'King Of The ArabNation'

Reference list of personalities involved.

The inter-office rivalry and jumble of complex issues competing for attention that British officials juggled while inadvertently shaping the future of the world. It is unique in how and why the British generals and diplomats acted as they did. By took as his starting point the voluminous, contradictory, and revealing records of the policy-makers in the British government and that many concerned with foreign policy-making were quite oblivious to the history and complexities of the Islamic World and how the British Empire tried to change the world with how shallow and confused the understanding of those that shaped the future of the Middle East was.

To know the context of what follows start with the overview here, and for reference list of personalities involved here.

The urgency of inducing Sherif Hussein and his sons to enter the war – even if they provided only a minor distraction to the Turks and a small symbol of Allied Muslim cooperation to the world at large – was now becoming acute. The war with the Ottomans was not going well – and not just at Gallipoli.

The Bedouin tribes who had rallied to Husayn and his sons – mainly the Juhayna, Harb, and ‘Utayba – were not jihadi warriors against an alien invasion like the Arabs of Iraq. Many of them heartily disliked the Turks and their railway to Medina; but they were essentially mercenaries, fighting for British-supplied gold and modern rifles. As for their martial qualities, individually they could be courageous, but up against regular troops – especially when these were equipped with modern weaponry – they tended to become disorganized and panic. Moreover, each tribe was reluctant to move outside its dira – its traditional zone of pasturage, water rights, and oasis gardens. Worse still, some tribal leaders soon showed that their loyalty could not be relied upon when the Turks offered cash which exceeded those of Hussein.

Showing things were not going too well, Britain’s defeat at Gallipoli was followed by an even more devastating setback in the war against the Ottomans. By mid-April 1916 it had become clear that all attempts to relieve the siege of Kut had failed. Negotiations on surrender began on 27 April, during which Townshend, with Kitchener’s approval, offered Khalil Pasha all his artillery and £1 million in return for his men being allowed to leave Kut on parole. Khalil immediately referred the offer to his uncle, Enver Pasha, who replied, ‘Money is not wanted by us.’ Townshend then raised the cash offer to £2 million but, insulted by what they considered an attempt to bribe them, Khalil and Enver declined once again. Realizing at last that the Turks were intent on unconditional surrender, Townshend resigned himself to the inevitable and on 28 April began destroying his guns. There was little mercy for the British and Indian ‘other ranks’ or the local Arab population after the Turks entered Kut. Hangings and torture were the lot of those Arabs who were deemed to have collaborated with the British, and the prisoners themselves were dispatched on a veritable death march to Anatolia, where the survivors were condemned to forced labor. Around two-thirds of the British and Indian troops who surrendered died of disease or maltreatment. General Townshend, on the other hand, was taken to Istanbul, where he lived out the rest of the war in pleasant semi-confinement, convinced to the last that the Turkish commanders were ‘Gentlemen’. For Britain’s war leaders, one defeat by ‘orientals’ had been shocking; two defeats seemed utterly appalling. As far as the war in the East was concerned, there was now ‘only one show in town’ – the revolt against the Turks by Sherif Hussein and his men. Fortunately, current and future promises of gold in very large quantities were about to produce the desired outcome. On 5 June 1916 Kitchener, the architect of the ‘Eastern Strategy’, whose vaguely worded message to the Sherif in September 1914 concerning the caliphate had set in motion the train of events that had since unfolded, drowned in the icy waters of the North Sea when the cruiser HMS Hampshire carrying him on a diplomatic mission to Russia was sunk by a German submarine. On the very same day, as we have seen, Husain’s sons ‘Ali and Faisal raised the banner of revolt at Medina and five days later the Sharif himself joined the rebellion, having previously been promised a subsidy of £50,000 per month in gold sovereigns, 5,000 rifles and a quarter of a million rounds of ammunition by decision of the British cabinet, a figure which would be raised to £125,000 in gold a month later, and eventually rise to £200,000 per month by mid-1917.

Below is General Townshend with Khalil Pasha on the right.

