By Eric Vandenbroeck
and co-workers
A Plan For Getting To The Negotiating
Table
After just over a
year, the war in Ukraine has turned out far better for Ukraine than most predicted.
Russia’s effort to subjugate its neighbor has failed. Ukraine remains an
independent, sovereign, functioning democracy, holding on to roughly 85 percent
of the territory it controlled before Russia’s 2014 invasion. At the same time,
it is difficult to feel sanguine about where the war is headed. The human and
economic costs, already enormous, are poised to climb as both Moscow and Kyiv
ready their next moves on the battlefield. The Russian military’s numerical
superiority likely gives it the ability to counter Ukraine’s greater
operational skill and morale and access to Western support. Accordingly, the
most likely outcome of the conflict is not a complete Ukrainian victory but a
bloody stalemate.
Against this
backdrop, calls
for a diplomatic end to the conflict are understandably growing. But
with Moscow and Kyiv both vowing to keep up the fight, conditions
still need to be ripe for a negotiated settlement. Russia seems determined to
occupy a larger chunk of the Donbas. Ukraine appears to be preparing an assault
to break the land bridge between the Donbas and Crimea, clearing the way, as
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky often asserts, for Ukraine to expel
Russian forces and restore its territorial integrity fully.
The West
needs an approach that recognizes these realities without sacrificing its
principles. The best path forward is a sequenced two-pronged strategy
aimed at first bolstering Ukraine’s military capability. Then, when the
fighting season winds down late this year, Moscow and Kyiv usher from the
battlefield to the negotiating table. The West can start by immediately
expediting the flow of weapons to Ukraine and increasing their quantity and
quality. The goal could be to bolster Ukraine’s defenses while making its
coming offensive as successful as possible, imposing heavy losses on Russia,
foreclosing Moscow’s military options, and increasing its willingness to
contemplate a diplomatic settlement. By the time Ukraine’s anticipated
offensive is over, Kyiv may also warm up to a negotiated settlement, having
given its best shot on the battlefield and facing growing constraints on its
own manpower and help from abroad.
The second prong of
the West’s strategy could be to roll out later this year a plan for
brokering a cease-fire and a follow-on peace process aimed at permanently
ending the conflict. This diplomatic gambit may well fail. Even if Russia
and Ukraine continue to take significant losses, one or both may prefer to keep
fighting. But as the war’s costs mount and the prospect of a military stalemate
looms, it is worth pressing for a durable truce that could prevent renewed
conflict and, even better, set the stage for lasting peace.
The War That Will Not End
For now, a diplomatic
resolution to the conflict is out of reach. Russian President Vladimir Putin
likely worries that if he stops fighting now, Russians will fault him for
launching a costly, futile war. After all, Russian forces do not entirely
control any of the four oblasts that Moscow unilaterally annexed last
September. NATO has grown bigger and stronger, and Ukraine is more alienated
than ever from Russia. Putin seems to believe that time is on his side,
calculating that he can ride out economic sanctions, which have failed to
strangle the Russian economy and maintain popular support for the war, an
operation that, according to polls from the Levada Center, more than 70 percent
of Russians still back. Putin doubts the staying power of Ukraine and its
Western supporters, expecting their resolve to wane. And he surely calculates
that as his new conscripts enter the fight, Russia should be able to expand its
territorial gains, allowing him to declare that he has substantially expanded
Russia’s borders when the fighting stops.
Ukraine is also in no
mood to settle. The country’s leadership and public alike understandably seek
to regain control of all the territory Russia has occupied since 2014,
including Crimea. Ukrainians also want to hold Moscow accountable for Russian
forces’ war crimes and make it pay for the immense reconstruction costs.
Besides, Kyiv has good reason to doubt whether Putin can be trusted to abide by
any peace deal. Rather than looking to the West for diplomatic intervention,
Ukrainian leaders are asking for more military and economic help. The United
States and Europe have provided considerable intelligence, training, and
hardware. Still, they have held off providing military systems of even greater
capability, such as long-range missiles and advanced aircraft, for fear that
doing so would provoke Russia to escalate, whether by using a nuclear weapon in
Ukraine or deliberately attacking the troops or territory of a NATO member.
Although Washington
is right to watch the risk of escalation, its concerns are overblown. Western
policy is caught between the goals of preventing catastrophic failure (in which
Russia swallows an under-armed Ukraine) and catastrophic success (in which an
over-armed Ukraine leads a cornered Putin to escalate). But it isn't easy to see
what Russia would gain from escalation. Expanding the war by attacking a NATO
member would not be in Russia’s interests since the country has a hard enough
time-fighting Ukraine alone. Its forces are severely depleted after a year of
the war. Nor would using nuclear weapons serve it well. A nuclear attack would
likely prompt NATO to enter the war directly and decimate Russian positions
throughout Ukraine. It could also alienate China and India, both of which have
warned Russia against using nuclear weapons.
