By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

How the U.S. and Iran Can Break the Nuclear Deadlock

The History of the Middle East had a checkered early history. In contemporary international relations, security is not just something countries seek for themselves. It is also a concept they use to justify controlling, constraining, and directing others’ behavior. When political scientists speak of “securitization,” they refer to a process through which a particular issue is portrayed as an existential threat, justifying extraordinary measures instead of something that governments can address through normal politics.

The Islamic Republic of Iran serves as a perfect illustration. Over the last two decades, Israel and the United States have tried to persuade the world to stop treating Iran as a normal country and to instead treat it like the international system’s leading danger. The result has been constant denunciations, crushing sanctions, threats of military action, and most recently, military operations against its territory—carried out during diplomatic negotiations between Tehran and Washington. Iran, in response, has been forced to devote more resources and attention to defense. It also increased uranium enrichment in defiance, to show that it would not be pressured into submission. The external securitization of Iran has fed into a parallel dynamic at home, as the state adopted a stricter approach in dealing with domestic social challenges, responding to these challenges with tighter restrictions.

The result is a securitization cycle: a vicious spiral in which Iran and its adversaries feel compelled to adopt more hostile policies in response to each other’s behavior. This phenomenon is somewhat like the security dilemma, where one government’s decision to bolster its capabilities prompts others to do the same. But with the security dilemma, each side is reacting to material increases in the other’s capacity. This cycle begins with rhetoric. The target country is portrayed as a threat, and then is treated as a threat. And in response, it turns to activities—such as bolstering its missile capabilities or increasing enrichment—that can be used to corroborate the initial allegation. The cycle, in other words, produces a self-fulfilling prophecy. The securitized country gradually distances itself from independent agency and becomes trapped in a series of reactive behaviors.

Breaking this cycle will not be easy, and it will require that foreign powers respect Iran’s rights and dignity and stop constantly defaming, threatening, and coercing a millennia-old civilization-state. But there are steps that Tehran can take to help in breaking the vicious securitization cycle. It can start by shoring up domestic support through economic reforms, bolstering its hand in international negotiations. After all, the Iranian people have proved to be Iran’s greatest asset in resisting and deterring foreign aggression. Tehran can also recalibrate its emphasis on material defensive power—an emphasis that often amplifies threat perceptions—and instead prioritize cooperation and coordination, particularly at the regional level. It can establish a frank dialogue with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to address mutual concerns and find a way to resume cooperation. And it can engage with the United States to manage their differences, starting with the nuclear issue and sanctions.

A billboard featuring the late Shiite military leaders Hassan Nasrallah, Hashem Safieddine, and Qassem Soleimani, Tehran, October 2025

 

Hard Pressed

Over the past two decades, Iran has been the target of intense securitization by Israel and the United States. Together, the two have constructed and disseminated a narrative that portrays Iran as an existential threat not just to its region but also to the entire globe. Benjamin Netanyahu, who called the Iranian government “a messianic apocalyptic cult,” alleged in a speech before the Knesset in 1992 that “Iran is three to five years from being able to produce a nuclear weapon.” U.S. President Donald Trump, among his many insults, has called Iran “a very evil place.” The manifest absurdity of these claims hasn’t stopped either of the two from continuing to advance them and engage in increasingly belligerent behavior. The United States has implemented extraordinary economic sanctions against Iran. Israel, aided by Washington, has bombed Iran’s infrastructure and killed its military leaders, scientists, and ordinary civilians.

As a result, Iran has been forced to react with defiant policies instead of pursuing its initial goal-oriented plans. In response to growing U.S. and Israeli pressure, it increased its uranium enrichment level to 60 percent and reduced its cooperation with the IAEA. Following the unprovoked joint U.S.-Israeli attacks, ordinary Iranians began debating whether Iran’s defense doctrine should change to include nuclear weapons. Calls for blocking the Strait of Hormuz have gained momentum. Had it not been for such aggression, Iran would have continued its unprecedented cooperation with the IAEA under the 2015 nuclear deal. It would have focused on regional cooperation, which it has championed since 1985.

