By Eric Vandenbroeck and
co-workers
Russia, Germany, and Poland 1917-1945
Part Eleven
While Hitler was
disappointed he had not gotten his short, victorious war, Stalin was irate. As
noted, three years earlier, Litvinov had negotiated the 1935
Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Under its terms, the USSR
would assist in defense of Czechoslovakia if that state were threatened, but
only if the French rendered assistance first.1 During the crisis in 1938,
Stalin offered to commit military forces to assist Prague, even ordering a
partial mobilization of the Red Army. It remains unclear whether this offer was
genuine, especially given possible Soviet interest in directing Hitler’s
aggression westward.2 The most recent evidence from the Russian archives
suggests that had the French acted, the Soviet Union would have fulfilled its
obligations under the terms of the 1935 treaty, but that the Kremlin was fairly
confident the French would not act.3 At the time, neither France nor Britain
seriously considered Soviet assistance, refusing to invite a Soviet delegation
to attend the Munich Conference where Czechoslovakia’s fate was decided.4 In
practice, this meant that Soviet collective security policy had failed once
again. Stalin had kept his options open throughout the 1930s. He maintained
channels to Germany and offered openings for political rapprochement from 1933
to 1938, even while Litvinov pursued collective security. Following the Munich
Conference, the German option became much more attractive.5 The series of
negotiations that would eventually lead to a renewal of the Soviet-German
partnership began over trade relations shortly following the Munich Conference.
As noted, German-Soviet economic exchange did not cease in 1933. However, it
did decline from its peak in 1930.6 Much of the continuing trade was conducted
under credit agreements, whereby the German government provided credits to the
Soviet government to purchase industrial and finished goods from German firms.
Every year between 1933 and 1938, Germany remained one of the top three
exporters to the USSR. And Germany continued to import key raw materials from the
USSR as its rearmament measures rapidly used up existing stocks of resources in
Germany. This led German officials, including Hermann Göring, then managing
German war production, to seek expanded trade agreements with their Soviet
counterparts five times in 1937 and 1938.7 However, these attempts failed
because the Soviets demanded political talks as part of any economic
agreement.8
Circumstances changed after the Munich agreement. By
December 1938, German raw material needs had become desperate, with former Reichsminister of Economics Hjalmar Schacht informing
Hitler that without further resource imports in critical areas like oil,
rubber, iron, manganese, phosphates, tungsten, and chrome, “armaments
production had reached the limit of peacetime expansion possibilities.”9 With
few other options, the Germans stepped up their negotiating efforts with the
USSR. On December 1, 1938, the Eastern European Economic Section of the German
Foreign Ministry, forty-one-year-old Karl Schnurre, decided to renew the German
approaches. A member of the Ostpolitik faction devised a generous credit
proposal designed to bring the Soviets back to the negotiating table. The
Germans would offer credits to cover Soviet purchases worth 500 million
Reichsmarks in Germany in exchange for 300 million Reichsmarks’ worth of Soviet
raw materials.10 The Soviets responded with a proposal for trade talks in
Moscow on January 11, 1939.
Behind the scenes,
there was enthusiasm on the Soviet side. Kliment Voroshilov sent Anastas
Mikoyan, then managing foreign trade, a list of requested purchases to be made
from Germany’s military industry as part of the deal.11 The final proposal
stretched to seventeen pages. The Soviet Air Force alone planned to request
from German industry four complete fighter and bomber prototypes, seven engine
designs, thirteen different machine gun and bomb designs, nine types of
laboratory equipment, and ten kinds of optical and electrical equipment. The
total list included 112 items. The Red Army would consider presenting German
trade representatives such a list during a period of supposed hostility shows
how essential German designs and expertise remained for the Red Army.12 It also
indicated that the Soviets had in mind broader rapprochement, as the Germans
would never agree to sell such a list of weaponry without a political
understanding.
The Soviets soon
found themselves disappointed, however. Hitler, steered by Ribbentrop, remained
committed to his approaches to Poland. With his assent, Ribbentrop canceled
Schnurre’s proposed trip to Moscow on January 28.13; instead, Ribbentrop
ordered Ambassador Schulenberg to enter into trade negotiations, but without
the power to agree. Negotiations seemed to be making progress, but Soviet
demands for large quantities of military materiel proved unpalatable to Hitler,
who still believed Ribbentrop’s promises about constructing an anti-Soviet
coalition. On March 11, the German Foreign Ministry ordered Schulenberg to
bring negotiations to a “standstill in a suitable way” while leaving room for
their future resumption.14
A change in
circumstance would ultimately present new opportunities. With German
connivance, Czechoslovakia had begun to disintegrate following the Sudeten
crisis of the previous year. Its remaining national minorities, particularly
the Slovaks, were encouraged to clamor for independence or greater autonomy.
