By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
Taiwanese President
William Lai Ching-te announced 17 measures to counter
growing national security threats posed by the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). Lai’s rhetoric and increased focus on counter-coercion efforts reflect
his concerns about PRC infiltration and malign influence within Taiwanese
society and government.[1] Lai identified the five largest threats facing
Taiwan as PRC infringement on Taiwanese sovereignty, infiltration, and
espionage within the Taiwanese military, efforts to erode Taiwanese national identity, United Front influence
through cross-strait exchanges, and efforts to coopt Taiwanese businesspeople
and youth through economic engagement — during a national security meeting on
March 13. Lai’s seventeen measures to combat these threats included a recommendation
for Taiwan’s military to restore the military trial system, allowing military
judges to collaborate with judicial authorities in criminal cases involving
active-duty personnel accused of treason and otherwise aiding Taiwan’s enemies.
Forty-three Taiwanese military officers have been accused of spying for the
PRC. The Taiwanese National Defense Ministry confirmed the most recent
espionage accusation against a Taiwanese Air Force officer on March 12.[2] Lai
likely intends to increase military discipline and discourage disloyalty
through the proposed re-establishment of the military trial system. PRC
espionage efforts pose a major threat to Taiwanese military readiness and risk
instilling a sense of mistrust of the military within Taiwan’s populace.
Lai introduced
additional anti-coercion measures focused on reducing PRC influence
promulgating through information operations and cross-strait exchanges and
economic initiatives. These recommendations aim to reduce the effectiveness of
PRC United Front influence and information operations and communicate the
dangers of engagement to Taiwanese people. The PRC frequently uses economic
measures to build stronger cross-strait ties and inculcate positive feelings
about cross-strait collaboration within the Taiwanese populace. Taiwan Affairs
Office (TAO) spokesperson Chen Binhua announced on
March 12 the most recent policy measures for the cross-strait Integration and
Development zone focused on providing opportunities and incentives for
Taiwanese businesses to operate in the PRC.[3]
Opposition Kuomintang
(KMT) politicians criticized Lai’s counter-coercion measures, characterizing
Lai’s actions as political manipulation and downplaying the risks of
cross-strait exchanges. KMT politicians accused Lai of manipulating narratives
against his political opponents under the guise of protecting national security
and placing Taiwan in a “quasi-war state.”[4] The KMT stated that, by
identifying all cross-strait exchanges as opportunities for United Front work,
Lai was infringing upon freedom of speech and economic opportunity and making
baseless accusations against Taiwanese nationals with ties to the PRC. The KMT
has facilitated discussions between Taiwan and the PRC since the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) cut ties with the ruling Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) during the Tsai administration. KMT legislators accused Lai of being too
militaristic and provocative, repeating established narratives portraying the
KMT as a force for peace with the PRC and the DPP as the party of war.[5]
Lai likely views any
cross-strait exchange as an opportunity for the PRC to conduct United Front
work, introducing positive sentiments about the PRC and CCP into Taiwanese
discourse. CCP infiltration threatens the legitimacy of Taiwanese institutions and could weaken public
support for the government.
The PRC conducted
military drills near Taiwan on March 17. The PRC Foreign Affairs Ministry
framed them as a protest against the US State Department’s removal of the
phrase “we do not support Taiwan independence” from one of its fact sheets.
Taiwan’s National Defense Ministry observed 59 People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
aircraft sorties around Taiwan, 43 of which crossed the median line of the
Taiwan Strait, and nine PLA Navy (PLAN) ships. The ministry reported the
highest single-day sortie numbers since the Joint Sword-2024B exercises in
October 2024. PRC Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said that the
deletion of the phrase “we do not support Taiwan independence” from the fact
sheet sent “wrong signals to Taiwan separatist forces,” requiring a “resolute
response” to Taiwanese separatist forces and their allies.[6] The United States
made this revision on February 16. PRC officials immediately criticized the
change and warned Taiwan against seeking independence.[7] The United States
maintains its long-standing position of preserving peace and stability in the
region, opposing “any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side,”
according to the State Department, so there has been no official policy change
accompanying the fact sheet revision.[8] The PRC is conducting the military
exercise likely to pressure the US State Department to undo the revision. The
United States attempted a similar change but reversed course after pushback
from the PRC in 2022.[9] This exercise follows the snap live-fire drills off
the coast of Taiwan on February 26 as part of an emerging pattern of
increasingly frequent PRC military activities near the island.