But the
implausibility of nuclear use isn’t the only reason the West should discount
Russia’s posturing; giving in to nuclear blackmail would signal other countries
that such threats work, setting back the nonproliferation agenda and weakening
deterrence. China, for instance, might conclude that nuclear threats can deter
the United States from coming to Taiwan’s defense in the event of a Chinese
attack.
A destroyed vehicle in Chasiv
Yar, Ukraine.
It is, thus, time for
the West to stop deterring itself and start giving Ukraine the tanks,
long-range missiles, and other weapons it needs to wrest back control of more
of its territory in the coming months. European countries have begun to deliver
Leopard tanks, and the United States has pledged 31 Abrams
tanks, which are scheduled to arrive in the fall. But both sides
of the Atlantic could increase the delivery size and
tempo. More tanks would enhance Ukrainian forces’ ability to punch through
Russia’s defensive lines in Ukraine’s south. Long-range missiles—namely, the
Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, which the United States has so far
refused to provide—would allow Ukraine to hit Russian positions, command
posts, and ammunition depots deep in Russian-held territory, preparing the way
for a more successful Ukrainian offensive. The U.S. military could also begin
training Ukrainian pilots to fly F-16s. Training would take time, but starting
now would allow the United States to deliver advanced aircraft when the pilots
are ready, signaling to Russia that Ukraine’s ability to wage war is on an
upward trajectory.
Yet, for all the good
that more excellent Western military help would do, it is unlikely to change
the fundamental reality that this war is headed for a stalemate. It is
possible that Ukraine’s coming offensive will prove stunningly successful and
allows the country to reclaim all occupied territory, including Crimea,
resulting in a complete Russian defeat. But such an outcome is improbable. Even
if the West steps up its military assistance, Ukraine is poised to fall well
short of vanquishing Russian forces. It is running out of soldiers and
ammunition, and its economy continues deteriorating. Russian troops are dug in,
and fresh recruits are heading to the front.
Moreover, if Moscow’s
military position were to become precarious, it is quite possible that China
would provide arms to Russia, whether directly or through third countries.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has made a big, long-term wager on Putin and will
not stand idly by as Russia suffers a decisive loss. Xi’s visit to Moscow in
March strongly suggests that he is doubling down on his partnership
with Putin, not backing away from it. Xi might also calculate the
modest risks of providing military assistance to Russia. After all, his country
is already decoupling from the West, and U.S. policy toward China seems
destined to get tougher regardless of how much Beijing supports Moscow.
Ramping up the
provision of military assistance to Ukraine, while it will help Ukrainian
forces progress on the battlefield, thus holds little promise of enabling Kyiv
to restore full territorial integrity. Later this year, a stalemate will likely
emerge along a new contact line. When that happens, an obvious question will
arise: What next?
After Stalemate
More of the same makes
little sense. Even from Ukraine’s perspective, it would be unwise to keep
doggedly pursuing a complete military victory that could prove Pyrrhic.
Ukrainian forces have already suffered over 100,000 casualties and lost many of
their best troops. The Ukrainian economy has shrunk by some 30 percent, the
poverty rate is spiking, and Russia continues to bombard the country’s critical
infrastructure. Around eight million Ukrainians have fled the country, with
millions internally displaced. Ukraine should not risk destroying itself in
pursuit of goals that are likely out of reach.
Come to the end of
this fighting season, the United States and Europe will also have good reason
to abandon their stated policy of supporting Ukraine for “as long as it takes,”
as U.S. President Joe Biden has put it. Maintaining Ukraine’s existence as a
sovereign and secure democracy is a priority, but achieving that goal does not
require the country to recover full control of Crimea and the Donbas soon. Nor
should the West worry that pushing for a cease-fire before Kyiv reclaims all
its territory will cause the rules-based international order to crumble.
Ukrainian fortitude and Western resolve have already rebuffed Russia’s effort
to subjugate Ukraine, dealt Moscow a decisive strategic defeat, and
demonstrated to other would-be revisionists that pursuing territorial conquest
can be costly and vexing. Yes, minimizing Russian gains and showing that
aggression doesn’t pay is critical, but this goal must be weighed against other
priorities.
