By
Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
In The Decline of
Magic: Britain in the Enlightenment (2020) Michael Hunter wrote that change
came about gradually, ‘through a kind of cultural osmosis’, dependent as much
on long-available ideas of classical antiquity as on any apparent breakthroughs
in knowledge. And ads that ‘the Enlightenment did not reject magic for good
reasons but for bad ones’.
In fact, a growing
amount of historical scholarship today argues that magical beliefs and
practices had an important influence on the development of natural philosophy
and that around the beginning of the eighteenth century the educated classes
chose to retain some elements of magical systems while rejecting others.
As Michael
Hunter details magical and occult philosophies had long been central to
how people studied the natural world. Consider the hermetic and cabalistic
influences on John Dee (whereby the Rosicrucian Chymical Wedding featured a prominent image of Dee’s
Hieroglyphic Monad), Paracelsus’s quest for
nature’s hidden secrets, or Isaac Newton’s
alchemical experiments. At the same time, the mechanical systems of
Gassendi and Descartes, which were dependent on the unseen motion of invisible
pieces of matter, presented people in the seventeenth century with occult or
hidden explanations for natural phenomena that functioned much like earlier
systems that had depended on invisible sympathies or magical forces.
Most Europeans
believed that the natural world represented an important means of understanding
God as Creator; some even referred to the physical universe as the Book of
Nature, a metaphorical text that contained crucial knowledge about the divine.
Before the eighteenth century, most people would have found it unthinkable to
separate God Some of these traditions, like hermeticism, were first encountered
by Renaissance scholars trying to recover traces of the “golden age” of ancient
Greece and Rome. Others, like the Judaic tradition of the Kabbalah, had already
existed in Europe for hundreds of years but received closer attention from
Christian writers and philosophers in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as
they searched for new and more powerful ways of
understanding their universe. This means that “scientific” inquiry often
had religious implications.
Physicians and other
medical practitioners commonly resorted to astrology in order to diagnose and
treat their patients, and the fundamental idea of magic, the belief that the
world contains hidden forces and powers that can be harnessed to accomplish specific
tasks, was seen as a powerful tool in the arsenal of some medical
practitioners. One such practitioner was the infamous medical reformer
Paracelsus born Theophrastus von Hohenheim (1493–1541) who, in the
early decades of the sixteenth century, combined a respect for nature’s secrets with a deep reverence
for God in his efforts to create an entirely new way of healing.
And while it seems
clear that attitudes toward magic did change in the seventeenth century and
that, for much of the eighteenth century, we find numerous people claiming that
a belief in magic was irrational, superstitious, and ignorant, there is evidence
that magical beliefs were not swept aside by scientific rigor and a commitment
to rationality, as the disenchantment theory would suggest.
The Enlightenment was
not a blank slate on which Europeans sketched a new world. It was more like a
piece of old parchment imperfectly scraped clean, still bearing traces of past
ideas around which modernity took shape.
The alleged secrets of the universe
To understand the
above we best go back around 1460, when the philosopher Marsilio Ficino
(1433–99) received a message from his patron, Cosimo de’ Medici (1389–1464),
the most powerful man in the Italian city-state of Florence. Up to this point,
Ficino had been hard at work translating the works of the ancient philosopher
Plato (c. 424–c. 348 BCE) from their original Greek into Latin, but his patron
had other ideas. He wanted Ficino to begin translating a different Greek
manuscript, one that Cosimo had only recently acquired. Obligingly, Ficino set
Plato aside and turned his attention to this new work. He soon realized that he
had stumbled across something very important.
The works that Ficino
translated became known as the Corpus Hermeticum, and
they contained the recorded wisdom of a mysterious figure known as Hermes
Trismegistus or Hermes “the Thrice-Powerful,” a contemporary of Moses and a
sage of unparalleled learning who had lived thousands of years earlier in
ancient Egypt. His writings promised to reveal the secrets of the universe to
those willing to learn, and this soon included Ficino, who became a passionate
advocate for the ideas of Hermes and was. instrumental in disseminating
them throughout Renaissance society. Ficino, along with many others, believed
that the Hermetic writings contained traces of ancient, uncorrupted wisdom that
might restore human understanding to the heights achieved by those, long ago, who
had known God and His creation in ways since lost to modern people.
