its founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and the varying expectations of the majority of the religious establishment and populace for an Islamic state.

The continuing debate between modernist and orthodox interpretations of Islam within Pakistan mirrors this dilemma. 

Jihadi groups such as Lashkar-e- Taiba place yet another interpretation on Islam, emphasizing the integration of tabligh (education) and jihad (holy war) needed to acquire the military skill essential for wielding political power.  2001-02, Pakistan was home to fifty-eight religious political parties; and twenty-four armed religious militias.5

The Kargil war of 1999, however, was the one military confrontation in a nuclearized South Asia.  

In 1949, thousands still crossed the borders of East Pakistan and West Bengal as poverty and communal tension drove people to seek security with their co-religionists. In the West, fighting with Pakistan over the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir had reached a deadlock. Pakistani fighters had clawed their way to unofficial rule over half of the state, which they called Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir), but they could make no further headway. Neither country was prepared to give way, even though internal food and financial crises meant that neither could afford the burden of war.

The winter of 1989-90 marked the onset of the Kashmiri insurgency, while the Ladakhi Buddhists began their violent agitation for status as a union territory in August 1989. 

The Congress Party, under Kushak Bakula, had been agitating for the restoration of a direct central administration in Ladakh. This was first introduced in the NEFA after the Chinese aggression in 1962. Under this system, Ladakh was manned by the Indian Frontier Administrative Personnel. The deputy commissioner-cum-development commissioner of the district and the assistant commissioners of Kargil, Nubra, and Nyoma were also drawn from the same service cadres.1 

In the 1967 Legislative Assembly elections, the Congress nominated Kushak Bakula's nominee Sonam Wangyal for the Leh seat, but unofficially, his opponent Kushak Thiksey enjoyed the patronage of the state government. 

The relations between Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq and Kushak Bakula were further embittered when Sonam Norbu, till then Ladakh's deputy commissioner, was nominated to the legislative council as a prelude to his inclusion in the state cabinet. Bakula's supporters perceived it as an attempt to divide the Ladakhi Buddhists by ignoring the claims of the elected representative.

Although 84 percent of the population of Leh district is Buddhist, Bodhi teachers were provided in only 32 of the 252 government schools. Despite specific recommendations of the Gajendragadkar Commission, the state government had not set up a degree college for the two Lakh inhabitants of the region. The Jammu and Kashmir Secretariat had only one Buddhist employee, and there was no Buddhist among the 18,000 employees of nine corporate sector units.2

Annoyed by some communal incidents in 1969 and fearful of being relegated to a minority within Ladakh, the Buddhist Action Committee decided to demand the status of a Scheduled Tribe.

It also asked that Tibetan refugees be settled in Ladakh, the Bodhi language be made a compulsory subject up to high school, and that Ladakh's political representative be a full-fledged cabinet minister. Apart from the induction of Sonam Wangyal in the cabinet, most of these demands were rejected by the state government on account of strong opposition from the Muslim Action Committee, which feared that such changes would upset the ethnic balance in the region. 

As a result, the Muslims of Kargil, who were predominantly Shia, began to see their interests inextricably linked to those of Kashmir, even though the vast majority of its Muslims were Sunnis. Sheikh Abdullah's decision to divide Ladakh into two districts in 1979, Leh and Kargil, created yet another communal fault line in Ladakh between its Buddhist and Muslim identities. This became much more pronounced during the agitation in 1989.

The trouble began with a minor scuffle between a Buddhist and some Muslim youth in Leh market in July 1989, which then snowballed into a violent separatist struggle by the Ladakh Buddhist Association. Its members demanded that Ladakh be given separate constitutional status as a union territory, accusing the "Kashmiri Sunni Muslims" of inciting the local Argon Muslims, who were decidedly in the minority, to "dictate terms" to the Buddhist majority and thereby dominate both the administration and economy. Buddhists also complained that the rich Bodhi language was being suppressed in favor of Urdu, now being imposed on Ladakhi children.

