By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
After years of
promoting globalization and free trade agreements, in the past decade, U.S. policymakers
have coalesced around an economic agenda that emphasizes industrial policy and
supply chain security. This pivot was in large part a reaction to the downsides
of economic interdependence. Although the overall economic benefits of
globalization are undisputed, they have been unevenly distributed. In many
parts of the United States, unfettered international trade brought a decline of
domestic industry and the loss of well-paid manufacturing jobs. Entire regions,
especially rural and predominantly industrial ones, were left behind. The
supply chain issues that emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic further
highlighted the dangers of interdependence. As a result, both Republicans and
Democrats have turned to industrial policy and trade restrictions to create
more domestic manufacturing jobs and reduce the United States’ reliance on
other countries.
But U.S. policymakers
risk overcorrecting. By adopting a narrow focus on economic security, they
could miss opportunities to court countries in the global South that want
economic relationships with the United States. And with great-power competition
heating up, now is not the time to look further inward. Instead, the United
States needs to seek out ways to reinforce its existing relationships and build
new ones in regions of strategic importance.
The Trump
administration needs a policy that can balance both economic and geostrategic
objectives. It must initiate a process of “reglobalization,”
investing in industries that support U.S. supply chains in countries in the
global South. Such measures are not the broad, often unpopular, and sometimes
harmful free trade agreements of past U.S. administrations. They are targeted
foreign investments that ultimately boost domestic manufacturing of high-end
products. By adopting this approach, the new administration could both
reindustrialize the United States and strengthen the web of partnerships it
needs to compete with China, Russia, and other strategic rivals.
Losing Ground
A global power shift
has changed the terms of U.S. alliances. The post–Cold War unipolar world,
dominated by the United States, is becoming a multipolar one. No longer do
countries naturally gravitate into Washington’s sphere of influence. Many
countries, especially in the global South, are increasingly comfortable
engaging with several major powers simultaneously. Vietnam, for instance, is a
U.S. partner that also maintains close ties with both China and Russia. India
is a member of the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue)—a grouping that
includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—and is considered by
Washington to be a strategic partner in countering Chinese influence in Asia.
But India also works closely with Russia, including by purchasing discounted
Russian oil and thus indirectly funding Moscow’s war in Ukraine. Turkey is a
U.S. treaty ally as a fellow member of NATO, but it also signed a deal in 2018
to purchase a Russian antimissile defense system and more recently requested to
join BRICS, the group whose early members included Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa.
The United States and
its closest allies, collectively, no longer represent the world’s largest
economic bloc. The newly expanded BRICS, which now boasts ten members (the most
recent additions are Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates),
account for more than a third of global GDP, surpassing the share of the G-7,
which includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. And as other countries build international partnerships,
they are driven not by a sense of shared values but by economic benefits. Many
African countries, for instance, have recently increased their economic ties
not only to China through its Belt and Road Initiative but also to Russia,
Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, which have made investments in ports,
clean energy, mining, and more.
The United States,
meanwhile, has increasingly turned its attention to domestic priorities.
Washington is focused on revitalizing former manufacturing hubs and building
capacity at home. There is bipartisan agreement on the need to create new
manufacturing jobs, especially in parts of the country most affected by
deindustrialization and production offshoring. In 2022, the U.S. Congress
passed the CHIPS and Science Act, which allocates more than $58 billion to
boost domestic production of computer chips and semiconductors, with broad
support from both parties.
The Port of Oakland in Oakland, California, January
2025
Washington is not
about to expand its foreign economic engagement with new free trade agreements,
either. Neither party has an appetite for such deals, as demonstrated by strong
bipartisan objection to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which led to the U.S.
withdrawal from the 12-country agreement in 2017, and stalled negotiations with
the EU in 2016 over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.
President Donald Trump, after renegotiating the North American Free Trade
Agreement in his first term, has suggested he might impose 25 percent tariffs
on goods from Canada and Mexico ahead of the planned review of NAFTA’s
successor, the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, next year. Tariffs have become a
mainstay of U.S. policy, used to protect domestic industries from unfair
competition, primarily from China, and to ensure that products vital for U.S.
national security are produced domestically. President Joe Biden maintained
many of the tariffs on Chinese goods that Trump put in place in his first term,
and Biden imposed new import restrictions on Chinese electric vehicles and
other green technologies.
If Washington
continues to train its focus inward, however, it could jeopardize its ability
to build relationships with countries in the global South that could help the
United States advance other strategic aims. The same countries are already
growing wary of aligning with Washington. The United States’ recent foreign
policy missteps and the perception of double standards in its divergent
responses to the wars and human suffering in Ukraine and Gaza have damaged the
country’s reputation. Many countries have started to look more favorably toward
other global and emerging powers, such as China, Russia, or the United Arab
Emirates, as a result. With its diminished economic and cultural appeal
hampering its ability to forge new partnerships, the United States risks
allowing its adversaries to deepen their ties to nonaligned countries in ways
that harm U.S. interests.