Hitler took advantage of the disorder that followed, ordering the Wehrmacht to
prepare to occupy the remainder of the Czech state.15 On March 14, 1939, he
ordered Czechoslovakia Emil Hacha, to Berlin. At one in the morning, Hitler,
who had kept Hacha waiting for hours while watching a movie, summoned the
elderly lawyer into his presence. He announced that as he spoke, the German
Army was invading Czechoslovakia. He told Hacha he could either order the Czech
military to lay down arms and prevent bloodshed, or force would be used,
including the terror bombing of Prague. Hacha’s reaction to this was a heart
attack. While under medical treatment, he signed Hitler’s demands and ordered
the surrender of the Czech military to the occupying Germans.16
There was a little
legal pretext for the invasion; one German representative in Prague recorded
that the Germans “deplored the perfectly correct, even accommodating, attitude
of the Czechs everywhere.”17 It was an act of naked aggression. Hitler’s reward
was the powerful Czech military arsenal, carefully built up throughout the
interwar period: more than 1,000 modern aircraft, 2,000 artillery pieces, and
800 modern tanks.18
The German invasion
stunned Neville Chamberlain. He delivered a quiet and cautious address to
Parliament shortly after the news came in on March 15.19 Two days later, he
addressed a crowd in Birmingham, saying, “Public opinion in the world has
received a sharper shock than has ever yet been administered to it, even by the
present regime in Germany.” He went on to insist defensively, “Really, I do not need to
defend my visits to Germany last autumn, for what was the alternative?” But
there was a hint of resolve in the speech that was new. He concluded by saying
that “No greater mistake could be made than to suppose that, because it
believes war to be a senseless and cruel thing, this nation has so lost its
fiber that it will not take part to the utmost of its power in resisting
aggression.”20
Hitler had more
shocks in store. Seven days after taking Czechoslovakia, he seized the city of
Memel from Lithuania. The following day, he forced Romania into a pro-German
trade treaty, providing the Wehrmacht with a guaranteed oil supply.21 Hitler
also began exerting heavier pressure to bring Poland into the German
orbit.22
Chamberlain finally
acted. During a cabinet meeting on March 18, he made clear that it was time to
take a stronger line, even to the point of risking war.23 After a brief
deliberation, his government, publicly announced a security guarantee to
Poland, promising to protect Polish sovereignty should Hitler invade.24 The aim
was to deter further aggression. But Chamberlain’s decision was made hastily,
without consulting the Foreign Office. His speech announcing the policy
indicated that he had chosen Poland over the Soviet Union as a partner in the
East.25
The problem was that
Britain could offer little military support to Poland directly, and Poland was
too weak to defeat Germany without considerable assistance. Realistically,
cooperation between Poland and the Soviet Union was the only means of deterring
German aggression toward the East. Unfortunately, by emphasizing commitments to
Poland without serious overtures to Stalin, Chamberlain had simultaneously
alienated the Soviet Union and made his foreign policy dependent upon it. He
had some reasons for ignoring Moscow: the broad consensus among British and
French intelligence continued that the Red Army had become useless after the
purges. For instance, in the spring of 1939, the French General Staff described
the Red Army as “virtually worthless,” while the head of the British Secret
Intelligence Service reported that it “could do nothing of real value.”26
Combined with a general distrust of Soviet ideology and lingering horror from
collectivization and the purges, the Soviets seemed a hopeless ally.
For his part, Hitler
was furious about the guarantee to Poland. It ended any possibility he could
cajole Poland into supporting a crusade against the Soviet Union.27 Upon
receipt of the news of the British statement, Hitler shouted, “I’ll cook them a
stew that they’ll choke on!”28 On April 3, 1939, he ordered plans drawn up for
the invasion of Poland, to begin no later than October 1 of that year.29 By way
of explanation, he told German military leadership that “We have nothing to
lose; we have everything to gain . . . the power of initiative cannot be
allowed to pass to others.”30
The Wehrmacht’s own
rearmament programs were leveling off, approaching maximum production possible
given resource, workforce, and finance constraints.31 Technologically,
prototypes commissioned between 1933 and 1935 now made up the bulk of German
production, providing—as noted—a temporary lead in armaments that would
gradually fade. The British and French were now committed to serious
rearmament, and across the Atlantic, the United States had also begun to gear
up for national mobilization.32 Hitler’s window for war was closing. After four
years, nothing had come of Ribbentrop’s efforts to persuade Polish foreign
minister Józef Beck to ally with Germany – Beck understood the stakes too
well.
The idea of a new
Soviet partnership would first emerge from veterans of the old. There were
constituencies within both the German military and Foreign Ministry, primarily
veterans of the Rapallo Era, that favored the renewal of ties with the Soviet
Union. 33 To sway the Führer, members of the German Foreign Ministry fed
information to key members of Hitler’s entourage indicating that Stalin was
interested in rapprochement in March, some of which was at best misleading.34
In this context, Göring, likely seeking to undermine rival Ribbentrop’s
influence with Hitler, suggested to Hitler the abandonment of overtures to
Poland and a reorientation toward the Soviet Union. To further sway Hitler, he
even traveled to Rome in mid-April to discuss with Mussolini the Italian
reaction should Germany pursue an anti-Polish agreement with Moscow.
The guarantee to
Poland had triggered a reaction in Moscow, too.35 Immediately, the Soviets
renewed their approaches to Germany. On April 17, 1939, Soviet ambassador
Alexei Merekalov in Berlin met with State Secretary
Ernest von Weizsäcker to discuss whether the now German-occupied Škoda Works in
Czechoslovakia would fulfill military orders that had been placed there by the
Soviet government.36 Merekalov concluded his remarks
by noting that the German reaction would demonstrate whether Germany wanted to
“cultivate and expand economic relations with Russia” or not.37 Stalin also
ordered the recall of his ambassadors in London, Paris, and Berlin for
consultations.