Taiwan is conducting
military exercises likely in response to a series of PRC cable-cutting efforts
around the island. These exercises include anti-landing combat readiness drills
at the Tamsui River from March 17 to 21 and a naval exercise on March 24. The
drills will occur approximately 20 nautical miles off the coast of Kaohsiung
and Pingtung--an area where multiple PRC vessels have operated recently.[10]
The Taiwanese Navy stated live munitions will not be used.[11] The location and
timing of these exercises appear to be in response to recent undersea cable
cutting incidents by PRC-affiliated vessels, even though the Navy characterized
the exercises as routine. The designated drill area is near critical undersea
cable lines and will likely attempt to drive away the PRC ships that have been
drifting within the exercise zone for months.[12] There are many ships
suspected of attempting sabotage on Taiwan’s underseas cables; the
Cameroon-flagged Shunxing 39 cargo ship cut Taiwanese
undersea internet cables near Keelung on January 3, the Mongolian-flagged Bao
Shun was driven away after it erratically sailed over undersea cable lines
north of Taiwan on January 6, and the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58 was detained for
likely cutting an undersea cable between Taiwan and the Penghu Islands on
February 25.[13
The Taiwanese
military is holding separate drills from March 17 to 21 at the Tamsui River to
improve combat readiness.[14] The anti-landing combat exercises feature
obstruction tactics to prevent PLA vessels from advancing upriver into Taipei,
such as deploying oil barrels and floating platforms into the waters.[15]
Tamsui was listed as one of 18 “red beaches” — sites identified by the National
Defense Ministry as suitable for PLA amphibious invasion — given its location
at the mouth of the Tamsui river, which runs through Taipei.[16] Taiwan has
conducted anti-landing and live fire drills at this site previously.[17]
Taiwan's Legislative
Yuan (LY) rejected the Executive Yuan’s (EY) motions to reconsider major
government budget cuts, which would severely hamper Taiwan’s ability to resist
PRC coercion and harm US-Taiwan relations given pressure from the United States
for Taiwan to increase its defense spending. The opposition-controlled LY voted
on March 12 to reject the EY’s motions to reconsider the budget, and the 61-51
vote followed party lines.[18] The EY had previously vetoed this budget bill
for violating the separation of powers, undermining Taiwan’s constitution,
infringing on the people's rights, affecting the operation of Taiwan’s
democratic government, and weakening the country financially.[19] The LY’s
budget proposal would cut government spending by 6.6 percent — the largest cut
in Taiwanese history — and some ministries would lose up to 40 percent of their
budget. The ruling DPP accused the opposition of removing 34 percent of
available government funding from the budget — a far higher number than the official
6.6 percent figure.[20] Taiwanese Premier Cho Jung-tai said that "the last
resort is to seek constitutional relief" after the LY vote, and Taiwanese
Control Yuan (CY) Vice President Lee Hung-chun and
Secretary-General Lee Chun-yi announced that the CY,
which faces a 96 percent cut in its budget, will ask the Constitutional Court
to rule on the budget bill.[21] The Constitutional Court is currently unable to
review cases after the LY passed an amendment to the Constitutional Court
Procedure Act (CCPA), raised the quorum to 10 out of 15 justices, and rejected
all of Lai's nominees to fill the seven vacancies on the court in December
2024.[22] The eight justices have so far abided by the new amendment,
effectively paralyzing the court.
The KMT-Taiwan
People’s Party (TPP) budget cuts would disrupt governance and harm Taiwan’s
ability to resist PRC coercion and aggression. Notable cuts in the proposed
budget plan include freezing 30 percent of the National Defense Ministry budget
and cutting three percent of military equipment expenditure, freezing 50
percent of the Foreign Affairs Ministry budget and cutting 100 percent of media
policy and promotion expenses, cutting 73 percent of the EY budget, and cutting
96 percent of the CY budget.[23]
US President Donald
Trump's nominee for Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby said
at his US Senate confirmation hearing that Taiwan needs to increase defense
spending to 10 percent of GDP to deter war with the PRC.[24] Taiwan currently
spends less than three percent of its GDP on defense. Taiwanese Premier Cho
Jung-tai said on March 12 that Taiwan currently “does not have the capacity” to
spend 10 percent of its GDP on defense, and the current cabinet proposal sets
the defense budget at 2.45 percent of GDP.[25] Colby and like-minded US
officials seek to incentivize Taiwan to more than quadruple its defense budget.
The KMT-TPP budget bill could hurt relations with the United States.
A PRC court convicted
Taiwan-based publisher Li Yanhe on secession-related
charges. Li is the second person whom the PRC has convicted of secessionism
since it released new legal guidelines in June 2024 for punishing Taiwanese
“separatism.” Li, also known by the pen name Fucha
(Fuchsia), is the PRC-born editor-in-chief of the Taiwanese publisher Gusa
Press. A Shanghai court convicted Li for “inciting secession” on February 17,
according to a statement that the PRC TAO gave to Taiwan’s Central News Agency
on March 17. The TAO did not release further details about Li’s sentencing.[26]
Shanghai authorities arrested Li in March 2023 after he returned from Taiwan to
Shanghai to cancel his PRC household registration as part of the process of
obtaining Taiwanese permanent residency. They held and investigated Li for
nearly two years for “endangering national security” before the court delivered
its verdict. The PRC Supreme People’s Procuratorate listed Li’s case along with
that of Taiwanese political activist Yang Chih-yuan as “major cases endangering
national security” on February 26.[27] Yang is a Taiwanese national whom the
PRC convicted of secessionism in August 2024 for founding a Taiwanese political
party that advocated Taiwanese independence.[28]
The PRC convictions
of Li Yanhe and Yang Chih-yuan are emblematic of the
PRC’s “lawfare” campaign and persecution against those whom it deems to be
proponents of Taiwanese independence. The TAO
disclosed Li’s sentencing days after the PRC held a symposium commemorating the
20th anniversary of its anti-secession law. It held both Li and Yang for around
two years and appears to have sentenced them by new legal guidelines that it
released in June 2024 to crack down on Taiwanese “separatism.” The TAO expanded
its list of “Taiwan independence diehards” in October 2024 to include Puma Shen
and Robert Tsao — two major proponents of Taiwanese civil defense.[29]
Taiwanese intelligence revealed that PRC officials directed state security
organs in February to increase efforts to prosecute pro-independence Taiwanese
nationals in PRC-friendly countries, such as Laos and Cambodia.[30] The PRC
likely intends to intimidate proponents of Taiwan independence, including
members of Taiwan‘s ruling DPP, to cease their advocacy and moderate their
positions through the escalation of its “legal warfare.”