The tradition
disseminated by Ficino is known as hermeticism, and it incorporated both
philosophical lessons on the nature of the divine as well as hands-on
instructions for magical work. Both hermeticism and the other tradition we
explore in this chapter, cabalism, are examples of learned magic – that is,
magic studied and practiced by the educated elite. This is very different from
the magic worked by healers, midwives, and others in small communities and
rural areas across Europe, practices usually labeled by historians as “folk
magic.” Learned magic had its roots in the distant past, and those who embraced
it did so with the hope that they would uncover secrets and mysteries that
would transform European society forever. This idea was so powerful and compelling
that it fundamentally altered intellectual life in Europe and continues to inspire people today.
This also concerned
the Rosicrucian manifestos (referred to widely by among others popular
philosopher/occultists like Rudolf Steiner founder
of today's Waldorf schools) presented the recovery of ancient esoteric
wisdom as the key to humanity’s spiritual “reformation,” and together they
demonstrate how traditions such as hermeticism and cabalism evolved during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, long after Ficino’s original translation
of the Corpus Hermeticum. There is little evidence
that the Rosicrucians
actually existed, however; their manifestos may have been part of a grand hoax,
or perhaps the idealistic imaginings of a single person. Even if this shadowy
society did not exist, however, the philosophy laid out in the Chymical Wedding and other works described a quest for
esoteric and occult knowledge inspired directly by the hermetic and cabalistic
traditions.
Hermes Trismegistus
as the founder of “Natural Magic” depicted in a
floor mosaic in the Siena cathedral:
From a magical worldview to Science
The shift in how
early modern people conceptualized and used occult causes leads us to the work
of the historian John Henry, who in contrast to Keith Thomas
Religion and the Decline of Magic (1971) has suggested that, rather than
'disenchantment', we should understand the fate of magic as one of
fragmentation in which philosophers retained some elements of magic and
rejected others.1
Thus early modern
chemistry included a wide range of different practices and methodologies,
including chrysopoeia,
the pursuit of metallic transmutation. When Herman
Boerhaave (1668 –1738) called for a reformation of chemistry in 1718
he was concerned about the respectability of the discipline, which he saw as
endangered by the fraud and trickery of quack alchemists. He knew very well, however,
that chrysopoeia was only a small part of the larger
practice of chemistry, even in the heyday of alchemy in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, and he also understood that the discipline of chemistry
had already integrated fundamental alchemical ideas and practices into its
foundations. The study and transformation of matter, which had been central to
alchemical work for hundreds of years, also
defined the discipline of chemistry as it emerged in the eighteenth century.
Boerhaave’s deliberate attempts to draw a line between
“respectable” chemical work and the fraudulent practices of
transmutational alchemists were therefore not a wholescale rejection of
alchemy. Instead, it was a careful repudiation of particular alchemical
practices. He, and others like him, tried to establish chemistry as a
respectable discipline of academic study by breaking it apart into pieces. They
separated and then pruned away its most troublesome elements, leaving behind a
set of theories and practices with a deep (but unspoken) debt to alchemy.
Magical beliefs and
occult systems were already part of the natural philosophies that proliferated
in the Enlightenment. And when the educated classes of the eighteenth century
for example adopted Newtonian science with enthusiasm, they were unaware or uncaring
that its foundations were rooted firmly in religious and alchemical
traditions.2
Whose Enlightenment?
Science, as we understand
the word now, is a modern invention. Its careful methodology, its well-defined
disciplines, its culture of white coats and laboratories full of sophisticated
technology go back perhaps 150 years; in fact, the word “scientist” was coined
only in the late
nineteenth century by William Whewell. Before that, investigators of
nature called themselves "natural philosophers".
It is challenging to
talk about the Enlightenment as if it was a singular phenomenon because it
looked very different in different places. Some of the most important
articulations of Enlightenment ideals originated in France, but other countries
experienced the Enlightenment in different ways. Whereas many French thinkers
attacked the dogmatic traditions of the Catholic Church and its influence on
French society, people living in the German states were generally more
interested in reforming the practice and structure of government, and some
historians remain uncertain whether the Enlightenment actually took hold in
Britain at all. There are enough common elements across different nations,
however, to suggest that we can identify some universal beliefs and ideals that
defined “the Enlightenment” for most people.
It is widely accepted
that this period in European history defined much of what we in the West now
understand as “modernity.” In other words, the Enlightenment effectively
created the idea of the modern West as most of us experience it today. For
example, the separation of church and state enshrined in most modern
democracies was articulated most forcefully by Enlightenment thinkers, along
with ideas about religious tolerance and the importance of individual liberty.
Most of these changes were rooted in conscious and deliberate reactions against
the status quo that had prevailed in Europe for centuries.