On April 21, Stalin
summoned his foreign policy team to the Kremlin, including Ambassador in London
Ivan Maisky, Merekalov,
Vyacheslav Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, and Litvinov. The air was tense,
particularly between Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinov and his rival
Molotov. Stalin made clear that he was “manifestly dissatisfied with England”
and that he was concerned “there might be a plot in London or Paris to involve
Moscow in a war and then leave her in the lurch.”38 Molotov suggested opening
negotiations with Germany. Merekalov made clear that
Berlin would be open to an agreement.39 Given the hostile attitude toward his
collective security project, Litvinov then dramatically offered his
resignation. Stalin rejected it, then turned to Maisky,
asking his assessment of the situation in London. Sensing the mood in the room,
Maisky suggested that a new British act of
appeasement toward Germany was indeed possible, possibly to encourage Hitler to
attack the Soviet Union.40
On May 3, Stalin
removed Maxim Litvinov, who was Jewish, from office. Stalin replaced Litvinov
with his closest associate Molotov, ethnically Russian and supportive of
renewed cooperation with Germany. Molotov, known as “stonearse”
by his associates for his dull personality and long working hours, would later
describe his understanding of the role of foreign minister as “expand[ing] the borders of our fatherland.”41 Stalin’s first order
to him, in Molotov’s own recollection, was to “purge the ministry of Jews.”42
This was intended as a signal to Hitler.43 Other signals were immediately
forthcoming, too. On May 4 and 5, Soviet diplomat Georgii Astakhov sought out
German diplomats in Berlin to discuss the Škoda contract issue.44 During those
meetings, one of them recalled, Astakhov “spoke about the removal of Litvinov
and tried to ask indirectly whether this event would bring us to a changed
attitude of the Soviet Union.” 45 Astakhov wrote back to Moscow that “the
Germans are trying to create the impression of an impending or even immediate
improvement in the German-Soviet relations” and that their motives for doing so
were so obvious, the Polish guarantee, that such signals should be taken
seriously.46
That assessment was
accurate. Hitler ordered a halt to media attacks against the USSR, then
recalled Ambassador Schulenberg, diplomat Gustav Hilger, and military attaché
Ernst Köstring from Moscow to Berlin for his own
round of consultations. On May 10, he met with Hilger, the most experienced
Russia expert in the Foreign Ministry, resident in Moscow for twenty years, and
trade negotiator Karl Schnurre. Unusually for Hitler, he listened attentively,
asking thoughtful questions on the nature of Soviet foreign policy.47 He met
with Köstring shortly thereafter, behaving
similarly.48 These men, veterans of the Rapallo Era and advocates of
rapprochement with the USSR, described a Stalin willing to collaborate and with
much to offer economically.49
On May 17, Astakhov
approached Karl Schnurre to discuss renewing the stalled trade talks. He also
noted that “there were no foreign policy disagreements between Germany and the
Soviet Union, and that, as a result, there was no basis for hostility between
the two states.”50 Astakhov then explicitly cited the precedent of the Treaty
of Rapallo, a subject laden with military and political meaning.51 Three days
later, in Moscow, new Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov visited Ambassador
Schulenberg for an hour-long conversation. Molotov suggested that economic
talks could resume once the necessary “political bases” were constructed. He
proposed both governments think about “the way in which better political bases
could be built.”52 He would not say more when pressed, leaving Schulenberg, to
Molotov’s amusement, temporarily bewildered.53 Schulenberg conveyed to Berlin
his belief that Molotov had “almost invited political discussions” and that
“our proposal of conducting only economic negotiations had appeared insufficient
to him.”54
In light of these
signals and ongoing talks between the Soviets and Great Britain, Hitler decided
to reopen negotiations in Moscow. On May 30, the German Foreign Ministry
informed Schulenberg, “Contrary to the policy previously planned, we have now
decided to undertake definite negotiations with the Soviet Union.”55 But after
years of mistrust, neither side was certain whether talks were entirely
tactical, aimed at isolating the other from other potential partners. Astakhov,
Merekalov, and Weizsäcker in Berlin and Schulenberg
and Molotov in Moscow spent much of June cautiously sounding out. For instance,
Astakhov visited the Bulgarian ambassador in Berlin, whom he hardly knew, and
spent two hours explaining Soviet attitudes toward Germany, apparently assuming
he would relay the information. Most notably, the Bulgarian ambassador told his
hosts, Astakhov had stated that of options available to the USSR, “a
rapprochement with Germany . . . was closest to the desires of the Soviet
Union.”56
On June 17, the
German Foreign Ministry informed Mikoyan of their interest in sending Schnurre
back to Moscow to reopen trade negotiations. He rejected this offer as being
too risky, given that there were British and French emissaries in Moscow.
Mikoyan eventually offered to send a delegation to Berlin instead.57 Stalin
seems to have been playing for time. Hitler, growing frustrated, briefly
canceled further talks, though only four days later, Schulenberg and Molotov
discussed the political basis upon which a trade deal could be negotiated.58
Between July 7 and July 12, the Germans dropped one of their major reservations
in the economic negotiations: they would sell armaments to the Soviets.59 This
marked a change in the German negotiating position, which had essentially
blocked weapons sales to the USSR since 1935.