A PRC research ship
conducted undersea detection operations within the prohibited waters of
Taiwan’s Dongding Island, part of Kinmen County.
China Coast Guard (CCG) ships conducted a patrol in restricted waters around
Kinmen the following day. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) on March 12
detected the PRC government research ship Yan Ping 2 in the prohibited waters
near Dongding Island — a small Taiwanese garrison
island off the coast of the PRC. The ship, which is owned by the Fujian
provincial government-affiliated Fujian Institute of Oceanography, dropped
detection equipment into the water for unknown purposes.[31] CGA boats expelled
the Yanping II and forced it to retrieve its equipment. A CGA statement on the
incident stressed that the PRC may be studying seabed geology, topography, and
hydrology in Taiwan-administered waters to familiarize itself with the
battlefield environment for future combat deployments.[32] Taiwan does not
claim territorial waters or a contiguous zone around any of the Kinmen Islands
due to their proximity to the PRC. It maintains “prohibited” and “restricted”
waters that are generally equivalent, however. The PRC has used “scientific
research” vessels around Taiwan and elsewhere to conduct reconnaissance and
challenge maritime sovereignty claims, including within the contiguous zone of
Taiwan itself.[33]
Four CCG ships
patrolled in ROC-restricted waters around the main islands of the Kinmen
archipelago for two hours on March 13. The CGA stated this was the 61st such
patrol since the CCG began patrolling within Kinmen-administered waters in
February 2024.[34] The PRC has normalized “law enforcement” patrols in waters
around Kinmen to erode Taiwan’s control of those waters and to assert the PRC’s
legal jurisdiction there. CCG ships also continuously circled Taiwan’s Pratas (Tungsha) Island — an outlying island that hosts a CGA
outpost — from March 11-15, possibly to monitor unknown Taiwanese activity in
the area.[35] The CCG is a paramilitary organization under the PRC’s Central
Military Commission. Its actions around Kinmen and other Taiwanese territories
often serve strategic goals and are not normal law enforcement measures. The
PRC possibly plans to capture Taiwanese outlying islands such as Pratas,
Kinmen, and Matsu in the early stages of a war to annex Taiwan, reducing
Taiwan’s strategic depth. It may also seek to split the islands from Taiwan,
possibly through blockade or short-of-war means, as an intermediate step to
achieving “national reunification.”[36]
China PRC netizens
circulated videos showing PLA barges with extendable piers, news of which first
emerged in January 2025. The construction and testing of mobile piers highlight
the PRC’s growing amphibious capabilities. Videos were originally shared on the
PRC-based social media app WeChat but have since been deleted.[37] Footage
revealed the barges at a beach in the South China Sea in a likely amphibious
landing exercise. Open-source analyst Damien Symon tracked the likely location
of the exercises at Zhanjiang.[38] A January 2025 Naval News article noted the
barges’ resemblance to World War II-era “mulberry harbors,” which Allied forces
used to land at Normandy on D-Day.[39] The barges incorporate bridge-like piers
capable of stretching above the surface of a beach to facilitate unloading
troops and vehicles. These theoretically expand the number of sites that the
PLA could use in an amphibious invasion of Taiwan by obviating the need for
preexisting ports.[40] Maritime analyst Sal Mercogliano estimates that the
barges could be used in conjunction with other amphibious-capable platforms to
offload ferries carrying PRC armored vehicles. Mercogliano called the barges
“logistic multipliers” to be used “between the assault phase and the seizure of
a port.”[41]
The PRC’s
construction of the barges signals its intent to achieve the military
capabilities that it needs to annex Taiwan by force.[42] PRC efforts to
construct mobile, amphibious barges align with the findings of the US Defense
Department’s 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR), which reported that the
PRC has placed a growing emphasis on developing amphibious hardware in recent
years.[43] The CMPR reported that an amphibious invasion of Taiwan would
require the PLA to establish both air and maritime superiority and would
“likely strain the PRC’s armed forces.”[44] PRC amphibious operations could
target not only Taiwan’s main island but also the outlying islands of Matsu or
Kinmen. The CMPR assesses that the PLA could also use amphibious capabilities against
Taiwanese-occupied South China Sea islands, including Itu Aba or Pratas.[45]
The PRC Foreign
Affairs Ministry criticized the G7 foreign ministers’ statement condemning PRC
coercion in the Taiwan Strait and other territories. G7 nations’ rhetoric
exemplifies a growing trend of United States and allied condemnation of PRC
short-of-war coercion. G7 foreign ministers from France, Canada, Germany,
Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States met from March 12 to
14.[46] The foreign ministers released a statement condemning the PRC’s
“illicit, provocative, coercive, and dangerous actions” and added that they
“oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force or
coercion, including in the East and South China Seas.”[47] This statement
aligns G7 rhetoric with the language of the US-Taiwan Relations Act, which
stipulates that the United States will maintain the ability “to resist any
resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security,
or social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.”[48] The G7 foreign
ministers’ statement omitted past mentions that there had been “no change in
the basic position of the G7 members on Taiwan, including stated One-China
policies."[49] The Taiwanese Foreign Affairs Ministry gave a statement
thanking G7 for its support.[50]
The G7 statement
expressed further concerns regarding risks to undersea telecommunications
infrastructure, although it did not specifically mention the PRC.[51] The
statement highlighted G7 opposition to “dark” or “shadow” fleets used in
illicit shipments of Russian oil.[52] Such “shadow fleets,” which often involve
ships owned by PRC- or Hong Kong-based firms, have played an instrumental role
in sustaining Russia’s economy throughout its invasion of Ukraine.
Foreign Affairs
Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said that the PRC had lodged solemn
representations with the nations involved.[53] Mao’s statement repeated PRC
talking points concerning efforts to position itself as a peaceful arbiter of
the Ukraine war while supporting the Russian war effort rhetorically and
economically.[54] The PRC routinely deflects accusations of support to the
Russian war effort despite the involvement of PRC-owned ships in Russian
“shadow fleets.”
The PRC opposes
statements from the United States and its allies criticizing PRC coercion. The
PRC response to the G7 statement came shortly after the PRC staged military
exercises near Taiwan. Mao Ning said that these exercises were “a resolute
response to external forces’ insistence on condoning and supporting ‘Taiwan
independence’” in the same March 17 press conference.[55] Mao accused the
United States of taking “a series of wrong actions” regarding Taiwan, including
the revision of the US State Department’s Taiwan Fact Sheet.[56] The new fact
sheet incorporates similar language as the G7 statement, stating that “We
expect cross-Strait differences to be resolved by peaceful means, free from
coercion.”[57] The PRC will likely continue to counter accusations of coercion
both rhetorically and militarily as the United States and coalition partners
follow the growing trend of condemning PRC coercive activities.
The PRC held a
symposium on Taiwan's "separatism" to commemorate the 20th
anniversary of the Anti-Secession Law. PRC officials regularly employ
anti-separatist rhetoric as part of an ongoing information operation to
delegitimize Taiwan and DPP authorities. Chairman of the Standing Committee of
the National People’s Congress Zhao Leji said that the PRC must “resolutely
combat ‘Taiwan independence’ secession.”[58] Commander of the PRC Eastern
Theater Command Lin Xiangyang also attended and gave a speech in which he
outlined PRC responses to Taiwan's “secessionists” and said that the PLA would
“work with the people of the whole country, including the people of Taiwan,” to
“deter and punish them.”[59] This rhetoric echoes sentiments expressed during
the Two Sessions meetings, during which PRC officials emphasized support for
pro-unification elements within Taiwan.[60] KMT official Huang Qingxian, who previously directed the KMT’s Mainland
Affairs Committee, also attended the symposium.[61]
The PRC passed the
Anti-Secession Law in 2005 as part of its legal campaign against “Taiwan
independence.”[62] Taiwanese media outlet CNA cited an unnamed US State
Department official who said that the PRC’s coercion campaigns against Taiwan
have intensified since the passing of the Anti-Secession Law.[63] The
Anti-Secession Law partially formed the basis for judicial guidelines that the
PRC released in June 2024 calling for severe punishment of “Taiwan independence
diehards,” including the death penalty.[64]
The PRC regularly
employs the language of “reunification,” “secession,” and “separatism” as a
means of delegitimizing Taiwan’s government and leadership. PRC officials have
repeatedly smeared Taiwanese President William Lai as a “dangerous separatist”
supported by “external interference” in an attempt to denigrate Taiwan’s
democracy. The PRC also regularly coopts Taiwanese public figures and
celebrities to create a false impression that Taiwanese society supports this
“reunification” narrative. The PRC’s language on “reunification” seeks to
legitimize PRC coercion against Taiwan, isolate Taiwan on the international
stage, and win support from PRC-aligned countries.
