By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
What makes
out Putin’s Russia
While the Polish president says talking to Putin is like negotiating
with Hitler, a more revealing issue was when Putin on
Thursday compared himself to Peter the Great, drawing parallels with
the tsar who waged war on Sweden and said the campaign in Ukraine stems from
Russia’s ‘fundamental values while drawing parallels between Peter’s
founding of St. Petersburg and his own government’s annexation of
territory saying: We will undoubtedly succeed in solving the tasks that we
face. Putin says Russia aims to acquire new territories. More revealing
because this is a pattern that goes back many years.
For example, after a ceremony commemorating the 1,030th
anniversary of Russia’s conversion to Christianity when he was in Saint
Petersburg, he celebrated Navy Day with an impressive military parade. He
complimented Russia’s powerful fleet that “defends the Motherland.” He did so
standing in front of the statue of Peter the Great.
Peter the Great, however, is known for strengthening Russia by throwing
it open to the outside world and inviting European experts to help build and
modernize it. He is said to have opened a “window on Europe,”
while Putin has deeply
alienated nations to the West and united Ukrainians
against Russia by launching a war that isolates his country and harms its
economy, with potentially massive long-term consequences.“Putin’s
Ukraine invasion, many Russians fear, has slammed that
window shut,” a news article in The New York Times said.
In a new era of strongmen, Vladimir Putin stands out as one of the
strongest. During his time in power, Russia has reasserted itself on the world
stage, a remarkable feat for a country that experienced such rapid decline in
the 1990s, only to accomplish an unexpected resurgence after Putin entered the
Kremlin. He has made it his mission to relitigate the end of the Cold War and
renegotiate its terms. As he embarked on his fourth term, Russia’s relations
with the West were the worst they had been since the last years of the Brezhnev
period in the early 1980s, with an escalating arms race and mutual ideological
invective. Thirty-five years ago, a succession of aging, infirm Soviet leaders
faced Ronald Reagan, a self-confident US president who denounced their country
as an “evil empire.” Today, the mutual mistrust, rhetorical invective, and
steady military buildup are strongly reminiscent of the Cold War, as is the
dissonance between the way America and Russia see each other.
But Cold War 2.0 is different. There is no universal ideological
competition between the West and Russia. Russia’s ideological appeal is to
“compatriots” in the post-Soviet space, to left-and right-wing populists in the
West, and to a diverse group of countries and people worldwide who dislike the
United States. The United States is much stronger militarily than Russia, and
it viewed Moscow more as a regional than a global strategic competitor.
However, Russia believes it has recently become a greater global competitor to
the United States, thanks to Putin’s accomplishments. Moreover, unlike the
USSR, Russia is integrated into the global economy, which gives it leverage the
Soviets never had. It also gives it vulnerabilities.
This is no longer a bipolar world, for China has emerged as the key
rising power that holds many big global cards. And there is another difference.
During the Cold War, the USSR and the West engaged each other through
established political and military government-to-government channels with game
rules that they both accepted. In the system of personalized rule that Putin
has created, these channels are moribund or primarily gone, and there are fewer
avenues for communication and hence more opportunities for miscalculation and
consequential mistakes. So the West has returned to the familiar dual-track
Cold War prescriptions for dealing with an antagonistic Russia: deterrence and
engagement.
Viewed from the Kremlin, however, Putin has achieved his major
objectives. Russia has restored itself to its “rightful” place on the world
stage. It has, once again, joined the global board of directors. The world can
no longer ignore it. It is respected—and feared. Even as Russia’s relations
with the West deteriorate, the West must deal with it. At a major defense and
security conference in Moscow, the Chinese defense minister jolted his audience
when he vowed that China would come to Russia’s assistance if the West attacked
it. In 2018 China joined Russia in its massive Vostok military exercises.
Western commentators may describe Russia as a “pariah state” or a “mafia
state.” But Beijing, as we have seen, aligns with Moscow in international fora,
and much of the Middle East views Russia’s role in the region as that of a
pragmatic mediator and broker. In Central Asia, Russia is also recognized as a
great power with which to be reckoned.