On July 21, Schnurre
formally opened new economic talks with Soviet envoys in Berlin. Hitler told
the German Foreign Ministry that “we will here act in a markedly forthcoming
manner, since a conclusion, and this at the earliest possible date, is desired for
general reasons.”60 Specifically, Hitler now planned to launch a war against
Poland in late August. An economic partnership with the USSR would provide
critical raw materials to maintain the German war machine in a possible British
blockade. Given that German military planners calculated Germany had only three
to six months of oil in the event of war, and even greater shortages of other
raw materials, Wehrmacht officers
concluded that “making our greater economic sphere blockade-proof can only be
achieved through close economic cooperation with Russia.”61 In essence, this
was the idea that had motivated Seeckt back in 1920:
that the USSR might serve as strategic and economic depth in a new war between
Germany and the Western powers. Even better, in the German view, an agreement
with Stalin might deter the British from honoring their guarantees to Poland at
all, thus handing Hitler yet another easy victory. Ribbentrop, who spent nearly
every moment by Hitler’s side in the critical months of 1939, told the Führer
this would in fact be the case.62
Stalin, whose
intelligence agencies allowed him to read much of the German diplomatic
traffic, was well aware of the German position.63 He resolved to extract the
highest possible terms from Hitler before reaching an accommodation. The
Germans began negotiations by proposing a large credit arrangement at high
interest, centering on raw material deliveries to be made over a short period
of time in exchange for finished goods.64 The Soviets countered every one of
the German terms and won each at the negotiating table as Hitler pressed the
German Foreign Ministry to reach an arrangement. By August 4, the two sides had
reached the basic contours of a credit deal.65 But the Soviets refused to
finalize the arrangement, waiting to see if they could improve their bargaining
position before political talks began.
Hitler was impatient
for Stalin’s agreement. On August 11, Hitler informed Mussolini that he was considering
temporary rapprochement with Stalin to deter any British or French action over
Poland.66 The same day, he declared to an amazed foreign visitor, “Everything I
am doing is directed against Russia; if the West is too stupid and too blind to
grasp this, I shall be forced to come to an understanding with the Russians,
strike West, and then after its defeat turn against the Soviet Union with my
assembled forces.”67
As Hitler waited for
Stalin, London and Paris sent representatives to Moscow to negotiate a military
alliance with the Soviets against Germany. Inexplicably, they were sent via
slow-boat, were not authorized to sign any documents, and, in the British case,
had not even been credentialed by their own government.68 Their primary goal
may have been to keep the Germans and Soviets from concluding a deal. On August
11, they finally arrived, greeted with a huge feast hosted by Commissar for
Defense Kliment Voroshilov. Despite the warm reception, Stalin was not
impressed. The envoys had low ranks, lacked credentials, and could not
communicate in Russian, the large delegation had only one Russian speaker as an
interpreter. At a meeting of a Politburo that day, Stalin formally decided to
begin political negotiations with Germany.69
The Germans had far
more to offer than the British and French. Sympathetic Stalin observer and New
York Times journalist Walter Duranty would later write, “I do not doubt that
the Soviet [sic] would always have preferred to retain its friendship with Germany
rather than rapprochement, however close, with Britain, France, and Poland.”70
That view was broadly shared in the embassies of the other great powers in
Moscow in August 1939.71 Hitler could give his assent to Soviet occupation of
the Baltic states, eastern Poland, and Bessarabia, whereas London and Paris
would not. Hitler could supply huge quantities of machine tools and military
technology to the USSR. At the same time, the British and French could not,
especially as they tried desperately to catch up with the German lead in
armaments.
