By Eric Vandenbroeck
and co-workers
Why NATO Must Admit Ukraine
On April 4, I sat at
the great round table inside NATO’s headquarters in Brussels and applauded as Finland
was formally admitted to the alliance. I am happy for my Finnish friends, and I
welcome this shift in the tectonic plates of European security. But my country,
Ukraine, is not yet a NATO member, and this shift will not be complete until it
is. Luckily for us, the wheels of history are turning, and there is nothing
anyone can do to stop them.
Russia’s war on Ukraine is about more than
killing Ukrainians and stealing our land. President Vladimir Putin is trying to
destroy the foundations of the European security order formed after 1945. This
is why the stakes are so high for Ukraine and the entire Euro-Atlantic
community.
Ukraine did not
choose this battle. Nor did the United States and its NATO allies. Russia
started this war. But it falls to Ukraine and its Western partners to bring the
conflict to an end, winning a just victory that guarantees peace and stability
in Europe for generations to come.
Doing so requires
accepting the inevitable: Ukraine will become a NATO member sooner rather than
later. It is time for the alliance to stop making excuses and start the
process that leads to Ukraine’s eventual accession, showing Putin that he has
already failed and forcing him to temper his ambitions. Throughout this war, we
have demonstrated that we are more than ready for membership and have much to
offer the alliance. We need a clear written statement from the Allies laying
out a path to accession.
Excuses, Excuses
As the most
successful defensive alliance in history, NATO is both a guarantor of security
and an expression of a shared political future. But the alliance’s strength
derives from the political will of its members, which has been sorely lacking
when it comes to admitting Ukraine.
At NATO’s 2008 summit
in Bucharest, members agreed to make Ukrainian membership an objective. Still,
they spent more time signaling to Russia that this would not happen (at least
at any point in the foreseeable future) than taking practical steps to make it
a reality. The alliance expressed its will to keep the door to membership open,
in other words, but only on the assumption that Ukraine would not darken NATO’s
doorstep any time soon. Three wars later—in Georgia in 2008, in Ukraine in
2014, and now again in Ukraine—it is clear that ambiguity is Putin’s best ally.
Ukraine has heard
many arguments in the 15 years since the Bucharest summit about why it cannot
join NATO. Alliance members have claimed that admitting new members with a
border with Russia might provoke Moscow. This argument was always wrong, but
repeating it now is laughable. When Russia occupied Crimea in 2014, Ukraine was
officially a non-aligned country with no ambition to join NATO. In 2022, when
Russia started its terrible all-out invasion, NATO still had not opened a
natural path for Ukrainian membership. As I write these lines, an air raid
siren is sounding in Kyiv, and Russia is amid a months-long assault on Bakhmut.
Moscow is also preparing to repel a series of Ukraine’s counteroffensives. So I
have a simple response to anyone who argues that admitting Ukraine to NATO would
provoke Russia: Are you serious?
Amazingly, opponents
of Ukrainian membership have continued to make this argument even after more
than a year of all-out war. Yet Finland’s accession demonstrates once and for
all why it doesn’t hold water. Russia responded to NATO’s latest
enlargement—which puts a member directly on Russia’s border—not by lashing out
at Finland but by downplaying the significance of the country’s accession,
presumably to avoid highlighting its failure to keep Helsinki out of the alliance.
Those who oppose
Ukrainian accession have also argued that Ukraine is divided over whether to
join NATO. In the past, this was true, but no longer. Ukrainians had grown
steadily more supportive of joining the alliance since 2014 when Russia
illegally seized Crimea and ignited a war in the Donbas. In 2019, Ukraine
formally amended its constitution to enshrine its commitment to join NATO. The
vast majority of Ukrainians—82 percent, according to a February 2023 poll by
the International Republican Institute—now support joining. And there is no
longer a regional divide on the issue: a majority of Ukrainians are pro-NATO in
all parts of the country.
The residents of NATO
countries increasingly see Ukraine as part of their broader community.
According to an EU-wide survey conducted in February 2023, 68 percent of EU
citizens consider Russia’s attack on Ukraine an attack on Europe. This is the
view of 80 percent of Poles and Spaniards, 70 percent of Dutch people, and 65
percent of Germans and the French. The leaders of most NATO countries and their
public view Ukraine as an integral part of Western security architecture. It is
time to act on these beliefs.
The newest argument
against Ukrainian accession is that the issue divides the alliance. But in
Europe, this same objection was raised by those seeking to block Ukraine’s path
toward membership in the European Union. A little over a year ago, we were told
that the EU was divided over whether to grant Ukraine candidate status. In June
2022, however, all 27 EU member states supported granting Ukraine this status,
giving the bloc a new sense of unity, purpose, and strength. The
same will happen to NATO when a decision on Ukraine’s path to membership is
taken.