 Ladakhis leveled an assortment of other complaints against the Kashmiri Muslims and the Kashmiri-dominated bureaucracy: they were accused of halting development contracts for the construction of buildings, roads, and bridges; of orchestrating the gross underrepresentation of Buddhists in the state services (of the state's 2,900 government employees, only 2 were Ladakhis); and of adopting unrealistic norms for the allocation of plan funds to Ladakh. 

Between 1987 and 1989, for instance, the state government had received more than Rs 100 crore from the prime minister's Special Assistance Fund, but Leh got only Rs 211akh. Under the J awahar Rozgar Yojna, the Valley was given Rs 7.2 crore, while Leh was given only Rs 20 lakh. Rs 25 crore was spent under the World Bank-aided Social Forestry Schemes, but Leh district was ignored. It had no share in the funds disbursed by the Central Land Development Bank and the Khadi and Village Industries Corporation in the state. 

For tourism development schemes in 1990, the sum of Rs 59lakh was earmarked for the Valley, whereas Leh was given only Rs 7lakh, and the neighboring Kargil district Rs 17 lakh.2

More significantly, the systematic dismantling of important forums for Ladakh development (such as the Ladakh Affairs Department), the absence of Ladakhi representatives in Farooq Abdullah's coalition government, and the fact that Buddhists were given only one of Ladakh's four seats in the state assembly reinforced their belief that the Valley was still treating Ladakh "as a colony."

The Buddhist agitators called for a boycott of the Kashmiri Muslims. Valley traders soon vanished from the Leh market, and their hotels and restaurants were shut down. The machinery of government became paralyzed as Kashmiri officials fled the areas of Leh, Khalsi, Nubra, and Zanskar. Denouncing "Kashmir's imperialism" and "hegemonism," LBA activists called on the local population to "free Ladakh from Kashmir." The LBA president asserted that "the Kashmiri rulers have been systematically eroding the Buddhists' ethnic and cultural identity for the last forty-two years and it can be saved only by making Ladakh a union territory." The social boycott against Kashmiri Muslims was soon extended to the local Muslims, rupturing the centuries-old bonds of amity. For the next three years, the Buddhists avoided Muslim-populated areas and did not enter hotels, restaurants, or shops run by Muslims. 

Farmers were prohibited from exchanging tools. No interreligious marriages were allowed, and meetings among relatives of different faiths were stopped.2

Throughout Kashmir's history, the world's great powers-most notably the United States, the former Soviet Union, and China-have accorded the state a place in their strategic agendas only insofar as it served their global interests or concerned their respective regional partners. However, none were willing to be dragged into the Kashmir issue by those partners. 

Furthermore, despite Indian and Pakistani expectations, outside support for either side has been limited. All in all, no global power has high enough stakes in the Kashmir conflict or the leverage to arrive at a solution acceptable to all the principal players. More to the point as we have seen in P.1, the complex character of the Kashmir conflict does not make it amenable to an externally driven peace process.

With the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Kashmir became entangled in a dispute arising in part from two mutually exclusive ideologies. At the outset of its long period of turmoil, Kashmir's fate was neither preordained nor decided on ideological grounds. 

Being part of the subcontinent's princely order, the Dogra state of Jammu and Kashmir lay outside the domain of British India, which in 1947 was divided based on the two-nation theory. 

At that point, Kashmir was not yet considered an inalienable part of either Pakistan or India but an important asset from the standpoint of geographical consolidation and the defense needs of the respective dominions. Hence, the battle between India's Congress and the Muslim League over Kashmir's accession was fundamentally political. 

Since independence, the two ideological rationales at the heart of the dispute have not gone unchallenged, both within and outside Kashmir. Pakistan, some argue, has not yet arrived at a clear formulation of its foundations, which are rooted in Islam. That is to say, the meaning, content, and relationship of Islam and the state have never been systematically established. 

Pakistan has remained suspended between the ambiguity of the call for a Muslim homeland by its founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and the varying expectations of the majority of the religious establishment and populace for an Islamic state. The continuing debate between modernist and orthodox interpretations of Islam within Pakistan mirrors this dilemma. From the earliest demands for a separate state and the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Islam has been both a rallying force and a legitimizing ideology that, along with the Taliban, included a wide array of political and religious leaders. 

