By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
How Biden Can Salvage Middle East Peace
and His Legacy
When U.S. President Joe
Biden leaves office in January, the already-faint prospect of a two-state
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may follow him out the door.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejects the very concept. Biden’s
successor, President-elect Donald Trump, spent his first term actively
promoting Netanyahu’s most expansionist dreams. Biden has so far failed to
achieve his highest goals for the Middle East—but in his final days he can
single-handedly reset the Israeli-Palestinian equation, preserve the potential
for a two-state solution, and rescue much of his tarnished legacy. His status
as a lame duck paradoxically gives him the power to do things possible only for
a leader whose next step is retirement.
Since the creation of
the state of Israel in 1948, the only moments when the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict has seemed potentially solvable have been times when the United States
has taken charge. And domestic politics have always limited the amount of pressure
any American president can apply. Biden now has an opportunity that none of his
predecessors had: he has been relieved of all domestic political constraints at
a moment when U.S. pressure is needed. Each of his predecessors has
had a lame-duck period, but none have coincided with such a decisive moment in
the conflict.
The status quo suits
nobody. Palestinians are the most obvious victims. In the past year, Israeli
forces have killed over 40,000 people in Gaza, as well as around 700 in the
West Bank (where Hamas is not in control). Israel is ensnared in a trap of its
own making: it cannot retain its identity as both a democracy and a
constitutionally Jewish state while maintaining an occupation through which it
rules over five million Palestinians who are not citizens of Israel. The United
States, by providing diplomatic cover for an occupation that most of the world
considers illegal—and by providing the weaponry on which this occupation
relies—has torpedoed its credibility, limiting its ability to champion
international law and criticize bad actors such as China, Iran, and Russia.
Something must give.
Biden’s personal
warmth for the Israeli people runs deep, but it is not exclusive. I saw this
firsthand when I worked for him for nine years on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. I had no experience in government, having trained as an
anthropologist who specialized in Islam. Biden hired me to help him understand
communities across the Middle East and Asia with which he had little
experience. Empathy is Biden’s superpower, and I have seen him display it
frequently for people well outside his circle of familiarity. It is past time
for him to demonstrate genuine empathy for the Palestinian people, who have
suffered immensely during an Israeli onslaught that Biden’s own policies have
enabled.
There are three
significant steps Biden could take during his final weeks, purely through
executive action, that would mitigate Palestinian suffering and preserve the
possibility of a two-state solution—which would also be the best way to
solidify Israel’s security in the long run. Biden should recognize Palestinian
statehood, sponsor a resolution on a two-state solution at the UN Security
Council, and enforce existing U.S. legislation on arms transfers. These three
actions would be relatively simple—and difficult to undo. And, together, they
could help change the trajectory of the Middle East, which is hurtling toward
catastrophe.
Getting It Done
Recognizing
Palestinian statehood isn’t nearly as radical as it sounds. Currently, 146 of
the 193 countries in the UN recognize Palestinian statehood, including more
than a dozen NATO allies. If the United States shifted its position, the rest
of the international holdouts might likewise do so overnight. Biden should
recognize Palestine the same way President Harry Truman recognized the state of
Israel in 1948, just 11 minutes after the nation’s self-creation: with a stroke
of the pen. In Truman’s case, official recognition consisted merely of a
type-written statement that read, “This Government has been informed that a
Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been
requested by the provisional Government thereof. The United States recognizes
the provisional government as the de facto authority of the new State of
Israel.” At the time, the armies of Israel and four of its neighbors were still
fighting over the UN’s plan for two nations—one Jewish and one Palestinian—and
the language of this presidential recognition did not bind the United States to
support any specific details of an eventual settlement. Biden should draft a
similarly simple statement, or even use Truman’s barebones formulation as his
model.
Biden should also
sponsor a UN Security Council resolution to establish an international
consensus for a two-state solution. The current international framework for the
settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains limited to Security
Council resolutions 242, 338, and 1397. Resolutions 242 and 338, passed in the
immediate aftermath of the Six-Day War of 1967 and the 1973 war, respectively,
call for a cessation of fighting and return of territories captured
(presumably, to Egypt, Jordan, and Syria). Neither resolution says anything
about the Palestinian inhabitants of these territories or even mentions the
word “Palestinian.” Resolution 1397, passed in 2002, merely affirms “a vision
of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within
secure and recognized borders.”
Biden could organize
the passage of a resolution that explicitly recognizes a sovereign Palestinian
nation in the territories Israel has occupied since 1967. There are no likely
vetoes: Russia and China already recognize Palestinian statehood, and leaders
from France and the United Kingdom have, over the past year, signaled their
willingness to grant such recognition before a negotiated settlement is
complete.
U.S. President Joe Biden at the White House,
Washington, D.C., November 2024
Finally, Biden must
enforce existing U.S. laws regarding arms transfers to Israel. One of the
worst-kept secrets in Washington is now out in the open: U.S. laws on arms
transfers have an invisible asterisk for Israel. There are at least two major
pieces of legislation which are long overdue for application. The so-called
Leahy law—or more properly, Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
as amended in January 2014—governs U.S. military aid dispersed by the
Department of State. (This measure, and another that governs aid dispersed by
the Department of Defense, gets its name from its sponsor, Patrick Leahy, a
Democrat from Vermont who served as a U.S. senator from 1975 to 2023 and who
was a leading congressional advocate of human rights.) Its language is
unambiguous: “No assistance shall be furnished under this Act or the Arms
Export Control Act to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if
the Secretary of State has credible information that such unit has committed a
gross violation of human rights.”