As the West wrestles over how to deal with Putin, it is essential to
remember that in many parts of the world, Russia is viewed as a sizeable
authoritarian country ruled by a successful leader who is pursuing his
country’s legitimate national interests as he defines them. Moreover, much of
the world’s view of Russia is colored by how the world regards the United
States. In the unpredictable age of Donald Trump, Russia’s attractiveness has
grown for some countries. As this book has shown, going back to 2014, China has
upgraded Russia as a partner, taking advantage of the West’s attempts to
isolate Putin. It has also sought to recruit Russia to its version of a
post-West global order. Some of Russia’s neighbors, especially Ukraine, view
Russia as an antagonist. But Russia has created several functioning
multilateral institutions in the post-Soviet space, such as the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the
Eurasian Economic Union. Key Middle Eastern countries—Iran, Syria, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and Israel—look to Russia to support their interests in the
region, even though these countries are on opposite sides of ongoing conflicts
and, in some cases, are deadly enemies. And the West itself is fragmented; it
has no unified view of Russia as a hostile actor. For instance, after the
poisoning of former Russian double agent Sergei Skripal
and his daughter in Great Britain, the United States and more than two dozen
other countries supported England in expelling Russian diplomats suspected of
spying. But these were nearly all NATO or EU members, plus Australia and
Ukraine, and some EU members, such as Austria and Slovakia, refused to follow
suit. Under Putin, Russia’s former allies in the Warsaw Pact, notably Hungary,
Slovakia, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic, have moved closer to Moscow.
Vladimir Putin won his 2018 reelection by an unprecedented margin.
True, no credible opponents challenged him, and many reported voting
irregularities were reported. But it is undeniable that he remains popular,
particularly outside the major urban centers. The Kremlin controls virtually
all electronic media and skillfully uses television to persuade the population
of its narrative of world events. Many young people, who have known only Putin
as their president, support him. They believe that Russia needs a strong leader
and, like so many generations of Russians before them, are willing to give him
the authority to make decisions for them. During his election campaign, Putin
appealed to the people by warning them of the danger the United States and its
allies posed to Russia and by reminding them that he had restored Russia to
greatness. According to the respected Levada polling organization, many
Russians believe the annexation of Crimea forced the West to respect Russia,
and more than 70 percent say that Russia has achieved superpower status. Russia
now can project power well beyond its neighborhood and is venturing back into
Latin America, Africa, and other places from which it withdrew after the Soviet
collapse. Its return to Latin America has been particularly striking, focusing
on Cuba, Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela, where it continues to prop up
the failing Maduro regime both economically and militarily.1 Despite its
economic weakness, and an economy smaller than Italy’s (Russia’s $1.3 trillion
GDP as opposed to the United States’ $18.6 trillion, and per capita income in
2017 of $11,440 as compared to the US’s $ 53,528), its global influence is
spreading.2
What drives Putin
The core driver of Putin is the quest to get the West to treat Russia
as if it were the Soviet Union. A review of his words and actions suggests his
foreign policy has been shaped by seven key propositions—a sort of bill of
rights in Moscow’s view—for Russia on the international stage. These are all
designed to reverse the consequences of the Soviet collapse and renegotiate the
end of the Cold War: Firstly, he believes Russia has a right to a seat at the
table on all major international decisions and will insist on inclusion. The
West should recognize that Russia belongs to the global board of directors.
Second, Russia’s interests are as legitimate as those of the West, and it will
press for the US and Europe to acknowledge and accept this fact of life even if
they disagree with Russia.
Third, Russia has a right to a sphere of privileged interests in the
post-Soviet space. It defines its vital security perimeter not as the borders
of the Russian Federation but as the borders of the post-Soviet space. Russia
will work to ensure that its former Soviet neighbors do not join any alliances
deemed hostile to Russia. Hence, Moscow will seek to guarantee that no
Euro-Atlantic structures—primarily NATO and the EU—move any closer to Russia
than they already are because they threaten Russia’s vital interests.
Fourth, some states are more sovereign than others. Great powers like
Russia, China, India, and the United States enjoy absolute sovereignty, meaning
they are free to choose which alliances they join. Smaller countries, like
Ukraine or Georgia, are not fully sovereign, and Russia will insist that they
respect its wishes. Russia does not seek allies in the Western sense of the
word but mutually beneficial instrumental partnerships with countries, such as
China, that do not restrict Russia’s freedom to act or pass judgment on its
internal situation.