There were also
ideological reasons behind Stalin’s preference for a German partnership. Stalin
perceived the capitalist world as a hostile bloc, divided between “rich” and
“poor” states.72 Great Britain stood at the head of the “rich” states; Germany
was a revisionist “poor” state. Stalin’s goal remained to avoid any unity
between these two groups, resulting in a capitalist crusade against the Soviet
Union. Instead, however, if the two fought an extended war, the Soviet Union
might profit enormously, staying on the sidelines until its weight could be
added decisively to the scales.73 As Molotov would explain to a party member in
1940, long war between Germany and the British and French would trigger
revolutions and civil wars in which the Soviets would intervene militarily. A
decisive victory “somewhere near the Rhine” would permanently establish
communist rule across Europe.74
The final steps had
not been taken yet. On August 12, the Soviets informed the German Foreign
Ministry that they were willing to begin talks of a political nature, provided
they could be held in Moscow.75 Hitler was amenable, driven above all by the
desire to reach an agreement before he invaded Poland. On August 13, the Polish
government ordered a partial mobilization of its army, further increasing
Hitler’s sense of urgency.76
On August 14,
Ribbentrop communicated to the Soviets his request for a personal meeting with
Stalin to discuss “the restoration of German-Soviet friendship, and where
appropriate, to resolve territorial issues in Eastern Europe together.”77
Molotov indicated his approval during a meeting with Schulenberg the following
day, presenting a few key items that should be included in
negotiations.78
On August 19, Molotov
provided the Germans with a Soviet draft of a nonaggression pact.79 It included
five brief articles, roughly based upon the 1926 Treaty of Berlin, which in
turn had been an extension of the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo. There were two unusual
terms. First, the draft treaty did not include a section that rendered the
treaty null and void in the event Germany or the Soviet Union committed
aggression against a third country, language that had been included in all
other Soviet nonaggression treaties to that point.80 Second, it stated that the
pact would be valid only if it included a special secret protocol covering key
points in foreign policy between the two states.81 The Germans interpreted
these terms to indicate Soviet interest in the partition of Poland and other
possible territorial agreements besides. However, before they could turn to the
Soviet draft treaty, Molotov insisted that a credit deal be finalized.82 Urged
on by the German Foreign Ministry, Schnurre and a Soviet envoy signed the
delayed trade agreement in Berlin after midnight that day. The final agreement
included a low-interest credit worth 200 million Reichsmarks (USD 80 million)
to be used by the USSR to purchase German machine tools and weapons.83 In
exchange, the USSR would export 180 million Reichsmarks’ worth of Soviet raw
materials over two years, with shipments to begin immediately.84 Given the
interest rates, the German concession to sell weapons, and uneven value of the
deal, it was clear Stalin had won the negotiations.85 The raw material exports
listed, while substantial, were hardly at the level of German expectations
needed to maintain an extended war against Great Britain.86
On the afternoon of
August 20, dismayed by breaking news of the Soviet-German economic agreement,
the French delegation in Moscow agreed to a major Soviet demand: that the Red
Army be allowed to cross Polish and Romanian territory in the event of a German
invasion.87 They did so without the consent of their Polish and Romanian
allies, both of whom were concerned that such an agreement would result in
permanent Soviet occupation. Although the Soviets claimed this was key to any
military arrangement, Stalin had already decided: he had agreed to political
discussions with the Germans nine days earlier and already provided the Germans
with the draft text of a treaty that strongly hinted at the partition of
Poland. Given the course of events, it seems probable that Stalin had inclined
toward a German pact since May and had only allowed the British and French
delegations to visit Moscow to get better terms from the Germans. In any case,
on August 21, Stalin temporarily suspended negotiations with Great Britain and France.
Immediately afterward, he sent his lead negotiator in those talks, Kliment
Voroshilov, on a duck-hunting expedition to halt any attempts to recommence the
process.88 The same day, Stalin ordered the Soviet Foreign Ministry to give
Ambassador Schulenberg an official memorandum on further negotiations.
Now just days from
his planned invasion, Hitler sent a personal cable to Stalin, writing that he
considered it “urgently necessary to clarify questions connected with it [the
political talks] as soon as possible,” and urging Stalin to accept a visit from
German foreign minister Ribbentrop, who would be delegated full powers to sign
an agreement.89 At 8:30 p.m. on the evening of August 21, Hitler learned that
Stalin had authorized Ribbentrop to arrive on August 23. He declared, “Now I
have the world in my pocket!” and immediately ordered champagne to be broken
out.90 The next morning, Hitler spoke to his senior military leadership,
outlining his plans for war against Poland. He told Germany’s military leaders
that “because we have sources of supply in Eastern Europe,” there was now
limited danger from the Western powers.91 Bolstered by an out-of-touch
Ribbentrop, he was confident that agreements already made with Italy, Japan,
and now the Soviet Union would deter any British or French military
interventions, he would finally have his short victorious war. Amateur “peace
feelers” from London behind the scenes also strongly suggested that the British
and French lacked the will to go to war.92 A final measure of reassurance
arrived when a British diplomat delivered a fresh offer from Chamberlain to
negotiate over Poland, hinting that the British guarantee to Poland was not, in
fact, ironclad.93 But with the renewal of Rapallo imminent, Hitler was ready to
start his war and would not allow any peace talks or concessions to divert him
from that aim. On the evening of August 22, Ribbentrop boarded Hitler’s
personal Condor aircraft and departed for Moscow.
The sequence of
events following the Munich Agreement:
1. The Sudetenland
became part of Germany following the Munich Agreement (October 1938).
2. Poland annexes Zaolzie, an area with a Polish plurality, over which the
two countries had fought a war in 1919 (October 1938).
3. Border areas
(southern third of Slovakia and southern Carpathian Ruthenia) with Hungarian
minorities became part of Hungary per the First Vienna Award (November 1938).
4. On 15 March 1939,
during the German invasion of the remaining Czech territories, Hungary annexes
the remainder of Carpathian Ruthenia (which had been autonomous since October
1938).
5. Germany
establishes the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia with a puppet
government on 16 March 1939.
6. On 14 March 1939,
a pro-Hitler Catholic-fascist government declares the Slovak Republic as an
Axis client state.