The reality is that
continued large-scale support of Kyiv carries broader strategic risks. The war
is eroding the West’s military readiness and depleting its weapons stockpiles;
the defense industrial base cannot keep up with Ukraine’s expenditure of equipment
and ammunition. NATO countries cannot discount the possibility of direct
hostilities with Russia. The United States must prepare for potential military
action in Asia (to deter or respond to any Chinese move against Taiwan) and the
Middle East (against Iran or terrorist networks).
The war is imposing
high costs on the global economy, as well. It has disrupted supply chains,
contributing to high inflation and energy and food shortages. The Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development estimates that the war will reduce
global economic output by $2.8 trillion in 2023. From France to Egypt to Peru,
economic duress is triggering political unrest. The war is also polarizing the
international system. As the geopolitical rivalry between the Western
democracies and a Chinese-Russian coalition augurs the return
of a two-bloc world, most of the rest of the globe is sitting on the
sidelines, preferring nonalignment to ensnarement in a new era of East-West
rivalry. The disorder radiates outward from the war in Ukraine.
Against this
backdrop, neither Ukraine nor its NATO supporters can take Western unity for
granted. American resolve is crucial for European staying power, but Washington
faces mounting political pressure to reduce spending, rebuild U.S. readiness,
and bulk up its capabilities in Asia. Now that Republicans control the House of
Representatives, it will be harder for the Biden administration to secure
sizable aid packages for Ukraine. And policy toward Ukraine could change
significantly should Republicans win the White House in the 2024 election. It
is time to ready a Plan B.
Getting To Yes
Given the likely
trajectory of the war, the United States and its partners need to begin
formulating a diplomatic endgame now. Even as NATO members ramp up military
assistance to support Ukraine’s coming offensive, Washington could start
consultations with its European allies and with Kyiv on a diplomatic initiative
to be launched later in the year.
Under this approach,
Ukraine’s Western supporters would propose a cease-fire as Ukraine’s coming
offensive reaches its limits. Ideally, Ukraine and Russia would pull back their
troops and heavy weapons from the new contact line, creating a demilitarized
zone. A neutral organization—the UN or the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe—would send observers to monitor and enforce the
cease-fire and pullback. The West could approach other influential countries,
including China and India, to support the cease-fire proposal. Doing so would
complicate diplomacy, but getting buy-in from Beijing and New Delhi would
increase the pressure on the Kremlin. If China refused to support the
cease-fire, Xi’s ongoing calls for a diplomatic offensive would be exposed as
an empty gesture.
Assuming a cease-fire
holds, peace talks should follow. Such talks could occur along two parallel
tracks. One way would be direct talks between Ukraine and Russia on peace
terms, facilitated by international mediators. On the second track, NATO allies
would start a strategic dialogue with Russia on arms control and the broader
European security architecture. Putin’s effort to undo the post–Cold War
security order has backfired and strengthened NATO. But that reality only
increases the need for NATO and Russia to begin a constructive dialogue to
prevent a new arms race, rebuild military-to-military contacts, and address
other issues of common concern, including nuclear proliferation. The “2 plus 4”
talks that helped end the Cold War provide a good precedent for this
approach. East and West Germany negotiated their unification directly,
while the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet
Union negotiated the broader post–Cold War security
architecture.
Provided that Ukraine
makes battlefield gains this summer, it is at least plausible that Putin would
view a cease-fire and peace plan as a face-saving off-ramp. To make this
approach even more enticing, the West could offer some limited relief from
sanctions in return for Russia’s willingness to abide by a cease-fire, agree to
a demilitarized zone, and participate meaningfully in peace talks. It is
conceivable that Putin would reject a cease-fire—or accept it only to rebuild
his military and make a last run at conquering Ukraine. But little would be
lost by testing Moscow’s readiness for compromise. Regardless of Russia’s
response, the West would continue providing the arms Ukraine needs to defend
itself over the long term and ensure that any pause in the fighting did not
work to Russia’s advantage. And if Russia rejected a cease-fire (or accepted
one and then violated it), its intransigence would deepen its diplomatic
isolation, shore up the sanctions regime, and strengthen support for Ukraine in
the United States and Europe.
Another plausible
outcome is that Russia would agree to a cease-fire to pocket its remaining
territorial gains but has no intention of negotiating in good faith to secure a
lasting peace settlement. Presumably, Ukraine would enter such negotiations by
demanding its top priorities: restoring its 1991 borders, substantial
reparations, and accountability for war crimes. But because Putin would surely
reject these demands out of hand, a prolonged diplomatic stalemate would then
emerge, effectively producing a new frozen conflict. Ideally, the cease-fire
would hold, leading to a status quo like the one that prevails on the Korean
Peninsula, which has remained largely stable without a formal peace pact for 70
years. Cyprus has similarly been divided but stable for decades. This is not an
ideal outcome, but it is preferable to a high-intensity war that continues for
years. What is doable.