On Sunday 29 October 1916, the Foreign Office was informed by telegram that ‘the notables and ulemas of the country’ and all ‘all classes of the populations’ had ‘unanimously’ recognized Sharif Hussein as ‘King of the Arab Nation’. The telegram was signed by Sharif Abdullah in his new capacity as foreign minister of the Arab government. Two days later, Clerk minuted that this was ‘rather a bomb’, and that ‘we really cannot recognize the Sherif as “King of the Arab Nation” yet a while’. He suggested approaching the French government and informing them that the British government intended to reply that Hussein’s title not only was ‘an unwarrantable intervention in the internal affairs of Arabia’ but also would do ‘incalculable harm to the Sherif’s cause. The time is not yet ripe for such a proceeding.’ Hardinge, however, did not want to commit the Foreign Office just yet. He suggested that ‘the views of the French government’ should first be sought, but Grey agreed with Clerk: ‘Let us make up our minds and then tell the French what we propose to do’ – after all, ‘the Sherif is our affair’.1

The Foreign Office’s advisers in Jeddah, Cairo and Khartoum had also been taken by surprise. Wilson regarded Hussein’s newly acquired regal dignity ‘somewhat premature’,2 while McMahon observed that ‘Shereef’s action appears ill-advised and premature’.2 Wingate, for his part, stated that Hussein’s title ‘would appear to be hardly in accord with the Sherif’s declaration regarding the complete independence within their territories of other Arab chiefs’.3 McMahon proposed to Wingate that Wilson should be instructed to inform Hussein that the high commissioner deprecated ‘an announcement of this nature which seems most inadvisable at a time when Sherif is not in a position to substantiate fully such claims made on his behalf’. Sir Henry, in any case, felt sure that the British government would ‘be unable at present to make public recognition of Shereef as more than the ruler of Hedjaz and champion of Arab people against Turkish oppression’.4

McMahon and Wingate at the same time considered it undesirable to discourage Hussein unduly. The high commissioner explained in a telegram to the Foreign Office that, although ‘given extent to which Shereef owes his present position and even existence to our aid and support we could be justified in withholding any recognition of his present action which has been taken without consulting us’, and that ‘this action is likely to prejudice his position in the eyes of certain Moslem countries where his motives and policy are still regarded with distrust’, he nevertheless recommended that ‘we might conclude by reiterating determination of His Majesty’s Government to continue efforts to bring about and support the independence of the Arab nation.5 The sirdar concurred with the insertion of some such clause in the message to Hussein, as it would ‘show that while we are doubtful of the political wisdom of his action it in no way affects our support of him and of the Arabs’ cause’.6

McMahon and Wingate also agreed on the title that should be conferred on Hussein. Sir Henry suggested that ‘considering the limited extent of his dominion and having regard to our treaties acknowledging the independence of Arab Chiefs such as Bin Saud etc. most that we could under existing conditions would be to recognize Shereef as “Malik” [i.e. “King”] of Hedjaz’. Sir Reginald, for his part, proposed that ‘King of the Arabs in the Hedjaz’ was a suitable address, as far as we are concerned, for the present’.7 Wilson had meanwhile been informed that a ‘coronation takes place November 4th or November 5th’, and even though Clerk thought the whole affair ‘fantastic’,8 ‘some notice of the Sherif’s elevation’ had nevertheless to be taken. A telegram was sent to McMahon on 3 November, in which the latter was instructed to tell Wilson, ‘if there is still time’, to inform Hussein that:  He had been instructed to offer sincere congratulations on the auspicious occasion. He should add that His Majesty’s Government is in consultation with their Allies on the question of a joint official recognition of His Highness’ new position, but as the enemy is not yet completely defeated and a premature recognition might do great harm to His Highness’ cause in Arabia and the whole Moslem world, there may be some delay.9