This law applies to
all countries receiving U.S. military assistance. “Department officials insist
that Israeli units are subject to the same vetting standards as units from any
other country,” Charles Blaha, a recently retired diplomat, wrote in June 2024.
“Maybe in theory. But in practice, that’s simply not true.” His words carried
particular weight: for seven and a half years, Blaha was the State Department
official in charge of vetting transfers to make sure they complied with the
Leahy law. A few weeks earlier, Leahy himself, now retired, had also blown the
whistle: “Since the Leahy law was passed, not a single Israeli security force
unit has been deemed ineligible for U.S. aid,” he wrote, “despite repeated,
credible reports of gross violations of human rights and a pattern of failing
to appropriately punish Israeli soldiers and police who violate the rights of
Palestinians.”
The arrest warrants
issued last week by the International Criminal Court for Netanyahu and former
Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant seem to constitute “credible information”
of gross violation of human rights—as would a large number of other well-documented
actions by Israeli authorities since October 2023. The State
Department has received nearly 500 reports of Israel using U.S.-supplied
weapons in attacks on civilians in Gaza. After Israel’s invasion of Lebanon
last month, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights accused Israel of
committing “atrocities in Lebanon, including acts of violence intended to
spread terror among civilians and indiscriminate warfare.”
The second piece of
legislation that Biden should enforce is the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act. This
statute forbids all arms transfers to any country that “prohibits or otherwise
restricts the transport or delivery of United States humanitarian assistance to
any other country.” Israel’s persistent refusal to permit more than a dribble
of aid into Gaza led the Biden administration to spend $230 million
constructing an elaborate floating pier this spring—which was operational for
only three weeks and managed to deliver even less aid during that time than the
trickle that flowed in by road in just four days during the same period. In
August, an oversight report by the Inspector General of the U.S. Agency for
International Development determined that the Israel Defense Forces had
improperly prioritized their own operational and security requirements over the
delivery of humanitarian aid.
Three weeks before
Election Day, the U.S. secretaries of state and defense publicly informed
Israel that it had one month to make good on promises it had made in March of
this year to remove impediments to humanitarian efforts, specifically citing
the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act. But the deadline passed on November 12
without any American response. Netanyahu successfully called Biden’s bluff.
Locked In
Could any of these
executive actions survive the presidential transition? After all, Trump spent
his first term enabling Netanyahu’s agenda, and his cabinet picks suggest his
administration will do little to rein in Israel.
Trump could try to
wheel back the application of relevant laws governing the transfer of arms. The
Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act contains a presidential waiver, so he could undo
any decision to invoke it without suffering much more than international ridicule.
But the Leahy law that governs the State Department contains no such loophole.
Once the department has officially acknowledged that “credible information” of
gross human rights violations exists, it legally cannot decide to continue
delivering weapons. Trump could not legally instruct his secretary of state to
simply determine the Leahy requirements had been met. The only legal off-ramp
would be a carefully calibrated process by which the parties guilty of gross
abuses are “remediated”—meaning that the only pathway out of a Leahy
prohibition for a country deemed guilty of gross human rights violations is to
stop committing gross human rights abuses.
Trump could try to
revoke recognition of a Palestinian state. But there is no precedent for such an
action. The United States has formally recognized nearly 200 states, but it has
never, as far as I can determine, formally recognized the nonexistence of one.
Trump can direct his lawyers to declare anything he wishes, but once nearly
every country in the world has acknowledged Palestinian statehood, it would be
a rather lonely fight. And a UN Security Council resolution mandating a
two-state solution would be beyond the ability of any American president to
overturn.
This program of
executive action would hardly create a new peace process, but its effect would
be significant. First, it would keep the prospect of Palestinian
self-determination alive, albeit on life support; without such action, Israel
is likely to annex some or all of the occupied territories over the next four
years. Second, it might change the political dynamic within Israel itself: a
two-state solution remains the only possible way for Israel to retain its
identity, and Netanyahu’s far-right government remains deeply unpopular. Third,
it would give the United States the leverage to pressure Israel into a
history-making deal; Trump has displayed no sympathy for the Palestinians, but
he has demonstrated a deep desire to go down in history as a geopolitical
deal-maker.
Less than two years
ago, Biden’s legacy was being compared with that of one of the greatest
American presidents, Franklin D. Roosevelt. Today, no one is making such
comparisons, and many Democrats and progressives have denounced Biden’s conduct
on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A far-sighted move could provide a better
ending to the foreign policy chapter of his story, as a president who rallied a
global coalition to defend freedom, democracy, and human rights not just for
Ukrainians but for Palestinians, as well.
Over the past year,
Biden has not shown himself to be bold, let alone radical. But throughout his
career, he has constantly surprised those who pegged him as the most
predictable man in Washington. I do not know whether the Biden of 2024 will
decide to finish his public life with a brave, heroic gesture. But the Biden I
worked for would have already directed his team to draw up such a plan.
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