The consequences are
already visible in Africa, where China in particular has made significant
inroads. Under its Belt and Road Initiative, China has offered loans to and
invested substantial sums in infrastructure projects in countries such as
Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and
Zimbabwe. Beijing has gained access to ports and natural resources in return.
Mining projects in Congo, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere have helped China secure
control of almost 90 percent of the global processing of rare earths, which are
needed to manufacture computer chips, semiconductors, and batteries. Although
African-sourced critical minerals still only account for a moderate proportion
of global production, the industry has huge potential. By neglecting to invest
in its development, the United States and its allies could miss an opportunity
to reduce their dependence on China for access to these resources.
China has similarly
expanded its economic influence in Latin America. Through its infrastructure
investments, such as a mega port in Peru and a hydroelectric plant in Ecuador,
Beijing is now the region’s second-largest trading partner after the United States.
And its influence is not always benign: in March 2023, China pressured Honduras
to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan in exchange for economic aid. Beijing
has begun to extend its involvement in the region beyond economic ventures,
too. In Argentina, for instance, China operates a deep space station that has
raised concerns among U.S. defense officials about the possibility it could be
used to track U.S. satellites.
Targeted Approach
The Trump
administration needs updated strategies to effectively compete with China for
influence among nonaligned countries. Building relationships in Africa and
Latin America is important not only to secure U.S. access to critical resources
but also to increase the number of countries that are willing to help the
United States advance its interests. And in the Indo-Pacific region, Washington
must create new partnerships beyond its established alliances with Japan, the
Philippines, and South Korea to curtail China’s rising economic and military
influence.
But to forge those
partnerships—as well as strengthen existing ones—the United States must offer
economic benefits. As former United States Agency for International Development
Administrator Samantha Power said at an event at the Council on Foreign Relations
in December, “No matter where I go, no matter what continent, no matter what
community even, the message is the same: we want trade, not aid.” The
United States therefore needs to ensure that its focus on boosting domestic
manufacturing of high-end products does not lead to a wholesale rejection of
new foreign economic partnerships. Such partnerships can be mutually
beneficial. By investing in industries abroad that can provide inputs for U.S.
manufacturing, Washington can both strengthen its supply chains and deepen its
ties to pivotal countries in the global South.
The new Trump team
should start by identifying the alliances it should strengthen and the
countries it should build new relationships with within Africa, Latin America,
and the Indo-Pacific region. In Africa and Latin America, this could include
countries that are rich in the natural resources used in battery or
semiconductor production, such as Chile and Zimbabwe, or are in strategically
important locations, such as Djibouti due to its access to the Red Sea. In the
Indo-Pacific, the United States should prioritize deepening its partnerships
with countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and others where it competes with
China for economic influence, as well as with Pacific Island nations whose
military cooperation could prove useful to Washington in the event of a
conflict with Beijing over Taiwan or in the South China Sea.
Next, the
administration should work with U.S. business leaders in critical domestic
industries, such as semiconductor manufacturing and car production, to
determine the raw or processed materials that can be sourced from priority
countries. The U.S. government should then invest in these countries to improve
infrastructure and build up industries that can feed directly into U.S. supply
chains. The Biden administration’s recent investment in a railway project in
Angola followed this logic: the route connects Angola with the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Zambia, facilitating the production of critical
minerals used in batteries. But Washington should be making far more of these
strategic investments. In Chile, for example, the United States can invest in
the copper industry, which is vital for semiconductor manufacturing. It can
finance mining projects in Indonesia, which has large reserves of nickel, a
mineral used to produce batteries for electric vehicles and other green
technologies. In Vietnam, the United States can invest in electronic
manufacturing to diversify its supply chains in this sector away from China and
Taiwan.
Additionally, the
United States can leverage its influence in international financial
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to
facilitate lending and investment in U.S. partner countries in the global
South. The United States is the largest shareholder of the World Bank Group,
and together with its closest allies, such as Germany, Japan, and the United
Kingdom, it has an outsized influence when it comes to making policy changes
and approving financial assistance packages. Washington could thus push for
measures that increase the foreign investment and economic aid to its new or
existing partners in the global South, adding to initial U.S. investments and
boosting these countries’ long-term economic development. Other U.S. allies,
including Japan, South Korea, and European countries, could also benefit from
better access to new markets.
This approach is more
targeted than the United States’ traditional economic aid, which has primarily
focused on grants, humanitarian assistance, and trade programs. It does not
just provide economic benefits to U.S. partners in the global South but also
meets the United States’ economic and national security needs. With a
commitment to reglobalization, and carefully crafting
trade and investment packages to build relationships with critical countries,
Washington can strengthen its domestic industries, protect its supply chains, and
enhance the partnerships it needs to advance other national security and
geostrategic interests—all at once.
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