Hussein was duly crowned as ‘King of the Arabs’ at Mecca on 4 November 1916. There was a simultaneous ceremony at Jeddah, which Wilson did not attend.10 The Foreign Office submitted a draft reply to Abdullah’s telegram to Sir Reginald on 6 November. This agreed, in the main, with McMahon’s and Wingate’s previous observations:  Attention of Sherif should firstly be called to inopportuneness of his announcement and he should then be told that H.M. Government and governments of France and Russia though they regard and will continue to regard His Highness as titular head of Arab peoples in their revolt against Turkish misrepresentation and are glad further to recognize him as lawful and de facto ruler of the Hedjaz is unable to recognize assumption by him of any sovereign title which might provoke disunion among Arabs at present moment and thus prejudice final political settlement of Arabia on a satisfactory basis. That settlement to be durable must come to with general assent of other Arab rulers of which at present there is no evidence and must follow rather than precede military success.11  One week later, the Foreign Office repeated to Wingate a telegram from Bertie in which the ambassador stated that the French government agreed with ‘general terms proposed for a reply to Sherif of Mecca’.12 It would take another 11 days before Grey could inform Wingate that the Russian government also concurred and that he might authorize Wilson ‘to reply to Sherif in terms of my telegrams’.13 The problem of the Emir’s new title remained. After consultations with the French government, the India Office, the high commissioner, and the sirdar, the Foreign Office finally wired Wingate on 11 December that, ‘after consideration, His Majesty’s Government have decided that most suitable title would be “Malik-el-Hejaz” [i.e. “King of the Hijaz”] with honorific style “Siyada” [i.e. “his Lordship”], and that “unofficially” they had been informed that the French government “probably” would do the same’.14

 

'Taking The Sheriff Into The Fullest Confidence Possible'

On 14 December 1916, Sir William Robertson observed in a note for the War Cabinet that Murray’s attack on El Arish was imminent and that after the occupation of that town, the latter intended to advance on Rafa. He believed that Sir Archibald should have the liberty to pursue the possibly demoralized Turkish troops in the area that, according to the Sykes-Picot agreement, came under international administration. However, this might easily lead to difficulties with the French ‘given their well-known susceptibilities regarding Syria’. For this reason, the CIGS considered it desirable to inform the French government in advance that ‘our sole object is to defeat the Turks, and that we should welcome their political cooperation both in the international sphere and in any negotiations which may become necessary in the French sphere of direct control, and in that of commercial and political interest’. During the meeting of the War Cabinet the following day, Sykes mentioned another reason why it was important to obtain French political cooperation. He explained that ‘if the forthcoming operations proved successful, it was possible that the tribes east of the Medina Railway would rise, and the headquarters of these tribes were in the French sphere’. The War Cabinet agreed that it was desirable to prevent unnecessary French suspicion. The Foreign Office was instructed to inform the French government that Great Britain should welcome French political cooperation.16

The British campaign in the Sinai subsequently was one of the subjects for discussion at an Anglo-French conference held in London from 26 to 28 December. On the last day, Alexandre Ribot, the French minister of finance, raised the point that ‘the French government was ready to attach a French battalion from Djibuti to the British forces to show the French flag’. Lloyd George promised that ‘when the British troops entered Palestine, which might be in six weeks or two months, they would be ready to accept the offer’, whereupon Lord Robert Cecil suggested that ‘a French political officer should be attached to General Murray, because the tribes in the British sphere had headquarters in the French sphere, and it was, therefore, necessary to constitute some form of liaison’.17

Lloyd George had something completely different in mind for the Sinai campaign than Robertson. According to Hankey, Lloyd George, when they had lunched together on 11 December, had ‘discoursed mainly on his plans for a big military coup in Syria’.18 Sir William, however, was as unwilling to accept this sideshow as any other. As far as he was concerned, Murray’s mission was completed the moment the latter had cleared the Turks from the Sinai. A real offensive into Palestine was out of the question. Robertson telegraphed to Murray on 9 December, that:

Today Prime Minister mentioned to me the desirability of making your operations as successful as possible. I am in the entire agreement. Wire précis of action proposed beyond El Arish, stating what additional troops you would require for advance if any. I cannot help thinking that given importance of achieving big success on the Eastern front, and the effects this will have, you might risk having fewer troops on Western [the Egyptian western front] is badly needed, and your operations promise well.