Modernists reject the notion that a state founded on Islamic principles must operate as a theocracy; rather, they identify Islamic ideals and principles with democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance, and social justice for all, including minorities. Orthodox opinions, most notably those of the Jamaat-i-Islami school of thought, equate the state with Islam and therefore would apply its guiding principles in all matters-legal, constitutional, and political-to the point of establishing Nizam-i-Mustafa (the Rule of Islam) throughout Pakistani society. Jihadi groups such as Lashkar-e- Taiba place yet another interpretation on Islam, emphasizing the integration of tabligh (education) and jihad (holy war) needed to acquire the military skill essential for wielding political power. In 2001-02, Pakistan was home to fifty-eight religious political parties and twenty-four armed religious militias.

The Kargil war of 1999, however, was the one military confrontation in a nuclearized South Asia. Although nuclear weapons were not used, nuclear capability unquestionably permeated the conflict, and there were reports that both India and Pakistan may have alerted or deployed nuclear weapons and delivery systems at the time.

When Pakistan attempted to link its withdrawal from Kargil to negotiations with India on the Kashmir dispute, the Clinton administration clearly alarmed, insisted that Pakistan 's withdrawal be unambiguous and unconditional. In return for Pakistan 's pledge to take "concrete steps ... for the restoration of the Line of Control in accordance with the Simla Agreement," Clinton promised to personally encourage "an expeditious resumption and intensification" of Indo- Pakistani detente, "once the sanctity of the Line of Control has been fully restored." Spokespersons for the Clinton administration took pains to emphasize that its major concern in brokering the agreement was "the immediate crisis," in other words, Kargil, not the Kashmir dispute. The United States also garnered support from Saudi Arabia to nudge Islamabad into swallowing the bitter pill of a unilateral withdrawal. 

During the height of the Kargil dispute, China reportedly rebuffed Pakistan's former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, when he visited Beijing to seek political support in the ongoing conflict.

Elected representatives generally associate the Kashmir conflict with the insurgent movement of the 1990s and think the key to a just and lasting peace is to end the violence, initiate a dialogue with the separatists (including militants), and most important, develop new political and constitutional arrangements to meet popular aspirations for self-governance. People's faith in the electoral process as a legitimate instrument of political change is already on the upswing following the 2002 assembly elections, which ended twenty-seven years of dynastic rule through the ballot box.

The meeting between India 's prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistan 's president General Pervez Musharraf at the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit in Islamabad in January 2004 finally restarted the “peace process” known as the "composite dialogue." With Vajpayee's successor Manmohan Singh carrying it forward.

However elected representatives generally associated the Kashmir conflict with the insurgent movement of the 1990’s and think the key to a just and lasting peace is to end the violence, initiate a dialogue with the separatists (including militants), and most important, develop new political and constitutional arrangements to meet popular aspirations for self-governance. People's faith in the electoral process as a legitimate instrument of political change is already on the upswing following the 2002 assembly elections, which ended twenty-seven years of dynastic rule through the ballot box.

By 2004, political forces in Kashmir as a whole could be roughly divided between traditional political parties such as the National Conference, People's Democratic Party, Congress, BJP, plus several elected representatives, separatist groups, plus minority groups. The National Conference continues as the largest political party. 

In the 2002 State Assembly elections for eighty-seven seats, the National Conference polled 28.18 percent of the vote, while the PDP took 14.64 percent in the seats it contested, and just 9.28 percent statewide. Congress won 24 percent of the votes in the seats it contested and 24.24 percent statewide.

By early 2004, a regional party, the PDP, represented a class of political leadership whose pro-Kashmiri stance was trying to appropriate the Hurriyat's political agenda without the latter's secessionist overtones. Separatist groups, however, believe that Kashmir's final future remains to be decided along the lines of their ideological leanings, political strategies, and goals, but they have become a divided lot. 

