By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Make NATO More European

Next week, when European and North American leaders gather in The Hague for the NATO summit, the main topics of discussion will be familiar: transatlantic burden sharing and national defense spending targets. Leaders will compare their efforts, tout increased budgets, and perhaps commit to the mutual goal of spending the equivalent of five percent of GDP on defense. This focus on dollars and euros is understandable given U.S. President Donald Trump’s demand for more European contributions, but it misses a more profound question. Once it is paid for, who will oversee and take responsibility for Europe’s defense?

To truly shift the burden from Washington to its allies, increased spending is necessary but not sufficient. NATO also needs to change the distribution of leadership and responsibility within the alliance. For over 75 years, NATO has operated under an implicit bargain: the United States leads, and Europe follows. The clearest manifestation of that arrangement is that the post of supreme allied commander for Europe, NATO’s top military position, has always been held by an American.

During the Cold War, that practice made sense. The United States had the leading role in European security, and so its general should lead the alliance. But today, a changing strategic landscape and the direction of U.S. domestic politics mean that the United States will not fill that role much longer. Europe now needs to lead the alliance, and to do that, a European needs to take the position of supreme allied commander.

Not long ago, this would have been considered a fringe position. For NATO’s European members, it still is. But according to NBC News, the Trump administration considered whether to give up the commander’s role, known as SACEUR, as part of a broader restructuring and cost-cutting initiative. In preparing for the Hague summit, the United States ultimately decided to retain the position, but it cannot continue to do so indefinitely. Europe and the United States should use this summit to prepare for a European SACEUR.

Opponents of such a move raise several concerns, including the legal and cultural difficulties of putting a European in control of the tens of thousands of U.S. forces still in Europe; the risk that the U.S. nuclear deterrent in Europe may not seem as credible to adversaries if Washington is not in command; and the general lack of European readiness to assume command. But there are solutions to overcome each of these obstacles—and now is the time to start applying them.

 

The Burden of Leadership

The original transatlantic bargain was built on the simple midcentury reality of American preeminence and European weakness. In 1949, Europe lay in ruins, and the United States provided not just military leadership but also economic lifelines and political cohesion. NATO’s architecture of command reflects that asymmetry. Today, the political and economic reality is very different, and yet the asymmetric command structure persists, preventing Europeans from assuming the role they need to take in defending their continent. The combined economies of European NATO members dwarf that of Russia. And European militaries, albeit uneven and lacking in key capabilities, are becoming better funded and reform-minded. The threat landscape has also evolved. The challenges NATO faces today are ones that Europe, with the right structures and commitments, can and should take the lead in confronting. The United States, meanwhile, is changing its strategic focus away from Europe. A bipartisan consensus in Washington holds that China is the country’s principal long-term challenge, and as a result, American attention and resources are flowing to the Pacific.

Perhaps more fundamentally, Americans increasingly believe that Europe should be able to take care of itself. The success of Trump’s “America first” movement, not to mention his frequent threats to abandon the defense of Europe, should send a clear message that no matter what steps European governments take regarding defense, the era of U.S. leadership on the continent is coming to an end.

European leaders can either prepare for such a change or remain dangerously dependent on a partner whose attention tends to wander. Appointing a European supreme allied commander would be a key step in that preparation. It would be a tangible expression of Europe’s willingness to assume responsibility for its defense. A European commander would not require ending the U.S. role in NATO. It would signal, instead, that Europeans are ready to lead, not just passively follow American commands.

This would likely appeal to parts of the United States government, at least the parts outside of the uniformed military. As the United States looks to move its focus and resources toward Asia, giving up the commander position would allow the United States to remain part of NATO while also increasing Europe’s responsibility for its defense. The U.S. nuclear umbrella could continue to protect Europe, but the burdens of leadership would be shifted.

Outside the NATO headquarters, Brussels, April 2025

 

Ready Or Not

Currently, the supreme allied commander wears two hats; he also serves as the head of U.S. European Command, which oversees all U.S. forces in Europe. Because a European commander would lack that authority over the U.S. military presence in Europe, some fear that there would be friction in crisis scenarios. Before directing U.S. forces, for instance, the SACEUR would have to negotiate military responses with the U.S. political leadership.