Murray interpreted ‘beyond El Arish’ rather liberally. In his reply, he observed that he had ‘always thought important results might be secured by an advance by us from Arish into Syria’. The best thing to do after the occupation of Rafa was to attack Beersheba, ‘where the enemy’s main concentration appears to be’. From Beersheba, moreover, Murray’s aircraft were able to attack the Hijaz railway, while the occupation of that town ‘would result in a rising of the Arab population in southern Syria, who are known to be very disaffected towards Turks’. If his operations progressed as he hoped, he would need, however, two extra divisions temporarily, perhaps from Mesopotamia, as Sir Archibald fully realized the ‘undesirability of taking troops from the main theatre’.

Robertson’s reaction to Murray’s telegram was again not formulated in unequivocal terms. After stating that it was the Prime Minister ‘who wishes you to make the maximum possible effort during the winter’, Sir William only referred to the problematic aspects of Murray’s request. However, such subtleties were wasted on Sir Archibald. In a subsequent telegram, he merely stated further arguments in favor of putting two extra divisions at his disposal. Consequently, ‘so that any possibility of misunderstanding may be removed’, Robertson telegraphed to Murray on 15 December that:  Notwithstanding the instructions recently sent to you to the effect that you should make your maximum effort during the winter, your primary mission remains unchanged, that is to say, it is the defense of Egypt. You will be informed if and when the War Cabinet changes this policy. In the meantime, you should be as aggressive as possible with the troops at your disposal subject to your main mission of defending Egypt.19

The War Cabinet was not prepared to overrule the CIGS. Ministers, as ever, shrank from openly intervening in strategic affairs. The day after Lloyd George had told the French delegation that it would be a matter of six weeks or two months before British troops would enter Palestine, Robertson wrote a note explaining that a campaign in Palestine during the winter was out of the question. Without denying the great advantages of the occupation of that country, it would be unsound to start an invasion under the present conditions, as this contravened ‘fundamental principles of strategy’. Also, for the year 1917, the maxim obtained that ‘our commitments in the minor theatres should be reduced to the minimum so that our maximum effort may be made in France’. The only concession he was prepared to make was that ‘we should complete our preparations in Egypt for an offensive in Syria in the autumn of 1917’.20 The War Cabinet acquiesced in Robertson’s point of view. On 2 January, it accepted the note ‘in principle’.21

After the occupation of El Arish on 21 December and the occupation of Rafa on 9 January, the EEF’s advance came to a standstill a few miles from the border with Palestine. As the rising of the tribes east of the Hijaz railway failed to materialize, there seemed to be no need for the detachment of a French political officer, but preparations nevertheless continued. The War Cabinet decided on 31 January that a British political officer should also be attached to Murray’s staff and that the latter’s instructions should be settled between the Foreign Office, the General Staff, and Sykes.22

As Georges-Picot had been chosen by the French government to act as the French representative with the EEF, he was invited to come to London to take part in these discussions so that the instructions to the British political officer tallied with those to his French counterpart. On 13 February, these consultations led to a satisfactory conclusion. The instructions constituted a careful elaboration of the Sykes-Picot agreement:

1.  The C.P.O. will act as adviser to the G.O.C. on political relations with native elements in the theatre of operations of the G.O.C. in C. Egypt beyond the Egyptian frontier.

2.  The French Commissioner is accredited to the G.O.C. in C. Egypt was the political representative of the French government in all negotiations that may be necessary for the theatre of operations of the Egyptian force beyond the Egyptian frontier.

3.  The G.O.C. will communicate with the French Commissioner through the C.P.O. and the French Commissioner will communicate with the G.O.C. through the C.P.O.

4.  The G.O.C. will use the C.P.O. or his delegate, and the French Commissioner, or his delegate, as his joint representatives in negotiations between the representatives of native elements in areas A and B and himself.

5.  The French Commissioner or his delegate will act alone, and on his responsibility, in any negotiations with native elements in the Blue area subject to the exigencies of the military situation for which the Military Commander alone is responsible. He will keep the G.O.C. apprised of all these negotiations through the medium of the C.P.O. But, in the event of any part of the Blue area coming within the theatre of operations of the Egyptian Force, the French Commissioner will act jointly with the C.P.O. in negotiations with native elements inhabiting that part of the area.