PRC state media
celebrated the closure of Voice of America (VOA) and other US state-funded
media outlets. US President Donald Trump signed an executive order on March 14
that cut funding for the United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM) and
terminated grants for Voice of America, Radio Free Asia (RFA), and other US
state-funded media outlets targeting international audiences.[65]
An editorial by PRC
state-owned tabloid Global Times on March 17 celebrated the closure of VOA and
the other outlets, claiming that their purpose was to “attack other countries
based on [Washington’s] ideological demands.” The editorial called VOA a “lie
factory” and blamed it for spreading “almost every malicious falsehood about
China,” including on topics such as the PRC’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang,
disputes in the South China Sea, Taiwanese independence, the protests in Hong
Kong, the PRC’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic, and PRC economic
overcapacity.[66] The official newspaper of the CCP’s Beijing municipal
committee, Beijing Daily, also released an article accusing VOA of spreading
“rumors and slander” against the PRC.[67] PRC Foreign Affairs Ministry
spokesperson Mao Ning declined to comment on US domestic policies but remarked
that some of the affected US media “have a bad record in reporting on
China.”[68]
The closure of VOA
and other US state-funded media outlets will likely aid PRC information
operations around the world by removing an influential voice that has often
countered PRC narratives and published original reporting about PRC malign
activities. The PRC’s own media ecosystem is heavily censored and dominated by
state media such as Xinhua, Global Times, and China Daily. The PRC has greatly
expanded its own media influence in foreign countries in recent years through
content-sharing agreements with local news media, disinformation campaigns on
social media, and other means.[69]
Northeast Asia Japan
The PRC accused Japan
of breaching its constitution by developing a new ballistic missile with a
range of 3000 kilometers (km). The Japanese Defense Ministry announced the
development of the Block 2 version of the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile
(HVGP) in February 2020 and conducted a series of tests concluding in January
2025.[70] The Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) is developing HVGPs as part of
its broader efforts to acquire stand-off capabilities. Japan first identified
this goal in its 2022 National Security Strategy.[71] Japan is growing
increasingly concerned with PRC and North Korean military activities near its
territory.[72] The US State Department Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(DSCA) announced a possible 200-million-US-dollar Foreign Military Sale (FMS)
to support Japanese HVGP production on March 10.[73] HVGPs will significantly
bolster the JSDF’s ability to defend its territories and enhance its
counterstrike capabilities by reaching almost anywhere in China. Japan is also
developing ship- and submarine-launched versions of the missile in addition to
the ground-launched HVGP. PRC National Defense Ministry spokesperson Zhang
Xiaogang condemned Japanese “militarism” and referenced historical atrocities
conducted by Japan’s military during World War II.[74] The PRC has employed
similar rhetoric following past instances of Japanese military enhancement.[75]
PRC narratives seek to downplay Japanese security concerns and portray Japanese
efforts to increase its security as the efforts of warmongers. [76]
North Korea
North Korea is
increasing its economic and media cooperation with the PRC. North Korea resumed
excavation work at the site of the New Yalu River Bridge, which connects
Dandong, PRC, and Sinuiju, North Korea, sometime between February 18 and 19.
The project was abandoned in August 2020.[77] North Korea may be constructing a
customs and immigration complex to complement the PRC facility on the opposite
side of the bridge. The North Korean construction efforts may be linked to a
PRC company’s plan to establish a 300,000-square-meter special economic zone
(SEZ) in Sinuiju.[78] The completion of this complex, whether it is a customs
facility or an SEZ, would significantly enhance overland trade cooperation
between North Korea and the PRC.
PRC state newspaper
the People’s Daily and the China Media Group (CMG) have reestablished their
presence in North Korea for the first time since the COVID-19 pandemic.[79] Liu
Rong, a correspondent of the People’s Daily in North Korea, and Dong Haitao, the
chief correspondent of CMG in North Korea, met with PRC Ambassador to North
Korea Wang Yajun as well as representatives from
North Korea’s state newspaper Rodong Sinmun and the Korean Central Broadcasting
Committee on February 28. PRC correspondents affirmed their commitment to
increase cooperative exchanges with North Korean media and political
representatives.[80] Foreign media outlets that operated in North Korea before
the COVID-19 pandemic include the United States’ AP, France’s AFP, Japan’s
Kyodo News, PRC’s Xinhua News Agency, People’s Daily, and CCTV; and Russia’s
TASS.
A ceasefire in
Ukraine may strengthen economic ties between North Korea and the PRC further.
Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Andrei Rudenko visited Pyongyang on
March 15, although North Korean state media did not report on the specifics of
the discussions.[81] The visit likely involved discussions about a ceasefire,
as Russian President Vladimir Putin had expressed support for the US proposal
for a ceasefire in Ukraine just two days earlier, on March 13.[82] North Korea
generates a significant source of revenue through illicit exports of missiles
and ammunition, as well as sending soldiers, to aid Russia against Ukraine.[83]
The PRC provides an economic alternative if the war in Ukraine ends.