Russian aggression
against Ukraine has reinvigorated the alliance and given it a new raison
d’être. Finland joined after resolving its differences with NATO countries.
Sweden will follow suit, and Ukraine can, too. It’s just a matter of political
will. If we focus on division, we will be divided. But if we look for practical
solutions, NATO will be stronger and more unified. It’s time to drop this
excuse and finally accept that there is no alternative to admitting Ukraine if
NATO’s goal is to ensure the security of the Euro-Atlantic community.
I am not questioning
NATO’s current commitment to Ukraine. Alliance members have delivered vital
assistance to Kyiv since Russia’s full-scale invasion began. But I am asking
for NATO’s strategy regarding Ukraine and the long-term security of the
Euro-Atlantic area. Fear has clouded the alliance’s judgment, leading it to
adopt an overly conservative approach that has had grave consequences for
thousands of Ukrainians kidnapped, raped, tortured, displaced, or killed.
NATO’s flawed strategy has also allowed Russia to undermine the security
of the West with cyberattacks, espionage, and political interference.
The current leaders
of NATO countries did not make the misguided decisions that brought us here.
Still, they can make the bold decision to expand the alliance and thereby safeguard
the Euro-Atlantic. Leaving Ukraine exposed will only lead to further
instability and Russian aggression.
Beyond Bucharest
Ukraine seeks NATO membership
and, with it, the protection of Article 5, which requires members to treat an
armed attack against one or more members in Europe or North America as an
attack against them all and “to take such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic area.” Who in our position would not seek such protections? But
we are realists. We are not seeking to drag the United States or other NATO
countries into a war. This is our war, and we are fighting it successfully with
the generous support of our partners and allies.
We have never asked
anyone else to put boots on the ground, and we do not intend to make such a
request. We don’t seek a magic wand that will miraculously end the war and eliminate
the need to win it on the battlefield. We are asking for a concrete timetable
for Ukraine’s accession to NATO.
At the alliance’s
upcoming summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, NATO members could send a written signal
to Russia that the game is over: Ukraine is part of the West, it is on NATO’s
doorstep, and it will soon walk through the door. To avoid misunderstandings,
we in Ukraine are not talking about immediate membership at the Vilnius summit
but about NATO allies taking a historic step toward admitting the country.
There is no need for
a membership action plan to set specific benchmarks for the country to meet
before accession; Finland and Sweden have shown that such programs are
unnecessary, and Ukraine is more than qualified to join. The time has come to
offer clarity instead of reiterating the open-door policy and letting Putin
exploit its ambiguity. NATO must resist the temptation to make additional
demands of Ukraine that would further delay its membership.
Instead, NATO could
make a political decision to put forward a timetable for Ukraine’s accession,
either at the Vilnius summit or by the end of 2023. Accession will be a
process, and achieving the ultimate goal of Ukrainian membership in the
alliance will depend on the security situation, but this process needs to start
without delay.
It would be
reasonable for NATO members to decide what kinds of security guarantees they
wish to offer Ukraine right now, pending the accession, and which contracts
will continue to apply after Ukraine becomes a NATO ally (in addition to those
enshrined in the NATO treaty). If NATO fails to act at the Vilnius summit,
however, it will continue to carry the shame of Bucharest. The time to work is
now.
An Asset, Not A Liability
Ukraine has much to
gain from NATO but also has much to offer in return. Ukraine is defending
NATO’s entire eastern flank and sharing what it learns with alliance members.
For instance, the Ukrainian military has shown that although the NATO principle
of decentralization—which delegates decision-making authority to
subordinates—works well with small units of professional soldiers and
contractors, it is ill-suited to a full-scale war in which drafted soldiers to
make up as much as 70 percent of units. Ukraine’s experience has also shown
that contrary to NATO practices, the commanders who train units could be the
same commanders who lead those units into battle. Other lessons that Ukraine
has taught NATO include the value of innovation, ingenuity, local initiative,
civilian support for the military, and civil defense.
During the war,
Ukraine has helped strengthen NATO’s rules, standards, and procedures,
improving the alliance’s ability to fight modern, high-intensity battles.
Ukraine also possesses unparalleled experience in countering hybrid threats,
conducting information warfare, and ensuring the resilience of state
institutions and critical infrastructure. Today, millions of Ukrainians are
honing their skills in Europe’s bloodiest war of the twenty-first century.
Tomorrow, they will use those skills to bolster NATO’s collective security.
The best way to
ensure Euro-Atlantic security is to welcome Ukraine into NATO. Politicians,
diplomats, and analysts can always be counted on to develop new arguments for
keeping Ukraine outside the alliance, as they have been doing for years. The
good news is that each new idea is weaker than the last. The bad news is that
constantly disproving them wastes precious time at the expense of people’s
security. Ukraine needs NATO, and NATO needs Ukraine.
For updates click hompage here