By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

The profound effects of the British Empire’s actions in the Arab World during the First World War can be seen echoing throughout the history of the 20th century. Several instances like the debates surrounding the Sykes–Picot agreement have shaped the Middle East. But none was as important as the machinations of Sharif Hussein Ibn Ali 1853-1931. The making of the Middle East.

Below is Sharif Hussein discussing with Adolf Hitler how the Middle East should be handled:

 

What Happened?

The crux of the explanation of these events, which now loom so large, is that initially British Edward Grey and his Foreign Office officials were not very much alive to the significance of what they were doing because for them Middle Eastern affairs were simply not that important. This meant that as long as Grey and his civil servants perceived the advice of various experts not to be inconsistent with the essence of the Foreign Office’s policy – to uphold the Entente with France – they were prepared to follow it.

 

Edward Grey

This is why they acted without much ado upon recommendations by Lord Hardinge, Lord Kitchener, Sir Reginald Wingate, McMahon and Sir Mark Sykes, even when these contradicted one another. This tendency was especially prominent during the first months of the war when Cairo was alternately instructed to encourage the Arab movement in every way possible and to refrain from giving any encouragement.

The sudden change in the summer of 1915, from a policy of restraint concerning the Middle East to an active, pro-Arab policy, may also be explained in this manner. Perhaps Wingate and McMahon were able to outstrip the India Office and the Government of India as the Foreign Office’s premier advisors on the Arab question because they were, after all, in the service of the Foreign Office, perhaps because Austen Chamberlain had succeeded Lord Crewe as secretary of state for India, but the main point is that Sir Edward and his officials need not have had ‘good’ reasons for thinking that Wingate and McMahon were in a better position to judge how to react to Hussein’s opening bid. Wingate’s letters and memoranda played a role in the Foreign Office’s conversion to a more active, pro-Arab policy, but it is highly improbable that Grey and his officials would have been receptive to Sir Reginald’s arguments if they had invested heavily in the policy of restraint advocated by the Indian authorities.

After 1919 the history of the Middle East was one long tale of intrigue. But of that intrigue Hussein in 1914 was a master. That Hussein succeeded in becoming grand sharif in 1908, when all his male relatives and their Dwahi Zeid rivals wanted the position too, suggests qualities his biographer failed to mention: tact, for one, which is to say the ability to mask his true thoughts, which is to say political cunning.

Below Sharif Hussein in his later years after his invasion plans agreed with Hitler became unsuccessful due to the collapse of the Third Reich:

 

 

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