Iran’s securitization has created a siege mentality, which often leads to the imposition of tighter social controls. These include restrictions on the Internet and social media and surveillance measures intended to root out spies and saboteurs. Such measures are certainly ineffective at addressing the sources of domestic discontent: economic hardship, the erosion of social capital, and a widening gap between the state and society. But they are what happens when a siege mentality is imposed on a country for decades. In Tehran’s case, the securitization began with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein—who waged war on Iran for eight years—and with separatist violence and massive terrorist operations shortly after the country’s 1979 revolution. It has continued thanks to constant U.S. and Israeli threats and coercion. Under these circumstances, any government would become consumed with real and perceived existential external threats to its dignity and independence.

And external threats are part of why Iran faces such hardship in the first place. Tehran, after all, has been forced to spend more on its military and less on development and welfare because Iraq, Israel, and the United States have attacked it. In addition, the economic warfare Washington has waged against Iran—via U.S. President Barack Obama’s crippling sanctions and then Trump’s maximum pressure campaign—has led to huge losses in the rial’s value, unbearable inflation, and rampant corruption to circumvent sanctions. Yet rather than see their own role in immiserating Iranians, outside powers have made politically charged, exaggerated, and selective portrayals of the Islamic Republic as a violator of human rights. This, in turn, has intensified the cycle of securitization and further reduced Iran’s capacity for independent agency in the global arena.

 

State and Society

To build both a better Iran and a safer world, Tehran and its antagonists will need to find a way out of this spiral. What will not work is apparent. Pressure has not persuaded Iran to change its behavior. Similarly, Iran’s defensive policies, such as increased nuclear enrichment, have never diminished perceived threats. Securitization operates in the realm of mental perceptions rather than material capability. As a result, defensive measures by the target often end up playing into the hands of hostile powers by strengthening their narratives. This is particularly true regarding provocative rhetoric, such as absurd statements in the 2010s by irresponsible Iranian politicians that Iran controlled four Arab capitals—Damascus, Baghdad, Beirut, and Sana’a—which were used by securitizing forces to justify their pressure against Iran.

That might make it seem as if Tehran is inextricably trapped. But history shows that, through careful diplomacy, it can find a way out. Iran was able to break the securitization cycle during the first half of the 2010s by engaging in dialogue with the United States, culminating in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which sought to ensure that, in return for economic normalization, Iran would never develop a nuclear weapon. The agreement changed Iran’s international environment (if only temporarily). The UN Security Council confirmed this reality in Resolution 2231, which declared “that the conclusion of the JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue” and expressed the entire body’s “desire to build a new relationship with Iran strengthened by the implementation of the JCPOA.”

Iran’s success in securing this agreement was primarily the result of high turnout in the 2013 presidential election, which dispelled illusions in the United States and Europe about the imminent collapse of the Islamic Republic—illusions that dated to Iran’s post-2009 election unrest. The 2013 election also provided domestic legitimacy to the incoming Rouhani administration, which sought to preserve and protect the rights of the Iranian people through dialogue rather than defiance. Breaking the securitization cycle, in other words, began at home, by building a broad domestic consensus. Iran can create such a consensus again, but doing so will require establishing a national dialogue among political groups, social factions, and the general population. Thankfully, Iran already has online platforms, created by nongovernmental organizations, that citizens can use to register complaints about policies and bureaucrats. These platforms also keep track of how widespread such complaints are. The government should encourage this reporting, and it should require that state agencies take corrective measures in response to such complaints. This would increase the government’s social capital and thus lay the groundwork for implementing policies aimed at countering securitization.

The Iranian government can further reinforce public confidence by improving Iranians’ living conditions. Although the United States’ economic war on Iran precludes massive economic improvements in the immediate future, the government can still combat corruption, enhance transparency, and curb the rent-seeking behavior that arises from sanctions circumvention. Doing so would reduce social and economic disparities, increase public satisfaction, and thus lessen the need for internal, securitized policies.

