By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Will or will she not? We think she will

For decades, Beijing has sought to absorb Taiwan, where Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government fled after losing the Chinese civil war, and importantly what led to the current situation and why it is faulty to see Taiwan as a conclusively part of China.

This explains why President Xi Jinping's determination as he asserts China's positions more forcefully than his recent predecessors. There is a personal factor involved here, too, of course. But China's leaders surely know that their country's moment of maximum opportunity in the world is now—at the tail end of decades of fast economic growth—and that the resources for global diplomacy, influence-building, and military investment will soon come under tremendous pressure from the need to fund more prosaic but inescapably necessary things, such as much more robust social security, national health insurance, and retirement systems.

Biden's earlier strong stance stating the USA would intervene with the military to defend Taiwan came against China's dramatically increasing military activity. Whereby present, US-China relations are fraught with a more aggressive Beijing.

 

Enter Nancy Pelosi

US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's possible visit to Taiwan has resulted in stern warnings from Beijing and mounting concerns in Washington. Although the California Democrat has declined to confirm the trip publicly, she has invited Democrats and Republicans to accompany her. China has lashed out at the potential visit, vowing to take "resolute and forceful measures" if the trip goes. This week, China's Defense Ministry reiterated the threat: "If the U.S. insists on taking its course, the Chinese military will never sit idly by." U.S. officials are worried that the reported visit would be met with a military response from China, potentially triggering the worst cross-strait crisis in decades.

Thus while there remains no official confirmation of a Taiwan stop, signs point to Nancy Pelosi going ahead with her plan to visit Taiwan despite concerns over how the trip would provoke China. However, yesterday Pelosi dully departed for Asia with a "tentative" itinerary for Taiwan.

For all the attention that Pelosi's trip is attracting, it is not unprecedented. There have been similar visits in the past, which are entirely consistent with the U.S. one-China policy, under which the United States recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, acknowledges (but does not endorse) China's position that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China, and maintains unofficial relations with Taiwan. Pelosi is not the first Speaker of the House to visit: Newt Gingrich met with Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui in Taipei in 1997. To be sure, Gingrich was a Republican Speaker during a Democratic administration; Pelosi and Biden, in contrast, belong to the same party. For that reason, Chinese officials believe she is acting in coordination with the White House.

Still, congressional delegations routinely visit Taiwan. Past administrations have sent cabinet-level officials to the island; in 2020, Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar visited Taipei. Pelosi would travel on U.S. military aircraft, but that is also nothing new; in June 2021, three U.S. senators arrived in Taiwan aboard a U.S. Air Force plane.

What sets Pelosi's visit apart is that it would occur when Beijing believes that the United States is moving away from its one-China policy. And there have been noticeable changes in U.S. diplomacy toward Taiwan in recent years. Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly referred to Taiwan as a "country." The Biden administration extended an invitation to Taiwan's representative in the United States to attend Biden's inauguration and invited Taiwan to participate in its Summit for Democracy. Administration officials also leaked to the media that U.S. military personnel are in Taiwan training its forces. None of these moves are tantamount to diplomatic recognition. Still, Beijing may view Pelosi's trip as an opportunity to message that the United States must stop what China sees as an intentional pattern.

Aside from attempting to halt the strengthening of U.S.-Taiwanese ties, China's reaction to Pelosi's potential visit is partly the product of unfortunate timing. Chinese President Xi Jinping will seek an unprecedented third term as head of the Chinese Communist Party this fall. He likely fears that high-level, public U.S. support for Taiwan would make him look weak and not in control of critical relationships and undermine his standing.

More important, Beijing's reaction reveals its growing comfort with the prospect of a crisis over Taiwan. As Xi faces economic headwinds at home and growing resentment over his strict zero-COVID policy, he may have concluded that a Taiwan crisis could rally the public and shore up his popularity. Xi may also have decided that international support for Taiwan is growing too strong, especially in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Taiwan and Ukraine are relatively young democracies that exist next to much larger authoritarian neighbors with long-standing designs on their territory; leaders worldwide have taken note of the parallels. Xi may feel he needs to deter countries from working with Taipei to increase its defenses and resilience. He could also find Pelosi's visit a good pretext for large-scale military exercises, which could test the People's Liberation Army's preparedness for complex operations. That could provide clues as to whether China's military would fare better than Russia's in Ukraine and gauge how the United States and Taiwan would react.

                   

Taiwan strait crisis

The last Taiwan Strait crisis occurred more than a quarter century ago.

The crisis began when President Lee Teng-hui accepted an invitation from his alma mater, Cornell University, to deliver a speech on "Taiwan's Democratization Experience." Seeking to isolate the Republic of China diplomatically, the PRC opposed such visits by ROC (commonly known as Taiwan) leaders. It argued that Lee harbored pro-Taiwan independence sentiments and was, therefore, a threat to stability in the region. A year earlier, in 1994, when President Lee's plane had stopped in Honolulu to refuel after a trip to South America, the U.S. government under President Bill Clinton refused Lee's request for a visa. Lee had been confined to the military airfield where he landed, forcing him to spend a night on his plane. A U.S. State Department official called the situation "embarrassing," Lee complained that he was being treated as a second-class leader. After Lee had decided to visit Cornell, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher assured PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that a visa for Lee would be "inconsistent with [the U.S.'s] unofficial relationship [with Taiwan]." However, the humiliation from Lee's last visit caught the attention of many pro-Taiwan figures in the U.S. This time; the United States Congress acted on Lee's behalf. In May 1995, a concurrent resolution asking the State Department to allow Lee to visit the U.S. passed the House 396 to 0 with 38 not voting, and the Senate 97 to 1 with two not voting. The State Department relented on May 22, 1995, and the PRC condemned the U.S. for "ruining" Sino-American relations.