As we generally
understand it today, to be enlightened is to be modern and open-minded. This is
no accident; the individuals at the forefront of the Enlightenment modeled in
their own lives a progressive ideal that equated rationality and tolerance with
modernity. Of course, this ideal had limits. Notions of tolerance and liberty
generally were applied only to white men and existed in clear opposition to the
practice of slavery which still existed in some
European colonies during the eighteenth century. Similarly, the famous cry
of “Fraternity!” or brotherhood that defined the spirit of the French
Revolution at the end of the eighteenth century excluded women and the poor. If
the Enlightenment gave us modernity, it also left us with some of the most
enduring social problems of the modern era, including racism, sexism, and a
persistent lack of respect for the working classes.
Though many people
living in the Enlightenment applied its ideals imperfectly, however, those same
ideals still represent a profound change in how Europeans understood their own
society as well as the wider universe. This was in part a culmination of some
of the trends described in previous chapters: for example, the slow but steady
rejection of ancient authority and its replacement by innovative methods of
inquiry and experimentation. At the same time, the strong connections between
natural philosophy, religion, and magic that had persisted for hundreds of
years became deeply and irrevocably strained in the eighteenth century. Some of
the most outspoken Enlightenment thinkers dismissed both organized religion and
magical beliefs as ignorant superstition, even as they quietly integrated
elements of earlier magical philosophies and practices into the new and
powerful natural philosophy that came to dominate the eighteenth century.
The emphasis on
reason in the Enlightenment tended to privilege particular ways of thinking
about the world and, in turn, created new institutions and priorities for
European society. If someone wanted to argue that the application of reason was
crucial to the development of a new and enlightened nation-state, then public
education would need to change in order to cultivate a properly rational
mindset in that nation’s citizens. Disciplines that had already embraced the
exercise of reason, such as the physical and mathematical sciences, could now
act as important exemplars for other disciplines, meaning that educated people
began to emphasize quantitative methods and approaches in fields like biology,
chemistry, and anthropology. At the same time, anything that might endanger the
exercise of reason, particularly the irrational belief in religious dogma or
the divine basis for the monarchy, needed to be minimized or suppressed. To
varying degrees, all of these changes happened in different places during the
Enlightenment.
While
self-consciously removed obvious traces of religion and magic from the wider
study of nature, they denigrated ideas that they found objectionable or
incompatible with their “age of reason,” calling them ignorant or
superstitious. Nevertheless, the world inhabited by these enlightened thinkers
was as filled with enchantment as it had been for people living in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. What people had once called “magic,” the
Enlightenment called “science.” The triumphal narrative of the Enlightenment,
written first by “the enlightened” themselves and then taken up by those who came after them, depicted a glorious new
world ruled by reason and liberty, free from the tyranny of ignorance,
superstition, and mindless tradition. This rhetoric, all but overflowing with a
shining kind of idealism, is compelling even now, it seems familiar to many of
us today, perhaps because we still find traces of these ideals in many of the
institutions of the modern West. Ultimately, though, the Enlightenment was more
complicated and contradictory than this narrative suggests. Its proponents and
supporters tried to make a new world, and in some ways, they succeeded. In
other ways, however, they did not. Not unlike the natural philosophers who
tried to overthrow Aristotle in the seventeenth century but whose worldviews
were shaped irrevocably by the very thing they wanted to dismantle, the great
thinkers and reformers of the Enlightenment never quite escaped the society
they wanted to transform. True liberty and freedom were still reserved for the
elite few, while the pursuit of “reason” justified ideas that were decidedly
irrational.
And whatever the
successes and failures of the great project that was the Enlightenment, it is
worth looking back over the preceding centuries to remind ourselves how
radically the world changed for European people. Whereby the influence of
classical antiquity was where the European gaze was fixed on the distant past,
by the middle of the eighteenth century, Europe was in the midst of another
cultural movement defined instead by a gaze directed to the horizon ahead.
Nevertheless, the ancient world has never lost its hold on the Western
imagination, at least not entirely. From the eighteenth century, there have
been periodic revivals of classical themes in architecture, art, philosophy,
and literature, and to this day millions of people admire pieces of classical
statuary in museums and galleries or visit sites like the Acropolis of Athens
and the Roman Colosseum.
Where the influence
of antiquity has waned is in our collective understanding of the natural world.