Fifth, Russia will continue to present itself as a supporter of the
status quo, an advocate of conservative values, and an international power
respecting established leaders. According to the Kremlin, the West promotes
chaos and regime change, as happened during the Arab Spring—without thinking
through the consequences of its actions. (Of course, in its sphere of
privileged interests, Russia can act as a revisionist power and upend the
status quo when it considers its interests threatened, as the annexation of
Crimea and the invasion of Georgia and Ukraine show.)
Sixth, Russia believes a fractured Western alliance best serves its
interests; hence it will continue to support anti-American and Euroskeptic groups in Europe and populist movements on both
sides of the Atlantic.
Finally, Russia will push to jettison the post–Cold War, liberal,
rules-based international order driven by the US and Europe in favor of a
post–West order. This order would resemble the nineteenth-century concert of
powers for Russia, with China, Russia, and the United States dividing the world
into spheres of influence.
Putin can take satisfaction that he has successfully achieved his
goals. After Ukraine, the West unsuccessfully sought to isolate Russia. But
Russia has deepening partnerships in various multilateral fora, such as BRICS
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and it works with China, India,
Pakistan, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey, and Iran. The list of fifty-eight
countries abstained in 2014 from condemning Russia for its annexation of Crimea
in the UN General Assembly reveals that a variety of countries—both democratic and
nondemocratic—do not want to antagonize Russia or impose sanctions on it.
Yet, in reality, Putin’s foreign policy record is decidedly mixed. His
clashes with the West—caused by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, its
support of a military campaign in Syria that ignores the humanitarian
catastrophe there, its ongoing election interference in the US and Europe, and
the poisonings in the UK—came at a high cost and have further alienated the US
and Europe. Moreover, the Ukrainian intervention has created a situation where
there is no obvious way out for Russia short of a total withdrawal, which Putin
has refused to contemplate so far. And despite formally leading two of
Eurasia’s major multilateral organizations—the CSTO and EEU—Russia does not
have real allies as the concept is understood in the West. Partners from China
to Belarus may support Russia in the United Nations and other fora, but, as
this book has shown, these partnerships are wary and partial. There are no
countries with which Russia is allied where the partnership involves a set of
shared values and a commitment to a common strategy in the way NATO or the EU
do. Russia’s partnerships are ad hoc and largely instrumental with limited
common interests. Perhaps this is what Putin prefers, but the result is a
Russia that operates in its orbit, largely depending on its resources, while
seeking to exploit and benefit from the existing divisions within the West. And
despite talk of a post-West order and the current global turmoil, there are few
signs that anything resembling a new order is emerging.
Moreover, it is important to distinguish between appearances and
reality in Russian foreign policy. For instance, despite the impressive show of
military might in the 2018 Vostok military exercises with China, observers
questioned what these troops and tanks were doing. Putin wanted the world to
see the 300,000 troops and 36,000 armored vehicles on display and to raise
concerns in the West, but the results of their maneuvers may have been less
consequential than initial appearances might suggest. Similarly, leaders from
the Middle East and elsewhere may travel to Russia and sign memoranda of
understanding for multibillion-dollar projects. Still, it is unclear how many
of these MOUs will be implemented. Putin’s world is designed to project an
external image of military might, forward movement, and economic dynamism. But
the reality may well be different. The extravagant rhetoric and external shows
of strength in Putin’s world mask severe domestic weaknesses.
Domestic realities in
Putin’s Russia
Foreign policy successes may have helped him win reelection. Still, the
domestic reality of Putin’s world is rather different, given the state of the
economy, demographic decline, and questions about succession. In nearly two
decades in power, Putin has successfully crafted an economic system whose main
accomplishment has been preserving state power and authority and its projection
abroad. From 2000 to 2008, when oil prices rose from $25 to as high as $147 a
barrel, GDP grew at an average of 7 percent per year, and individual household
incomes also rose after the doldrums of the late 1990s. Putin was a beneficiary
of rising oil prices. The 2008 financial crisis hit Russia hard, but GDP growth
recovered—until 2014. Since the onset of the Ukraine crisis, GDP growth has
been sluggish, below 2 percent.