The largest political body representing the separatist agenda and thus an important player during 2005 was the Hurriyat Conference, but it is sharply divided between moderate and hard-line factions. 

Soon after Hurriyat's first public foray across the Line of Control in 2005, Azad Kashmir's prime minister, Sardar Sikander Hayat Khan, questioned its credentials: "How can we accept any decision (on Kashmir) by those who live under compulsions, do not have unity among themselves and are not representatives of all regions?"

The lesson has yet to sink in that if "sole-representative" status is bestowed from above, it can also be taken away by its patrons.

On the Indian side, too, Hurriyat had hoped the central government would acknowledge it as the representative of a de facto nation, something that no political authority in New Delhi is likely to concede. Hurriyat exercises no leverage over militants, either, as is evident from the United Jihad Council's public refusal to even meet Hurriyat leaders during their visit to Azad Kashmir and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen's outright dismissal of a Hurriyat plea to stop the violence and give peace a chance.

The Mirwaiz-led centrist faction of the Hurriyat was being coaxed into supporting Musharraf's proposal for an autonomous Kashmir, although the idea of self-governance or self-rule is far from a new one in the Valley's context. Much older and traditional players, such as the National Conference, which have championed this cause since 1947, are clearly better equipped with the political skills needed to fight this battle. If Hurriyat were to abandon its separatist agenda, it would not only run the risk of being eclipsed as a political force but might also invite the wrath of Kashmiris for having misled a generation of young men and women and for sacrificing thousands of lives.

Finally, there are the jihadi forces, with the strength of more than one hundred organizations in Azad Kashmir. They are not much different in their character, goals, and strategies from the jihadi groups based in Pakistan.In the Northern Areas, political forces are broadly organized in two clusters.

The first contains sectarian Sunni and Shia organizations, which are politically very active with a substantial support base, though confined to their respective communities. 

While many sectarian organizations have been banned in the post-9/11 period, their political dynamics in the Northern Areas are very different from those in the rest of Pakistan. First, the entire spectrum of political issues ranging from school curricula to fundamental rights, representation, and the constitutional and legal status of the region, is framed and debated along the Shia-Sunni divide. 

In 2004-05, the controversy over the Islamiat curriculum in schools was explained as the administration's attempt to divert attention from the issue of representation. In the absence of traditional political parties, which were not allowed to operate there before 1994, the majority Shia community in fact do not have access to any well-established, alternative political platforms to voice its grievances. 

Because Islamabad was afraid that the local demand for a separate province-a Shia-majority province-is gaining ground, it is unlikely to reverse its policy of encouraging a Sunni influx to change the area's demographic character or seriously crack down on the Sunni sectarian organizations, which the administration relies on to undercut the Shias as well as to keep the population divided.

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, by early 2006, was the only militant group with a substantial Kashmiri cadre, since its chief led an unprecedented hunger strike in Muzaffarabad in protest against the Musharraf regime. Its dilemma, however, is twofold. First, it clings to Pakistan's old political line, being the only player to insist that New Delhi formally recognize that all of Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory, yet seeks the status of the principal interlocutor, which only India can concede (though precisely for that reason is not likely to do so).

Second, like Hurriyat, the Hizbul expects to be rewarded, although it has little to offer in terms of ending the violence because in the past decade it has been marginalized by none other than its patron-the Pakistani establishment-in favor of Lashk-e- Taiba and Jaish-i-Mohammed, which have been at the forefront of the Kashmiri jihad. The field commanders of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen also feel that ‘the wages of war are greater than any payouts that may come with peace;' albeit for different reasons, which make jihad a lucrative proposition. Such entrenched vested interests in continued violence need to be taken into account in any initiative that seeks to bring Hizbul, especially its Valley-based leadership (of both factions), into the peace process.

Plus there are also the political leaders of the minority communities-the Kashmiri Pandits, Ladakhi Buddhists, Shia Muslims (of Kargil), Gujjars, Paharis, and Dogras- and other popular representatives of both parts of Jammu and Kashmir who have usually not directly, been involved in bilateral negotiations mainly because it is assumed that only two seats are available at a single negotiation table, one for New Delhi and one for Islamabad.

