By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

A Modicum Of Restraint

U.S. contributions, however, come with strings attached. Washington will try to preserve its interests, which demand restraint in the targeting of nuclear facilities and oil infrastructure. Israeli interests demand no such forbearance.

All signs, then, point to a significant Israeli response. Iran has demonstrated its ability to inflict damage on Israel, so Israel needs to demonstrate that it can inflict even more damage on Iran. (Thus is the nature of escalation.) The most effective way to do so would be to hit Iran in its territory. It could, for example, send multiple sorties to hit a small number of strategic targets with a disproportionate force – similar to the strategy used to destroy Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s bunker in Lebanon. This kind of attack could inflict enough damage to count as a win for Israel even if it fails to destroy the target entirely. And it could be much more palatable for the U.S., which would almost certainly be involved in or consulted on the operation. The U.S. could set certain targets off limits to preserve its interests while maintaining its relationship with Israel.

Knowing that a counterattack is on the way, Iran is already considering its options. Tehran has made it clear that any Israeli action will be met with action of its own. Politically, the government is split between those who want to make peace with the West, which could, in theory, restrain Israel, and those who want to continue to resist. A massive Israeli strike on Iranian soil would eliminate the possibility of any cease-fire talks, particularly those related to its nuclear program, and empower those who favor escalation.

Even so, a direct military attack on Israel would not be in Iran’s best interests. Besides the fact that Tehran does not want to see the region thrown into all-out war, the country faces several military constraints. Its navy does not have the capability to navigate from the ports in the Persian Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean unopposed or without early intel warning of its adversaries' movements. (The U.S. and Israel can easily target naval moves through the Red Sea.) It has no ballistic missile submarines, and its surface power is limited. And it cannot afford to redeploy naval assets closer to Israel since doing so would leave vulnerable the strategic Strait of Hormuz.

Its air force is similarly unequal to the task. Its fleet – its aging, non-stealth F-14s, F-4s, Mig-29s and KC 700-class refueling tankers – cannot attack Israel directly. Previous efforts to attack Israeli territory through ballistic missiles and drones have failed to maximize damage thanks to Israel’s sophisticated air defense systems. (Notably, earlier attacks, including the one on Oct. 1, were often conducted for ancillary reasons – saving face, a show of force or a reminder to its allies that Iran had not abandoned them – rather than to inflict as much death and destruction as possible.)

An Iranian ground assault is also unlikely. The Iranian military’s newest tank, for example, has a range of 350 miles, with internal fuel bringing its internal capability range to roughly just over 475 miles. The closest route from Tehran to the Syrian-Lebanese border is roughly 1,120 miles. But even if Israel were in range, the cost and complexity of fueling armor and men through terrain that necessarily passes through other countries is utterly disqualifying. It would draw in other countries, including the U.S. and potentially Turkey, and would leave Iran unable to defend itself closer to home.

Tehran’s response, then, will primarily be executed by its proxy groups in Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories and Yemen. For Iran, this will involve supplying more arms, intelligence, money, expertise and equipment to expand operations in their respective areas of operation. Though some question the integrity of the Iranian-proxy relationship, especially now that Hezbollah has taken such a beating, the fact is that these groups have no recourse and no other patron besides Iran to support them. Their loyalty intact – or at least bought off – these groups can be used to open new fronts against Israel and its allies in order to stretch the frontline. This would strain the IDF, which lacks the manpower to fight multiple fronts. For Iran, using proxies also allows the government to respond without actually attacking Israel directly.

Ultimately, Iran’s capabilities are less important to the outcome of the conflict than the U.S.-Israeli relationship. The past year may have tested their ties, but it has yet to fully break them. This means that Washington will likely accept any Israeli response, which we believe will yield some restraint, however small it may be. Israel’s ideal scenario is the elimination of Iran. But an acceptable, second-best goal is to make certain the anti-Israel factions are gone. Israel can't change the reality of Iran’s existence, but perhaps it thinks it can change the way it interacts with Hamas and Hezbollah.

The Israeli Security Cabinet convened on Oct. 10 to decide how it will retaliate against Iran’s recent missile barrage. There’s reason to believe it's retaliation could be severe: One day earlier, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant warned that Israel’s response would be “lethal, precise and above all surprising.” Whatever form it takes, Israel’s actions could escalate the conflict and expand the battlefield throughout the Middle East.