North Korea
began easing its
COVID-19 pandemic restrictions in 2024 by reopening its border to certain
foreign visitors, including diplomats and Russian tourists. It has also shown
signs of allowing tourism for PRC nationals, as reported by the ISW on February
14.[84] North Korea’s trade with the PRC saw an increase on-year, with total
trade reaching 222.5 million US dollars in January and nearly 122 million US
dollars in February, compared to 190 million and 121 million US dollars in the
same months of 2024.[85] This suggests that North Korea may be aiming to
attract foreign currency from the PRC now that COVID-19 no longer hampers
bilateral trade. The PRC could view this as an opportunity to regain influence
over North Korea, especially if it perceives that postwar relations between
Russia and North Korea are weakening.
South Korea
The CCG blocked South
Korean authorities from inspecting a PRC-installed steel structure within the
bilateral Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) in the Yellow Sea on February 26. The
PRC likely aimed to expand its territorial influence over the disputed waters
amid South Korea’s political instability and leadership vacuum.[86] The South
Korean Oceans and Fisheries Ministry sent the Onnuri
marine research vessel to inspect the PRC structure in the disputed area. CCG
ships, along with three rubber boats, prevented the Onnuri
vessel from approaching the structure. South Korea dispatched a Coast Guard
vessel in response, leading to a two-hour standoff. The CCG claimed that the
structure was an aquafarm but refused to cooperate with South Korea’s request
to verify this statement. The PRC constructed steel structures in April, May,
and December 2024. South Korea and the PRC agreed to establish the PMZ in the
overlapping area of their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in 2000 to resolve
disputes related to Yellow Sea fishing rights and oil exploration.[87] The
South Korea-PRC joint agreement explicitly prohibits activities unrelated to
fishing in the PMZ. The South Korean Foreign Affairs Ministry stated that it
will ensure that the PRC does not infringe upon South Korea’s maritime
rights.[88] The PRC Foreign Affairs Ministry stated that the PRC and South
Korea are maintaining good communication and described the current situation in
the Yellow Sea as “stable.”[89] The PRC’s refusal to cooperate with South
Korean authorities is a rare escalation in this context. The PRC withdrew or
suspended working on the installations when South Korea protested similar PRC
activities in the past.[90]
The PRC may utilize
maritime installations within the PMZ to territorialize the Yellow Sea,
capitalizing on South Korea’s political turmoil following President Yoon Suk-yeol's martial law declaration in December 2024 and the
vacancies of multiple high-level military positions.[91] The PRC officially
justifies the installation of buoys and other structures as being for maritime
data collection and fishing activities. The Yellow Sea is within the
PRC-claimed Nine-dash line. The PRC has used similar tactics in the South China
Sea, building island bases that it eventually militarized.[92] The PRC can
expand its physical presence and achieve similar strategic objectives in the
Yellow Sea by gradually encroaching on the PMZ.
Oceania
The PRC accused New
Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) Director General of Security
Andrew Hampton of spreading false information after he expressed concerns
regarding PRC activities in the Pacific Ocean. The PRC routinely deflects and
denies concerns expressed by Five Eyes partner nations despite active efforts
to gain military and political footholds in Oceania. Hampton addressed the New
Zealand Institute of International Affairs on March 6, highlighting the role of
intelligence cooperation in the Pacific, specifically between members of Five
Eyes. Hampton said “The PRC’s ambition is to link economic and security
cooperation, create competing regional architectures, and expand its influence
with Pacific Island countries across policing, defense, digital, disaster
relief, and maritime spheres.”[93] The PRC Embassy in New Zealand called
Hampton’s statement “baseless.”[94]
Hampton and the
embassy’s comments follow a blue-economy cooperation deal between the PRC and
the Cook Islands, which have free association with New Zealand. New Zealand
authorities expressed concern over the deal, which they felt contradicted the
compact of free association.[95] Hampton’s address noted that he had recently
visited the Cook Islands and that New Zealand’s security service has “shared
classified intelligence with them on foreign interference and espionage
risks.”[96]
PRC information
operations against New Zealand fall in line with broader PRC efforts to drive a
wedge between Five Eyes partner countries. New Zealand is a member of the Five
Eyes along with the United States, Britain, Canada, and Australia. New Zealand has
faced criticism from other Five Eyes members over its largely economics-driven
relationship with the PRC.[97] PRC criticism and accusations against New
Zealand reflect PRC efforts to weaken US coalition-building efforts in the
Pacific, where it seeks to expand its political influence.
Latin America
A PRC state newspaper
condemned Hong Kong firm CK Hutchinson's sale of Panama Canal ports to BlackRock.
The PRC may view the port sales as weakening PRC influence in Panama and, by
extension, Latin America. United States-based asset management firm BlackRock
agreed to purchase Balboa and Cristobal ports in the Panama Canal on March 5.