Just before his first visit to the Valley, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced a reduction in troop levels in the state. An army battalion numbering 3,000 soldiers was de inducted from the Khannabal area of Anantnag district in south Kashmir, followed by another battalion in the Sunderbani area of Rajouri district and 1,200 soldiers from Uri in Baramulla district. In February 2006, India 's defense minister Pranab Mukherjee announced the redeployment of another brigade-sized formation of 5,000 troops to the northeast.

In February 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh next was the first to hold a roundtable conference in Kashmir in February 2006, which had the potential to recast the long-established hierarchies of power, spreading some of it to religious, ethnic, and linguistic groups as well as regions in Jammu and Kashmir. 

Here the Gujjar and Bakkarwal leaders, for example, expressed their hope to see that the special needs of their communities are met, for example, through traveling panchayat systems that move with their livestock across mountains, more funding for schools and colleges, and efforts to overcome backwardness in their communities. Around that time also President Musharraf presented a new focus on "maximum self-governance," a departure from Pakistan's traditional demand and closer to the Indian offering of Jammu and Kashmir maximum political autonomy. 

A terrorist strike in Mumbai in July 2006 led the Manmohan Singh government to suspend the peace process.

As for Pakistan and Kashmir, both mainstream political parties-the Benazir Bhutto-led PPP and the Nawaz Sharif-led Muslim League (PML-N) were keeping aloof. This raises serious questions about how far General Musharraf can sell a Kashmir settlement to the domestic constituencies in Pakistan. Though dissenting voices underlining the costs of Pakistan 's Kashmir policy are, for the first time, being heard in the public discourse, whether they or General Musharraf will succeed in bringing about a paradigm shift remains open to question.

The deep pluralities of Kashmir society and the diverse nature of political demands-ranging from affirmative discrimination to more autonomy to a separate constitutional status within the Indian or Pakistani states or a sovereign independent state-preclude the possibility that a "single spokesperson" will do any more. 

Later exchanges occurred between the Indian government and representatives of Jammu, the Valley, and Ladakh; between various representatives of Jammu, the Valley, and Ladakh themselves; between Indian and Pakistani parts of Kashmir across the LOC; between representatives of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and the Northern Areas; and between the Pakistani government and representatives of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and the Northern Areas.

 

1. See Karan Singh, Autobiography, Oxford University Press, 1994.

2. Hindustan Times, May 15, 1992, and April 20, 1995.

3. See Martijn Van Beek, "Dangerous Liaisons: Hindu Nationalism and Buddhist Radicalism in Ladakh:' in Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia, edited by Satu P. Kimaye, Robert G. Wirsing, and Mohan Malik (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004, pp. 193-218.

Although nuclear weapons were not used, nuclear capability unquestionably permeated the conflict, and there were reports that both India and Pakistan may have alerted or deployed nuclear weapons and delivery systems at the time.6 al from Kargil to negotiations with India on the Kashmir dispute, the Clinton administration was alarmed, and insisted that Pakistan's withdrawal be unambiguous and unconditional. In return for Pakistan's pledge to take "concrete steps ... for the restoration of the Line of Control by the Simla Agreement," Clinton promised to personally encourage "an expeditious resumption and intensification" of Indo-Pakistani detente, "once the sanctity of the Line of Control has been fully restored." Spokespersons for the Clinton administration took pains to emphasize that its major concern in brokering the agreement was "the immediate crisis," in other words, Kargil, not the Kashmir dispute. The United States also garnered support from Saudi Arabia to nudge Islamabad into swallowing the bitter pill of a unilateral withdrawal. During the height of the Kargil dispute, China reportedly rebuffed Pakistan's former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, when he visited Beijing to seek political support in the ongoing conflict.7 

Elected representatives generally associate the Kashmir conflict with the insurgent movement of the 1990s and think the key to a just and lasting peace is to end the violence, initiate a dialogue with the separatists (including militants), and most important, develop new political and constitutional arrangements to meet popular aspirations for self-governance. People's faith in the electoral process as a legitimate instrument of political change is already on the upswing following the 2002 assembly elections, which ended twenty-seven years of dynastic rule through the ballot box.