Part One: Russia, Germany, and Poland Part One
Part Two: Russia,
Germany, and Poland Part Two
Part Three: Russia,
Germany, and Poland Part Three
Part Four: Russia,
Germany, and Poland Part Four
Part
Five: Russia,
Germany, and Poland Part Five
Part Six: Russia, Germany, and Poland Part Six
Part
Seven: Russia, Germany, and Poland Part Seven
Part
Eight: Russia, Germany, and Poland Part Eight
Part Nine: Russia, Germany, and
Poland Part Nine
Part
Ten: Russia, Germany, and Poland
Part Ten
Part Twelve: Russia, Germany, and Poland Part Twelve
Part Thirteen:
Russia, Germany, and Poland Part Thirteen
Part Fourteen:
Russia, Germany, and Poland Part Fourteen
Part Fifteen: Russia, Germany, and Poland Part Fifteen
1. “Treaty of Mutual
Assistance between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics,” May 16, 1935, League of Nations Treaty Series Volume 159 (1935),
1–3. Available digitally at https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.unl/lnts0159&div=1&id=&page=&collection=unl; see
also Anna M. Cienciala, “The Nazi-Soviet Pact of
August 23, 1939: When Did Stalin Decide to Align with Hitler, and Was Poland
the Culprit?,” in Ideology, Politics, and Diplomacy in East-Central Europe, ed.
M. B. B. Biskupski (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2003), 175.
2. See, for instance,
Lukes, Czechoslovakia between Stalin and Hitler; Hugh Ragsdale, “Soviet
Military Preparations and Policy in the Munich Crisis: New Evidence,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, 47:2 (1999), 210–226; Jiri Hochman, The Soviet
Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934–1938 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1984); Zara Steiner, “The Soviet Commissariat of Foreign
Affairs and the Czechoslovakian Crisis in 1938: New Material from the Soviet
Archives,” The Historical Journal, 42:3 (Sep. 1999), 751–779.
3. Ragsdale, “Soviet
Military Preparations and Policy in the Munich Crisis: New Evidence,” 226;
David Stone, A Military History of Russia, 189–190; Erickson, The Soviet High
Command, 503.
4. Steiner, “The
Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the Czechoslovakian Crisis in 1938,”
752.
5. There has long
been an intense debate over which state took the initiative and when Stalin
decided upon an arrangement with Hitler. Roberts long defended a late date,
suggesting Stalin’s decision was made only in desperation in August and arguing
that “Soviet-German contacts in May–June 1939 are of limited significance.” He
further suggests that Astakhov and other Soviet figures may have acted
independently when they approached their German counterparts in the spring of
1939. Roberts, The Unholy Alliance, 144. Of course, initiative of that sort
seems unlikely in a Soviet system that was still in the process of murdering
hundreds of its diplomats. Fleischhauer suggests that the decision made in
mid-August to partner with Hitler was a “logical way out of a hopelessly narrow
set of possible Soviet foreign policy options,” a conundrum created by French
and British intransigence in the August negotiations. Ingeborg Fleischhauer,
“Soviet Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Hitler-Stalin Pact,” in From Peace
to War, ed. Bernd Wegner, 45. True, but French and British “intransigence”
vis-à-vis a Soviet Union, in part a reaction to the bloody purges, had become
clear well before August 1939, as had alternative Soviet approaches. Watt sees
Soviet demarches in May 1939 as in earnest, opening “the long road to the
Nazi-Soviet pact.” Watt, How War Came, 254. Weinberg agrees, thinking that a
Soviet decision was largely made between March and May, with tentative steps
initiated by Moscow: “If the earliest hints . . . all came from the Soviet
side, this may have been because the Russian government was better informed
about German intentions than the other way around.” Weinberg, Starting World
War II, 1937–1939, 568. Historian of Russia Jonathan Haslam argues that Stalin
actively pursued relations with Western powers and Germany from 1933 onward,
likely deciding on partnership with the latter following the Polish Guarantee.
Jonathan Haslam, “Soviet‐German Relations and the Origins of the Second World
War: The Jury Is Still Out,” Journal of Modern History, 69:4 (December 1997),
785–797, 791. Anna Cienciala goes even farther,
suggesting that “Stalin always preferred a pact with Germany.” Cienciala, “The Nazi Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939,” 153.
The evidence presented here suggests that Stalin repeatedly tried to restore
good relations with Germany in the 1930s, in part as a product of Soviet
economic and military dependence on Germany; that he feared the formation of an
anti-Soviet coalition; and that he believed by the spring of 1939 that he could
get far more from a partnership with Germany than he could with France or Great
Britain. The latter depended in part on the history of collaboration, and part
on the prospect of a war in Western Europe that would weaken all the states
involved and give the USSR a chance to continue to improve its military.
6. Edward E. Ericson
III, Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933–1941
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 187 (Table 1.1).
7. Ericson, Feeding
the German Eagle, 30
8. No. 619, DGFP, D:
I, 912.
9. Ericson, Feeding
the German Eagle, 28.
10. Ibid., 30.
11. “Zamestitelyu predsedatelya soveta narodnykh komissarov SSSR, Tov. Mikoyanu”
[To Deputy Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, Comrade Mikoyan], 28
January 1939, RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3s, d. 1237 (1), l. 43.
12. For more details
of the trade negotiations, see Nos. 481–485, 488–495, 613, 620–631, ADAP, D:4.
13. Ericson, Feeding
the German Eagle, 34.
14. Ibid., 36. By
contrast, Ribbentrop claimed in his memoirs, written rapidly shortly before his
execution in 1946, that the entire idea of collaboration with the Soviets had
been his idea, and that the idea had come to him following Stalin’s speech of March
10, which stated that “Russia did not intend to ‘pull the chestnuts out of the
fire’ to please certain capitalist Powers.” Given that the German Foreign
Ministry broke off trade talks the following day, this was obviously untrue.
