By Eric Vandenbroeck
and co-workers
Preparing China For War
Recently China
warned of retaliation
if Taiwan’s president met a US House speaker during a visit and not to
allow Tsai Ing-wen to transit through the US, saying it would be a provocation,
and it should be added that Xi Jinping says that he is preparing for war. At the
annual meeting of China’s parliament and its top political advisory body in
March, Xi wove the theme of war readiness through four separate speeches, in
one instance telling his generals to dare to fight. His government also
announced a 7.2
percent increase in China’s defense budget, which has doubled over the last
decade, and plans to make the country less dependent on foreign grain imports.
And in recent months, Beijing has unveiled new military readiness laws, new
air-raid shelters in cities across the strait from Taiwan, and new “National
Defense Mobilization” offices countrywide.
It is too early to
say for sure what these developments mean. Conflict is not certain or imminent.
But something has changed in Beijing that
policymakers and business leaders worldwide cannot afford to ignore. If Xi says
he is readying for war, it would be foolish not to take him at his word.
Weeping Ghosts, Quaking Enemies
The first sign that
this year’s meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference—might not be business as usual came on March
1, when the top theoretical journal of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
published an essay titled Under the Guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on
Strengthening the Army, We Will Advance Victoriously. The essay appeared under the name “Jun Zheng”—a homonym for “military government” that possibly refers
to China’s top military body, the Central Military Commission—and argued that
“the modernization of national defense and the military must be accelerated.” It also called for an intensification of
Military-Civil Fusion, Xi’s policy requiring private companies and civilian
institutions to serve China’s military modernization effort. And riffing off
Xi's speech to Chinese military leaders
in October 2022.
It is too early to
say for sure what these developments mean. Conflict is not inevitable or
imminent. But something has changed in Beijing that policymakers and business
leaders worldwide cannot afford to ignore. If Xi says he is readying for war,
it would be foolish not to take him at his word.
Even before the
essay’s publication, there were indications that Chinese leaders could be
planning for a possible conflict. In December, Beijing promulgated a new law
enabling the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to more easily activate its reserve
forces and institutionalize a system for replenishing combat troops during the
war. As the analysts Lyle Goldstein and Nathan Waechter have noted, such measures suggest that Xi may have
learned about military mobilization from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s
failures in Ukraine.
The law governing
military reservists is not the only change that hints at Beijing’s
preparations. In February, the top
deliberative body of the National People’s Congress adopted the Decision on
Adjusting the Application of Certain Provisions of the [Chinese] Criminal
Procedure Law to the Military During Wartime, which, according to the
state-run People’s Daily, gives the Central Military
Commission the power to adjust legal provisions, including “jurisdiction, defense and representation, compulsory measures, case
filings, investigation, prosecution, trial, and the implementation of
sentences.” Although it is
impossible to predict how the decision will be used, it could become a
weapon to target individuals who oppose a
takeover of Taiwan. The PLA might also use it to claim legal jurisdiction over
a potentially occupied territory like Taiwan. Or Beijing could use it to compel
Chinese citizens to support its decisions during wartime.
Since December, the
Chinese government has also opened several National Defense
Mobilization offices—or recruitment centers—across
the country, including in Beijing, Fujian, Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia,
Shandong, Shanghai, Sichuan, Tibet, and Wuhan. At the same time, cities in
Fujian Province, across the strait from Taiwan, have begun building or
upgrading air-raid shelters and at least one “wartime emergency hospital,”
according to Chinese state media. In March, Fujian and several cities in the
province began preventing overseas IP addresses from accessing government
websites, possibly to impede tracking of China’s preparations for war.
Xi’s Inner Vlad
If these developments
hint at a shift in Beijing’s thinking, among the proposals discussed by the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference—the advisory body—was a plan
to create a blacklist of pro-independence activists and political leaders in
Taiwan. Tabled by the popular ultranationalist blogger Zhou Xiaoping, the plan
would authorize the assassination of blacklisted individuals—including Taiwan’s
vice president, William Lai Ching-te—if they did not
reform their ways. Zhou later told the Hong Kong newspaper Ming Pao that
his proposal had been accepted by the conference and “relayed to relevant
authorities for evaluation and consideration.” Proposals like Zhou’s do not
come by accident. In 2014, Xi praised Zhou for the “positive energy” of his
jeremiads against Taiwan and the United States.