6.  The French Commissioner and the C.P.O. will act jointly in any communications that may be necessary with the King of the Hedjaz, but through the medium and with the approval of the High Commissioner in Egypt, G.O.C. in the Hedjaz.

7.  The C.P.O. will keep the French Commissioner apprised of any negotiations with the military or political officers that the Mesopotamian force may enter into with native elements in area A.

8.  Concerning the Brown area, no political negotiations shall be directly entered into with native elements in this area until it is occupied.

 

The below mentioned Foreign Office (FO) documents can be searched and read online, here: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/help-with-your-research/research-guides/foreign-commonwealth-correspondence-and-records-from-1782

 

1. Wingate to Hogarth, private, 5 July 1916, Wingate Papers, box 138/3.

2. Tel. McMahon to Grey, no. 945, 31 October 1916, FO 371/2782/218006.

3. Tel. McMahon to Grey, no. 947, 31 October 1916, FO 371/2782/218629.

4. Tel. Wingate to McMahon, no. 628, 2 November 1916, FO 371/2782/221025.

5. Tel. McMahon to Grey, no. 947, 31 October 1916, FO 371/2782/218629.

6. Tel. McMahon to Grey, no. 961, 2 November 1916, FO 371/2782/220339.

7. Tel. Wingate to McMahon, no. 628, 2 November 1916, FO 371/2782/221025.

8. Tels McMahon to Grey, no. 961, 2 November 1916, and Wingate to McMahon, no. 628, 2 November 1916, FO 371/2782/220339.

9. Tel. McMahon to Grey, no. 955, 1 November 1916, and minute Clerk, 2 November 1916, FO 371/2782/219490.

10. Minute Clerk, 3 November 1916, on tel. McMahon to Grey, no. 967, 3 November 1916, and tel. Grey to McMahon, no. 880, 3 November 1916, FO 371/2782/220832.

11. See tel. McMahon to Grey, no. 980, 7 November 1916, FO 371/2782/223715.

12. Tel. Grey to Wingate, no. 6, 6 November 1916, FO 371/2782/221869.

13. Tel. Grey to Wingate, no. 13, 13 November 1916, Wingate Papers, box 143/1.

14. Tel. Grey to Wingate, no. 21, 24 November 1916, FO 371/2782/234461.

15. Tel. Balfour to Wingate, no. 35, 11 December 1916, FO 371/2782/246846; cf. also Dan Eldar, ‘French Policy towards Husayn, Sharif of Mecca’, Middle Eastern Studies, 26 (1990), p. 341.

16. Robertson, El Arish Operations, 14 December 1916, and minutes War Cabinet, 15 December 1916, Cab 23/1.

17. Anglo–French conference, minutes of a meeting, 28 December 1916, I.C. 12, Lloyd George Papers, F/120/2.

18. Hankey diary, 11 December 1916, Hankey Papers, vol. 1/1.

19. Tels C.I.G.S. to G.O.C.-in-C., Egypt, no. 26174, 9 December 1916, G.O.C.-in-C., Egypt to C.I.G.S., no. A.M. 1380, 10 December 1916, G.I.G.S to G.O.C.-in-C., Egypt, no. 26289, 12 December 1916, G.O.C.-in-C., Egypt to C.I.G.S, no. A.M. 1389, 13 December 1916, and C.I.G.S. to G.O.C.- in-C., Egypt. no. 26624, 15 December 1916,WO 33/905. See also Murray’s discussion of these telegrams in his Sir Archibald Murray’s Despatches (London, 1920: Dent), pp. 130–1.

20. Robertson, ‘NOTE ON A PROPOSAL TO UNDERTAKE A CAMPAIGN IN PALESTINE DURING THE WINTER WITH THE OBJECT OF CAPTURING JERUSALEM’, 29 December 1916, WO 106/310.

21. Minutes War Cabinet, 2 January 1917, Cab 23/1.

22. See minutes War Cabinet, 31 January 1917, ibid.

 

 

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