The preeminence of Aristotle, Ptolemy, and Galen lasted for almost 2,000 years,
there increasingly where individuals who sought to understand the cosmos in
ways that were different from the philosophies of antiquity. In histories of
the “Scientific Revolution,” men like Copernicus, Paracelsus, Descartes, and
Francis Bacon are hailed as reformers and innovators who carved modernity from
the solid, weighty philosophies of the past in the same way that the artist
Michelangelo (1475–1564) described freeing a sculpture hidden within a block of
marble with chisel and mallet. These attempts to abandon the teachings of the
ancients were often imperfect or limited, but taken together they represent a
crucial shift in the European mindset that paved the way for new ways of
studying and understanding the world.
An informed and educated citizenry
The Enlightenment
vision of an informed and educated citizenry drove a series of developments in
the eighteenth century that opened up the methods and discoveries of science to
larger and larger audiences. A member of the middle classes living in 1750 would
have been exposed to mainstream scientific ideas in a way that hardly existed a
century earlier. Information was now conveyed in the vernacular rather than in
Latin, and natural philosophers recognized an opportunity both to educate the
public and to secure sources of financial support and social prestige by
staging demonstrations and exhibitions open to everyone, including women and
children. More than at any previous point in European history, the average
person living in the eighteenth century had opportunities to see and understand
the new world described by mathematicians, taxonomists, and geologists.
Some classical
philosophies, like Aristotelianism, had virtually no room whatsoever for a
deity, while others, like Epicureanism, had as their goal the diminution or
rejection of divine causation in the universe. With the widespread acceptance
of Christianity in the early centuries of the Common Era, however, large
numbers of people started to consider the role of an omnipotent, omniscient God
in the natural world. Some ancient philosophies of nature, like that of Plato
and his Neoplatonist followers, lent themselves relatively easily to the
Christian conception of a singular and all-powerful deity, but European
philosophers and theologians in the Middle Ages struggled to reconcile the
teachings of pagans such as Aristotle with the foundations of Christian belief
and doctrine. The intellectual flourishing of the Renaissance, sparked by the
recovery of ideas and texts new to Western Europe, included a deep fascination
with the prisca sapientia,
the ancient wisdom of Creation. Philosophers as disparate as Marsilio Ficino,
John Dee, Francesco Patrizi, and Robert Fludd sought to bypass centuries of
degeneration and touch the mind of God by reading the Book of Nature in new and
powerful ways, guided by those with an older and more perfect understanding.
The chaos of the
Reformation and the splintering of Christendom made that task more difficult as
there was now widespread and acrimonious disagreement about the very nature of
faith. Thus, from the sixteenth century onward we see a shift in how people understood
the relationship between God and His creation. Philosophers and naturalists
remained as pious as before; consider Johannes Kepler “thinking God’s thoughts
after Him,” or Paracelsus wandering the world in search of the divine secrets
hidden in nature. Yet, the religious anxieties that led Dee to converse with
angels, that landed Galileo in front of the Inquisition, and that drove both
Descartes and Gassendi to demonstrate the presence of God in their mechanical
philosophies all suggest that the relationship between God and nature, once
assured, was now the subject of question and doubt. When Newton suggested that
comets were sent periodically by God to correct imbalances in the vast cosmic
machine, yet another attempt to demonstrate God’s presence, the German
mathematician Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) accused Newton of making God seem
like an inferior mechanic forced to tinker with an imperfect universe. In
Leibniz’s outrage, we catch a glimpse of profound anxiety that existed around
the turn of the eighteenth century, one motivated by depictions of God as mere
caretaker, winding up the cosmic watch and then walking away.
Newton, however, was
committed absolutely to the idea that the Creator remained present in His
creation, proposing at one point that universal gravitation was the invisible
hand of God at work in the cosmos. There is a deep irony, then, in the fact
that many philosophers in the eighteenth century interpreted the Newtonian
universe as one ruled not by God, but by mathematics and reason. The rise of
deism and its distant, unknowable God went hand-in-hand with the proliferation
of Newtonian science, thanks in part to efforts by leading Enlightenment
thinkers like Voltaire and Diderot to separate organized religion from secular
institutions. In response, some theologians and philosophers proposed new
evidence for the presence of God. For example, the English clergyman William
Paley (1743–1805) published his Natural Theology: or, Evidence of the Existence
and Attributes of the Deity in 1802 and argued that the presence of design in
nature was clear evidence for the existence of God. Paley is known today for his
“watchmaker analogy,” which claims that the intricate complexity found in many
living things must be the result of deliberate design rather than chance or
accident, and which remains a central idea held by present-day proponents of
creationism and “intelligent design.”