Two major factors are shaping Israel’s response. The first is, at least from Israel’s perspective, the existential nature of the war. For Jerusalem, the fight represents the future of the country’s relationship with the Islamic and Arab worlds. That relationship has shaped much of Israel’s short existence, wherein borders were established and maintained largely through force against what the public sees as enemies in every direction. The second is its ally in the United States. Though formidable, the Israel Defense Forces by themselves lack the capabilities to conduct a massive, sustained strike on Iran – let alone the numbers to defend against counterattacks.

The IDF would have to traverse Jordan and Syria to reach Tehran, with about 1,000 miles (1,600 kilometers) between Tel Aviv and Tehran. Covering that much ground would require access to transit routes (ideally granted from other countries) and refueling capabilities for aircraft, the latter of which is provided by the United States. It therefore needs the financial and military assistance the U.S. can bring to bear.

U.S. contributions, however, come with strings attached. Washington will try to preserve its own interests, which demand restraint in the targeting of nuclear facilities and oil infrastructure. Israeli interests demand no such forbearance.

All signs, then, point to a significant Israeli response. Iran has demonstrated its ability to inflict damage on Israel, so Israel needs to demonstrate that it can inflict even more damage on Iran. (Thus is the nature of escalation.) The most effective way to do so would be to hit Iran in its own territory. It could, for example, send multiple sorties to hit a small number of strategic targets with a disproportionate force – similar to the strategy used to destroy Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s bunker in Lebanon. This kind of attack could inflict enough damage to count as a win for Israel even if it fails to destroy the target entirely. And it could be much more palatable for the U.S., which would almost certainly be involved in or consulted on the operation. The U.S. could set certain targets off limits to preserve its interests while maintaining its relationship with Israel.

Knowing that a counterattack is on the way, Iran is already considering its options. Tehran has made it clear that any Israeli action will be met with action of its own. Politically, the government is split between those who want to make peace with the West, which could, in theory, restrain Israel, and those who want to continue to resist. A massive Israeli strike on Iranian soil would eliminate the possibility of any cease-fire talks, particularly those related to its nuclear program, and empower those who favor escalation.

Even so, a direct military attack on Israel would not be in Iran’s best interests. Besides the fact that Tehran does not want to see the region thrown into all-out war, the country faces several military constraints. Its navy does not have the capability to navigate from the ports in the Persian Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean unopposed or without early intel warning of its adversaries' movements. (The U.S. and Israel can easily target naval moves through the Red Sea.) It has no ballistic missile submarines, and its surface power is limited. And it cannot afford to redeploy naval assets closer to Israel since doing so would leave vulnerable the strategic Strait of Hormuz.

Its air force is similarly unequal to the task. Its fleet – its aging, non-stealth F-14s, F-4s, Mig-29s and KC 700-class refueling tankers – cannot attack Israel directly. Previous efforts to attack Israeli territory through ballistic missiles and drones have failed to maximize damage thanks to Israel’s sophisticated air defense systems. (Notably, earlier attacks, including the one on Oct. 1, were often conducted for ancillary reasons – saving face, a show of force or a reminder to its allies that Iran had not abandoned them – rather than to inflict as much death and destruction as possible.)

An Iranian ground assault is also unlikely. The Iranian military’s newest tank, for example, has a range of 350 miles, with internal fuel bringing its internal capability range to roughly just over 475 miles. The closest route from Tehran to the Syrian-Lebanese border is roughly 1,120 miles. But even if Israel were in range, the cost and complexity of fueling armor and men through terrain that necessarily passes through other countries is utterly disqualifying. It would draw in other countries, including the U.S. and potentially Turkey, and would leave Iran unable to defend itself closer to home.

Tehran’s response, then, will primarily be executed by its proxy groups in Iraq, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories and Yemen. For Iran, this will involve supplying more arms, intelligence, money, expertise and equipment to expand operations in their respective areas of operation. Though some question the integrity of the Iranian-proxy relationship, especially now that Hezbollah has taken such a beating, the fact is that these groups have no recourse and no other patron besides Iran to support them. Their loyalty intact – or at least bought off – these groups can be used to open new fronts against Israel and its allies in order to stretch the frontline. This would strain the IDF, which lacks the manpower to fight multiple fronts. For Iran, using proxies also allows the government to respond without actually attacking Israel directly.

Ultimately, Iran’s capabilities are less important to the outcome of the conflict than the U.S.-Israeli relationship. The past year may have tested their ties, but it has yet to fully break them. This means that Washington will likely accept any Israeli response, which we believe will yield some restraint, however small it may be. Israel’s ideal scenario is the elimination of Iran. But an acceptable, second-best goal is to make certain the anti-Israel factions are gone. Israel can't change the reality of Iran’s existence, but perhaps it thinks it can change the way it interacts with Hamas and Hezbollah.

 

 

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