Convincing Kyiv
Persuading Kyiv to go
along with a cease-fire and uncertain, the diplomatic effort could be no less
challenging than getting Moscow to do so. Many Ukrainians would see this
proposal as a sellout and fear that the cease-fire lines would merely become
new de facto borders. Zelensky would need to scale back his war dramatically
aims after having promised victory since the early months of the war—no easy
task for even the most talented of politicians.
But Kyiv may
ultimately find much to like in the plan. Even though the end of fighting would
freeze in place a new line of contact between Russia and Ukraine, Kyiv would
not be asked or pressured to give up the goal of taking back all of its land,
including Crimea and the Donbas. Instead, the plan would be to defer settling
the status of the land and people still under Russian occupation. Kyiv would
forgo an attempt to retake these territories by force now, a gambit that would
surely be costly but is likely to fail, instead accepting that the recovery of
territorial integrity must await a diplomatic breakthrough. A breakthrough, in
turn, may be possible only after Putin is no longer in power. In the meantime,
Western governments could promise to fully lift sanctions against Russia and
normalize relations with it only if Moscow signed an acceptable peace agreement
with Kyiv.
This formula thus blends
strategic pragmatism with political principles. Peace in Ukraine cannot be held
hostage to war aims that, however morally justified, are likely unattainable.
At the same time, the West should not reward Russian aggression by compelling
Ukraine to accept the loss of territory by force permanently. The solution is
to end the war while deferring the ultimate disposition of land still under
Russian occupation.
Even if a cease-fire
was held and a diplomatic process got underway, NATO countries should continue
to arm Ukraine, removing any doubts in Kyiv that its compliance with a
diplomatic roadmap would mean the end of military support. Moreover, the United
States could make clear to Kyiv that if Putin violated the cease-fire while
Ukraine honored it, Washington would further step up the flow of arms and waive
restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to target military positions inside Russia
from which attacks are being launched. Should Putin spurn a clear opportunity
to end the war, Western governments would win renewed public favor for
providing such additional support to Ukraine.
As another incentive
to Ukraine, the West should offer it a formalized security pact. Although
NATO is unlikely to offer membership to Ukraine—a consensus within the alliance
appears out of reach for now—a subset of NATO members, including the United
States, could conclude a security agreement with Ukraine that pledges it
adequate means of self-defense. Although it would fall short of an ironclad
security guarantee, this security pact might resemble Israel’s defense
relationship with the United States or the relationship that Finland and Sweden
enjoyed with NATO before they decided to join the alliance. The pact might also
include a provision similar to Article 4 of the NATO treaty. It calls for
consultations when any party judges its territorial integrity, political
independence, or security to be threatened.
Alongside this
security pact, the EU should craft a long-term economic support pact and
propose a timetable for admission to the EU, guaranteeing Ukraine is on the
path toward full integration into the union. Under the best circumstances,
Ukrainians have tough days ahead of them; EU membership would offer them the
light at the end of the tunnel they so deserve to see.
Even with these inducements,
Ukraine might still refuse the call for a cease-fire. If so, it would hardly be
the first time in history that a partner dependent on U.S. support balked at
being pressured to scale back its objectives. But if Kyiv did start, the
political reality is that support for Ukraine could not be sustained in the
United States and Europe, especially if Russia accepted the cease-fire. Ukraine
would have little choice but to accede to a policy that gave it the economic
and military support needed to secure the territory under its control—the vast
majority of the country—while taking off the table the liberation by force of
those territories still under Russian occupation. Moreover, the West would
continue to use sanctions and diplomatic leverage to restore Ukraine’s
territorial integrity—but at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield.
A Way Out
For over a year, the
West has allowed Ukraine to define success and set the war aims of the West.
This policy, regardless of whether it made
sense at the outset of the war, has now run its
course. It is unwise because Ukraine’s goals conflict with other
Western interests. And it is unsustainable because the war’s costs are
mounting, and Western publics and their governments are growing
weary of providing ongoing support. As a global power, the United
States must acknowledge that a maximal definition of the interests at stake in
the war has produced a policy that increasingly conflicts with other U.S.
priorities.
The good news is that
there is a possible path out of this impasse. The West should do more now to
help Ukraine defend itself and advance on the battlefield, putting it in the
best position possible at the negotiating table later this year. In the
meantime, Washington should set a diplomatic course that ensures the security
and viability of Ukraine within its de facto borders—while working to restore
the country’s territorial integrity over the long term. This approach may be
too much for some and not enough for others. But unlike the alternatives, it
has the advantage of blending what is desirable with what is doable.
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