For all of these
developments, however, the typical European person in the eighteenth century
had a religious outlook that was largely unchanged from that held by previous
generations. Most Christians went to church each week, followed the teachings
of the Bible, and shared an understanding of God that would not have been out
of place in the seventeenth century. Popular religious movements such as
Pietism or the revivalist fervor of the Great Awakenings were grassroots
affairs, inspired not by sophisticated theologies but by broad social trends
and attitudes. In some cases, however, changes to religious attitudes and
practices had their roots in the ideas of the educated elite, as in the
increasing emphasis on religious tolerance that was encouraged and mandated by
Enlightened monarchs and governments.
For most people,
then, the unseen hand of God remained present in the universe. They were
untroubled by the problem of occult or hidden causes that had preoccupied
generations of philosophers and theologians. Even in antiquity, Aristotle and
Plato had struggled to define not just the role of hidden causes in the
universe but also the question of how to study phenomena that could be known
only by their effects. The universe bequeathed to the eighteenth century by
Isaac Newton solved this problem not by banishing or revealing occult causes,
however; on the contrary, he made occult causation central to his philosophy.
When Leibniz criticized Newton’s explanation for universal gravitation as
lacking a clear description of its causes, the latter agreed that his work
described “general Laws of Nature” whose “Causes be not yet discovered.” In
fact, Newton seemed unconcerned that the causes for gravitation were hidden.
His natural philosophy described the effects of gravity on the matter, what he
called “manifest Qualities”, while conceding that “their Causes…are occult.”3
Thus, Newton resolved the problem of occult or hidden causes by suggesting that
it was not a problem at all. Someone could use Newtonian methods to measure and
understand gravity’s behavior without needing to know anything at all about
what caused it.
That Newton was able
to sideline or ignore the problem of occult causation owes a significant debt
to the mechanical philosophies that had appeared some decades earlier. The tiny
atoms of Gassendi or the invisible corpuscles of Descartes were no less occult
than the sympathies and correspondences of the hermeticists
or the hidden properties of the Aristotelians; none of these things were
visible to ordinary perception. Yet, there had been relatively little concern
from contemporaries that these mechanical causes for natural phenomena were
hidden from sight – even if Cartesian corpuscles remained invisible, someone
still could infer their motions and behaviors by reference to natural laws and
geometrical principles. The widespread acceptance of mechanical explanations
for natural phenomena meant that, by the latter decades of the seventeenth
century, mainstream philosophies of nature had already embraced occult causes.
It was hardly more problematic for Newton to describe the action of an
invisible force such as gravity on similarly invisible pieces of matter.
Thus, the Newtonian
universe was one in which occult causation was the rule and not the exception.2
By 1750, most of the European middle classes understood the universe to be a
vast expanse in which the Earth was merely one planet among many. What a difference
from the small contained cosmos known to the educated elite of the Middle Ages,
which ended just beyond Saturn’s orbit at the sphere of the fixed stars. In
such a realm, where humanity was both the literal and figurative center of
everything, the interconnectedness of the premodern world made a deep and
intuitive sense to many people. The relationship between microcosm and
macrocosm, the practice of sympathetic magic, the influence of the heavens on
human health, personalities, and events, all sprang from an understanding of
the universe in which everything had its proper and natural place within a
complex web of correspondences and associations. By and large, however,
Enlightenment philosophers rejected the mystical and spiritual elements of the
Renaissance worldview in which humanity, Nature, and God all existed as part of
an interconnected whole. What persisted into the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries was a desire to understand humanity’s place in the wider universe.
Attempts by the French biologist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744–1829) to
understand all life in the context of evolutionary change, by Carl Linnaeus to
integrate humans into biological taxonomies, and by Georges Cuvier to reconcile
human history with geological and paleontological discoveries all suggest that
this theme of interconnectedness was transmuted rather than dismantled.
Humanity had been displaced from the center of the physical universe by the
ideas of Copernicus and Galileo, but metaphorically we humans remained the
polestar around which all of Nature revolved.
1.“The Fragmentation
of Renaissance Occultism and the Decline of Magic,” in History of Science 46
(2008): 1–48.
2. Sir David
Brewster, Memoirs of the Life, Writings and Discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton
(Edinburgh, 1855), vol. 2, pp. 374–5.
3. Isaac Newton, Opticks, Based on the Fourth Edition London, 1730 (New
York: Dover Publications, 1952), Book III, Part I, Query 31, p. 401.
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