The instigating event was the 1995 address Lee gave at his alma mater, Cornell University, on what he dubbed "Taiwan's democratization experience." The fact that the Taiwanese president was granted a visa to visit the United States after Secretary of State Warren Christopher assured his Chinese counterpart that Lee would not be allowed to enter the country enraged Beijing. In retaliation, the Chinese military conducted missile tests and exercises in the Taiwan Strait. This prompted Secretary of Defense William Perry to announce that the United States would dispatch two aircraft carrier strike groups to the area, demonstrating that the United States was prepared to intervene to repel a Chinese invasion.

Since then, China has developed a more robust toolkit to punish Taiwan. Whereas Taiwan's military budget exceeded China's in 1994, China now outspends Taiwan by 20. In recent years, China has become bolder in its coercive military maneuvers: look no further than its near-daily incursions into Taiwan's air defense identification zone. To send a message, China will have to do something that rises significantly above that kind of baiting, which means its options are increasingly escalatory.

In addition to its military advantage, China has significantly more leverage over Taiwan's economy. At the time of the 1995­–96 crisis, Taiwan's exports to the mainland accounted for one-third of one percent of its total exports; today, that figure is 30 percent. China could choose to cut off its market to many Taiwanese goods, which would be difficult for Taiwan—or the United States—to counter.

It is not just relations between China and Taiwan that have evolved. During previous crises, China had an overriding interest in preserving a constructive relationship with the United States. This was true during the 1995–96 crisis, the standoff sparked by the accidental U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and an incident in 2001 when a Chinese fighter jet collided with a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. In all these cases, Chinese leaders ultimately sought a way to de-escalate tensions. Now, however, with U.S.-Chinese relations in a free fall, Xi may believe there is little left to preserve.

           

Trouble ahead

A far more dangerous era for cross-strait relations is in the offing. Xi has set an objective of achieving China's "great rejuvenation" by 2049; unification with Taiwan is a precondition for that goal. And he may want to move more rapidly than that timeline suggests: Xi is unlikely to live to see 2049 (he would be approaching 100 years old) and has said that this issue cannot be passed from generation to generation. That implies he would like to make at least significant progress on the question of Taiwan's status or resolve it all together on his watch. As CIA Director William J. Burns recently said; "I wouldn't underestimate President Xi's determination to assert China's control—the People's Republic of China's control—over Taiwan. . . . I think the risks of that become higher, it seems to us, the further into this decade that you get." After cementing his rule at the upcoming Party Congress and having sidelined rivals and placed loyalists in critical positions, Xi will have a freer hand in pursuing his objectives.

The Biden administration should initiate a comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. It took place in 1994, and significant changes in cross-strait dynamics. A guiding principle of U.S. policy should deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan. The United States should clarify that it would use force to come to Taiwan's defense.

The U.S. government should improve Taiwan's combat capabilities. The United States should assist Taiwan in reforming its reserve forces and developing territorial defense forces while pushing Taipei to increase defense spending and invest in asymmetric capabilities such as missiles, sea mines, and portable air defenses. U.S. policymakers must also prepare their civilian population for a potential Chinese attack. This would entail planning how to maintain adequate food, fuel, and medical supplies during a conflict.

Meanwhile, to lower the chances of a conflagration, the United States should reconsider gestures that inflame tensions but do not meaningfully increase deterrence or Taiwan's resilience. Bilateral security cooperation between the United States and Taiwan will need to grow in the coming years, but such activities should not be made public. High-level U.S. officials should visit when there is a substantive reason for doing so, such as discussing U.S.-Taiwanese trade relations or cooperation on global health issues. Suppose the United States believes that a crisis is brewing. In that case, a high-level symbolic trip could be helpful to send a signal to China, but until that day, senior officials should not touch down in Taipei just for the sake of doing so.

By that standard, Pelosi's planned visit is ill-advised. Although Taiwan is unlikely to secure any tangible gains, it will bear the brunt of any Chinese response. But Pelosi seems unlikely to cancel her trip; she may feel that this is her last opportunity to show her support for Taiwan, given that she is unlikely to remain Speaker following the midterm elections. Plus, the bedrock of her political career has taken a tough stance on China. Now that the visit has become public and there is significant bipartisan support in Congress for her trip, there will also be political fallout if her plans end in cancellation.

The best outcome would be for Pelosi to delay her trip until after the midterms but before the next session of Congress, which would coincide with the aftermath of China's Party Congress. Xi will likely sell any delay as a Chinese victory, much as Chinese President Jiang Zemin cast the 1995–96 crisis in the same light, and Pelosi would still be able to count a trip as part of her legacy. In the meantime, Pelosi could introduce legislation that would increase Taiwan's defense capabilities, potentially including provisions such as prioritizing arms deliveries to the island or starting a foreign military financing program with Taipei. A bill could also grant the Biden administration authority to negotiate a comprehensive trade deal with Taiwan. In preparing for a future crisis over Taiwan, such substantive measures would be far more meaningful than any symbolic gesture.

 

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