By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

The first negotiated defeat of a modern democracy

Without a course correction, America may soon preside over the first negotiated defeat of a modern democracy at the hands of an aggressive autocracy in the heart of Europe, an area that American presidents have declared as vital to its national interest for 80 years.. Trump’s New Ukraine Policy Is Old Hat. The White House may soon preside over the first negotiated defeat of a modern democracy.

President Donald Trump has a new Ukraine policy. It’s the same as his old Ukraine policy—force Kyiv to make more concessions and hope that Russian President Vladimir Putin will be satisfied, take the deal, and set the stage for Trump to get his Nobel Prize. It hasn’t worked before, and it won’t work now. Worse, it comes at a moment of critical vulnerability for Ukraine. Reports from the field suggest that the fighting has intensified, the metrics are worsening, and, without action, Ukraine could soon suffer a military defeat that will give Russia an important symbolic victory and perhaps more.

Pokrovsk, an industrial and rail hub in Eastern Ukraine, is teetering. For months, Ukraine has held on against relentless Russian pressure. But now, Russian troops are close to encircling the area, leaving just a 10-kilometer corridor through which Ukraine can supply what remains of its defense, according to the Kyiv Independent. President Volodymyr Zelensky recently said Russian forces in the sector outnumber the Ukrainians 8 to 1. The Ukrainian Defense Ministry has said that over 300 Russian troops have infiltrated the city, and Moscow is trying to send sabotage teams to create chaos from within.

The city of Pokrovsk, Ukraine, is seen from above, following months of intense fighting near the front line.

Pokrovsk would be the largest urban area to fall in more than two years. And this is not simply about one city. For much of the war, Pokrovsk has been a central node for Ukrainian logistics close to Ukraine’s linked urban fortresses. Ukraine has shifted its supply networks somewhat to account for this, but Pokrovsk’s collapse could still endanger the entire defensive line in Donetsk.

Moscow’s progress stems less from tactical brilliance than from political will and sheer endurance. Russian budget data suggests about 29,000 people signed military contracts per month from January to September, according to the Institute for the Study of War. Ukrainian estimates show Russia has been losing roughly 35,000 soldiers a month over the same period. In other words, Moscow is losing more troops than it recruits—yet using increasingly lucrative pay packages, it is replacing its losses fast enough to sustain the campaign.

Ukraine cannot replicate that mercenary strategy. Over 110,000 AWOL cases were registered in the first seven months of this year. In some battalions, commanders report having fewer than 10 combat-effective infantrymen. Ukraine mobilizes around 30,000 people per month, yet only a third are fit to fight. Zelensky says the army is 1 million strong. To switch out exhausted units, a Ukrainian military analyst says Zelensky should have three times more.

Exhaustion is now a strategic threat. Many soldiers spend 100 to 200 days on the front line with almost no rotation, according to LeMonde, as drone-saturated skies make relief and movement nearly impossible.

What is causing or at least massively compounding this crisis is the collapse of external support. The United States has effectively halted direct large-scale military aid. Some deliveries have resumed, primarily when paid for by European or other partners. Key systems, including long-range missiles, Patriot batteries, and precision-guided rockets, are often stalled in procurement bottlenecks or held back due to stockpile concerns.

Europe promised to fill the gap. It has fallen short. The European Union pledged in 2023 to send 1 million artillery shells within a year. It missed the deadline. Ammunition supplies lag behind battlefield needs.

Ukraine remains critically short of the long-range systems required to strike deep into Russian territory—particularly to hit oil infrastructure, the lifeblood of Russia’s war economy. Washington has allowed Ukraine access to only some of the weapons that would make such attacks truly consequential.

Money is also running out. The International Monetary Fund says Ukraine will need at least $65 billion in external financing through 2027, assuming major hostilities end by late 2026—an increasingly unlikely scenario. According to the Economist, this year’s war burden alone amounts to roughly $100 billion or about half of Ukraine’s GDP. Yet the European Union remains divided on how to provide the necessary support. Belgium has blocked the E.U.’s use of frozen Russian sovereign assets, worried about legal risks and potential retaliation from Moscow. Russian threats have produced European appeasement.

Reporting now suggests the Trump team is considering asking Ukraine to make additional land concessions that Putin has demanded. (The administration’s Ukraine envoy, who has taken a more aggressive stand against Russia than others in the White House, has said he would depart in January.) Ukrainians overwhelmingly reject such concessions, and the country’s constitution forbids altering territory without a referendum. Were Russia to get these concessions, it might well decide to hold out for even more control over Ukraine, turning it into a client state such as Belarus.

Russia’s strategy has always been to outlast the West, believing that the U.S. and Europe would tire of this conflict. That belief is being reinforced not by Moscow’s victories, but by the West’s internal divisions and dysfunctions.

Without a course correction, America may soon preside over the first negotiated defeat of a modern democracy at the hands of an aggressive autocracy in the heart of Europe, an area that American presidents have declared as vital to its national interest for 80 years.

Incidentally, the Nobel Peace Prize is awarded for peace, not surrender.

 

 

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