But this is not an insurmountable problem. NATO’s history is full of examples of shared command structures, such as the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. One possible solution would be for a European commander to be supported by a U.S. deputy commander who would retain authority over American forces, manage nuclear coordination, and ensure compliance with U.S. law.

Some argue that only an American general or admiral can effectively command U.S. troops. Yet U.S. troops have often served under non-American commanders, including in the UN operations in East Timor and Lebanon, in NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and even in the EU-led mission in Bosnia. As in those cases, while a European commander could exercise NATO operational authority, the United States would retain the ultimate authority over its forces. A carefully structured arrangement, including a formal role for the U.S. deputy commander, could ensure compliance with U.S. legal frameworks while maintaining integrated NATO operations.

Concerns about nuclear deterrence are similarly overstated. The worry is that NATO’s opponents would not believe that the U.S. government would ever support a European supreme allied commander’s request for nuclear support. But what matters for nuclear deterrence is the credibility of the alliance’s nuclear posture, which relies on both political will and operational clarity regardless of the nationality of the SACEUR. That credibility could be preserved under a European commander with a clear division of responsibilities: the European commander would oversee conventional operations, while nuclear responsibilities remained firmly under U.S. purview through the deputy commander. NATO’s established protocols for the use of nuclear weapons would remain fundamentally unchanged. Adversaries would understand that NATO’s deterrent remained intact, even as its military leadership evolved.

Another objection is that no European exists who has the talent and experience to fill the post of supreme allied commander. American four-star generals and admirals are groomed to lead combatant commands such as the European Command, usually after overseeing tens of thousands of forces and handling large-scale multinational and joint operations. By contrast, no European officer today has commanded multinational forces on that scale in decades. No British general, for example, has commanded even a single deployed division (roughly 10,000–15,000 soldiers) since 2003 in the Iraq war.

This is a reasonable concern. But the only way to create European experience is to assign European responsibility. To accept the argument that Europeans have become incapable of rising to this level of leadership is to essentially condemn NATO to American leadership in perpetuity—and the United States will not accept that task forever. The leadership needs to change, and individual Europeans will need to grow into the role.

The process does not need to be rushed. To ensure a smooth transition, NATO could take a phased approach. The current supreme allied commander, U.S. General Christopher Cavoli, assumed the role in July 2022 and will likely hand over the reins to U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Alexus Grynkewich sometime this summer. Coincident with his appointment, the allies should agree at next week’s summit that the next SACEUR will be European, as part of the expected progress in European capability development. A multiyear road map could include increased European command roles in NATO operations, expanded joint exercises, and a formal restructuring of the command hierarchy to accommodate shared leadership.

 

Trust and Evolve

The real barrier to a European supreme allied commander is not the lack of capability, doctrine, or personnel—it is the lack of political will. For decades, Europe has relied on American leadership not only because of U.S. power but also because doing so absolved Europeans of having to make difficult command decisions, resolved internal European disputes over who would lead within Europe, and helped cement the U.S. presence in Europe.

That dynamic is changing. France, Germany, Poland, and others are boosting defense budgets. EU initiatives are fostering greater defense cooperation. NATO’s own defense planning process is pushing members to close capability gaps. The pieces of a more capable European pillar in NATO are slowly falling into place. What’s needed now is a strong signal to adversaries and allies alike that Europe is both paying more and ready to lead.

The appointment of a European commander would be that signal. It would reflect Europe’s progress while also accelerating it. It would place Europe at the center of its own defense while preserving U.S. engagement in a more sustainable form.

Ultimately, this is a question not just of power but of trust. Do Americans trust Europeans to command the alliance? Do Europeans trust themselves to command, and can they trust one another to agree on who should be the commander? If the answers to those questions are no, then the future of the NATO alliance will be bleak. After all, how can Europeans lead if they can’t even take command? A NATO that evolves into a partnership of equals, however, will be stronger, more cohesive, and more resilient in the face of future threats. The time to start that evolution is now.

 

 

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