The meeting between India 's prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistan 's president General Pervez Musharraf at the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit in Islamabad in January 2004 finally restarted the “peace process” known as the "composite dialogue." With Vajpayee's successor Manmohan Singh carrying it forward.

However elected representatives generally associated the Kashmir conflict with the insurgent movement of the 1990’s and think the key to a just and lasting peace is to end the violence, initiate a dialogue with the separatists (including militants), and most important, develop new political and constitutional arrangements to meet popular aspirations for self-governance. People's faith in the electoral process as a legitimate instrument of political change is already on the upswing following the 2002 assembly elections, which ended twenty-seven years of dynastic rule through the ballot box.

By 2004, political forces in Kashmir as a whole; could be roughly divided between traditional political parties such as the National Conference, People's Democratic Party (PIW), Congress, BJP, plus a number of elected representatives, separatist groups, plus minority groups. With the National Conference continues as the largest political party. In the 2002 State Assembly elections for eighty-seven seats, the National Conference polled 28.18 percent of the vote, while the PDP took 14.64 percent in the seats it contested, and just 9.28 percent statewide. Congress won 24.24 percent of the votes in the seats it contested and 24.24 percent statewide.8

By early 2004, a regional party, the PDP, represented a class of political leadership whose pro-Kashmiri stance was trying to appropriate the Hurriyat's political agenda without the latter's secessionist overtones. Separatist groups however believe that Kashmir's final future remains to be decided along the lines of their ideological leanings, political strategies, and goals, but they have become a divided lot. The largest political body representing the separatist agenda and thus an important player during 2005 was the Hurriyat Conference, but it is sharply divided between moderate and hardline factions. Growing differences with other centrist leaders, such as Yasin Malik, have also depleted its already limited political capital.9 

Finally, there are the jihadi forces, with the strength of more than one hundred organizations in Azad Kashmir. They are not much different in their character, goals, and strategies from the jihadi groups based in Pakistan. In the Northern Areas, political forces are broadly organized in two clusters.

The first contains sectarian Sunni and Shia organizations, which are politically very active with a substantial support base, though confined to their respective communities. While many sectarian organizations have been banned in the post-9/11 period, their political dynamics in the Northern Areas are very different from those in the rest of Pakistan. The entire spectrum of political issues, ranging from school curricula to fundamental rights, representation, and the constitutional and legal status of the region, where framed and debated along the Shia-Sunni divide.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Pakistan army chief Asim Munir [File: AP Photo]

 

In conclusion, what the situation today concerns:

Pakistan has announced a host of countermeasures against India, including the closure of its airspace, as tensions escalate following the above-mentioned Pahalgam attack that killed 26 people.

Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif claimed – without providing any evidence – that the attack was “orchestrated” and rejected India’s claims that Pakistan was involved.

Pakistani officials say any Indian attempt to divert water from the Indus River will be considered “an act of war” after New Delhi announced its withdrawal from a decades-old water allocation pact with Islamabad.

India’s Prime Minister Modi pledged to hunt the Pahalgam gunmen to the “ends of the earth”.

Police in Indian-administered Kashmir claim to have identified three suspects, two of whom are Pakistani nationals, in the attack.

The United Nations urged India and Pakistan on Friday to “exercise maximum restraint” as relations between the two nuclear-armed rivals rapidly deteriorate. “Any issues between Pakistan and India, we believe, can be and should be resolved peacefully through meaningful mutual engagement,” U.N. spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric said. The warning came after Indian and Pakistani soldiers reportedly briefly exchanged fire across their heavily patrolled and contested border in the Kashmir region late Thursday.

Historically fraught tensions between the two countries flared on Tuesday, when militants killed 26 people near the Kashmiri resort town of Pahalgam in the worst terrorist attack on civilians in the India-administered territory in decades. India accused Pakistan of backing militants like the ones thought to be responsible for the attack, but Islamabad has denied involvement.