However, Putin’s economic system may prove inadequate for Russia
seeking to strengthen its international role. Although its economy recovered
from the combined blows of falling oil prices and Western financial sanctions
in 2014, Russia remains largely dependent on its revenues from oil and gas,
which constitute 50 percent of its national budget. Putin has yet to implement
economic reforms—from raising the retirement age to diversifying the economy
away from oil and gas, supporting small and medium-sized businesses, and
modernizing the economy. These reforms have been recommended to him by a
succession of advisers since the early 2000s, most notably by the former
finance minister Alexei Kudrin. It is unclear whether
he will introduce these reforms in his fourth term. In 2005, Putin abandoned
pension reform when senior citizens took to the streets to protest. In 2018 he
also modified his subsequent attempt to raise the retirement age after
protests. Still, he did raise it to age 60 for women and age 65 for men—in a
country where the average male life expectancy is 66.5 years and female life
expectancy 77.5. Economic reform could adversely affect the vested interests of
many people and groups who support Putin in the patrimonial rent-seeking system
that prevails in Russia. If there is no far-reaching structural modernizing
reform, Russia will increasingly lag behind many of its neighbors, including
China. The Russian economy can and will continue to muddle through. Still,
without all of the effective institutions of a modern state, and given the
pervasiveness of corruption from the top to the bottom of society, Putin’s
Russia will perpetuate the historical pattern of projecting military might as
the major source of its power and influence. At the same time, it remains
economically far behind many of its competitors.
The United States’ April 2018 sanctions against twenty-four businessmen
and officials close to Putin and twelve businesses haD
adversely affected the billionaires’ domestic and international holdings. But
the sanctions will, if anything, make them more dependent on the Kremlin’s
largesse, and their companies are more likely to be bailed out by the Kremlin
and de facto nationalized. Western sanctions may impose penalties but also
strengthen Putin’s ability to increase state control over the economy.
Demographics are another major challenge. Despite a mini baby boom in
recent years, the Russian population is declining, and life expectancy lags
behind most industrialized countries. The figures for mortality among young men
aged eighteen to thirty are particularly striking: they resemble those of
sub-Saharan Africa rather than those of advanced industrial countries. This has
significant implications for the future workforce and military recruitment.
However, while the Slavic birthrate is falling, Russia’s Muslim population
continues to enjoy high birth rates, and by 2020 Muslims will constitute
one-fifth of the population of the Russian Federation, potentially challenging
the tenuous ethnic peace that Putin has promoted.6 Many of the best and
brightest young people have emigrated, and the brain drain shows no signs of
abating. Moreover, a combination of neglect and systemic corruption has left
Russia with a decaying physical infrastructure that requires concerted
attention. The question is whether Putin will continue to replicate the pattern
of the late Brezhnev era: domestic stagnation because reform is considered too
destabilizing politically, combined with foreign policy activism that appeals
to the population’s patriotism and renewed nationalism that antagonizes the
West.
A key question for the future is succession. According to the Russian
constitution, this is Putin’s last term in office, and he is obliged to step
down in 2024; he will have been in power for one year less than was Stalin.
Historically, several models for succession exist in a millennium of Russian
history. The most common succession mechanism in the tsarist and Soviet times
was death by natural causes. There were also several instances of death by
unnatural causes when tsars were assassinated. Rulers have also been overthrown
in palace coups, in both the tsarist and Soviet times, when Khrushchev was
ousted by his erstwhile comrades. Rulers have been overthrown by popular
revolutions, too, as in 1917. In the post-Soviet era, there have been only two
managed transitions: when Boris Yeltsin chose Putin to succeed him and when
Putin picked Medvedev—in the latter case, only to switch places with him four
years later and return to the Kremlin.
On 20 September 2021, one Moscow pensioner, who gave his name only as
Anatoly, told Reuters news agency he voted for the ruling party as he
appreciated Putin’s efforts to restore Russia’s influence on the world stage.”
Countries like the United States and Britain more or less respect us now like
they respected the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 70s. The Anglo-Saxons only
understand the language of force,” he said. But with official turnout
reported to be about 52%, there were signs of widespread indifference.” I
don’t see the point in voting,” said one Moscow hairdresser named Irina. “It’s
all been decided for us anyway, see: “Russia election: Putin’s party wins
election marred by fraud claims.
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