Joachim von Ribbentrop, The Ribbentrop Memoirs, trans. Oliver Watson (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954), 108.
15. Weinberg, The
Road to War, 534.
16. Fest, Hitler,
570–571; Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich in Power: 1933–1939 (New York:
Penguin, 2005), 682.
17. Weinberg,
Starting World War Two, 1937–1939, 539.
18. Evans, The Third
Reich in Power, 683.
19. Weinberg,
Starting World War Two, 1937–1939, 539.
20. Neville
Chamberlain, “Speech by the Prime Minister at Birmingham on March 17, 1939,” 17
March 1939, The British War Bluebook. Digitized
at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk09.asp.
21. Robertson,
Hitler’s Pre-war Policy and Military Plans, 167.
22. Weinberg,
Starting World War Two, 1937-1939, 537–538.
23. Ibid., 542.
24. G. Bruce Strang,
“Once More unto the Breach: Britain’s Guarantee to Poland, March 1939,” Journal
of Contemporary History, 31:4 (Oct., 1996), 721–752.
25. Kotkin, Stalin:
Waiting for Hitler, 616.
26. Strang,
“Britain’s Guarantee to Poland,” 738.
27. Rolf-Dieter Müller, Enemy in the
East, 148.
28. Fest, Hitler, 578.
29. Robertson,
Hitler’s Pre-war Policy and Military Plans, 165.
30. No. 192, No. 193,
DGFP, D: VIII, 207–212, cited by Maiolo, Cry Havoc, 273.
31. Tooze, Wages of
Destruction, 316. Behind closed doors, Hitler expressed great frustrations with
the slowdown in rearmament and the drive for autarky: “The Four Year Plan has
failed and we are finished if we do not achieve victory in the coming war.”
32. Maiolo, Cry
Havoc, 268.
33. Watt, How War
Came, 239.
34. Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Der Pakt: Hitler, Stalin und die
Initiative der deutschen Diplomatie, 1938–1939 [The Pact:
Hitler, Stalin and the German Diplomatic
Initiative, 1938–1939] (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1990), 118.
35. Robertson,
Hitler’s Pre-war Policy and Military Plans, 167; Kotkin, Stalin: Waiting for
Hitler, 617.
36. Cienciala, “The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939,” 171;
“Memorandum by the State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizsäcker),”
in Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941: Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941: Documents
from the Archives of the German Foreign Office (hereafter NSR), eds. Raymond
James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (Washington DC: US Department of State,
1948), 1. For the Soviet side of this approach, see “Telegramma
polnomochnogo prestavitelia
SSSR v Germanii A. F. Merekalova v narodnyi komissariat inostrannykh del SSSR” [Telegram from the Ambassador
Representative of the USSR in Germany A. F. Merekalov
to the Soviet People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs], 18 April 1939, in God krizisa: 1938–1939, Tom II, Dokumenty
i materiali [Year of Crisis 1938–1939, Volume II,
Documents and Materials] (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs USSR, 1990), 389.
37. Kotkin, Stalin:
Waiting for Hitler, 622.
38. The Maisky Diaries, 179.
39. Kotkin, Stalin:
Waiting for Hitler, 623.
40. The Maisky Diaries, 179.
41. Molotov
Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics, Conversations with Felix Chuev, ed. Albert Resis (Chicago:
Ivan R. Dee, 1993), 8.
42. Resis, “The Fall of Litvinov,” 35.
43. Cienciala, “The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939,” 173,
citing Andrei Gromyko.
44. No. 1, in Die Beziehungen zwischen
Deutschland und der Sowjetunion, 1939–1941: Dokumente des Auswärtigen Amtes (hereafter BZDS) [Relations between
Germany and the Soviet
Union, 1939–1941: Documents from
the German Foreign Office],
ed. Alfred
Seidel (Tübingen: H. Laupp’sche Buchhandlung,
1949), 1–2.
45. Cienciala, “The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939,” 174;
BZDS, No. 2, No. 3, 2–3. See also Resis, “The Fall of
Litvinov,” 35.
46. Astakhov, “Pismo vremmenogo poverennogo v delakh SSSR v Germanii G. A. Astakhova zamestiteliu
narodnogo komissara inostrannykh del SSSR V. P. Potemkinu”
[Letter from the Chargé-d’Affaires of the USSR in
Germany G. A. Astakhov to the Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of
the USSR V. P. Potemkin], God krizisa, Tom I,
457–458.
47. Anthony Read and
David Fisher, The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact,
1939–1941 (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988), 75.
48. Köstring, General Ernst Köstring,
32 quoted in Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 45.
49. Fleischhauer, Der
Pakt, 176-183. Fleischhauer argues that much of the
impetus for the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the behind-the-scenes maneuvering
that resulted in the prospect being brought to Hitler’s attention came from
senior diplomats in the German Foreign Ministry like Ambassador Schulenberg,
Karl Schnurre, and Gustav Hilger—the Ostpolitik faction who believed A
partnership in the East best guaranteed german
security.
50. No. 5, BZDS, 5;
No. 332, DGFP, D: VI, 429.
51. No. 5, BZDS, 5–6.
52. “Memorandum by
the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg),” 20 May 1939, NSR,5.