In response to Tuesday’s attack, India closed Attari-Wagah, its main land border crossing with Pakistan; revoked visas issued to Pakistani nationals, to go into effect on Sunday; and suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, a crucial water-sharing agreement with Pakistan. The treaty was signed in 1960 and has withstood two wars between the countries. Some experts say that if India decides to restrict the flow of water, it could lead to severe water shortages for Pakistan, particularly during its dry season; the country is already struggling with drought and low rainfall. However, many experts say such fears are overblown and that India cannot hold back such a massive volume of water. There is also concern that New Delhi could release surplus water from some rivers without notifying Islamabad, potentially causing floods.

Pakistan warned on Thursday May 24, that any attempt by India to stop or divert the flow of water under the Indus Waters Treaty would be considered an “act of war,” also threatening to suspend the 1972 Simla Agreement, a peace treaty that established the de facto Line of Control that divides Kashmir between the two countries; India, under the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, established direct control over its portion of the majority-Muslim territory in 2019, effectively ending the region’s semi-autonomous status.

On Thursday, Pakistan also canceled special visas issued to Indian nationals, closed its airspace to all Indian-owned or operated airlines, reduced New Delhi’s diplomatic staff in Islamabad, and suspended all trade with India through third parties.

Kashmir has long been a flash point in India-Pakistan relations, but a recent uptick in extremist violence could point to a “sense of hopelessness” among the region’s population, FP columnist Sumit Ganguly wrote last November following another attack on civilians.

 

Pakistan Response

Pakistan believes an international investigation is needed into the killing of 26 men at a tourist spot in Indian Kashmir this week and is willing to work with international investigators, the New York Times reported on Friday, quoting Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif.

Asif told the newspaper in an interview that Pakistan was “ready to cooperate” with “any investigation which is conducted by international inspectors.”

India has said there were Pakistani elements to the attack on Tuesday, but Islamabad has denied any involvement. The two countries both claim the mountainous region, but each controls only part of it.

Since the attack, the nuclear-armed nations have unleashed a raft of measures against each other, with India putting the critical Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance and Pakistan closing its airspace to Indian airlines.

Asif told the newspaper that India had used the aftermath of the militant attack as a pretext to suspend the water treaty and for domestic political purposes.

India was taking steps to punish Pakistan "without any proof, without any investigation," he added.

"We do not want this war to flare up, because flaring up of this war can cause disaster for this region," Asif told the newspaper.

 

1. Times of India, October 25, 1969. 

2. See Karan Singh, Autobiography, Oxford University Press, 1994.

3. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, May 14, 1992.

4. Hindustan Times, May 15, 1992, and April 20, 1995.

See also Martijn Van Beek, "Dangerous Liaisons: Hindu Nationalism and Buddhist Radicalism in Ladakh:' in Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia, edited by Satu P. Kimaye, Robert G. Wirsing, and Mohan Malik.

5. For details see Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective, New Delhi, 1995, and Saeed Shafqat, "From Official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad and Lashkar-e- Taiba," in Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation?, New Delhi, 2002, pp. 143-45).

6. For reports that Pakistan prepared "nuclear-tipped missiles," see Bruce Riedel, American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, Policy Paper Series 2002 (Philadelphia, Pa.: Center for the Advanced Study of India, 2002). For reports that India placed its nuclear arsenal at "Readiness State 3" (ready to be mated with Prithvi and Agni missiles and Mirage 2000 aircraft for delivery), see Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace (New Delhi: Harper Collins India, 2000), p. 437.

7. Raj Chengappa, "Will the War Spread?" India Today International, July 5,1999, p. 14; and John Lancaster, " U.S. Defused Kashmir Crisis on Brink of War," Washington Post, July 26, 1999.

8. Praveen Swami, "The Question of Power" (www.flonet.com!fl2220/stories/20051007004602900.htm)

9. See Hindu, Chennai, June 16, 2005.

 

 

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