Also, at the
two-sessions meetings, outgoing Premier Li Keqiang announced a military
budget of 1.55 trillion yuan (roughly $224.8 billion) for 2023, a 7.2 percent
increase from last year. Li, too, called for heightened “preparations for war.”
Western experts have long believed that China underreports its defense expenditures. In 2021, for instance, Beijing
claimed it spent $209 billion on defense, but the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute put the figure at $293.4
billion. Even the official Chinese figure exceeds the military spending of all
the Pacific treaty allies of the United States (Australia, Japan, the
Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand). It is a safe bet China is spending
substantially more than it says.
But the most telling
moments of the two-sessions meetings, perhaps unsurprisingly, involved Xi
himself. The Chinese leader gave four speeches—one to delegates of
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, two to the
National People’s Congress, and one to military and paramilitary leaders. In
them, he described a bleak geopolitical landscape, singled out the United
States as China’s adversary, exhorted private businesses to serve China’s
military and strategic aims, and reiterated that he sees uniting Taiwan and the mainland as vital to the
success of his signature policy to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the
Chinese ethnos.”
In his first speech
on March 6, Xi appeared to be girding China’s industrial base for struggle and
conflict. “In the coming period, the risks and challenges we face will
only increase and become more severe,” he warned. “Only when all the
people think in one place, work hard in one place, help each other in the
same boat, unite as one, dare to fight, and be good at fighting, can they
continue to win new and greater victories.” To help the CCP achieve these
“greater victories,” he vowed to “correctly guide” private businesses to
invest in projects that the state has prioritized.
Xi also blasted the
United States in his speech, breaking his practice of not naming Washington as
an adversary except in historical contexts. He described the United States and
its allies as leading causes of China’s current problems. “Western countries
headed by the United States have implemented containment from all directions,
encirclement, and suppression against us, which has brought unprecedented
severe challenges to our country’s development,” he said.. In contrast, U.S.
President Joe Biden’s administration has emphasized “guardrails” and other
means of slowing the deterioration of U.S.-China relations, Beijing is
preparing for a new, more confrontational era.
On 5 March, Xi gave a
second speech laying out a vision of Chinese self-sufficiency that went
considerably further than any previous discussions, saying China’s march to
modernization is contingent on breaking technological dependency on foreign
economies—meaning the United States and other industrialized democracies. Xi
also said that he wants China to end its reliance on grain and
manufactured goods imports. “In case we’re short of either, the international
market will not protect us,” Xi declared. Li, the outgoing premier, emphasized
the same point in his annual government “work report” on the same day, saying
Beijing must “unremittingly keep the rice bowls of more than 1.4 billion
Chinese people firmly in their own hands.” China currently depends on imports
for over a third of its net food consumption.
In his third speech,
on 8 March, to representatives from the PLA and the People’s Armed Police, Xi
declared that China must focus its innovation efforts on bolstering national defense and establishing a network of national reserve
forces that could be tapped in wartime. Xi also called for a “National Defense Education” campaign to unite society behind the
PLA, invoking as inspiration the Double Support Movement, a 1943 campaign
by the Communists to militarize society in their base area of Yan’an.
In his fourth speech
(and his first as a third-term president), on March 13, Xi announced
that the “essence” of his great rejuvenation campaign was “the
unification of the motherland.” Although he has hinted at the connection
between absorbing Taiwan and his much-vaunted campaign to make China great
again essentially, he has rarely, if ever, done so with such clarity.
Taking Xi Seriously
One thing that is
clear a decade into Xi’s rule is that it is essential to take him seriously—something that many U.S. analysts
regrettably do not do. When Xi launched a series of aggressive campaigns
against corruption, private enterprise, financial institutions, and the
property and tech sectors, many analysts predicted that these campaigns would
be short-lived. But they endured. The same was true of Xi’s draconian Zero
COVID policy for three years—until he was uncharacteristically forced to
reverse course in late 2022.
President
Xi Jinping is intensifying a decadelong campaign to break critical
economic and technological dependencies on the U.S.-led democratic world. He is
doing so in anticipation of a new phase of ideological and geostrategic
“struggle,” as he puts it. His messaging about war preparation and his equating
national rejuvenation with unification mark a new
phase in his political warfare campaign to intimidate Taiwan. He is willing to
use force to take the island. What remains unclear is whether he thinks he can
do so without risking uncontrolled escalation with the United States.
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