BlackRock’s consortium will also buy CK Hutchinson’s controlling interest in 43
other ports globally.[98] Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao published two opinion
pieces criticizing the sales on March 13 and 15. Hong Kong and Macao Affairs
Office of the State Council and Liaison Office of the Central People’s
Government in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) — two official
government entities — reposted the articles on their websites.[99] Hong
Kong-based government bodies commented on the sales more directly than PRC
bureaucracies did. PRC Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said on
March 5 that the ministry had “no comment” on BlackRock’s purchase of the
ports. Lin said that “China supports its companies, including Hong Kong SAR
companies, to invest and start businesses overseas” and that the ministry
opposes “the abuse of coercion and pressure in international economic and trade
relations” during a regular press conference.[100] Reports have emerged
suggesting PRC officials’ disapproval of the sales, however. The Wall Street
Journal cited unnamed sources who said that PRC President Xi Jinping had
planned to use the ports to bargain with the United States and felt that CK
Hutchinson had not properly consulted the PRC.[101] Bloomberg also cited anonymous
sources who said that PRC leaders have told regulatory bodies, including the
State Administration of Market Regulation, to investigate CK Hutchinson’s deal
for potential violations.[102]
PRC's disapproval of
the port sales contradicts narratives suggesting that the PRC assigned no
security value to the two Hong Kong-based ports. The PRC may interpret CK
Hutchinson’s sale of the ports as a sign of diminishing PRC influence in Latin
America. Panama declared that it would not renew its Belt and Road membership
shortly after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Panama in February
2025. The PRC uses the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a means of cultivating
soft power ties via infrastructure agreements and economic partnerships. Panama
was the first Latin American state to sign onto BRI in 2017, with other Latin
American countries shortly following suit.[103] The PRC likely interprets the
sale of the two Panama Canal ports, along with Panama’s plans to withdraw from
BRI, as a soft power win for the United States. The PRC sent a CCP delegation
to visit Panama on March 16, indicating that the PRC is still prioritizing
diplomatic relations with Panama.[104] The PRC will likely continue efforts to
shore up its soft power in Latin America if it fears other countries will
follow Panama’s example and withdraw from BRI.
Iran
The PRC, Russia, and
Iran issued a joint statement calling for an end to “illegal unilateral
sanctions” on Iran. The PRC put forth a five-point proposal to resolve the
Iranian nuclear issue and called for the United States to return to
negotiations. PRC Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu,
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, and Iranian Deputy Foreign
Minister Kazem Gharibabadi met in Beijing on March 14
to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue. They released a joint statement that
reaffirmed the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal,
called for the removal of sanctions on Iran, and welcomed Iran’s claimed
commitment to a purely peaceful nuclear program and cooperation with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[105] PRC Foreign Affairs
Minister Wang Yi also put forth a five-point proposal to resolve the Iran
nuclear issue, including opposition to sanctions and threats of force,
respecting Iran’s right to pursue civilian nuclear energy (but not nuclear
weapons), and resuming negotiations based on the JCPOA including the United
States.[106]
The PRC is using the
Iranian nuclear issue to position itself as a responsible mediator and force
for stability in the Middle East while framing the US withdrawal from the
nuclear deal and “maximum pressure” sanctions against Iran as the true core of
the problem. This diplomatic effort supports Beijing’s ambition to be perceived
as the true defender of the international order and champion of the Global
South, in contrast to the United States. The PRC has framed its efforts at
mediating a Saudi-Iran détente in 2023 and advocating for an
Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire in 2024 in similar terms.[107]
Beijing has an
interest in preventing instability in the Middle East that could threaten its
economic interests, particularly vital energy shipments from Iran and other
Persian Gulf states. The PRC imports around 15 percent of its oil from Iran. It
thus wishes to prevent a regional war, a regional nuclear arms race, or the
collapse of the Iranian regime. The PRC has supported Iran by buying 90 percent
of its oil and providing it with certain military-use materials, including
recent shipments of sodium perchlorate that can be used to make missile
fuel.[108]
The timing of the
PRC-hosted nuclear talks may be related to several recent developments in the
Middle East and the United States, in addition to the planned expiration of
JCPOA measures in 2025. First, US President Donald Trump sent a letter to
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in early March that he said called for
making a deal on the nuclear issue.[109] Russia offered to serve as a mediator
between the United States and Iran.[110] Beijing likely wants to play a role in
resolving this issue to its own benefit. Second, US media reported in February
that Israel may strike Iranian nuclear facilities in the first six months of
2025, according to US intelligence assessments.[111] Third, US sanctions on
Iranian and “shadow fleet” tankers may threaten PRC access to Iranian oil. The
PRC has somewhat benefited from anti-Iran sanctions that have allowed it to buy
Iranian oil at a significant discount. The new tanker sanctions may have offset
the benefits of this discount, however, by raising the cost and difficulty of
importing sanctioned oil into the PRC and threatening the viability of
independent PRC oil refiners.[112]
The United States
sanctioned Hong Kong-based vessels illicitly transporting oil to Iran. The PRC
supports Iranian and Russian military efforts through its involvement in
illicit supply chains. The US Treasury Department sanctioned a Hong Kong-based
firm, Heshun Transportation Trading Limited, and one
of its vessels — the Hong Kong-flagged Peace Hill. The Treasury Department