 

Good Neighbor

As it builds consensus at home, Tehran can begin working to improve its international reputation. Officials should prioritize confidence-building measures centered on improving dialogue with Iran’s neighbors. They might, for example, pursue former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s proposed Hormuz Peace Endeavor, which aimed at fostering cooperation and confidence-building among countries neighboring the strategic Strait of Hormuz. They could also create a Muslim West Asian Dialogue Association, which aims to replace enmity with amity through conversations among the eight Persian Gulf littoral states, along with Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. Or they could establish a Middle East Network for Atomic Research and Advancement, which would create regional mechanisms for ensuring nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament while simultaneously enhancing cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology among regional countries that reject nuclear weapons.

Iran has the region’s greatest aggregate power and human, natural, and geostrategic resources, and so it makes sense for it to help lead these initiatives. Tehran should also realize that its power can make others uncomfortable, and therefore the country should pivot from a narrative of building a “strong Iran” which can appear unilateral and threatening, to a narrative of building a “strong region.” Iranian officials, for example, can reframe the country’s scientific and cultural capacities as resources that can benefit all of West Asia, rather than as proof of Iran’s sway.

But the region’s other states will need to play their own part in breaking the securitization cycle. To do so, they should focus on isolating the regional figure most responsible for securitizing Iran: Netanyahu. He and his allies have proven that they consider peace and tranquility to be an existential threat to their fortunes. This makes them unlike Iran, which—according to Article Two of its constitution—was founded upon “rejection of all forms of oppression, submission to oppression, domination of others and submission to domination” and “utilization and further advancement of science, technology and advanced results of human experiences” that “bring about political, economic, social and cultural independence as well as equity, justice and national solidarity.”

Israel’s recent behavior provides an opening for Iranian leaders. The horrific crimes in Gaza have resulted in a global outcry and awakened consciences across ideological barriers. But few governments have been more consistent in criticizing Israel and advocating for the Palestinians than Tehran. Iranian officials could thus work with international organizations and institutions, including the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, to foster global empathy and build a strong consensus against apartheid, genocide, and aggression. In doing so, Iran might be able to neutralize and possibly even reverse its securitization. It makes no sense for Iran to be securitized with accusations of nuclear proliferation when the leading proponent of those charges is a regime that possesses an illegal nuclear arsenal.

 

Get Along

U.S. President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, May 2025

Iran’s priority in foreign policy will always be its own neighborhood. Tehran, however, should also try to deepen its relationships elsewhere. That includes closely cooperating with Russia. Coordinating with China, which is a rising global powerhouse, is an absolute imperative. But Tehran could also benefit from improving relations with Europe and managing its differences with the United States. This would help ensure that Iran is a serious, equal, and long-term partner to China and Russia—and not just engaging with them out of imposed desperation.

Managing and containing differences with the United States may also be necessary for breaking the cycle of securitization. No government, aside from the Israeli regime, has done as much to try to isolate Iran as has Washington. (Although no one has done as much as Israel to persuade the United States to be hostile toward Iran and Iranians.) Tehran should thus consider the possibility of renewed direct dialogue with Washington, based on equal footing. Expectations must be managed, as the objective of talks cannot be to restore friendly links between the two countries. Iran and the United States have intractable differences rooted in identity and ideology that neither can realistically concede: for Washington, this includes the nature of Iran’s revolutionary political establishment and its stance on Israel; for Tehran, it includes Washington’s blind support for Israel and its global presence. But by agreeing to disagree on these ideological quarrels, negotiators could manage tofind ways to prevent them from triggering unnecessary crises. They can also resolve many of their political disputes through a mutual give and take.

At the top of the list is Iran’s nuclear program and U.S. sanctions, the very nexus that the JCPOA was designed to address. The United States must realize that it cannot obliterate Iran’s substantial capabilities, as most are indigenous and can be rebuilt. But both countries can agree on two shared objectives: Iran should never build nuclear weapons, and the United States should never threaten or engage in military and economic war against Iran. To those ends, Iran could offer transparency, limits on enrichment, and a possible regional mechanism, such as an enrichment consortium. The United States, for its part, would have to lift its own sanctions and permit the lifting of UN sanctions.