53. “Zapis’ besedy narodnogo
komissara inostrannykh del
SSSR B. M. Molotova s poslom Germanii v SSSR F. Shulenburgom” [Record of a Conversation between the
People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov and the Ambassador of
Germany F. Schulenberg], 20 May 1939, God krizisa,
Tom I, 482–483.
54. “The German
Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the State Secretary in the
German Foreign Office (Weizsäcker),” 5 June 1939, NSR, 18.
55. Ericson, Feeding
the German Eagle, 46.
56. “Foreign Office
Memorandum (Woermann),” 15 June 1939, NSR, 20.
57. Ericson, Feeding
the German Eagle, 46–47
58. “The German
Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office,” 3
July 1939, NSR, 28.
59. Ericson, Feeding
the German Eagle, 49.
60. Ibid., 49.
61. Ibid., 54.
62. Watt, How War
Came, 426–428, 480.
63. Ibid., 231.
64. “The German
Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenberg) to the German Foreign Office,” 4
August 1939, NSR, 39, quoted in Ericson, Feeding the German Eagle, 54.
65. Ericson, Feeding
the German Eagle, 57.
66. Robertson,
Hitler’s Pre-war Policy and Military Plans, 177.
67. Fest, Hitler,
585.
68. Moorhouse, The
Devils’ Alliance, 20–21.
69. Kotkin, Stalin:
Waiting for Hitler, 657.
70. Walter Duranty,
“The Enigma of Germany and Russia: The pact made by Hitler and Stalin explained
in terms of their personalities by a close observer of the Russian experiment
and the European scene,” New York Times, 3 September 1939, 1.
71. German diplomat
Johnnie von Herwarth wrote that there was “near unanimity amongst the Western
embassies in Moscow that summer that Stalin had a higher regard for the Germans
than for the other Western powers, and that he certainly trusted them more.”
Moorhouse, The Devils’ Alliance, 23.
72. Stalin made this
clear in a conversation with Georgi Dimitrov in September 1939: “A war is on
between two groups of capitalist countries (poor and rich as regards colonies,
raw materials, and so forth) for the redivision of the world, for the domination
of the world. We see nothing wrong in their having a good hard fight and
weakening each other. It would be fine if at the hands of Germany the position
of the richest capitalist countries (especially England) were shaken. Hitler,
without understanding it or desiring it, is shaking and undermining the
capitalist system. . . . We preferred agreements with the so-called democratic
countries and therefore conducted negotiations. But the English and French
wanted us for farmhands [v bastrakakh] and at no
cost! We, of course, would not go for being farmhands, still less for getting
nothing in return.” Georgi Dimitrov, The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933–1949,
ed. Ivo Banac (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2003), 115–116.
73. Kotkin, Stalin:
Waiting for Hitler, 673.
74. Moorhouse, The
Devils’ Alliance, 15.
75. Kotkin, Stalin:
Waiting for Hitler, 659.
76. “Zapis’ besedy narodnogo
komissara inostrannykh del
SSSR V. M. Molotova s poslom Germanii v SSSR F. Shulenburgom” [Record of the Conversation between the
People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov and the
Ambassador of Germany in the USSR F. Schulenberg,” 17 August 1939, in Dokumenty vneshnei politiki, 1939 god (hereafter DVP) [Foreign Policy
Documents, 1939] (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian
Federation, 1992), available digitally through Militera:
Voennaia literatura, 609.
77. BZDS, No. 33,
56–58, 57.
78. Memorandum by the
German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg), 16 August 1939, NSR, 53. “Pamiatnaia zapiska vruchennaia V. M. Molotovu F. Schulenbergom 15 avgusta 1939 g.”
[Aide-Memoire Given to Vyacheslav Molotov by F. Schulenberg on August 15,
1939], 15 August 1939, in God krizisa, Tom II,
232–233.
79. “Zapis’ besedy narodnogo
komissara inostrannykh del
SSSR B. M. Molotova s poslom Germanii v SSSR F Shulenburgom” [Record of a Conversation between the
People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov and the Ambassador of
Germany F. Schulenberg], 19 August 1939, in God krizisa,
Tom II, 274–278.
80. Cienciala, “The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939,” 207.
81. “The German
Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office,” 19
August 1939, NSR, 63–65.
82. Kotkin, Stalin:
Waiting for Hitler, 659.
83. “Foreign Office
Memorandum: The German-Soviet Trade Agreement,” 29 August 1939, NSR, 83–85. 84.
This was in addition to 420 million Reichsmarks of ongoing trade and
outstanding credit payments owed by the USSR.
85. Ericson, Feeding
the German Eagle, 61.
86. Geoffrey Roberts,
The Unholy Alliance: Stalin’s Pact with Hitler (London: I. B. Tauris, 1989),
176.
87. Cienciala, “The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939,” 209.
88. Moorhouse, The
Devils’ Alliance, 24; Kotkin, Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 661.
89. Kotkin, Stalin:
Waiting for Hitler, 660.
90. Hilger and Meyer,
The Incompatible Allies, 300; Kotkin, Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 662.
91. Ericson, Feeding
the German Eagle, 58.
92. Watt, How War
Came, 406–407.
93. Kotkin, Stalin:
Waiting for Hitler, 662; Watt, How War Came, 542.
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