sanctioned a Panama-flagged tanker, Corona Fun, for manipulating AIS data to
cover shipments of Iranian oil and the San Marino-flagged vessel Seasky for moving fuel oil to the PRC on behalf of Iran’s
national oil company.[113] These two vessels are owned by companies in Hong
Kong and Shanghai, respectively.[114] The Treasury Department noted the
sanctioned vessels’ roles in Iran’s “shadow fleet”, a network of ships used to
deliver Iranian oil to the PRC.[115] The Treasury Department previously imposed
sanctions on the Panama-flagged Huihai Pacific, also
owned by a Hong Kong firm, for its role in a similar Russian “shadow fleet” of
illicit oil shipments to the PRC.[116]
ISW has noted Hong
Kong’s role in illicit economies that support PRC allies and partners. Hong
Kong has emerged as a hub for PRC firms to circumvent sanctions on Iran,
Russia, and North Korea, as its lenient regulatory environment facilitates
relatively easy concealment of corporate ownership and the rapid creation and
dissolution of shell companies.[117]
Conflict-monitoring
group Conflict Armament Research (CAR) released a report finding that Yemeni
authorities intercepted PRC-made hydrogen fuel cells en
route to the Houthi-controlled port of Salif. The PRC may be providing the
Houthis with limited aid as part of an arrangement to protect PRC ships. A CAR
report revealed on March 13 that Yemeni National Resistance Forces (NRF) seized
the pressurized gas canisters on a trading vessel in the southern Red Sea in
August 2024. Markings on the seized cylinders indicate that they were produced
by PRC manufacturers.[118] CAR did not identify the manufacturers or the ship,
saying that it would continue its investigation. CAR found that the canisters
were incorrectly labeled as “oxygen cylinders” likely to obscure their true
purpose. The manufacturers advertised them for use in hydrogen fuel cell UAVs
on their website and in accompanying transfer documents. Hydrogen fuel cells
could improve the range, payload, and stealth of UAVs used by Houthi militants to target commercial
shipping in the Red Sea, as well as US and Israeli military assets and civilian
infrastructure in Israel and Saudi Arabia.[119][120]
The PRC may be
helping to advance Houthi capabilities as part of an arrangement that protects
PRC ships in the Red Sea. PRC officials have engaged in diplomacy with
the Houthis to ensure the safety of PRC-affiliated commercial vessels
transiting the Red Sea.[121] They reportedly advised the Houthis to avoid
targeting PRC-affiliated shipping while continuing attacks on Western-linked
vessels.[122] The PRC has called for an end to Houthi attacks but has generally
refrained from directly criticizing the Houthis.[123] The PRC denied exporting
drones or military technologies to the Houthis.
[1]
https://www.president.gov dot tw/NEWS/39105
[2]
https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/editorials/archives/2025/03/17/2003833542;
https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/03/13/2003833360
[3] http://www.news
dot cn/tw/20250312/1445526ad6404336b1666c752610573f/c.html
[4]
https://www.taipeitimes dot com/News/taiwan/archives/2025/03/14/2003833431
[5] https://udn dot
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[6] https://www.mfa
dot gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202503/t20250317_11577237.shtml
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[7]
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https://www.mfa.gov
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[8]
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[10]
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[11] https://www.cna
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[12]
https://www.taiwannews dot com.tw/news/6055227
[13]https://www.msn.com/en-us/politics/government/after-cable-damage-taiwan-to-step-up-surveillance-of-flag-of-convenience-ships/ar-AA1xdXfm?ocid=BingNewsSerp
https://www.taiwannews
dot com.tw/news/6013668
https://www.cga dot
gov.tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=164475&ctNode=650&mp=999
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-january-24-2025
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-february-28-2025
[14]
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[15]
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https://www.cna.com
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[16] https://tw.news
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https://www.cy dot
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https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-taiwan/
[58] http://www.news
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[60]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-march-7-2025
[61] https://www.gov
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https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/03/continuing-the-reduction-of-the-federal-bureaucracy/
https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/2025/03/the-voice-of-radical-america/
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https://www.globaltimes dot cn/page/202503/1330246.shtml
[67] http://views.ce
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https://freedomhouse.org/report/beijing-global-media-influence/2022/authoritarian-expansion-power-democratic-resilience
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[75] http://www.news
dot cn/world/20240319/c097938a67a44e05a194ee6f091da3f8/c.html;
https://www.scmp dot
com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3212686/china-berates-japan-over-massive-military-expansion-plans;
mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/xwfyr/16294378.html; mod.gov dot cn/gfbw/xwfyr/yzxwfb/16278237.html
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[78]https://www.nknews
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[85]https://www.nknews
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[87]
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https://www.voanews.com/a/east-asia-pacific_new-zealand-criticized-five-eyes-alliance-stance-china/6205205.html;
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[100]https://www.fmprc.gov
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[101]
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dot gov.cn/wjbxw_new/202402/t20240208_11243950.shtml
https://www.mfa dot
gov.cn/mfa_eng/wx/fvrbt/202411/t20241113_11525576.html
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