Iran could foster an agreement by being more transparent about its nuclear program through appropriate cooperation with the IAEA. Iranian officials are justifiably worried that any information they provide to the IAEA will be used for military targeting, given their belief that classified information has leaked from the organization in the past. The IAEA director’s June remarks that Tehran had “not answered, or not provided technically credible answers to, the Agency’s questions” were also misused by Israel to justify that month’s bombing campaign. Iran thus has every right to demand that the IAEA be diligent in observing its own procedures and codes of conduct on impartiality, objectivity, confidentiality, and sensitivity to national security concerns in exchange for continued cooperation. But as long as they are managed, the risks of cooperation should be worth the payoffs. Transparency with the IAEA should halt the dissemination of unsubstantiated securitizing narratives around Iran and facilitate a political deal with the United States.

If Tehran and Washington do implement an updated nuclear agreement, the countries might also manage to address other difficult issues, such as regional security, arms control, and counterterrorism. Iran, for example, might be asked to promise that it will not attack the United States or its allies in the region in return for a reciprocal guarantee by the United States and its partners. Tehran might also promise that it will not use its military capabilities other than in self-defense against prior armed attack, based on a reciprocal commitment. The United States, however, would have to deal with Iran’s security grievances, including its threatening presence around Iran and the unparalleled flooding of the region with sophisticated American weaponry. For all of Washington’s fretting about Iran’s defense procurement, Tehran spends only a fraction of what U.S. allies in the region do on military purchases in real, per capita, and GNP percentages.

Iran and the United States might also find that they have opportunities to actively aid each other. Iran, for example, boasts a strong network of universities; a large, well-educated population; and a thriving private sector, with long historical ties to global markets. In fact, it is one of the most untapped, stable, and lucrative economies anywhere. Together, Iran and the United States could thus cooperate on important scientific and technological issues.

Likewise, they might find areas of short-term foreign policy coordination. Tehran and Washington, despite their strategic differences, cooperated in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early years of this century and against the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) in more recent ones. Today, they again have mutual challenges in matters of extremism, as well as in threats to freedom of navigation. They could become avenues of at least short-term deconfliction, if not coordination. Iran and the United States would also benefit from some cooperation in the fight against international drug trafficking. Situated along the primary transit routes for narcotics originating in Afghanistan, Iran has borne a disproportionate share of the human and financial costs of counternarcotics efforts, including thousands of casualties among its law enforcement personnel. Quiet coordination, whether through intelligence sharing, technical assistance, or support for regional interdiction mechanisms, would address a shared security threat without requiring political alignment on broader ideological disputes.

An Iranian cleric visiting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force Museum in Tehran, November 2025

 

Actions and Reactions

The securitization cycle has placed Iran, the region, and NATO countries, particularly the United States, in a complex and self-reinforcing predicament. Iran’s defensive and reactive measures, rather than reducing threats, have intensified securitized perceptions of Iran and helped advance the narrative that Tehran is dangerous. Breaking this cycle is a vital necessity for Tehran. The idea that Iran is an existential threat may be completely wrong. But this perception has created existential threats for Iranians, something the June attacks made painfully evident.

Escaping securitization requires a set of simultaneous, comprehensive, and coordinated strategies. It necessitates active and balanced regional and global diplomacy, internal reforms, domestic and international confidence-building measures, a pivot back to the ideational power of the Islamic Revolution, the nonprovocative strengthening of the country’s defense capabilities, and a shift in strategic communications.

At the same time, breaking the securitization cycle is pivotal for the United States and Europe. They should start by engaging with Iran as a partner, rather than a threat. They should remember that doing so will advance their own interests. By becoming ensnared in a belligerent, securitizing discourse against Iran, the United States and Europe have escalated regional and global tensions without achieving any of their stated objectives. They would be much better served respecting Iran’s independence, dignity, and legitimate rights while redirecting their focus onto the main cause of instability in the region: Israel’s unlawful and unconscionable behavior.

Iran is a natural mediator. Its culture, history, and location mean it can facilitate dialogue and cooperation between Asia and Europe. It can serve as a hub for trade, particularly with the landlocked states of Central Asia. Its human capital means it can be a major partner in global technological innovation. Breaking Iran’s securitization cycle and allowing it to ascend to its rightful place will help yield peace, development, and stability for the decades.

 

 

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